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Abstract 
Local Content is an oil sector governance and sustainability policy that aims at 
check-mating the dominance of the foreign oil companies in host countries, and 
encouraging the participation of the local oil firms in the petroleum value-chain. 
It is a burgeoning concept applied in the upstream petroleum contracts in the 
developing petro states. This study was conducted to examine the local content 
accounting, accountability and governance of the Nigerian Content 
Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB) and the five major International 
Oil Companies (IOCs) operating in Nigeria (Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Total 
and Agip). The soft and hard accountability of the two principal actors were 
determined. The work drew on the Chatham House Guidelines for Good 
Governance in Emerging Oil and Gas Producers (2013) to derive its conceptual 
and analytical models. The study used the convergent parallel design and a 
combination of the three accounting paradigms to draw its conclusions. 
Thematic analysis, descriptive and inferential statistics including the post hoc 
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests with Bonferroni Corrected Alpha, and 
the logistic regression tests were used. The study also applied the mechanistic 
content analysis methodology on fifty sustainability reports of the selected IOCs 
in line with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the International 
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) 
sustainability reporting guidelines. Disclosure index and paired-samples t-test 
were used to determine the existence and trends in the IOCs’ local content 
disclosure practices before and after the enactment of the Nigeria’s local 
content law. The study found the local content policy to be an accountability-
based sustainability driver in the Nigerian petroleum sector. Although the 
NCDMB’s performance was favourable to a large extent, the study found that 
corruption, fronting, and non-disclosure of the beneficial ownership of some oil 
firms remained the major challenges of local content in Nigeria. An expectation 
gap between the Board and the stakeholders on the financial accountability was 
established. The study found moderate and consistent local content disclosure 
indices of the periods before and after the Nigeria’s local content law, but 
higher volumetric disclosure in the period after the law, signifying likely impact 
of the local content law on the IOC’s voluntary disclosure. It was recommended 
that the Board should tighten up its regulatory responsibilities and avoid 
questionable practices. It was also suggested that the Nigerian local content 
rules should incorporate more incentives such as unringfencing and cross-
fencing of upstream costs to encourage more investment. The study also 
suggested that the accounting standard-setting bodies should issue dedicated 
accounting standards or expand the existing IFRS 8 and IAS 21 to 
comprehensively address the preparation and presentation of local content 
information in the annual financial statements. 
Key Words: accountability, sustainability, accounting, governance, local content, 
petroleum contracts, IFRS, IAS, mandatory and voluntary reporting, GRI/IPIECA   
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the accounting, accountability and governance 
practices of the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
(hereafter, the NCDMB) and the International Oil and Gas Companies 
(hereafter, the IOCs) in the implementation of, and compliance with, local 
content sustainability rules in petroleum contracts in Nigeria. The aim is to 
apply an accountability-based conceptual framework of accounting 1  to 
address three major accountability issues within the context of the broader 
natural resource governance practices. Firstly, to critically establish, within 
the context of the Nigerian oil and gas industry, the relationship between 
local content and the three tenets of sustainability (social, economic and 
environmental), the issue that has received relatively little attention from 
scholars. Secondly, to evaluate the extent of the NCDMB’s accountability by 
assessing its ability to enforce compliance with the local content 
sustainability rules as provided by the law. Finally, to investigate the extent 
of accountability of the IOCs operating in Nigeria by their ability to comply 
with and align the mandatory and the voluntary local content reporting 
practices in their attempt to support sustainability through oil and gas 
contracts.  
 
Historically, the Nigerian oil and gas sector like that of many other 
developing countries has been dominated by the powerful IOCs. This results 
in a massive outflow of resources for the payment of training and 
procurement and remuneration of expatriates (Karl, 1997; Nwosu et al., 
2006; Ihua, et al., 2009; Atsegbua, 2012). In 2000, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) confirmed that the indigenous oil and gas 
firms had benefited with as little as 5% of the estimated annual contract 
values of between $10bn and $12bn (Mohammed, 2009; Nwaokoro, 2011). 
                                                          
1 Two major accounting frameworks were identified in the literature, and they are Decision-based (or decision 
usefulness) and Accountability-based frameworks (see Ijiri, 1983). Although the accountability-based is the chosen 
framework for this study both frameworks will be discussed in detail in chapter five. 
2 
 
This fact was supported by Frynas and Paolo (2007) who asserted that over 
95% of the country’s petroleum production was provided by only five IOCs 
– Agip, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total.2 Apart from the capital and 
technological strength of the IOCs, this may also be connected to the 
alleged connivance of the IOCs and the Nigerian officials. For instance, it 
was found that between 1995 and 2004 Halliburton had paid the Nigerian 
officials a $180 million bribe to secure an LNG contract (George and Lacey, 
2006). From the discovery of oil in 1956 to 2006, it was estimated that the 
value of the Nigeria’s capital flight had amounted to $380 billion with about 
a 2 million estimated losses in job opportunities (Abdulwahed, 2014). This 
trend is similar in many other oil-producing developing countries and proves 
that natural resources can be a curse and not a blessing (Auty, 1994; Ross, 
1999).  
 
To reverse this trend, the local content policy was adopted in Nigeria and 
elsewhere to boost the participation of indigenous companies in various 
contracts along the petroleum value chain. This includes oil licensing, 
exploration, drilling, production and other oil-related activities such as the 
financial, insurance and legal services. Many oil-producing countries 
including Nigeria, have adopted the local content as a sustainability policy 
that ensures the flow of benefit from the petroleum sector to compensate 
for the negative social, economic and environmental consequences of oil 
and gas extraction. Sustainability, in particular, has been extensively 
studied by accounting scholars, but with exclusive emphasis on 
environmental reporting (e.g., Schaltegger and Burritt, 2010; Ngwakwe, 
2012; Accounting, Organizations and Society Editorial, 2014). These studies 
have failed to consider the contemporary sustainability policies such as the 
local content, and the complex accountability and governance practices of 
the two major accountors (regulators and the IOCs). This study attempts to 
fill this gap. 
 
                                                          
2 These companies were alleged to have not only dominated the industry and marginalized the indigenous firms but 
also engage in various environmental violations through gas flaring, oil spillage and communal conflicts without 
adequate compensation to the neighbouring communities.  
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Local content in the petroleum contracts is measured as the proportion of 
the cost of materials and services directly or indirectly acquired by the 
concessionaire from the local sources, and the total cost of goods and 
services used for the entire petroleum project (KPMG, 2011). It is 
considered a sustainable development initiative which will benefit a country 
long after the depletion of oil and natural gas resources (Vosloo, 2005; 
Alba, 2009; Heller, 2011). Local content has become one of the principal 
components or parameters of oil contracts and license agreements in 
Nigeria and many of the petro-states (Tordo et al., 2009; Boykett et al., 
2012; Ravat and Kannan, 2013).  
 
Efforts to use local content to gain sustainable development had started in 
the United Kingdom in the 1970’s3. The period had witnessed the creation 
of the first local content monitoring agency by establishing the Offshore 
Supplies Office (OSO). The office was responsible for the auditing and 
reporting processes to track all transactions made by oil and gas companies 
to ensure that local labour, materials and equipment were used in their 
operations (Klueh et al., 2009; Wabote, 2011). Empirical evidence has 
shown that local content has been effectively applied in eliminating 
information asymmetry between the government and the IOCs, inducing 
local sourcing of materials, and engaging in component manufacturing 
licensing (UNCTAD, 2003). The policy, though not escaping scholars’ 
arguments and counter arguments, was viewed as a “springboard for 
sustainable economic transformation” Balouga (2012: 23) and “a promising 
way of promoting social and economic development” (Martini, 2014: 1) in 
oil-rich countries. These may include achieving improved health and safety 
standards, oil supply security, employment and training of local labour, 
resource conservation, and generation of return (Grayson, 1981; Bentham, 
1988 cited in Stevens, 2008). These benefits are not automatic (Andrews-
Speed, 2009 in Appiah-Adu and Sasraku, 2013); but only achieved through 
strong accountability and good governance of the natural resources sector 
(Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010; Chatham House, 2013) which Nigeria is lacking 
                                                          
3 Although the UK was considered to be the pioneer country that started to apply local content, countries such as 
Nigeria have already had one form of local content or the other in place. For example, the Nigeria’s Petroleum Act 
of 1964 had made requirements for employment and training of nationals in various management and supervisory 
positions. See Atsegbua (1999) and Okpe (2015). 
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(Watts, 2004; Usman, 2011; Abutudu and Garuba, 2011; Cash, 2012; 
Ushie, 2012; Okeke and Aniche, 2013). To justify the conduct of this study, 
the next section continues this line of argument and presents the study’s 
problem. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Justification for the Study 
     
It was argued that “poor nations of the 21st century would not be those 
that lack resources (human and material) ...., but those that cannot 
account for whatever resources they have”. Hence, “accountability would 
continue to remain fundamental to the construction of viable socio–political 
economy” (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2012: 361). Even the resource and 
material scarcity arises “primarily from failures of governance rather than 
from a physical shortage of resources or materials” (Andrews-Speed et al., 
2012: vii). Hence, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(hereafter the EITI) and many other international financial institutions have 
advocated that only greater accountability and transparency through 
disclosure of financial and non-financial transactions relating to petroleum 
contracts including investments in local content could cure the curse of oil 
resources (Klieman, 2012; Short, 2014).  
 
Nigeria, where “oil becomes a problem rather than a solution” (Kopinski et 
al., 2013: 583) due to accountability and governance failures among policy-
makers and the IOCs (George and Lacey, 2006; Usman, 2011), adopted the 
international best practice and created a local content oversight agency – 
the NCDMB. The agency is the responsible authority to administer, 
coordinate, monitor and supervise the implementation of the local content 
law – the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development (NOGICD) 
Act 2010. Similar to its international counterparts, the Board’s regulatory 
and governance functions have spanned across the five-point petroleum 
value chain (Alba, 2009) used by Gboyega et al. (2011) to discuss the 
political economy of the Nigeria petroleum sector. These functions will be 
clearly described in chapter four of this work. 
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Five years into the implementation of the policy, many successes have been 
recorded by the NCDMB including the attraction of over $500m foreign 
direct investment (FDI), the creation of thousands of new jobs and the full 
domiciliation of fabrication and construction activities. Moreover, about 87% 
of the total oil and gas contracts in the industry were claimed to have been 
won by indigenous oil companies (NCDMB, 2013; Africa Centre for Energy 
Policy, 2014). Other areas of achievement include the Nigerian content 
values said to have been captured through the Nigerian Content Compliance 
Certificate (NCCC) issued to operators/contractors. It was reported that 
during the periods 2010-2012 out of the $27.029bn contract values 
awarded $19.157bn were captured as Nigerian content. Furthermore, 
training expenditure of $110.8million with employment and training man-
hours of 4.84million hours were also retained as Nigerian content, signifying 
the extent of the Board’s ability to influence the domiciliation of oil and gas 
activities (NCDMB Annual Performance Report, 2012). The Board has also 
been strategizing to enhance the ownership, manning and maintenance of 
onshore and offshore drilling rigs as well as marine vessels by Nigerian oil 
companies. At present, many Nigerian firms are said to have owned marine 
vessels, oil rigs and some companies engaged in maintenance services 
through the Board’s Marine Vessels Ownership Strategy (MAVOS) and 
Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy (ORAS) (NCDMB, 2012, 2013).  
 
These purported achievements can only be possible through the 
cooperation claimed by the IOCs that operate in the Nigeria’s oil and gas 
industry. These results were described by Hufbauer et al. (2013) and other 
industry stakeholders as bogus and mere self-praising press releases. Many 
parties have raised several accountability and governance-related issues 
concerning the relationship between the Board and the IOCs. Initially, the 
standards and targets set out by the Board are in many ways considered 
unattainable and capable of creating a fertile ground for corruption or 
connivance which are critical to local content execution (Ovadia, 2014; 
Martini, 2014). In addition, with the controversial section of the NOGICD 
Act which gives the NCDMB the right to collect gift of money or property 
from individuals or corporate bodies, the Board’s independence is called into 
question (Nwaokoro, 2011; Hufbeur, 2013; Nwapi, 2015). In a likely 
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connivance of the Board and the oil companies, it was alleged that an IOC 
had executed a contract worth $8bn without owning any tangible assets in 
the country contrary to the mandatory 50% asset ownership requirement 
(The Will, 2013; Akpata, 2014).  
 
Concerning the award of oil blocks, licenses, contracts and the bidding 
processes, the Board had once been accused of unjustly excluding an 
indigenous company from a $3.8 billion FPSO project in favour of a foreign 
company (Rexler, 2010; Daily Trust, 2014). The Board was also said to be 
unable to deal with indigenous firms fronting for the IOCs and making the 
policy ineffective (Daily Trust, 2013). As such, it was reported that “over 70 
percent of contracts awarded to Nigerian companies are executed overseas” 
(Balouga, 2012: 24). This practice contradicts the Board’s earlier claim of 
retaining a large Nigerian content share. A group of local accounting firms 
were also reported to have instituted a legal action against the NCDMB and 
the NNPC for allegedly violating the tendering procedures to appoint 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers (hereafter, PwC) a foreign auditing firm, to 
conduct a forensic auditing job for the former (Iyatse, 2014).  
 
It was alleged that both the NNPC and the NCDMB “lack the (required) 
administrative or institutional capacity to effectively monitor and enforce 
compliance with Nigerian content policy on oil and gas multinationals” 
because of the IOCs’ strength and influence (Okafor and Aniche, 2014: 84). 
The excessive influence might have been a result of vested interest on the 
part of the political elite. It is, therefore, unlikely that such companies 
would voluntarily support responsible sustainability-related initiatives such 
as the local content (Bowie, 2013). This fact gave this study the motivation 
to investigate the IOCs’ soft and hard accountability. Specifically, the IOCs’ 
mandatory and voluntary local content reporting which receive less 
academic attention will be studied.      
 
Stakeholder engagement is another critical area of assessing the 
accountability of any government oversight agency (AccountAbility1000, 
2008). However, the NCDMB’s laxity in engaging with civil society groups, 
research institutes and trade unions of the oil industry was observed 
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(Ovadia, 2013). Moreover, in terms of financial record-keeping, neither an 
auditable record of the revenues and expenditure nor published financial 
statements relating to the NCDF or any other fund under the Board’s 
custody was publicly available. This contradicts S. 90 of the Act and the 
fundamental objectives of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI) which are “to monitor and ensure accountability in the 
revenue receipts of the Federal Government from extractive industry 
companies” (NEITI Act, 2007). In this connection, it was observed that one 
of the major factors that impede local content successes in Nigeria are 
corruption, mismanagement, and “opaque accountability” resulting in 
scanty or complete absence of proper financial records and audited 
accounts (Nwosu, 2006: 1282).   
 
Besides the afore-mentioned NCDMB’s and IOCs’ reported local content 
accountability challenges, the conflicting arguments surrounding local 
content as a sustainability policy have not been empirically investigated by 
prior studies. Local content has once been described as “a controversial 
industrial policy tool” (Johnson, 2013a: 1) or “a global problem” as 
contained in Hufbauer et al. (2013) book title. While some scholars 
perceived local content to be a source of curtailing the resource curse and 
sustaining the socio-economic and environmental conditions of resource-
rich nations, others regarded the policy as distorting the smooth flow of 
trade and in some cases creating avenues for corruption. These contrasting 
perceptions of local content ordinarily determine the stakeholders’ 
cooperation and conducts towards the implementation of the policy. As 
such, any assessment of local content has to take into account the nature 
of the prevailing stakeholders’ perceptions towards the policy within the 
various contexts. It is, therefore, part of the concern of this study to 
establish the stakeholders’ position on local content and its accountability 
relevance as it affects the triple-bottom-line sustainability.  
 
Based on the above discussion, this study applies the mixed-method 
approach combining the mainstream, interpretive and critical accounting 
perspectives to conduct an investigation into the accountability practices of 
the NCDMB and the IOCs in addition to a general assessment of their 
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performance with a particular focus on enforcement, compliance and 
disclosure and reporting of information. The next section presents the aim 
and objectives of the study. 
 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the extent of the mandatory and 
voluntary accountability of the NCDMB and the IOCs in the implementation 
of local content sustainability policy in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
Other specific objectives are:   
1. To critically assess stakeholders’ perceptions of local content as a 
sustainability policy pursued through the petroleum contracts. 
2. To examine the accountability expectations of local content in the 
Nigerian petroleum sector.  
3. To develop a framework to examine using stakeholders’ perceptions, 
the NCDMB’s general accountability performance in the 
implementation of local content sustainability in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry. 
4. To examine the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s 
financial accountability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
5. To evaluate the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s 
ability to enforce the provisions of the ‘first consideration’ to Nigerian 
oil and gas firms in the award of petroleum contracts, licenses, 
procurement of materials, employment, and technology transfer. 
6. To critically assess the extent of stakeholders’ awareness and 
effectiveness of the NCDMB’s local content programmes. 
7. To critically evaluate the level of the IOCs’ compliance with 
mandatory local content reporting requirements in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry.  
8. To critically examine the extent of voluntary local content 
sustainability disclosure and reporting practices of the IOCs in their 
global sustainability reports before and after the creation of the 
Nigerian local content law. 
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9. To determine the changes in the volume of voluntary local content 
sustainability reporting of the IOCs before and after the creation of 
the Nigerian local content law. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
1. To what extent do the stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry perceive local content to be a sustainability policy in 
petroleum contracts? 
2. What are the accountability expectations of local content in the 
Nigerian petroleum sector? 
3. What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s 
general accountability performance in the implementation of local 
content sustainability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
4. What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s 
financial accountability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
5. What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s 
ability to enforce the provisions of the ‘first consideration’ to Nigerian 
oil and gas firms in the award of petroleum contracts, licenses, 
employment, procurement of materials, and technology transfer?   
6. What is the extent of stakeholders’ awareness and effectiveness of 
NCDMB’s local content programmes? 
7. To what extent do the IOCs operating in Nigeria comply with 
mandatory local content reporting? 
8. To what extent do the IOCs voluntarily disclose and report local 
content sustainability indicators in their global sustainability reports 
before and after the creation of the Nigerian local content law?  
 
1.5 Hypothesis 
 
H0 There is no significant difference in the volumetric disclosure of 
local content sustainability of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before 
and after the creation of the Nigerian local content law. 
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H1 There is a significant difference in the volumetric disclosure of 
local content sustainability of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before 
and after the creation of Nigerian local content law. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
This study comes at a time when the local content policy is increasingly 
gaining global popularity in petroleum industry practices but lacking the 
deserved academic attention. Given this, the study intends to be one of the 
pioneer studies in the field of accounting for local content. The first 
intended relevance of the study is to the academic literature on local 
content, sustainability, governance and accountability and an innovative 
conceptual framework. Also, the study is designed to advance the frontier 
of accounting research where it provides formal foundational arguments 
connecting local content to sustainability accounting and extending this 
argument to test empirically whether the Nigerian local content regulators 
and the IOCs discharge their sustainability duties via their mandatory and 
voluntary local content commitments. The study also promotes the 
applications of mixed-methods techniques in the accounting research. The 
work is expected to assist policy-makers in both the government and the oil 
companies to adopt viable decisions in the design, enforcement and 
implementation of local content in Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Local Content in the Upstream Petroleum Contracts 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the basis for the debate on local 
content in petroleum contracts and its relevance to sustainability so as to 
set the stage for the discussion of the accounting, accountability and 
governance of the front-line local content accountors, that is, the NCDMB 
and the IOCs. The chapter defines local content as it affects the petroleum 
contracts and justifies its relationship with the three tenets of sustainability. 
To set the context for reporting the local content performance in the 
subsequent chapters, this chapter reviews local content within the spheres 
of the sustainability accounting and presents the accounting and reporting 
provisions of local content in the petroleum contracts.  
 
2.2 Meaning of Local Content  
 
Local content or domestic content (Vaaland, 2015) is a political-economic 
policy (Hansen, et al., 2015) which is regarded as a “key issue of economic 
and social performance of oil and gas companies” (GRI, 2013: 14). It refers 
to “the amount of local personnel, material and services that working 
interest owners are required to employ when drilling and operating a well, 
as specified under the term of a concession agreement” (The Schlumberger 
Oil and Gas Glossary). It becomes the catch-phrase in the petroleum and 
the renewable energy sectors and involves a requirement that an investor 
purchases a given amount of materials locally for incorporation into their 
products (Ssennago 2006; Kazzazi and Nouri, 2012; Dobbs et al., 2013; 
Vaaland, 2015). Scholars have considered local content to involve 
percentages of input used (material, labour and services), expenditure 
incurred (CAPEX and OPEX) 4 , investment committed, technology 
transferred, equipment manufactured, hours worked, etc., which are locally 
                                                          
4 Expenditure in the oil and gas industry is commonly divided into capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating 
expenditure (OPEX).  
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secured at the exploration, development, production and decommissioning 
stages of the petroleum value chain (Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1997; 
Stella et al., 2008; Rodriguez and Suslick, 2009; Wetherill, 2010; Tordo, et 
al. 2010; Esteves and Barclay, 2011; Kalyuzhnova, 2012; Scot et al., 2013; 
Johnson, 2015; NRGI, 2015; Toulekima, 2015). These activities involve 
drilling operations, rig maintenance, environmental services and other 
support functions feeding into both the upstream and downstream sectors 
of oil and gas industry. 
 
The common denominator in local content is value-addition as determined 
by ownership or location of oil firms (Wells and John, 2008; Ogbodo, 2008). 
Hence, the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation 
Association (IPIECA) defines local content as “the added value brought to a 
host nation...through the activities of the oil and gas industry” via the 
workforce, contractor and supplier development, and “local ownership, local 
control and local financing” (GRI, 2013: 14; Toulekima, 2015:3). In some 
countries, the local content share is determined by the ratio of the 
indigenous-foreign equity of oil companies; in others, firms’ physical 
presence alone suffices. The relevance of corporate governance structure of 
companies (ownership) and location are discussed in Section 3.5.1 of the 
next chapter. Using the value addition, the study demonstrated how 
Nigerian oil firms have been marginalised by their foreign counterparts from 
executing contracts and gaining from the huge investment in the country’s 
oil industry (see chapter four). In this connection, the Natural Resources 
Governance Institute (NRGI) (2015: 1) defined local content as “the value 
brought to the local, regional or national economy from an extraction 
project”. 
 
Other definitions of local content are country-specific. For example, the 
Nigerian content was defined as “the quantum of composite value-added or 
created in the Nigerian economy through the utilization of Nigerian human 
and material resources for the provision of goods and services to the 
petroleum industry within acceptable quality, health, safety and 
environmental standards in order to stimulate the development of 
indigenous capabilities” (NNPC, 2006). This definition suggests value 
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addition for local sustainable development while maintaining the highest 
health and ecological standards5. In Ghana, local content was defined as 
“the quantum or percentage of locally produced materials, personnel, 
financing, goods and services rendered in the petroleum industry value 
chain and which can be measured in monetary terms” (Petroleum Local 
Content and Local Participation Regulations, 2013).  
 
A very contentious issue in defining local content (Esteves et al., 2013) is 
the determination of what constitutes the term “local”. Local content is 
sometimes understood to mean channelling oil and gas contracts for sub-
national or community development (Esteves, 2013; Nwapi, 2015). This 
opinion is rather minority as almost all other scholars use the concept to 
refer to a nation-wide policy (e.g., Warner, 2011; Tordo et. al., 2013; 
Ovadia, 2013). That is why some countries simply use the term ‘national 
content’ (NRGI Reader, 2015). The practice of the majority of oil-producing 
countries except Canada and Spain (that applied the policy in particular 
regions) is that local content and national content are one and the same 
(Stephenson, 2013; Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2013). The IOCs also report 
their local content performances on the national basis6 (GRI, 2013). It was 
therefore recommended that in determining the term ‘local’ when reporting 
local content indicators – EC1, EC5, EC6, and EC7, IOCs should be guided 
by the International Accounting Standards (IAS) 14: Segmental Reporting 
(now IFRS 8: Operating Segments) (GRI, 2013). This discussion will come 
up later in chapter three. In an apparent effort to solve this complication, 
Warner (2007), Oguine (2011) and Azubuike, (2012) specifically used the 
concepts of ‘local content’ and ‘community content’ as the micro and macro 
terms to differentiate between the broad and the narrow perspectives of the 
policy. The major difference is that while local content is about a nation-
wide benefit through petroleum contracts, the community content was 
described as the degree of employment and contracts rendered to the 
immediate oil communities by the extractive companies (Oguine, 2012). To 
sum up, Toulekima (2015: 4) observes that the definition of local content 
                                                          
5 It has been recommended that local content objectives should not interfere with critical business aspects, 
particularly the health and safety standards. See Achilles (2015). 
6 As an example refer to the sustainability/integrated financial reports of the five sampled companies involved in 
this work. 
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varies “depending on whether the approach focuses on the national, local or 
company level”. The political economy of the Nigerian petroleum sector, for 
instance, accommodates both the micro and the macro dimensions of local 
content. Local content comes in different forms from what is available in the 
extant literature. The next section briefly looked at the most common forms 
of the policy. 
 
2.3 Forms of Local Content  
 
Munson and Rosenblatt (1997: 278) classified local content by the 
percentage of local materials or labour in headcounts (volume-based), the 
monetary value of materials, wages and salaries (value-based) or whether 
or not a penalty is involved. This penalty may be in the form of imposition 
of high a tariff, fine or cancellation of contracts (The Economist, 1993). 
Nigeria and Indonesia, for instance, have opted for the fine or cancellation 
of contracts while the UK did not apply any legal sanction, but rather, the 
non-compliant companies faced difficulties in winning contracts and licenses 
during bidding rounds (Neff, 2005). Alternatively, firms that comply may 
enjoy incentives such as import duty waivers (Hollander, 1987). Tordo et al. 
(2013) differentiated between local content and local content development. 
They argue that while local content only focussed on local share of 
materials, salaries, wages and employment, local content development 
focuses on long-term local development through capacity building, training 
and skills acquisition, supplier development and investment in local 
manufacturing. This classification will be helpful in discussing local content 
metrics in Section 3.4.2, as well as in analysing the IOCs’ sustainability 
reports in chapter nine. In another view, Anchondo (2010) grouped local 
content arrangements into two – IOCs forming partnerships with local firms 
or maintaining local sponsors to operate in the host country as in the case 
of the Nigeria’s Local Content Vehicles (LCVs) scheme applied during the 
2005 oil licensing rounds; or IOCs to use a given percentage of local labour, 
input or expenditure in their operations.  
 
From another point of view, Hansen et al. (2015) consider local content 
from two different perspectives – economic and the political. The economic 
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perspective deals with local income generation, increase in productivity and 
efficiency of local industry as well as the governance and institutional 
arrangement to achieve these. Within the economic sphere, local content 
has other accounting and financial implications on firms. The policy is found 
to be associated with transfer pricing policies of multinational enterprises 
including the IOCs (PwC, 2012; Sigam and Gacia, 2012; ACET, 2014). 
Belderbos et al. (2000) found evidence that subsidiaries operating in high 
tax countries use transfer pricing to report higher import values and lower 
local content ratios. Similarly, it was also found that local content impacts 
on the costs, net present values (NPVs), internal rate of return (IRR) and 
payback periods (PBPs) of multinational companies as well as their 
decisions to increase their just-in-time delivery (Warner, 2010; Esteves and 
Barclay, 2011; Nishikimi and Kuroiwa, Hansen et al, 2015). Consequently, 
upon review of the Brazilian oil and gas industry, Awasthi and Kozio (2013) 
found that the cost vs local content graph asymptotically increases, or 
simply, local content increases proportionately with its marginal cost.  
 
On the other hand, the political perspective of local content is concerned 
with policy-making and the roles of political elites in resource extraction 
(Hansen et al., 2015). This reaffirms the claims that local content rules 
have dual roles in fostering economic growth and providing local political 
elite with new techniques to accumulate wealth (Ovadia, 2015), win 
elections, and curb civil unrest (OPEC, 2011b). Although both perspectives 
are relevant to this study,7 the economic perspective is more emphasised 
over the political as the research is within the limits of accounting and 
finance area. The politics of the Nigerian petroleum sector, for instance, 
accommodates both the micro and the macro local content approaches 
discussed above. While it is evident that oil communities 8  have greater 
opportunities for gaining employment and contracts because of their 
proximity to oil production facilities, workforce and entrepreneurs from all 
parts of the country also play significant roles. As local content is 
                                                          
7 Apart from the economic perspective which is more relevant to the research, the political perspective also applies 
where we discuss issues of marginalization of local firms, perceived connivance between IOC’s and policy-makers, 
fronting, as well as the possible corruption in local content.   
8 Most of the Nigeria’s oil communities cluster around the Niger-Delta area of the South-South geopolitical zone 
consisting of six states: Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Edo and Cross-Rivers. 
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considered more prominent in petroleum contracts, the next section 
discusses the operations of the rules in the oil and gas industry. 
 
2.4 Local Content in the Petroleum Industry 
 
The oil-producing countries that applied local content in their upstream 
petroleum sectors have experienced mixed results (Chowla, 2005; Veloso, 
2006). Two positions were taken by scholars on this issue. Some scholars 
(Grossman, 1981; WTO/UNCTAD, 2002; Aneke, 2002; Heum, et al., 2003; 
INTSOK, 2003; Neff, 2005; Lahn, 2007; Hao et al., 2010; Lec, 2011) 
believed that although the policy may have long-run benefits, it may also 
create distortions, corruption, price increase, tensions between national oil 
companies (NOCs) and international oil companies (IOCs), or project 
delays. The policy may, therefore, work against the general interest of the 
economy and the local companies (Warner, 2011). Commenting on this 
issue, Bressand (undated: 4) observed that: 
In some cases, however, local-content obligations amount to putting the cart before 
the horse, triggering the development of a protected sector in which a few privileged 
local partners serve as gatekeepers and rent collectors more than as genuine 
economic developers and innovators. 
This notwithstanding, other scholars view local content as a form of 
sustainable development initiative that fosters value-addition, linkages, 
ownership and control, stakeholder engagement, social license to operate, 
job creation, oil reserves and production levels, and technological 
capabilities (Nwokeji, 2007; Wetherill, 2010; IPIECA et al, 2010; Nwaokoro, 
2011; Warner, 2011; Balouga, 2012; Ngoasong, 2014: Ablo, 2015). It is 
also effective in correcting market failures and reducing information 
asymmetry between governments and the IOCs (Kumar, 2002; Osammor, 
2008; Chatham House, 2013). Local content is often calculated based on 
“the share of contract sums awarded to local firms minus costs of imported 
materials or services used in the (oil) project” (Stella et al., 2008: 26). 
   
Warner (2011) supported by Lunde (2013) argues that local content has a 
direct, indirect and induced impact on the economy of oil-producing 
countries. Direct effect refers to the value derived from the actual oil and 
gas production such as the Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT), royalties and 
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bonuses. Indirect effect involves local purchasing of raw-materials, 
services, and equipment through which the government receives 
Companies Income Tax (CIT) from the profits made by the suppliers. The 
induced effect involves the earnings and spending by the employees of oil 
firms from which government receives Personal Income Tax (PIT) and 
Value-Added Tax (VAT). In this connection local content was said to have a 
multiplier effect that extend to the social, economic and environmental 
aspects through the value chain contracting processes on which Scot et al. 
(2013: 27) commented as:  
…the influx of money and labour to an oil development area generates additional 
indirect demand for local goods and services …. Local men and women in existing 
economic activities such as farming or fishing might reinvest capital earned from 
waged employment, facilitating local market expansion and gains in productivity.   
 
In support of the above points, Esteves (2011) and Dobbs et al. (2013) 
suggested that local content and royalties/taxes are complementary 
instruments used by oil–producing governments. This pragmatic stance was 
countered by Bertrand (2014) and Nwapa (2014) who categorised the 
resource extraction strategies into two groups: revenue-focussed or fiscal in 
which governments rely on taxes and royalties, and operators strive at 
maximizing profits; and in-country-value focussed or non-fiscal where 
governments opt for lower revenue in return for long-term sustainable 
development through the promotion of local capacity, ownership and 
participation, and operators are after their long-term impact on the host 
economies. For this reason, Ngoasong (2014: 2) observes that local content 
is “shifting the emphasis from revenue maximization through fiscal policies 
to an increasing focus on IOC’s contribution to wider societal development”. 
In this regard, Cotula (2013: 45) noted the existence of a trade-off 
between local content and royalties and taxes because “if sourcing local 
labour, goods and services increases project costs, the investor will 
probably want to compensate for this by paying lower public revenues”. For 
instance, some production-sharing contracts may provide that costs for 
training or similar programmes incurred by the contractor are recoverable 
costs deductible from the cost-oil before ascertaining the profit-oil to be 
shared with the host government (Wright and Gallun, 2005).  
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To achieve sustainable development goals, almost all the resource-driven 
economies have one form of local content or another (Dobbs et al. 2013; 
Ovadia, 2014) supported by legislation, policies or guidelines (Ado, 2013)9. 
Table 2.1 below presents some of these countries and their prioritised local 
content activities. 
 
Table 2.1: Local Content Policies in Oil and Gas Sectors of Selected Countries 
Country Legal Framework Year Strategy 
UK Policy 1970 In-country procurement 
Norway Local Content Law (art. 54 of 
the Royal Decree of 1952) 
1972 Indigenous participation 
Malaysia Petroleum Development Act 1974 Licensing 
South Africa Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework 
2000 Procurement 
Brazil Local Content Legislation 2003 Oil concession 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Local Content & Local 
Participation Framework 
2004 In-country fabrication 
Kazakhstan Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 223-IV 
2009 Procurement & services 
Indonesia Local Content Rules 2009 In-country procurement 
Nigeria Local Content Act 2010 Indigenous participation, 
procurement, 
employment & 
domiciliation of oil & gas 
activities 
Ghana Local Content Regulations 2013 Indigenous participation 
& industrialisation 
Angola Legislations/Decrees  Participation, all areas of 
local value addition 
Source: Modified from Ado (2013), Hufbauer et al. (2013) and Ablo (2015) 
 
Some of the above-listed countries have opted for local content policies out 
of sustained frustration caused by their inability to translate oil wealth into 
meaningful development. Therefore, several sources have regarded local 
content as a sustainable development policy or an extended and more 
guided form of corporate social responsibility aimed at enhancing national 
control of natural resources (Stevens, 2008). The following sections aim at 
enhancing our understanding of the relevance of local content to 
                                                          
9 This is a theoretical paper published by the author of this thesis on local content and its position vis-a-vis the WTO 
rules. The paper has attracted a wide readership and was cited by several peer-reviewed journal articles and 
conference papers in petroleum and energy studies, including dissertations of the Universities of Oslo, Sweden, 
Pretoria, Utara, Nairobi, Southern Denmark, the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, the United Nations 
University and other publications of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Society of Petroleum 
Engineers (SPE), the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP) University of Dundee, the 
World Bank, the United Nations, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management Korea, the Memorial University, Canada, etc.     
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sustainability activities used to tackle the developmental issues bedevilling 
the oil-producing developing countries.   
2.5 Local Content as a Sustainability Policy 
 
Sustainable development is the “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet 
their own needs” (UNCED, 1987: 8). Literature sources, although scanty, 
have indicated that local content and sustainability are closely related 
concepts (Renwick, 2008; Duval et al., 2009; Toulekima, 2015) engaged 
with by companies operating in host countries. The Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 2011: 19) for example, although avoided 
using the term ‘local content’ explicitly, has implicitly used its proxies to 
argue that multinational companies (MNCs) have to promote policies that 
“contribute to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to 
achieving sustainable development” in their host countries. These policies 
according to the OECD are achieved through the local capacity building, 
development of domestic markets, and employment and training. The 
guidelines further recommended that MNCs must ensure that they “in their 
operations, to the greatest extent practicable, employ local workers and 
provide training with a view to improving skill levels...”. Hence, MNCs have 
to align profit maximization with a contribution to local sustainability 
(Esteves, 2007). In addressing the issue of local purchasing (another proxy 
for local content) by the MNCs, Nijaki and Worrel (2012) claimed that 
governments can strategically use local procurement to achieve 
sustainability goals including equity and social justice to compensate for the 
negative impact of corporations especially those of the extractive industry10. 
Generally, Tordo et al. (2013: xi) found local content policies to “have the 
potential to stimulate broad-based economic development, which is 
necessary to alleviate poverty and achieve the United Nation’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs)...”  
                                                          
10 As shown earlier in the work, oil industry activities are associated with high risks leading to environmental 
degradation, global warming, social dislocation, unrest and political crises. To mitigate these effects, those affected 
(i.e, oil communities and the national economy at large) have to be fairly compensated. This compensation can 
effectively be done by utilizing the oil sector to create an equitable, widespread and long-lasting economic benefit 
through a range of polices such as local content which compels oil companies to use local input and local labour in 
their projects. See also Heller (2011). 
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Commenting on the contributions of local content to sustainability, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (2011a: 144) 
claimed that:  
Local content has a crucial role to play; a role that can, and should, provide a strong 
platform for a country’s economic and social development. In this regard, it is useful to 
have a well-defined, coherent, effectively managed and well-administered local content 
framework that positively engages and mobilizes all the relevant stakeholders – local 
communities, local industries, service companies, national oil companies (NOCs), 
governments and international oil companies (IOCs) – and in a manner that enables 
economic growth and social progress. 
The above comment shows that local content policies “are essential for the 
sustainability of resource-led economic development”, and that the whole of 
mining operations are recognised by local stakeholders as acceptable only if 
its benefits can contribute to local sustainability (Labonne, 1999; Gibson, 
2000; Ovadia, 2014: 1). These contributions are made through the 
employment of local residents, using local services, and expansion of the 
local market for labour and goods (Dorian and Humphreys, 1994; Eggert, 
2000). It also indicates that local content depends on the engagement and 
collaboration of stakeholders who bring “valuable knowledge, resources and 
commitment” (IPIECA, 2011: 8). This study uses the perceptions of the 
above extractive industry stakeholders identified by the OPEC (2011a) and 
supported by Azapagic (2004), to examine local content accountability and 
governance in Nigeria. 
  
Economics and accounting scholars have discussed the sustainability 
relevance of corporate responsibility performances including local content. 
On this basis, local content was described as an asset. Cairns (2011: 211) 
views sustainability as grounded in the concept of intergenerational equity 
which implies investment in various types of assets to maintain social well-
being. This is why Wiig and Ramalho (2005: 4) have asserted that 
“....assets under the ground (oil) have to be substituted for by other real 
assets, financial assets or human capital in order to maintain the capital 
stock and promote future growth in a country”. They noted that local 
content is the real asset, while training (also part of the local content), is 
the human asset. At the firm level, oil companies view local content as an 
intangible asset, that is, goodwill (ILO, 2009) as it enhances their 
“regulatory approval” and “strategic positioning with host authorities” 
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(International Quality and Productivity Centre, 2010 cited in Marshal and 
Serwinowski, 2011: 2). For example, in its annual financial report, Petrofac 
(2013) stated that local content “facilitates our entry into new markets, 
cements long-term customer relationships and reduces our costs”.  
 
Cairns (2011) and Keutiben (2014) used the accounting and the economic 
prices to argue that natural capital (oil) is depleted to build up other kinds 
of capital (local content); the process involves an opportunity cost of having 
less resource to build future generations. This is perhaps why Heller (2011) 
claimed that local content can benefit oil-producing countries “long after oil 
and mineral reserves are depleted”. Also, the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) (2012: 8 & 51) identified that “the 
level of local content, ecological security, government profits, etc.,” were 
the determinants of oil-producing countries’ success. To contribute to the 
extant literature that fails to properly articulate and theorize the 
relationships between local content and sustainability, the following sections 
present the three tenets of sustainability (social, economic and 
environmental) and how local content is relevant to each.   
 
2.6 Social Sustainability Dimension of Local Content  
 
The social dimension of sustainability involves local and community 
initiatives, wealth creation and skills development (Szekely and Knirsch, 
2005). Social sustainability is more difficult to measure (Azapagic, 2004). 
Solow (1974) in Cairns (2006: 213) argues that societal sustainability is 
measured “by the standard of living of the least fortunate generation 
looking forward from the present”. Hence, the “oil wealth of a country 
belongs to both present and future generations” and that “sustainable 
development is not guaranteed by big profits alone”; how the profits are 
spent is what matters (Wiig and Ramalho, 2005: 4; Andrews-Speed, 2009 
in Appiah-Adu and Sasraku, 2013). Two local content arguments support 
the social dimension of sustainability – the Social Compensation and the 
Political Harmony arguments (Warner, 2011). These are discussed below.  
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2.6.1 Social Compensation Argument 
 
The idea behind the social compensation argument is that communities that 
have been negatively affected by oil operations should get reasonable 
benefit in return. The nature of oil and gas operations is always 
accompanied by social and ecological disasters and permanent or 
temporary “loss of economic livelihood” for communities which have to be 
fairly compensated (Andrews-Speed and Rogers, 1999; Ogri, 2001; Warner, 
2011; Tordo, et al., 2013: 26). Compensation in oil and gas operations has 
received particular international attention with the International Standards 
for Environmental and Social Impacts setting the standards for 
compensating communities that suffer the loss of earning a living (Tordo, et 
al., 2013). These standards include adopting local content policies or the 
international efforts to compensate oil pollution victims (International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Funds, 2012). A practical case is the Nigeria’s 
Niger-Delta communities that have lost their farming and fishing activities 
to the aggressive oil production. Since the discovery of oil in 1958, the 
region has been experiencing indiscriminate gas flaring, oil spillage, toxic 
waste disposal, erosion, etc. (Benedict, 2011). Closely related to the social 
compensation is the political harmony as discussed in the next subhead.    
 
2.6.2 Political Harmony Argument 
 
The political harmony occurs when the government makes efforts to align 
its interests with that of the larger society in order to achieve political 
stability. Sustainability initiatives in general and local content in particular, 
are said to be increasingly applied to check-mate not only global warming 
and carbon footprint but also the potential of natural resources to fuel civil 
war, political unrest, and global terrorism (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Le 
Billon, 2000; Gunasekaran and Spalanzani, 2012). Janus (2011: 24) argues 
that the most important “input to conflict is locally available labour” if not 
engaged in productive activities. Nigeria, for example, is using local content 
initiatives to tackle the conflict and crises within the oil- producing 
communities of the Niger-Delta region. In Liberia and Sierra Leone local 
content was used to achieve post-conflict harmony (Warner, 2011). In 
Angola, under the post-conflict support strategy, the World Bank had 
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focused on local content in the oil sector through venture collaborations, 
development of local markets and transparency (Blakeley et al., 2003).   
 
It was concluded that if well utilized, mineral resources have the potential 
to promote peaceful co-existence among communities, resolve armed 
conflicts, as well as prevent conflict reoccurrence (Wennmann, 2012). It 
should be noted that the socio-political stability is the most important 
aspect of sustainability because nothing can be sustained amidst social and 
political unrest. Another critical aspect of local content is the economic 
dimension presented in the following section. 
 
2.7 Economic Sustainability Dimension of Local Content  
 
This dimension of sustainability is concerned with the economic impact of 
corporations on the society at the local, national or global level (GRI, 2012) 
including employment and wealth creation (Azapagic, 2004). Economic 
sustainability is basically “the major driver for local content and 
participation” (Bertrand, 2014: 72; Hansen et al., 2015). It was also argued 
that local content can “generate economic activities that can last longer 
than the economic cycle of the finite natural resource” (Heum et al., 2011 
in Mendonca and de Oliveira, 2013: 281). The economic dimension of 
sustainability is covered by four local content arguments – the Infant 
Industry, the Market Power, the Balance of Payment and the Strategic 
Sectors arguments. These arguments are presented below. 
 
2.7.1  Infant Industry Argument 
 
This argument is of the view that emerging domestic industries are 
obviously lacking the economies of scale advantage and need to be 
protected and supported up to the period they can effectively compete with 
their developed counterparts (Melitz, 2005; Warner, 2011; Enderwick, 
2011). The underlying idea of this argument is that for any developing 
nation to set up a new industry, the pioneer industry may need to be 
sheltered from foreign competition up to the time it can depend on itself. It 
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is assumed that infant industries lack the ability to compete unassisted with 
international competitors that enjoy an “unfair competitive advantage” in 
many forms (Enderwick, 2011: 330). This argument had historically been 
used in the United States when it was trying to industrialize its economy 
amidst the British dominance of global trade. As a result, the US was 
branded “the motherland of infant industry protection” (Shafaeddin, 2000: 
4). Norway for instance, had in 1974 incorporated local content in her 
petroleum licensing round to support the development of her infant oil and 
gas industry by requiring the procurement of Norwegian goods and services 
in the development and production phases, giving opportunities to 
Norwegian firms to win between 50% and 70% of the oil and gas contracts 
(Hunter, 2009).  
 
2.7.2   Market Power Argument 
 
This argument had reasoned that international suppliers may ordinarily be 
found to be applying undue power to compete with local industries. Market 
power here implies foreign suppliers’ purchasing powers which put the local 
firms at a disadvantage. Warner (2011) argues that the market power 
argument is different from the infant industry argument in that under the 
latter domestic firms will be at an advantage from the local content 
specifications; whereas under the former, local content requirements are 
not intended to advantage the local industry but are used to make sure that 
the domestic industry is not at a disadvantage. This follows that in bidding 
for oil contracts, companies from industrialized countries have all that it 
takes to compete favourably with the local firms, and not the other way 
round (Ssennago, 2006). The Nigeria’s new local content law, for example, 
has required first consideration for indigenous firms at a special preferential 
price margin which compromised the highest bidder principles (S. 16 of 
NOGICD Act, 2010). This preference margin was also applied by Australia, 
Canada, Turkey, New Zealand and the US (Naegelen and Mougeot, 1998 in 
Ssennago, 2006: 219).  
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2.7.3 Balance of Payment Argument 
 
This is another form of economic sustainability in which local content 
strategies are adopted by governments to safeguard and protect their 
balance of payment positions. High imports in the capital-intensive oil 
industry lead to persistent “foreign currency drainage” and very often 
affects the positions of countries’ balance of payments (WTO and UNCTAD, 
2002, 2003, 2007, 2014; and WTI Advisors, 2013: 8). The local content 
policy is adopted to reduce the level of imports by encouraging local 
procurement and domiciling oil and gas activities. The International 
Accounting and Reporting Issues (2007, 2008, and 2009) required that the 
net import-export values (representing the balance of payment) should be 
reported by companies in annual reports as one of the local content 
performance. More discussion on this is made in Section 3.12 of the next 
chapter. In Nigeria however, the NOGICD Act 2010 provides that no 
materials, equipment, component or service should be imported if it can be 
obtained from the local suppliers. In cases where Nigerian firms are unable 
to produce the required goods or components, foreign firms are encouraged 
to set up local production of such component through the Equipment 
Component Manufacturing Initiatives (ECMI) which is one of the important 
local content programmes developed by the NCDMB. Through local 
manufacturing, it was argued that governments can check-mate transfer 
pricing manipulations in which oil subsidiaries inflate asset prices in order to 
report lower profit and pay lower corporate tax. Therefore, local content 
and transfer pricing are inversely related (Belderbos et al., 2000; PwC, 
2012; Sigam and Gacia, 2012; ACET, 2014). At the firm level, through local 
content oil firms can achieve just-in-time (JIT) delivery with reduced lead-
time and stock holding costs (Awasthi and Kozio, 2013).  
 
2.7.4 Strategic Sectors Argument 
 
Due to the increasing economic and security consciousness of governments, 
the need to protect some strategic and sensitive sectors such as energy, 
defence, communication and transport from foreign ownership becomes 
necessary (Enderwick, 2011). The economic excellence of these sectors 
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may not be guaranteed without protection. For oil operations, countries 
understand the essence of energy security to national development and in 
many cases, refuse to allow 100% foreign ownership in the industry. As for 
the OPEC it has been a policy that all member countries must acquire a 
controlling shareholding (at least 51%) of all oil and gas licenses (Olomola 
and Olumide, 2005). This has led to efforts by OPEC nations to create 
national oil companies and acquire controlling shares from the concessions 
previously held by the IOCs. Many if not all oil-producing countries have 
switched from the non-participatory concession to the modern participatory 
joint ventures, production-sharing and service contracts (Likosky, 2009). 
The environmental dimension of local content follows this section.  
 
2.8 Environmental Sustainability Dimension of Local Content  
 
Local content has indirect contributions towards ecological sustainability 
through four different avenues – technology transfer, renewable energy, 
local sourcing, and mitigation of environmentally damaging social 
conditions. Stephenson (2013) observed that local content has to be 
combined with and supported by other industrial policies in order to impact 
positively on the green growth. The four supporting arguments are 
presented in the following paragraphs. These arguments do not replace or 
exempt the IOCs from their standard and better environmental or CSR 
practices mostly embedded in their contractual agreements as reviewed by 
Tienhaara (2011).  
 
2.8.1 Technology Transfer Argument 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was the first to advocate the importance of technology transfer in tackling 
the threats of climate change in developing countries (Karakosta et al., 
2010). Specifically, Kypreos and Turton (2011) considered its relevance to 
carbon emission control. It was therefore believed that through technology 
transfer where the local workforce acquires better technology, local content 
promotes efficiency, green innovation and better ways to minimize waste. 
Haug (2011: 112) argues that “as countries combine technology and 
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environmental policies to deal with market failures with industrial and 
employment policies, local content requirements such as in the US, China, 
and India have multiplied”. Local content through technology transfer is 
viewed as positively related to environmentally-efficient local industrial 
operations (Martinsons et al., 1996; Minchener, 2000; EPA, 2009). One of 
the priorities of the African continent is exploiting technology transfer to 
checkmate gas-flaring and environmental degradation. It was found that 
through technology transfer, Nigeria will achieve some clean environmental 
initiatives such as the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs) contained in 
the Kyoto Protocol (Olatunde, 2013).  
     
2.8.2 Renewable Energy Argument 
 
Local content policy is very effective in promoting the renewable energy 
technology which impacts on the clean environment (Johnson, 2015). 
Johnson (2015) observed the increasing need for governments to use the 
local content to concurrently promote renewable energy deployment to 
mitigate negative climate change while impacting on the socioeconomic 
objectives such as job creation and poverty reduction. Presently, more 
countries use local content as part of their green policy to develop 
renewable energy sectors. Some introduced local content in their solar 
energy (France, India and Italy), some in wind energy (China, Brazil South 
Africa, and Spain) while others applied in both sectors (Canada, Turkey). 
France introduced her local content in 2012 through the Solar Energy 
Project Developers Scheme with the aim of developing a French solar 
energy supply chain. India’s local content started in 2010 through the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) with the intention of 
increasing local jobs in the green energy sector. The region of Ontario in 
Canada began its local content in 2009 under the Green Energy and Green 
Economy Act with the objective of increasing renewable energy deployment 
as well as creating green jobs. The Spanish regions of Galicia, Navarra, 
Castille, Leon and Valencia started using local content in 2003 to create a 
strong local supply chain and providing new economic opportunities in other 
economically backward regions of the country (for overview, see 
Stephenson, 2013; Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2013). Although China had 
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scrapped its policy in 2009, researchers have faulted such discontinuation 
on the basis of technological catch-up (Zhang, et al., 2013). In Nigeria, due 
to undeveloped renewable energy sector (Oyedepo, 2012; Kankara, 2013), 
local content policy has not been applied to either the solar or the wind 
energy alternatives. Kuntze and Moerenhout (2013) observed that 
advocates of the environmental sustainability of local content through 
renewable energy based their argument on the fact that with the ability of 
the policy to protect and secure the growth of the infant industry more 
mature players will be available in the global renewable energy market 
which will bring down green energy costs. This point was also supported by 
Zhang, et al. (2013) who observed the proliferation and saturation of the 
wind energy market in China as a result of localization of manufacturing 
activities in the renewable energy sector.  
 
2.8.3 Local Sourcing Argument 
 
It was argued by Fossgard-Moser (2003: 80) that local sourcing of 
materials, components and services for the production of oil and gas is one 
important avenue through which energy firms “contribute to the sustainable 
economic development” of host countries. It was observed that between 
40%-80% of the income of the petroleum sector is invested in sourcing 
materials, components and other goods and services (Dobbs et al., 2013). 
This amount usually exceeds the value of royalty and taxes generated by a 
country11 (Dobbs et al., 2013; Ovadia, 2014). Local sourcing of materials as 
one of the important tools/strategies of local content (EY, 2014) is also 
indicated to have strong potential for environmental protection due to the 
possible reduction in hydrocarbon emissions and other pollutants associated 
with long freight and haulage. For example, it was estimated that road 
transportation accounts for over 20% of CO2 emission in the UK (Begg and 
Gray, 2006). Consequently, Holt and Watson (2008: 321) concluded that “if 
all food in the UK were sourced from within 20 km of where it was 
consumed, environmental and congestion costs would fall from £2.3bn to 
£230m”. Moldanova et al. (2009) in Tesfay (2014: 138) argues that the 
                                                          
11 This confirms that in-country-value-focused strategy promoted by local content is more advantageous to local 
sustainability than the revenue focused. 
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transportation activity “burns most of the world’s petroleum” which includes 
diesel, kerosene, gasoline, etc., and which produces air pollution that 
subsequently contributes to global warming. Houghton (2008) posits that 
the transportation sector is the second largest petroleum-related carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emitting sector accounting for “37% of mono-nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), 31% of Ozone O3, 19% of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), 18% 
of Carbon monoxide (CO) and 14% of black carbon (BC)” (Tesfay, 2014: 
138). Due to their globalised nature, oil and gas companies often engage in 
shipping materials and equipment from their home countries. A study 
conducted in 2000 showed that ocean transportation used about 200-290 
million metric tons of fuel and released particulates and exhaust gases of 
between 600 and 900 Tg of CO2 (Endresen et al., 2003, 2007; Corbett and 
Kohler, 2003; Eyring et al., 2005). In Nigeria, it was reported that crude oil 
transportation was responsible for the devastation of the ecosystem of the 
country’s oil region. Most of these adverse environmental impacts could be 
mitigated through local sourcing of materials, equipment, components and 
supplies as advocated by local content proponents.  
 
2.8.4 Mitigation of Environmentally Damaging Social Conditions 
 
This line of debate emerged from Janus (2011), Warner (2011) and 
Gunasekaran and Spalanzani (2012) who argue that besides the issues of 
carbon footprints and global warming that directly affect the environment, 
local content also prevents social conflicts, unrest and global terrorism 
generally which indirectly affect the environment. It was reported that 
Nigeria is one of the worst gas-flared and oil-spilled countries in the world 
recording about 4,835 spill incidents between 1976 and 1996 most of which 
were caused by bunkering and sabotage by irate youth from oil 
communities due to perceived marginalization and neglect by the 
government and oil companies (Ikporukpo, 1985; Brume, 2006; Benedict, 
2011; Lawal and Ese, 2012). The Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) claims that besides the loss of money to the 
state, illegal bunkering or oil theft “...has led to uncountable loss of lives 
and unquantifiable damage to the environment due to oil spills”; and 
vandalisation of oil pipelines “constitutes the greatest rate of environmental 
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degradation and pollution” (NEITI, 2013: 11). With its social compensation 
effects, local content has the potential to mitigate some environmentally 
damaging social behaviour (Warner, 2011). Figure 1 below summarises the 
above discussion and depicts the convergence of the three sustainability 
dimensions as driven by local content. 
 
Figure 1: Proposed theorizing of Local Content as Sustainability Driver 
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Figure 1 above shows how local content produced the three groups of 
argument each of which led to one sustainability dimension, and 
subsequently produced the overall ‘triple-bottom-line’ implying that local 
content practices in the oil industry result in sustainability. To summarize 
the above proposition and the sustainability arguments, Olawuyi, (2012: 3) 
argues that for any petroleum exploration, production and development 
operations to be considered sustainable “it must lead to financial returns 
and profits to local entities as well as a positive balance of payments and 
technology transfer “. It should equally “result in the emergence of clean 
and efficient technologies in the host country”. Additionally, it should 
provide improved quality of life, equity and “must alleviate the suffering of 
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the country by providing social infrastructures...”. These comments have 
involved all the three local content sustainability areas which have to work 
together to achieve the desired result. A major challenge to policy-makers 
in a free-market economy is the reconciliation and consolidation of the 
three dimensions and all the possible tensions existing among them. For 
example, it was considered unjustifiable for business corporations to 
sacrifice part of their profits to engage in the social and environmental 
activities (Reinhardt, et al., 2008) as this would undermine their wealth-
maximization motives (Friedman, 1970). This is why it was recognised that 
sustainability involves trade-offs (Barbier, 1987). In Section 2.4 it was 
indicated that local content itself is a trade-off between in-country value 
and revenue through royalty and taxes.  
 
As corporations may not voluntarily engage in certain local content 
sustainability activities for fear of losing control of the value chain (Hansen 
et al., 2015), regulations may have to be used. In some cases, however, in 
their attempt to gain political support, social license to operate, reduction in 
transportation and labour costs or elimination of tariff, firms voluntarily 
adopt local content rules (Swamidass, 1994; Munson and Rosenblatt, 1997; 
Fossgard-Moser, 2003; IPIECA, 2011). In another cases, governments have 
to use state laws or concession agreements to mandate the policy. In 
Section 3.5.5 below the study discusses how Indonesia, India and Saudi 
regulated their CSR practices to achieve sustainability. The absence of 
strong laws often makes developing countries vulnerable to environmental 
and human right abuses by the IOCs. In the next chapter, the study also 
reviewed the hard and soft approaches to enforcing local content.  
 
Having successfully established the link between local content and 
sustainability, the next attempt is to present the nature in which local 
content provisions are embodied in petroleum contracts and the impacts of 
such on sustainability. The next section presents the discussion on how 
local content rules are incorporated in petroleum contracts.   
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2.9 Local Content Provisions in the Model Petroleum Contracts  
 
There are many ways through which governments use local content to 
achieve their sustainable development objectives. The most common are 
the natural resource exploitation license, import license, and permission for 
investment or procurement (Hestermeyer and Nielsen, 2014: 565). 
Extractive industry licenses and contracts often contain provisions for local 
employment, training, technology transfer and sourcing of materials (Alba, 
2009; Tordo, 2010). During the 2000, 2005 and 2006 Nigeria’s licensing 
rounds, for example, bidders were required to show their commitment to 
technology transfer and obligations for training and employment of 
Nigerians. Venezuela had in 1997 offered twenty oil fields under operating 
service contracts and reserved five fields for local companies or joint 
venture with a Venezuelan company as the operator. In Chad, oil licensees 
are required to give preference to local materials, components and local 
labour. The case is similar in Timor-Léste and Equatorial Guinea. It was 
required in the Brazilian 2007 license round-7 that 37% local content be 
targeted in all expenditure at the exploration phase, 40% in the geological 
survey, 10% in logistics for drilling operations, and 95% in detailed 
engineering related to field production (Guimaraes, 2011). The situation is 
also similar in Egypt during a contract between the Egyptian General 
Petroleum Corporation and the American Esso Inc., where it was agreed 
that priority had to be given to local contractors and locally manufactured 
equipment, machinery, materials, and consumables (Likosky, 2009). These 
provisions are meant to put oil contracts in the hands of local firms in order 
to ensure sustainability in host countries. Local content is considered ‘‘a 
negotiation point between companies and governments, stipulated in the 
terms of contracts” (Boykett et al., 2012: 206).  
 
A survey of some oil-producing countries’ licensing arrangements revealed 
the increasing use of local content in petroleum licensing as part of the oil 
companies’ commitment to sustainable development activities in host 
environments. Table 2.2 below illustrates this increasing application of local 
content rules in petroleum negotiations using the model petroleum 
contracts of selected countries. 
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Table 2.2: Local Content in Model Petroleum Contracts of Selected 
Countries 
 
Source: Reviewed and extracted by the author from the Extractive Industry Source 
Book12 and Nwoakoro (2011) 
 
Table 2.2 above exhibits the principal areas of local content 
(employment/training, procurement/contracts, and technology transfer) 
embedded in petroleum agreements of various countries. This research 
made a short analysis to ascertain the local content elements most applied. 
From the table contracts and procurement have the highest application, 
then employment and training. The least applied tool is technology transfer. 
                                                          
12 Available online at: http://www.eisourcebook.org/932_55LocalContent.html 
Profile Local Content Provisions 
Country Type of 
Petroleum 
Contract 
Year Employment 
& Training 
Contracts &  
Procurement 
Technology 
Transfer 
Angola PSA     
2008 
* * * 
Brazil Concession     
2008 
   - * * 
Bangladesh PSC     
2008 
* * * 
Cambodia  2004 * * * 
Cyprus PSC  2007 * * - 
Eq. Guinea PSC NA * * * 
Ethiopia PSA NA * * - 
India  PSC 2007 * * * 
Iraq PSC NA * - * 
Jordan PSA 2009 * * * 
Kenya PSC 2008 * * * 
Liberia PSC NA * * - 
Libya Ex. & PSA 2006 * * - 
Namibia Petroleum 
Agreement 
NA * * * 
Nigeria Offshore 
Deep 
Water PSC 
1993 * * * 
Seychelles Petroleum 
Agreement 
2013 * * - 
Sierra Leone Petroleum 
License 
2012 * * - 
Tanzania PSA 2013 * * * 
Timor-Leste PSC NA * * - 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Deep on-
shore PSC 
2006 * * * 
Turkmenistan PSA 1997 * * * 
Uganda PCS 1999 * * * 
Vietnam PSC NA - * - 
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This may not be unconnected with Tordo et al (2013: 150) argument that 
“foreign investors may be reluctant to transfer proprietary technology to 
companies with majority local ownership”. It was observed that the absence 
of ownership policy in Kazakhstan and Brazil and the relaxation of such 
policy in Malaysia were deliberate attempts to fast-track technology transfer 
and foreign investment. Figure 2 below compares the frequency of the local 
content tools/strategies applied in the model petroleum contracts above. 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of local content tools/strategies in oil contracts of selected 
countries 
 
Source: Author 
 
The three local content provisions above have sustainability implications, 
for instance, employment and training serve both the social and economic 
sustainability, procurement and contracts serve economic sustainability, 
and technology transfer serves environmental sustainability. The above 
analysis has therefore shown more emphasis on the social and economic 
sustainability. Similarly, the accounting and financial implications of the 
above provisions are discussed in Section 3.15. The three local content 
provisions also attract other fiscal incentives such as favourable tax rates 
for IOCs that establish facilities for local manufacturing or servicing in 
Nigeria (S. 48 NOGICD Act). These are some of the reasons why petroleum 
contracts often involve accounting and reporting provisions of local content 
which are regulated and enforced by designated local content agencies such 
as the NCDMB. These accounting provisions are considered by this study as 
mandatory (hard) local content accountability of oil companies. Aside the 
mandatory provisions, oil firms also engage in voluntary (soft) reporting. 
21
22
15
Local Content Tools/Strategies
Employment & Training Procurement & Contracts Technology transfer
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These two reporting practices will be the subjects of the next chapter. But 
before going into that, the next section presents a few examples of the 
accounting and reporting provisions in petroleum contracts of selected 
countries. 
 
2.10 Accounting and Reporting Provisions of Local Content in the 
Model Petroleum Contracts 
  
It is a common practice that countries include dedicated sections in their 
petroleum agreements that prescribe how expenditure on the local content 
(e.g., local training and local purchases) should be disclosed. This is 
basically where local content oversight functions are critical due to the 
challenges involved in verifying and comparing actual performance against 
the reported. It was observed that (Alba, 2009: 11) 
Internationally accepted accounting and reporting standards have been developed to 
deal with key financial accounting and reporting issues unique to the extractive 
industries. It is common practice for producing countries to refer to such standards 
in sector laws, contracts, and licenses. Special accounting procedures are also 
generally annexed to the relevant contract or license. Ideally, accounting procedures 
are standardized and apply (sic) to all projects in a country.  
 
This section has conducted a survey of some contract documents to locate 
such accounting provisions as they relate to local content.  For example, the 
Brazilian Concession model contract of 2008 provided as follows: 
 Accounting: 
The Concessionaire shall keep all documents, books, papers, registers and other 
elements, as well as all the necessary corroborative documentation to the calculation 
of the Local Content and give support to its accounting, provide all relevant charges 
and submit the financial statements in accordance with the applicable Brazilian 
legislation and in accordance with the fundamental principles of accounting and this 
Agreement. 
Other countries – India, Namibia and Sierra Leone have adopted a common 
accounting and reporting framework designed to report expenditure on local 
purchases using exact wordings. For example, the Indian model petroleum 
contract stated as follows:  
Local Procurement Statement: 
In furtherance of the obligation in Article 23 of the Contract for the Contractor to give 
preference to the procurement of Indian goods and services, the Contractor shall prepare in 
respect of each Year a local procurement statement, containing the following information: 
(a) The amount of expenditure incurred by the Contractor directly, or indirectly through 
its Subcontractors, on goods supplied, produced or manufactured in India; 
(b) the amount of expenditure incurred by the Contractor directly, or indirectly through 
its Subcontractors, on services provided by Indian entities; 
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(c) the respective percentages that the expenditure recorded under items (a) and (b) 
above represent the Contractor’s total expenditure; 
(d) a detailed description of the procedures adopted during the year to identify and 
purchase goods and services from Indian suppliers; and 
(e) a detailed exposition of how the local purchases for the Year as recorded under 
items (a) and (b) above compared with the projected purchases included in the 
budget statement for that Year (pursuant to Section 12.1.3), with explanations for 
any significant variations; 
 
In the Nigerian case, the local content accounting provisions for oil 
contracts are contained in the NOGICD Act as follows: 
S. 60. Within sixty days of the beginning of each year, each operator shall submit to 
the Board their annual Nigerian Content Performance Report covering all its projects 
and activities for the year under review.  
S. 61. Subject to section 60, the report shall specify by category of expenditure the 
Nigerian content on both a current and cumulative cost basis and shall set out- (a) 
employment achievement in terms of hours or days worked by Nigerian and foreign 
workers and their status; and (b) procurement achievement in terms of quantity, 
tonnage of locally manufactured materials and materials of foreign origin.  
62. The Board13 shall undertake regular assessment and verification of the Nigerian 
Content Performance Report filed by all operators in compliance with the provisions 
of this Act as may be considered appropriate by the Board.  
63. The Board shall issue directives to operators, contractors and other entities or 
persons in order to develop a process to facilitate reporting of activities relating to 
any aspect of this Act.    
 
One of the objectives of this study is to examine whether the NCDMB can 
enforce oil companies to submit local content reports in line with the above 
provisions. As stated earlier, the oversight agencies have the mandate to 
issue regulations and procedures to stakeholders on how to account for and 
report their progress on local content. Generally speaking, the introduction 
of local content into the accounting discipline is an emerging issue which 
found its way through the sustainability and social accounting literature. It 
is, however, pertinent that the study discusses how local content is 
incorporated into the sustainability accounting practice. This is the aim of 
the next section. 
 
2.11 Sustainability Accounting and Local Content Provisions in 
Petroleum Contracts 
 
Sustainability has already entered the accounting realm (Bebbington, 2001) 
and, local content as a sustainability policy has several accounting 
                                                          
13 That is the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB). 
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implications (see Section 2.3). Schaltegger and Burritt (2010: 378) argue 
that the reasons for sustainability accounting by firms include 
greenwashing, mimicry, industry and legislative pressure, self-regulation, 
ethical reasons, and business-case. In this work, the voluntary reporting of 
local content is supported by one of the most commonly used sustainability 
study approaches – the business case, and used by oil firms to gain public 
support and social license. The central idea of local content is that the 
environmental degradation, emission and pollution footprints together with 
the first-order (threats to health, life, etc) and second-order (social unrests, 
dislocation, etc) social costs associated with oil and gas production (Spence, 
2011) are exchanged with economic and societal development activities in 
host oil-producing countries. In this regard, some of the documents that 
have played major roles in introducing local content into the accounting 
research include the International Accounting and Reporting Standard 
Issues/the Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators in Annual 
Reports (2007, 2008), the IPIECA, and the GRI sustainability reporting 
projects (IPIECA, 2011; GRI, 2013).  
 
2.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the general and specific meanings of local content as 
it relates to the three tenets of sustainability and accounting in petroleum 
contracts. It demonstrated that the policy involves a portion of oil and gas 
contract values including materials and man-hours, that is sourced locally 
for the execution of petroleum projects at the preliminary, development, 
drilling, production and decommissioning stages. The chapter found local 
content to be a bargaining mechanism and an important element in oil 
contract bidding and awarding processes. The review of several petroleum 
model contracts in the chapter has revealed that the contract and 
procurement components of local content were more frequently used over 
the employment and training and technology transfer. The chapter also 
introduced the accounting provisions of local content in petroleum 
contracts; this will be extended to the next chapter after reviewing the 
wider natural resource governance.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Overview of Accounting, Accountability and Governance Provisions 
of Local Content Sustainability in Petroleum Contracts 
  
3.1 Introduction 
 
The last part of the previous chapter set the scene for the discussion of the 
accounting provisions of local content in petroleum contracts. This chapter 
extends the discussion to introduce the governance and accountability 
factors including the accounting and reporting processes applicable to local 
content. The chapter draws heavily on the Chatham House good 
governance framework which specifically addressed the oil and gas sector. 
This governance framework involves “local content” and “accountability”, 
the two concepts which are the key topics of the study. The chapter then 
discusses the mandatory and voluntary accounting frameworks that guide 
local content reporting of oil companies. The next section starts by 
introducing the petroleum and natural resource governance before 
considering the accounting and accountability issues. 
 
3.2 Governance in the Petroleum Sector 
 
Achieving sustainable development is the major objective of natural 
resource extraction policies (NRGI, 2014, 2015). Roy and Tisdell (1998: 
1322) posit that if not implemented properly, “good economic policies will 
not achieve sustainable development”, but “effective implementation of 
policies depends on good governance”. Therefore, “good governance is just 
as important as and, even more important than good economic policies”. 
This implies that for the local content policy to achieve the desired 
sustainability goals it has to be supported by good governance 
arrangements (Ovadia, 2015). Governance was also identified as one of the 
basic pillars of achieving local content (Schlumberger, 2014). To further 
support these assertions, the Natural Resources Governance Institute 
(NRGI) has dedicated a large part of the ‘precept 10’ of its Natural 
Resources Charter Decision Chain on local content (NRGI, 2014). This 
shows how relevant governance practices are to the implementation of local 
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content. Discussion of governance in the petroleum sector is vital as one of 
the study’s major concerns is the assessment of accountability in the 
implementation of local content policy in Nigeria. This informed the decision 
to adopt the stakeholder-accountability approach as the framework which 
produced sixteen (16) accountability indicators used in the study (see 
Figure 15 and Table 5.3). Apiah-Adu and Apiah-Adu (2013) applied Derby’s 
(2010) three natural resource governance indicators – accountability, 
transparency and participation – to study sustainable development in the 
petroleum sector of Ghana. Heller and Heuty (2010: 53) also identified 
another set of oil sector governance and accountability of oversight 
agencies to include “transparency, clarity of roles and responsibilities, and 
the enshrinement of core rules in law rather than in contracts14”. Natural 
resource governance is a complex issue (Andrews-Speed et al., 2012), and 
the two sets of indicators presented above are considered too narrow to 
address all issues raised by the study. For this, the work finds the Chatham 
House governance framework (2013) as the most appropriate to adopt 
(although a practitioner framework) for three reasons. Firstly, throughout 
the governance literature known to the study, it is the only framework that 
specifically tailors to addressing the oil and gas sector. Secondly, it 
incorporates ‘local content’ and ‘accountability’ which are the focal points of 
the research. Finally, adopting the framework will enrich the academic 
literature on oil sector governance and will also strengthen the links 
between the theory and the practice. With this introduction, the next 
section presents the Chatham House governance framework. 
 
3.3 The Chatham House Good Governance in the Oil and Gas 
Sector 
 
The Chatham House publication – the Guidelines for Good Governance in 
Emerging Oil and Gas Producers (2013)15 (Valérie Marcel, 2013), outlined 
                                                          
14 It was noted that a country risks being short changed if it left major petroleum rules such as local benefit or 
environmental protection policies open to negotiations with contractors. They should rather be treated as 
mandatory legal requirements. 
15The project was the result of a collaborative work of experts from governance institutions including the 
Commonwealth secretariat, the Natural Resource Charter, the Natural Resource Governance Institute and the 
PETRAD. The purpose was to invite experts to draft these guidelines that would address most of the governance 
issues of oil and gas extraction as would particularly be useful for the developing and new frontier oil-producing 
countries.  
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seven key determinants for assessing good governance of the oil sector. 
The essence of presenting this governance framework is to form the basis 
for the discussion of local content, accountability and accounting within the 
context of petroleum operations in Nigeria. By doing this the study’s 
conceptual framework would be developed from the first principle and 
progress through the chapters. Figure 3 below presents the Chatham House 
governance framework. 
 
Figure 3: Chatham House Petroleum Sector Good Governance Guidelines 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Chatham House (2013) 
 
The following sections will firstly discuss the seven elements in turn then 
proceed with the discussions of local content and accountability elements 
throughout the rest of the thesis. 
 
3.3.1  Attract the Most Qualified Investor for the Long Run 
 
Investment is the first step in any oil and gas operation. To attract the most 
suitable investor (particularly, the IOCs), it was recommended that there 
1
•Attract the most qualified investor for the long run
2
•Maximize economic return to the state through licensing
3
•Earn and Retain Public Trust and Manage Public Expectation
4
•Increase Local Content and Benefits to the Broader Economy
5
•Ensure National Oil Company Participation in the Development of the 
Resources
6
•Gradually Build Capacity and Enable Actors to Perform their Roles
7
•Increase Accountability
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have to be effective prequalification criteria when awarding oil licenses and 
contracts. To discourage corruption, all information on bidding must be 
publicly available. Auctions and open license biddings were also said to be 
the most efficient options (Chatham House, 2013). This indicator would 
contribute to our understanding of one of the functions of the NCDMB of 
participating in oil license and contract processes and mandating oil firms to 
submit, during the prequalification16 stage, specified documents describing 
the scope of the work, list of potential bidders, invitation to tenders, dates 
for pre-qualification and technical evaluations, etc. See Appendix 1a and 1b 
for sample invitation to tenders for the sale and purchase of crude oil, and 
invitation to pre-qualification including the local content requirements of S. 
20-22 of the NOGICD Act, 2010.  
 
3.3.2  Maximize Economic Return to the State through 
Licensing 
 
It was posited that to achieve sustainable development from their natural 
endowment, oil-producing countries “should design fiscal terms that give 
the state early revenues for urgent development needs while ensuring long-
term economic benefits via local content requirements” (Chatham House, 
2013: 5). This statement points to the arguments on the complementarity 
of, and the trade-off between local content and royalties/taxes suggested 
by Esteves (2011) and Cotula (2013).  
 
3.3.3  Earn and Retain Public Trust and Manage Public 
Expectation 
 
As far as the petroleum activities are concerned public trust can only be 
obtained through job creation, stakeholder engagement and disclosure of 
information on bidding procedures. This minimizes corruption and the 
“potential grievances from unsuccessful bidders” (IPIECA, 2011: 29; 
                                                          
16 In several instances, the IOCs operating in host countries issues Invitation to Tenders (ITTs), receive and review 
prequalification documents from prospective bidders, and award contracts. This is a typical example of countries 
like Nigeria where the NOC and the IOCs operate together in a joint venture with the IOCs as operators. In this case, 
to ensure accountability in the process, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has recommended that these 
documents should be reported by the IOCs in company reports. See GRI (2013).   
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Chatham House, 2013). In Section 1.3 for instance, we have observed 
stakeholders’ concerns over the possibilities of corruption associated with 
the implementation of local content in Nigeria especially in selecting 
contractors or where import waivers are involved. This is why S.57 and 63 
of the NOGICD Act demand transparency, reporting and stakeholder 
engagement in petroleum contracts. To meet local expectations, local 
content is the recommended policy. This is presented in the next section.  
 
3.3.4 Increase Local Content and Benefits to the Broader Economy 
 
Local content according to Chatham House (2013: 19) is a “macroeconomic 
policy that maximizes linkages between the capital-intensive, high-tech 
petroleum sector and other sectors of the economy”. NRGI (2015) observes 
that governments who want to introduce local content “need to understand 
associated costs and challenges such as potential loss in company profits 
resulting in reduced revenue, inflation and corruption”. As would soon be 
seen, two local content models are presented and reviewed below. These 
two models (first and second models) are used to underpin this work.  
  
3.3.5 Ensure National Oil Company Participation in the Development 
of the Resources 
 
This governance element ensures the participation of NOCs in natural 
resource governance. In many jurisdictions including Nigeria, Brazil, Angola 
and Senegal NOCs participate in petroleum activities alongside their foreign 
counterparts through joint ventures, production-sharing or service 
contracts. This practice, besides being one of the requirements to join the 
OPEC, has the advantage of reducing information asymmetry between 
authorities and the IOCs (Olomola and Olumide, 2005; Chatham House, 
2013) which may put the authorities at a disadvantage. For instance, the 
Nigerian government carries the majority interest in all the seven joint 
ventures with the major IOCs and oversees the numerous production-
sharing contracts. This gives the government enough leverage to pursue 
local content which results in local capacity development. 
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3.3.6 Gradually Build Capacity and Enable Actors to Perform their 
Roles 
 
It was required that NOCs should acquire skills and knowledge through on-
the-job training and technology transfer in order to change their positions 
as dormant to more active partners. This does not exempt the IOCs from 
their role as one of the pursuers of local sustainability. The Nigeria’s 
NOGICD Act for example apart from providing for technology transfer has 
also made a provision for succession plan 17  as recommended by the 
Chatham House (2013). The next section presents the accountability 
indicator as the last but the most important indicator in the governance 
framework.  
 
3.3.7  Increase Accountability 
 
Accountability is viewed as the “institutionalised relationship between 
actors” that is, accountees and accountors (Darby, 2010). Lahn et al. 
(2007) contended that the whole issue of accountability in the natural 
resources hinges on three elements: revenue transparency, licensing and 
contracting and local content. That is why local content and accountability 
cannot be separated. Figure 4 below presents the governance framework 
discussed above and the local content models it produced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 This involves provisions for training and technology transfer to the locals preparatory to the period when local 
personnel become competent to take over leadership positions currently occupied by the expatriates. 
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Figure 4: Good Governance Framework & Local Content Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Local Content Models                         
   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author generated from literature 
From Figure 4 above we can see that two local content models - Klueh et al. 
(2009) or the first model, and EY (2014) or the second model, are produced 
from the Good Governance framework. The notable differences between the 
two models are that while the former provides the foundations for the 
existence of local content, and in combination with the governance 
framework, underpins our conceptual framework (stakeholder-
accountability), the latter forms the tools or strategies that are to be used 
to achieve local content sustainability benefits. The two models work in 
tandem; authorities use the elements of the first model to exercise their 
regulatory roles in the petroleum value chain to pursue the elements of the 
second model (see Appendix 2 for the functions of regulators via the first 
First Model
Principles of local content
(Institutional/Regulatory Provisions)
Second Model
Strategies of local content
(Tools of the Trade)
Good Governance in Oil and Gas Sector 
(Chatham House, 2013) 
 Attracting most qualified investor 
 Maximizing returns through licensing 
 Earning trust & managing 
expectations 
 Local content 
 NOC participation 
 Enabling actors to perform roles 
 Accountability 
 
Ernst & Young (2013) Model 
 Ownership 
 Taxation 
 Supplier development 
 Employment & training 
 Social programmes 
Klueh, et al (2009) Model 
 Accountability 
 Metrics 
 Efficiency 
 Information 
dissemination/transparency 
 Spin-off effects 
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model). Similarly, the IOCs support sustainability in the oil industry through 
the second model. This line of discussion is presented in Sections 4.8 and 
4.11. The second model is also a practitioner model found to be very 
relevant to the academic discourse for the particular contributions it makes 
towards the understanding of a complete picture of local content 
governance in the oil sector initiated by this work. As a similar theoretical 
model is lacking, the use of the EY (2013) model becomes unavoidable. The 
next sections consider the two models.   
  
3.4 The First Model: Institutional/Regulatory Provisions  
 
From Figure 4 above we have seen how local content was found within the 
oil sector governance framework. Although the first model predated the 
Chatham House Governance framework, it can be logically and convincingly 
argued that local content as a sustainability policy implemented by 
governments for the benefits of the citizens is under the umbrella of 
governance. After studying local content policies of many international oil 
and gas industries around the world, Klueh et al. (2009) developed the 
‘principles of local content’, consisting of five elements involving 
regulations, rules, procedures and institutions that provide the ground and 
the environment for the implementation of local content. These principles 
are a necessary condition and mutually inclusive. These are presented in 
Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5: First local content model 
 
Source: Compiled from Klueh (2009) 
1
•Accountability
2
•Adequate Metrics
3
•Information Dissemination
4
•Efficiency
5
•Acknowledgement of Spin-off Effects
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The above principles are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
3.4.1  Accountability 
 
It was opined that local content “arises from a contract-based market 
exchange between MNCs and local firms”, and to execute the contract there 
has to be an established body that would facilitate the process (Hansen, et 
al. 2015: 6).  Accountability in this context involves the establishment of a 
strong independent public agency that will shoulder the responsibility of 
monitoring, reporting and compliance with local content rules. The agency 
according to Klueh, et al., (2007) has to maintain personnel competent in 
accounting practice to discharge the stated functions more efficiently. The 
agency has to ensure that local contractors and suppliers are involved in all 
petroleum bidding and contracts. Many oil-producing countries that use 
local content rules have created dedicated oversight agencies. For example, 
the UK’s OSO, the Norwegian GSO, the Australian ISO, the Brazilian ANP, 
the Indonesian SKSPMIGAS and the Nigerian NCDMB. The core functions of 
these agencies have been summarised in Appendix 2. It should be 
appreciated that the concept of “accountability” has intercepted both the 
governance framework and the Klueh’s local content model, underscoring 
the fact that accountability is the philosophical basis of governance in 
general and local content in particular (refer to Figure 4 above). Next to 
accountability is the reporting metrics. 
 
3.4.2  Adequate Metrics 
 
This principle is used by the authorities to ascertain “what constitutes local 
content” and its computation at the exploration, development, production, 
and decommissioning phases – for the purpose of accounting and reporting 
(Klueh, 2009: 1131; Tordo, 2013). These metrics must be clearly and 
unambiguously stated (Hansen, et al. 2015) and may include percentages 
of capital expenditure (CAPEX), operating expenditure (OPEX), man-hours, 
jobs generated, tonnes of equipment fabricated in-country, subcontracting, 
etc. (Hilary-Nwokonko, 2004; Bordmann, 2010; Warner, 2011). These 
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metrics can be categorised according to Munson and Rosenblatt’s (1997) 
volume- and value-based local content and Tordo et al.’s (2013) ‘local 
content’ and ‘local content development’ (see Section 2.3). Local content 
metrics are divided into two parts as shown in Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6: Categories of Local content metrics  
Category 1    Category 2 
    Local content   Local content development 
         Input metrics                     output metrics 
 
      
      
             no. of employees;                value of training;          value of post  
          value of salaries/wages        training man-hours          training earnings
         
         
         
         
      
 
                                                         no. of suppliers                                    value of import 
                                                                                                         in a program                                         substitution  
 
 
   value spent with local firms 
 
                             investment                             increase in revenues  
in local suppliers                 of local manufacturers  
Local content in the 
workforce 
Oil and gas 
company 
Local Training & Education 
Local supply chain investment 
Local supplier development programs 
Expenditure 
with suppliers 
Local content in 
supply of 
goods/services 
Source: Tordo et al. (2013: 66) 
 
Figure 6 above indicates that while the first category (i.e., local content) 
focuses on the actual salaries and wages, the size of local personnel 
employed and the value of expenditure on local suppliers, the second 
category (i.e., local content development) focuses on the measures of 
sustaining the first category. For instance, if the IOCs refuse to train and 
transfer the required technology to the local workforce or fail to invest in 
the local supply chain, there would certainly be no qualified local personnel 
or capable contractors, suppliers or manufacturers to participate in the 
petroleum value chain and actualise the local content aspirations. Metrics in 
the second category are divided into input and output, that is, investment 
and returns on the investment. It emphasises the establishment of local 
linkages and other benefits for future generations. This underscores the 
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sustainability nature of local content and reaffirms Heller’s (2011) argument 
that local content would benefit future generations after the oil has 
depleted. Both categories of metrics have been adequately captured by the 
second local content model (EY, 2014) and the GRI/IPIECA sustainability 
guidelines to be discussed in later sections. The next principle is efficiency.   
 
3.4.3  Efficiency 
 
It has been claimed that in setting targets for local content, regulators have 
to consider the available technological capacity in the industry (Hansen, et 
al., 2015). Targets have to be realistic and within the capacity of local 
suppliers, contractors and personnel (Esteves, 2011; Kalyuzhnova, 2012; 
Tordo, et al., 2013). This constraint is regarded as the determining factor 
for the size of local benefit that could be derived (Klueh et al. (2009). 
Although her fabrication sector was considered relatively developed, for 
example, it has been reported that the Nigerian indigenous capacity in the 
oil sector is largely weak technologically, financially and institutionally 
affecting most of the local content targets (Balouga, 2012). One of the key 
functions of the oversight agencies is informing stakeholders about the 
industry’s capacities and new opportunities (IPIECA, 2011). The next 
section considers this issue.     
 
3.4.4  Information Dissemination (Transparency) 
 
Information dissemination is an integral part of transparency (Bushman and 
Smith, 2003; Cornand and Heinemann, 2008). Local content successes rely 
on the extent to which policy-makers are transparent to the industry 
stakeholders including the IOCs, NOCs, indigenous oil firms, trade 
associations, civil society groups, etc. (Chatham House, 2013). That is why 
local content is a stakeholder-based policy because no single party can 
accomplish it without the collaboration of other parties (Vaaland et al., 
2012). Tackling information asymmetry is one of the major functions of 
local content Osammor (2008; Chatham House, 2013). For this purpose, 
Klueh et al (2009) recommended that an information office which will 
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promote local-foreign stakeholder collaboration, and joint ventures should 
be established. The office should maintain a register of all qualified local 
contractors. This type of register has been utilized by many countries 
around the world. For example, the   FPAL of the UK, Ireland and 
Netherland, JQS of Norway and Denmark, RPP of Venezuela, SICLAR of 
Argentina18 and JQS of Nigeria19.  
 
3.4.5  Acknowledgement of Spin-off Benefits 
 
This principle is concerned with the creation of strong economic linkages 
between the oil industry and other sectors (Klueh, 2009) facilitated by the 
combined effect of the above four principles. For this reason, this study 
concludes that local content agencies through their regulatory functions 
(accountability) design and monitor performance targets (metrics) which 
are communicated to stakeholders (information 
dissemination/transparency) who use available capacity (efficiency) to 
develop economic linkages (spin-off benefits). For example, a study by 
Adewuyi and Oyejide (2012) found a clear evidence of such linkage in the 
fabrication and construction, well construction, completion, ICT and control 
systems sectors of the Nigerian oil industry. 
 
Having discussed the foundation and institutions of local content, it is 
pertinent also to present and consider the avenues, mechanisms or 
strategies applied by authorities to achieve the desired local content 
objectives. These are contained in the second local content model 
presented in the next section and are termed by this study as the ‘tools of 
the trade’.  
 
 
                                                          
18 These are contractors/suppliers prequalified databases available on Achilles http://www.achilles.co.uk 
19 The Nigerian Joint Qualification System (JQS) is a database of prequalified oil and gas contractors, service 
providers and workforce meant to facilitate interactions among stakeholders in the petroleum value chain as well 
as reducing the length of the contracting circle.   
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3.5  The Second Model: Tools of the Trade 
 
The global accounting and auditing firm Ernst & Young (EY)20 identified five 
tools or strategies through which local content can be maximised. The 
rationale for using this model is that while the academic literature fails to 
give sufficient attention to the mechanisms of achieving local content, the 
Ernst & Young model has provided a comprehensive account of this. The 
variables in the model are found to be consistent with the local content 
indicators of the GRI and the IPIECA, the existing practices of oil-producing 
countries (see Tables 2.1, 3.1 and 3.2), the three fundamental mechanisms 
used by the NCDMB (Hufbauer et al., 2013), and the local content 
strategies of the IOCs (Ngoasong, 2014). These indicators are presented in 
Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7: The Second Model (Tools/Strategies) 
 
Source: Compiled by author from Ernst and Young (2013) 
The sections below discuss the above tools.  
3.5.1. Ownership 
 
Local share ownership in oil companies plays a significant role in 
determining the extent of local content in petroleum operations. 
Notwithstanding the argument of some scholars and the practice of some 
                                                          
20 Ernst & Young is one of the top four global Accounting and Auditing Firms that worked in the local content field. 
The other three audit firms PriceWaterHouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte also contributed immensely to our 
understanding of local content in the oil industry. 
1
•Ownership
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•Supplier Development
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•Employment and Training
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•Social Programmes
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countries (such as Brazil, Kazakhstan, Norway, Malaysia and Russia) that 
location of companies is enough to determine the local value addition 
(Nordas, et al., 2003; Wells and John, 2008; Kniznikov and Wilson, 2010; 
Heum, et al., 2011), other countries (including Congo, Uganda and Angola) 
require specific percentages of local share ownership in oil licenses as part 
of their local content strategies (PwC, 2013). Nigerian local content rules 
have gone to the corporate governance roots of the IOCs and categorised 
oil companies according to the percentage of share ownership, board 
membership and managerial and supervisory positions held by nationals 
(Hilary-Nwokonko, 2004). This position is supported by the GRI/IPIECA 
local content sustainability indicators. Supporting further, Cotula (2010: 10) 
argues that effective local content arrangements would “set specific 
percentage targets for positions reserved to local nationals, possibly 
differentiated by categories of employment (e.g., unskilled labour versus 
technical and managerial positions; temporary versus permanent 
employment)”. This staffing arrangement has implications for corporate 
board diversities and the general performance of the IOCs (Peterson, et al., 
1996; Wang, et al., 1998; Delios and Björkman, 2000; Richards, 2001; 
Harvey and Richey, 2001; Ruigrok, et al., 2007).  
 
Using the accounting framework and the input-output data, the empirical 
study proves that exports by domestic-private and state- owned enterprises 
have higher local content values compared to that of the wholly-owned 
foreign and foreign joint venture companies (Koopman et al., 2012). In a 
contrary argument, Tordo et al. (2011) contend that local ownership may 
adversely affect local value-addition in some situations because foreign 
investors may not be willing to invest and transfer proprietary technology to 
companies with majority local shareholding. The heated debate on the 
determinants of local value-addition is yet to be resolved with the two 
major international bodies – the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank divided on the ownership-location dichotomy. While the former 
prioritises local equity ownership alone, the latter considers the totality of 
the location, number of nationals on corporate boards and equity ownership 
to be the determining factors for value-addition through local content 
(Dobbs et al., 2013).  
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3.5.2 Taxation 
 
The nature of the fiscal regime of countries determines the extent of local 
content value to be achieved (Chatham House, 2013; EY, 2014). Tax 
breaks, lowered royalties, un-ringfencing or cross-fencing of costs are 
employed by governments to attract the IOCs and to encourage exploration 
in frontier areas (Jennings et al., 2000; Chantasasawat, 2008; Ravat and 
Kannan, 2013; IMF, 2013). Through this, local oil firms and workforce gain 
new technology and employment. Taxation is, therefore, “a public policy 
tool that may be used in social and environmental matters” (2010: 36).  
 
3.5.3 Supplier Development  
 
One of the most important elements of local content is the enhancement of 
the capacity of local suppliers (Balasubramanyan, 1991). EY (2014) noted 
that the capital and operating expenditure (CAPEX and OPEX) of the oil 
industry are extremely significant, and oil companies will benefit from 
localisation of the supply chain. Local procurement is capable of lowering 
the operating costs of oil companies (Ovadia, 2014). It has also been 
argued by Sturgeon et al. (2008) in Primo and DuBois (2012) that local 
suppliers have the ability to minimize logistic risks, cut down lead-times, 
ensure flexible delivery and assist oil and gas companies to meet their local 
content obligations. EY (2014) found evidence that some IOCs engage in 
redesigning their oil rigs to a format which will enhance local content in 
areas of high specialization and spend. In this connection, a special IOCs–
supported programme – the Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy - was 
initiated by the Nigeria’s NCDMB to encourage rig ownership and 
maintenance.  
 
For this reason, Ngoasong (2014) observed that to support the technology 
capacity of local suppliers and contractors IOCs have now maintained a 
defined local sourcing mechanism. Supplier development indicator is part of 
the GRI/IPIECA sustainability guidelines and will be used in chapter nine to 
assess the Nigeria’s IOCs’ extent of engaging local suppliers. 
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3.5.4 Employment and Training 
 
Although the oil industry is not a major employer of labour due to its capital 
extensive nature (Frynas and Paulo, 2007; EY, 2014), employment and 
training of local workforce have been practiced by almost all the IOCs with 
the intention of developing local capacity and meeting local content targets. 
Local content was proved to be positively related to employment but has 
mixed effects on welfare (Chao and Yu, 1993; Gu and Yabuuchi, 2003). 
Fossgard-Moser (2003) used a case study to demonstrate how local 
employment could lead to sustainable development which is the prime aim 
of local content policy. He considered the demand for local labour from 
various perspectives – demand perspective (the construction phase of oil 
and gas project, for example, requires the highest number of labour and 
materials), cost perspective (utilizing local labour is cheaper than using the 
expatriates), sustainability perspective (at the operations phase less labour 
is required) and skills perspective (some stages of petroleum development 
such as the construction phase require low-skilled labour). Engaging local 
labour provides the avenue for technology transfer which is an important 
aspect of local content in petroleum contracts (see Sections 2.2 and 2.8.1). 
Havro and Santiso (2008) posit that the benefits of local content can 
effectively be enhanced when it is accompanied by technological spill-over. 
Employment and training are part of the GRI/IPIECA sustainability 
indicators to be dealt with in chapter nine. 
 
3.5.5 Social Programmes 
 
Through social programmes oil companies accomplish social responsibilities 
which may eventually lead to greater local content. Due to its triple-
bottom-line nature, a number of studies have related local content to 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) or Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) which are variants of sustainability. For example, Fossgard-Moser 
(2003) classified local employment and local purchases by IOCs as part of 
CSP. Both local content and the CSR were underpinned by legitimacy theory 
(Ado, 2014). Ado (2014) also found that CSR, which used to be voluntary, 
was increasingly becoming regulated and mandatory as in Indonesia, India 
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and Saudi. Viewed as an efficient alternative to local content capable of 
enhancing transactions between IOCs and local suppliers, CSR is said to 
have covered three major areas – transparency, labour/human rights, and 
local content (OECD/IEA, 2006; Amadi et al., 2006; Anchondo, 2010; 
Olowokudejo et al., 2011; Cimino et al., 2014)21. Wiig and Kolstad (2010) 
after conducting an intensive study of the Angolan oil and gas industry 
found that local content and environmental efforts to reduce gas flaring and 
oil spills were the two most important CSR components that determined the 
award of petroleum contracts. Many of the CSR activities of extractive 
companies often relate to local hiring, job retaining, utilisation of local 
suppliers, and re-investment in the downstream ventures (Vintro et al., 
2012; Van Alstine et al., 2014). This is why Gulbrandsen and Moe (2005) 
argue that local content is part of the activities resulting from the ever-
increasing pressure on multinational corporations to ensure that their 
operations lead to the maximization of local benefits.  
 
Summing up, it can be concluded that local content as a key lever for 
sustainable economic development (Cortula, 2010) is concerned with 
corporate governance (ownership), fiscal issues (taxation), supply chain 
strategies (supplier development), human resource issues (employment 
and training), and corporate social responsibility (social programmes). 
These tools were further supported by the Natural Resources Governance 
Institute (NRGI) (2015). The sustainability relevance of the two local 
content models is presented in the next section. 
 
3.6 Relevance of the Local Content Models to Sustainability 
 
The two local content models that have emerged from the good governance 
framework would help significantly in setting the context of this study. As 
shown earlier (Figure 4), the first model (Klueh et al., 2009) is the 
institutional and regulatory basis for local content. For example, there could 
                                                          
21 Local content only works in an accountable and transparent atmosphere as corroborated by EITI, Revenue Watch 
Institute, Publish What You Pay, etc. Labour issues are also a major area of local content because the major aim of 
the policy is to create local jobs and reduce the poverty and sufferings of the host oil-producing nations. 
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not be an effective local content policy without a regulatory agency, or 
monitoring, compliance, accounting and reporting procedures (principle of 
accountability), or in the absence of specific targets (principle of metrics), 
capacity (principle of efficiency) or information and engagement with the oil 
industry stakeholders who are the executors of local content (principle of 
information dissemination). Even though local content exists, it would still 
have no impact if it is unable to create linkages among different sectors of 
the economy (principle of spin-off effect). The combination of the five 
principles points towards the achievement of sustainability. The first model 
would also allow an assessment of the functions of the NCDMB. While prior 
studies on local content in Nigeria have assessed the situation of available 
capacity (principle of efficiency) (Ihua, 2010; Balouga, 2012; Vaaland et 
al., 2012; Abdulwahed, 2014) and linkages (principle of spin-off effect) 
(Ihua, 2011) in isolation, none has studied the accountability principle 
which according to literature involves the setting of targets (principle of 
metrics) and transparency (principle of information dissemination). This is 
part of the gap the current study attempts to fill.  
 
The second model (EY, 2014) depends on the first model and consists of 
local content sustainability drivers that impact on the quality of lives and 
the environment of the present and future generations. We can apply the 
direct, indirect and induced effects of local content (Warner, 2011; Lunde, 
2011; Saipem Sustainability Report, 2013) to justify how governments 
generate tax through local labour and local procurement to effect 
developmental projects; or the use of taxation to attract investment in local 
content (Jennings et al., 2000; Chantasasawat, 2008; Cotula, 2010; Ravat 
and Kannan, 2013; IMF, 2013). The study also reviewed the ownership and 
location arguments in Section 3.5.1 and found how OPEC members have 
used ownership strategies to acquire participating interests in concessions 
previously held by the IOCs. It was further reviewed how local sourcing 
(supplier development) reduces pollution, transportation costs and 
enhances environmental and economic sustainability (Section 2.8.3); and 
how local employment serves as social compensation leading to social 
sustainability (Section 2.6.1). For the social programmes, the study has 
57 
 
reviewed how local content relates to the corporate social responsibility 
(Ado, 2014) which is, undoubtedly, a subset of sustainability. 
 
The sustainability drivers in the second model have also coincided with 
those of the GRI/IPIECA local content sustainability indicators used to 
analyse the IOCs’ sustainability reports in chapter nine. The model also 
consists of local content strategies used by countries in Table 2.1 of the 
previous chapter. For example, the UK, South Africa, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Kazakhstan and Indonesia focused on in-country procurement (supplier 
development variable), Norway focused on indigenous participation 
(ownership variable), whilst Nigeria, Ghana and Angola concentrated on 
both options. Having exhaustively discussed the concept of ‘local content’ 
as developed from the governance framework the study now introduces the 
concept of ‘accountability’ which is the intersection between the governance 
framework and the first local content model (see Figure 4).  
 
3.7 Accountability in Local Content    
 
Central to the seemingly unrestricted definitions of accountability are the 
relationship between two parties (accountor and accountee), the subject-
matter (financial or non-financial), and the resulting performance 
consequences  (Scott and Lyman, 1968; Stewart, 1984; Gray and Jenkins, 
1985; Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Gray et al., 1996; Frink and Klimoski, 
1998; Mulgan, 2000; 2003; Ebrahim, 2003; Pollitt 2003; Kluvers, 2003; 
Dubnick, 2005; Goddard, 2005; Koppell, 2005; Bovens et al. 2008; Kim, 
2009; Iyoha and Oyerinde 2010). Accountability involves organisational 
practices clarifying goals, expectations, assessment, and provision of 
information to measure performance (Holland, 2002). Its scope involves 
reporting, auditing, power, sanctions, enforceability, answerability, 
responsibility, responsiveness, etc. (Mitchell, 1993; Frink and Klimoski, 
1998; Newell and Bellour, 2002; Ebrahim, 2003; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; 
OECD, 2008; Darby, 2010; Boni, et al., 2011). Accountability is attributed 
to the book-keeping and accounting literature (Sinclair, 1995; Weber, 
2011; Messner, 2009) and linked with the idea of checks and balances, 
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provision of accounting information and prevention of corruption. It is the 
cornerstone and philosophical basis for the accounting practice (Roberts, 
1991; Andrew, 2001; Connolly and Hyndman, 2003; Iyoha and Oyerinde, 
2010; McCall and Klay, 2009; Weber, 2011). As such, any discussion of 
local content accountability suggests accounting and reporting on local 
content.  
 
Accountability is used to confront many extractive industry governance 
challenges including petroleum licensing and contracting, biddings, local 
content, revenue collection and spending, as well as auditing in the oil and 
gas industries around the world (Short, 2014). Therefore, accountability as 
both a natural resource governance indicator and an underpinning principle 
of local content (see Figure 4) underscores the responsibilities and the 
calling and answering to account among stakeholders involved in local 
content implementation. Local content accountability is said to either be 
assertive/mandating which obliges the utilization of and reporting on local 
materials, suppliers or labour; or encouraging/voluntary which motivates 
the behaviour of oil and gas companies to engage in voluntary activities 
including disclosure of local content information in sustainability reports 
(Tordo, et al., 2013: xvii; Bastida, 2014).  
 
While the mandatory local content uses government policies, guidelines or 
legislation to regulate the accountability relationships between responsible 
agencies and stakeholders, voluntary local content utilises 
recommendations of best practices by accountability bodies such as the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), the Transparency 
International (TI), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the 
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA). This reaffirms Levitt and Chandler’s (2012: 3) argument that local 
content may operate in the form of “government mandates” in one situation 
while in another “may be identified with corporate social responsibility”. To 
articulate this discussion very well, the following section draws on Van 
Alstine’s (2014) typology of natural resource governance to illustrate the 
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mandatory, voluntary and the hybrid local content accountability. This is 
presented in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8: Typology of local content accountabilities in natural resource 
governance 
   Mandatory Regulations  Voluntary Initiatives 
 
                  
                Macro 
 
 
                 
                 Micro  
 
 
                                                              Hard                                               Soft 
                      (Assertive, Mandatory)              (Encouraging, Voluntary) 
             
  Adapted and modified from Van Alstine (2014: 34) 
             
The above figure shows that local content rules may be hard or soft at the 
macro and micro levels (Tordo et al., 2013; Van Alstine, 2014). Hard rules 
are mandatory provisions and often come in the form of government 
policies, guidelines and regulations as in the case of Ghana, UK, South 
Africa and Indonesia, or dedicated legislation as that of Nigeria, Brazil and 
Angola (Table 2.1). Oil concessions form part of the hard rules that 
mandate oil companies to implement local content with the attached 
accounting and reporting requirements (see Section 2.10). These are 
largely at macro (national) level although in few cases the micro community 
content also applied. The mandatory provisions are binding on both the 
regulators (e.g., NCDMB) for enforcement accountability and the IOCs for 
compliance accountability. Soft rules at the macro level are voluntary 
practices that encourage oil companies to comply with the international 
best practice on local content (e.g., reporting local content in sustainability 
or annual financial reports). At the micro level, however, there is the CSR. 
Local content 
legislation/laws,   
Oil Concessions 
 
 
 
 
Community content 
      Local content 
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At the centre there lies a hybrid (soft/hard) accountability that is, the EITI. 
EITI is a voluntary initiative but is increasingly adopted as mandatory in 
some jurisdiction such as the Nigerian NEITI Act 2007. These hard and soft 
rules are accompanied by mandatory and voluntary accounting and 
reporting frameworks respectively. These are addressed in the following 
sections. 
 
3.8 Accounting and Reporting Frameworks of Local Content in 
Petroleum Contracts 
 
Many oil-producing countries are striving at laws that give preference to 
indigenous oil companies, encourage joint ventures, and establish uniform 
financial accounting standards for the IOCs operating in their environment 
(Lunde, 2013).  This invokes the regulation governments, of the accounting 
practice for the IOCs to report local content expenditure. The reason for 
regulating accounting practices arises from information asymmetry and for 
that, “government intervention in the financial accounting standard-setting 
process has been regarded as necessary because of failures in the market 
for accounting information” (Gaffikin, 2005; Chalmers et al., 2012: 1010). 
Many petroleum license agreements have provided the procedures of 
accounting for, and reporting of local content (see Section 2.10). These 
form the basis for the mandatory reporting to fulfil mandatory 
accountability.  
 
Similarly, IOCs may report their local content performance voluntarily in 
their integrated annual financial or sustainability reports based on the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or the IPIECA guidelines (IPIECA, 2010; 
Perego and Kolk, 2012; Searcy and Roca, 2012; Fonseca et al., 2012; 
Murguia and Böhling, 2013). The International Accounting and Reporting 
Issues (2007, 2008) provide another framework for local content reporting. 
The International Accounting Standards (IAS) 14: “Segment Reporting” 
(superseded by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 8: 
“Operating Segments” and the IAS 21: “Effects of the Changes in Foreign 
Currency” Rates are also found to be useful in reporting local content. 
These reporting guidelines and standards will be discussed in detail later in 
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the chapter. Moreover, the number of publications on local content by the 
top global auditing firms (KPMG, 2011; Deloitte, 2013; PwC, 2013; Ernst & 
Young, 2014) further indicated the greater need for accountability in local 
content. Commenting on the accounting and reporting procedures in the 
extractive industry in general and local content in particular, Alba (2009: 9) 
observes that:  
Accounting rules and procedures for EI (extractive industry) operations and regular 
audits that meet international standards are also critical, in particular, to assess 
production and export volumes, prices, and capital and operating costs, as well as to 
monitor compliance with procurement procedures, local content obligations, and 
social compensation requirements. 
 
It follows that companies involved in oil and gas contracts have to carefully 
account for, and report on local content expenditure incurred at the 
exploration, development and production stages of petroleum projects 
(Mariano and La Rovere, 2007). The reporting frameworks of local content 
are discussed in line with the mandatory and voluntary reporting (see 
Figure 8) above. The next section starts with the mandatory reporting.  
 
3.9 Mandatory (Hard) Local Content Reporting Framework 
 
Mandatory reporting provides evidence that organizations comply with 
regulations (Cowan and Gadenne, 2005). In local content, it is the reporting 
made directly to relevant authorities and not usually for public consumption 
due to the sensitive business information involved. Variations among 
countries in the measurement of local content for the purpose of reporting 
have been noticed; among the most prominent are the Nigerian, Kazakh’s 
and the Brazilian methodologies. A comprehensive local content report has 
to involve percentages of ownership of oil firms, 22  materials, labour, 
services and contracts, nationals in professional or management positions 
and local taxes (Kalyuzhnova, 2012). Simply, the reporting should be 
                                                          
22 Some countries place emphasis on company ownership in determining the level of local content. For example, for 
the purpose of local content in Nigeria oil and gas were categorised into six classes according to the percentage of 
local share ownership, number of nationals in the executive, management and supervisory positions, asset 
ownerships, etc (see Hilar-Nwokonko, 2004). Based on this categorization, governments determine value additions 
made specifically to the local economy.  Some governments only consider the location of the company and not 
share ownership that is, the local address of companies. That is to say, a company does not necessarily have local 
ownership for it to add value to the local economy.  
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around the second local content model (see Section 3.5). As part of its 
monitoring responsibilities, for instance, the Nigerian NCDMB has developed 
a local content level reporting measure – the Nigerian Content Index (NCI) 
using the formula:  ∑ (𝑷 𝒙 𝑳𝑪𝑹)𝒏𝒊=𝟏 , where i  = various oil and gas activities 
(fabrication, engineering, manufacturing, material procurement, etc), p = 
average annual expenditure (on particular activity), and LCR = local content 
ratio 23  (Abdulwahed, 2014). These values are often recorded in a 
predesigned reporting template issued by regulators (Hilary-Nwokonko, 
2004; see Appendix 10 for a sample). Appendix 2 presents the mandatory 
local content reporting frameworks of selected countries and the 
responsible agencies that are accountable for the enforcement of the 
provisions. The next section considers the voluntary reporting which is only 
applicable to the IOCs.    
 
3.10 Voluntary (Soft) Local Content Reporting Framework 
 
Voluntary reporting is considered to be a “rational, deliberate activity” 
performed strategically by organizations to achieve legitimacy-related 
outcomes (Patten, 1992; Lindblom, 1993; Brown and Deegan, 1999; Milne 
and Patten, 2002; Higgins et al, 2014: 1093). Such reporting may be value-
added statements, environmental reporting, social accounting and auditing, 
human resource accounting, sustainability reporting, employee and 
employment reporting, etc. (Gray, 2012; Higgins, et al., 2014). Local 
content is a form of social accounting contained in the sustainability reports 
of oil companies. Gray (2012: 687) refers to social accounting as consisting 
of all types of account “which go beyond the economic...”. Voluntary 
reporting requirements on local content are in a form of guidelines, 
recommendations and best practices. Due to the emergence of these 
guidelines Kniznikov and Wilson (2010: 3) observe that “public reporting on 
local content targets has increased in recent years”. The following section 
discusses the voluntary local content reporting in the light of the 
GRI/IPIECA, the International Accounting and Reporting Issues and the 
EITI, as listed in Figure 8 above.   
                                                          
23 These ratios were clearly spelt out in the NOGICD Act 2010 as will be extensively discussed in the next chapter. 
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3.11 The GRI and the IPIECA Sustainability Reporting Guidelines on  
Local Content 
  
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the International Petroleum 
Industries Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) are the two 
most recognised sustainability reporting bodies targeting specifically the oil 
and gas companies. GRI is the sustainability reporting standard-setter that 
provides one of the most widely recognised voluntary reporting guidelines 
which outlined key sustainability indicators including local content (KPMG, 
2011; Perego and Kolk, 2012; Menichini and Rosati, 2014). GRI was 
modeled in accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) and provided a set of measures based on the triple-bottom-line of 
economic, social and environmental sustainability (Roberts and Koeplin, 
2007; Stenzel, 2010). GRI guidelines addressed local content issues under 
the Economic Performance Indicators with the title: Market Presence 
including Local Content (GRI, 2010). The IPIECA, on the other hand, is a 
not-for-profit global organization of petroleum firms for environmental 
issues whose concerns are to address social, environmental and human 
right issues associated with the oil and gas activities including climate 
change, oil spill, gas flaring, biodiversity and social responsibility (Owens 
and Sykes, 2009). Local content was presented in IPIECA’s sustainability 
guidelines under the Economic and Social Indicators. Local content 
provisions in the GRI and IPIECA sustainability reporting guidelines are 
presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. 
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Table 3.1: Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Local Content Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines 
(Economic Performance: Market Presence including Local Content) 
Indicators Description Reporting elements Qualitative Quantitative 
G4-EC5 Local wages  Range of ratios of standard entry level 
wage  by gender compared to local 
minimum wage  at significant locations of 
operation 
       __   
G4-EC9 Local 
procurement 
 Policy, practices, and proportion of 
spending  on locally-based suppliers at 
significant  locations of operation 
    
G4-EC6 Local hiring  Procedures for local hiring and 
proportion of senior management24 hired 
from the local community at significant 
locations of operation 
 Report the percentage of senior 
management at significant locations 
of operation that are hired from the 
local community 
 Report the organization’s 
geographical definition of ‘local’25 
_   
G4-DMA Procurement 
Practices 
(Additional 
Guidance) 
 Report measures to develop local supply 
chain including actions taken to improve 
participation of local suppliers. This 
includes efforts to: 
 simplify the procurement process for 
local suppliers (e.g., unbundling, 
access to financing, or shorter-term 
contracts); 
 increase supplier capability to meet 
company standards (e.g., skills 
training, training on health, safety 
and environment); 
 assist supplier development (e.g., 
capacity building, technical 
assistance or technology transfer, 
supplier network development, 
diversification) 
 Report how the procurement process 
facilitates or encourages first-tier 
suppliers and contractors to buy locally 
 Report pre-qualification criteria for 
potential suppliers, including track record 
of working with local firms, strategies for 
developing local content in a given 
country, and demonstrable experience of 
developing capacity of local suppliers and 
subcontractors. 
 Report local business development 
activities not related directly to meeting 
current company needs, but resulting 
from increased economic activity and 
opportunities made possible by the 
project and its economic benefits 
    
Source: Global Reporting Initiative Sector Supplement: Oil and Gas (2013) 
 
                                                          
24 This confirms that local content could affect the corporate governance arrangement of organizations, in this case, 
the Board diversity. This is part of local content rules in many oil-producing countries such as Nigeria. 
25 To be guided by the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14. 
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The next table presents the IPIECA local content sustainability indicators. 
     Table 3.2: International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation    
      Association (IPIECA) Local Content Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
 
(Social & Economic Indicators) 
Indicators Description Reporting elements Qualitative Quantitative 
SE5 Local content 
practices 
 Report company policies, approaches and 
strategies to sourcing goods, services and 
human resources 
 Quantify the number (or percentage) of 
company’s organizational entities that 
are covered by formal agreements or 
legislation within host countries 
regarding local content 
    
SE6 Local hiring 
practices 
 Describe the nature and effectiveness of 
processes and strategies aimed at 
providing employment opportunities to 
residents or nationals of host countries 
 Quantify the number and/or percentage 
of local versus expatriate employees in 
management and other senior roles in 
target countries or regions 
 Provide information on how local 
employment strategies promote diversity 
and inclusion (e.g. in relation to gender, 
ethnicity, disability) at the local level 
including management roles 
 Include information and/or quantitative 
data on local employees that are given 
training in other (non-local) assets of the 
company 
 Discuss indirect job creation as a result of 
the company’s activities 
    
SE7 Local 
procurement & 
supplier 
development 
 Describe the programmes and processes 
to improve the ability of local suppliers 
and contractors to support operations 
and projects 
 Report the proportion of money spent on 
goods and services sourced locally 
 Describe any activities undertaken to 
assist supplier development 
 Describe how the procurement process 
facilitates or encourages first-tier 
suppliers and contractors to buy locally 
 Discuss the pre-qualification criteria for 
potential suppliers, including: 
 track record of working with local 
firms; 
 strategies for developing local 
content in a given country; and 
 demonstrable experience of 
developing capacity of local 
suppliers and   subcontractors 
    
Source: IPIECA (2010: 95-99) 
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2 above exhibit the various local content sustainability 
indicators and their reporting procedures. Although the GRI is the most 
commonly used guideline, the two standards are often used together in a 
single sustainability report by oil companies26. The present study combined 
these indicators and adopted a content analysis procedure to test whether 
there is any variation in the IOCs’ local content reporting before and after 
the enactment of the Nigeria’s local content law. The next section considers 
other voluntary local content reporting provisions. 
 
3.12 The International Accounting and Reporting Issues & the 
Guidance on Corporate Responsibility Indicators in Annual Reports 
 
Based on the review of the practical implementation of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the UNCTAD's intergovernmental 
working group of experts on International Standards of Accounting and 
Reporting (ISAR) recommended the disclosure of corporate responsibility 
indicators including local content represented by local purchasing, 
employment creation, employee training and local expenditure on research 
and development, linkages and value-add through supplier engagement. 
Collectively, these indicators form the tools/strategies of the second local 
content model (Section 3.5). The reporting standard requires companies to 
identify and compute the value of local purchasing relevant to the reporting 
period using the accrual-basis accounting. In the annual report, the total 
value of the local purchasing is reported “as an absolute figure and also as 
a percentage of total purchasing”. Also, the nature of the locally-sourced 
items and the list of local suppliers may also be attached to the additional 
information (International Accounting and Reporting Issues, 2007: 81). Oil 
companies may categorise their purchases into ‘foreign’ and ‘local’ and 
report that in the value-added statement (Forte Oil PLC Annual Reports, 
2010).  
 
The guidelines recommended that companies should also disclose their local 
employment and workforce development based on full-time, part-time, 
                                                          
26 These two indicators are very similar and are not in any way in conflict with one another. The five IOCs that 
formed the sample for the content analysis in this study use both the GRI and the IPIECA guidelines in their 
sustainability reports.  
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contract, gender or salaries and wages categories. Import and export 
values should also be reported to “calculate the contribution of the 
reporting company to the host country's balance of payments” 
(International Accounting and Reporting Issues, 2007: 79). This supports 
the balance of payment argument of local content (see Section 2.7.3). A 
survey conducted on these indicators found that local purchasing was 
adequately disclosed by only 10 out of the 100 sampled enterprises with 
the import-export values reported by only 13 companies (International 
Accounting and Reporting Issues, 2008, 2009). 
 
3.13 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and 
Local Content 
 
The EITI emphasises a wider accounting, disclosure and transparency of 
local content expenditure.  EITI had suggested that due to the huge amount 
of money oil companies spend on their suppliers and labour, more 
accountability and transparency around the expenditure are needed (World 
Bank, 2012). This includes reporting payments to governments, details on 
concluded contracts and license awards, and information relating to 
materials, equipment and supplies (Ravat and Kannan, 2013). EITI (World 
Bank, 2012) identified some challenges associated with local content 
reporting to include uniformity of definition, data availability, cost-benefit, 
and confidentiality. Local content is defined either by ownership or location 
as discussed in Section 3.5.1. The absence of standard definition and 
measurement affect the sustainability accounting field (Ngwakwe, 2012). 
Companies also tend to be sceptical about publishing information on their 
suppliers and contracts since they are competing with many rivals for a 
common thing (World Bank, 2012). In spite of this, many IOCs are 
subscribing to voluntary local content reporting as will be shown in chapter 
nine. The following section presents the accounting and reporting treatment 
of some local content items.  
 
 
 
 
68 
3.14 International Petroleum Accounting Treatment of Local 
content in Oil Contracts 
 
A number of publications on the international petroleum accounting 
(Johnston, 1999; Jennings et al., 2000; Edition Technip, 2004; Wright and 
Gallun, 2005, 2008) have acknowledged the accounting implications of local 
content in oil and gas contracts. Johnston (1999) divides the contents of 
the profit-sharing contracts (PSCs) into two broad sections as (i) local 
employment and training, and (ii) local procurement. Budgets for the 
employment, procurement and other expenditure are often submitted in the 
form of a work programme27 to National Oil Companies (NOCs) representing 
the host government, for approval. During contracting, local content 
agencies play the sole responsibility of scrutinizing and approving all 
contract documents and processes including the invitation to tenders and 
advertisements (see Appendix 1a for a sample) to ensure full compliance 
with local content requirements. Apart from the two categories mentioned, 
Wright and Gallun (2005) added the third provision – technology transfer, 
as another term forming part of contractual agreements. They recognise 
that although the contractor may bring in employees from its home 
country, the majority of the workforce has to be local. In addition, the 
contractor has to train the locals throughout the project’s life as supported 
by Fossgard-Moser (2003).  
 
It was noted that in most of the PSCs the training cost is significant; hence, 
a recoverable cost (Wright and Gallun, 2005) or left as allowable deductions 
for tax purposes (Tordo, et al., 2013). For instance, as an incentive to 
promote local content, Angolan petroleum contract provides that 
contributions to the training and development fund are tax deductible, and 
the training costs for Angolans are allowable production costs (Tordo, et al., 
2013). Further, in line with the social programme strategy of local content 
(EY, 2014) Jennings et al. (2000: 610) observe that some contract 
provisions require infrastructure and industrial development activities as 
part of the exploration arrangement. They, therefore, discussed the 
                                                          
27 The work programme outlines the IOC's commitments in respect of oil and gas operations including seismic 
activities, drilling, financial commitments, local employment, etc. It is a critical negotiation element and contains all 
agreements, risks, and cost recovery issues. 
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accounting treatment of ‘infrastructure costs’ (building roads, bridges, 
hospitals, etc), and ‘local support costs’ including training, employment and 
transferring technology. They recommended that all costs that “in 
substance are acquisition, exploration, development, or production are 
simply accounted for as such” while other costs that are not necessary for 
the exploration and production activities are a bonus or royalty to host 
governments and should be treated as such. Although there is no dedicated 
international accounting standards issued for local content reporting, the 
Global Reporting Initiative (2013) recommends that “reporting 
organizations should use the International Accounting Standards (IAS) 14 
(now International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 8: Segmental 
Reporting) as a reference in defining ‘local’ as required by Indicators EC1, 
EC5, EC6, and EC7”.28 These indicators are used to report local expenditure 
on labour and suppliers as well as the local contributions of companies.  
 
Another important standard useful for local content reporting is the IAS 21: 
Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange rates. According to the standard, 
multinational companies operating in the host environment are to 
determine their ‘functional currency’29. PwC (2011) observes that for the oil 
companies, the majority of the expenditure at the exploration phase is 
mostly in foreign currency because most of the activities are done by home 
company personnel. However, when activities advance to the development 
phase, transactions are mostly denominated in local currency because local 
workforce and suppliers are used in order to reduce operating cost 
(Fossgard-Moser, 2003) or to fulfil local content obligations. Currency 
translation due to local content, therefore, forms part of the global 
reporting. In determining a foreign operation in the context of IAS 21, 
Sutton (2004) suggests that parent company managers have to consider 
some important factors which include (1) the level of local content in goods 
and services, (2) proportion of intercompany sales or purchases, (3) rates 
of local sales and, (4) local sources of funds. The final exercise for oil 
companies is to report all the economic transactions in financial statements 
                                                          
28 Note that discussion of EC1 and EC7 indicators is out of the scope of this study. 
29 “Functional currency is the currency of the primary economic environment in which the entity operates. The 
primary economic environment in which an entity operates is normally the one in which it primarily generates and 
expends cash” (IFRS). 
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and sustainability commitments (including local content) in sustainability or 
integrated financial reports.   
 
3.15 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the accounting, accountability 
and governance provisions of local content sustainability. The chapter used 
the Chatham House Good Governance Framework as the foundation to 
develop local content models considered important to the research. With 
the adopted governance principles, the chapter found that the hard and soft 
accountability typologies are the best way to describe the local content 
enforcement and compliance responsibilities of the two major accountors – 
local content agencies and the IOCs. In line with the shared accountability 
that binds both the agencies and the IOCs, the chapter reviewed the 
accountability requirements found in legislation, government policies, as 
well as guidelines for other non-governmental institutions. The chapter 
further conducted an overview of the treatment of local content in 
accordance with the international petroleum accounting provisions. The 
accountability and governance principles reviewed in this chapter are 
applied to the study context – the Nigerian petroleum sector – in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Local Content Sustainability in the Nigerian Petroleum Sector: An 
Overview of the Study Context 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
The aim of this chapter is to relate the discussion on the accounting, 
accountability and governance to the study context that is, the Nigerian Oil 
and Gas Sector together with the responsibilities of the NCDMB and the 
IOCs as the two major accountors in the implementation of local content in 
petroleum contracts. This discussion is important because as the NCDMB is 
charged with the enforcement accountability, the IOCs as the investors, 
license-holders and awarders of oil contracts, are charged with the 
compliance accountability. The IOCs’ core functions in the industry are 
conducted through joint ventures, production-sharing and service contracts. 
In chapter three, the study introduced the classification of local content 
accountability into soft/voluntary and hard/mandatory which are applied in 
this chapter to trace who is accountable to whom and for what. The chapter 
starts by introducing the Nigerian oil and gas industry and the sustainability 
situations therein. 
 
4.2 The Structure and Political Economy of the Nigerian Petroleum 
Sector 
 
The Nigerian political-economy and governance are supported by the 
petroleum sector which is centrally controlled by the executive power 
(Gboyega et al., 2011). Created in the 1930s, the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry is the largest in Africa (EIA, 2015) which, as a primary source of 
sustainability (Toudolo, 2009), becomes the nation’s live-wire that 
generates the largest GDP from a daily production of 2.46 million bbl/d 
(Atakpu, 2007; Omenikolo and Amadi, 2010; EIA, 2011). Nigeria’s 
estimated crude reserves as at 2011 totalled 37bn barrels and 5.29 trillion 
cubic meters of gas which are equivalent to 2.53% and 2.82% of the world 
oil and gas reserves respectively (International Energy Outlook, 2011, 
KPMG, 2014). On estimate, the industry annually consumes about $18bn in 
services ranging from construction, engineering procurements, Front-End 
Engineering Design (FEED), Seismic surveys, fabrications, etc. (Omenikolo 
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and Amadi, 2010). Investment inflows were estimated at $147 billion 
between 1990 and 2008 and annual return of $30 billion (Kupolokun, 
2006). Kupolokun (2006: 12) also observed that by 2010 about $13 billion 
will be generated annually from the projected 25% annual increase in the 
country’s gas demand which is about the highest in the world. The industry 
is made up of two major segments – oil operating and oil servicing 
segments. The operating segment involves the front-line companies that 
deal with the acquisition of operating licenses and managing oil and gas 
production while the servicing segment involves companies that render 
support functions such as seismic surveys, drilling, well completion, etc. 
(Usman, 2011). The industry is further sub-divided into three strategic and 
complementary sectors – the upstream, the mid-stream, and the 
downstream. Each of these sectors has its own share of the resource curse 
burden with the upstream sector as the initial stage of the sustainability 
challenge due to the nature of operations involved which lead to 
environmental pollution and degradation, economic mismanagement as well 
as social and political crisis. The midstream activities are often merged with 
that of the downstream.  
 
The upstream sector deals with the basic acquisition of operating licenses 
and the subsequent exploration, drilling and production of oil and gas 
(Okoye and Mbonu, 2005; Chokor, 2010; An et al., 2011; Usman, 2011; 
UNCTAD, 2012; Barata, et al., 2014). Operating licenses in Nigeria’s 
upstream sector are divided into three classes: Oil Exploration License 
(OEL), Oil Prospecting License (OPL), and Oil Mining Lease (OML) (Itsueli, 
1993; Atsegbua, 1999; Nordas, et al, 2003; Ayodele and Frimpong, 2003). 
It is through licenses that governments pursue their local content objectives 
(see model petroleum contracts in Section 2.10). Upstream activities can 
either be onshore or offshore 30  (Usman, 2011). Chatham House (2013) 
viewed local content as the link between the upstream petroleum sector 
and other sectors of the economy. Oil companies operating in the upstream 
                                                          
30 Onshore oil operation occurs on land, while offshore is subsea operation. Both have sustainability implications 
including social crisis, land degradation, ecological and marine damages, etc.  See also Spence (2011). Offshore 
operations produce up to 2million bbl/d in Nigeria since 2002 (see ACOA, 2004; Klueh et al, 2007). 
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sector are subjected to tax under the Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA) and 
the payment of royalties.  
 
The mid- and downstream sectors handle activities ranging from crude oil 
refining and storage to transportation and marketing of refined products 
(Okoye and Mbonu, 2005). The Nigerian downstream sector controls the 
petrochemical plants as well as the four refineries engaged in different 
processes to convert crude oil into usable products (Usman, 2011).  Unlike 
the upstream sector, companies engaged in the downstream are taxed 
under the Companies’ Income Tax (CIT). Local content legislation in Nigeria 
addressed exclusively the upstream sector, hence, the primary concern of 
this study.  
 
4.3 Contractual Agreements in the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum 
Sector 
 
There are different contractual agreements between the Nigerian 
government and the IOCs. These contracts include Concessions, Joint 
Ventures (JVCs), Production-Sharing (PSCs) and Service Contracts (SCs) 
(Tienhaara, 2012). These contracts are the appropriate means through 
which petro-states pursue local content policies by committing oil 
companies to local employment and training, local sourcing and supplier 
development, technology transfer as well as reporting on them. These 
contract forms are discussed below. 
 
4.3.1 Concession 
 
Under concession, operating companies are granted exclusive right to 
engage in the exploration, production, and marketing of oil and gas in 
return for royalties and taxes (Likosky, 2009; Mazeel, 2010). In addition, 
the Nigeria’s Mineral Oils Act of 1959 and the Petroleum Act of 1969 
required all operators to train Nigerians to become craftsmen, tradesmen, 
supervisors and senior managers within a specified period (Oguine, 2011). 
Although some local content provisions were attached to concessions the 
government significantly lacked control over exploration and production; 
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IOCs were the owners as well as operators of the oilfields. This traditional 
arrangement had been taken over by a modern partnership-based system 
due to decolonization, the emergence of OPEC and the creation of the New 
International Economic Order (Smith et al., 2000; Likosky, 2009).  This 
shift was unavoidable by host governments including Nigeria, who was 
financially at a disadvantage in the concession arrangements. The shift 
could also be supported by the strategic sectors argument discussed in 
Section 2.7.4.  
 
4.3.2 Joint Venture Contracts (JVCs) 
 
These contracts occur when the host government acquires a participatory 
interest in concessions held by IOCs (Nlerum, 2010). Under the JVCs, IOCs 
conduct business with the host government through the national oil 
company (NOC). It is an avenue for technology is transferred to citizens 
(Oguine, 2011). JVCs are funded jointly through monthly ‘cash calls’ 
according to each party’s percentage stake (Akinrele, 2003; Ariweriokuma, 
2009). Presently Nigeria through its national oil company runs seven joint 
ventures with the major IOCs. Table 4.1 below shows these arrangements. 
 
Table 4.1: Joint Venture Contracts between NNPC and the Major IOCs  
Joint ventures % of participation 
NN
PC 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
She
ll 
Elf Agip Texac
o 
Chevr
on 
Phillips Mobil Pan 
Ocean 
Operator 
NNPC/Shell/El
f/Agip 
55 30 10 5      Shell 
NNPC/Texaco/
Chevron 
60    20 20    Chevron 
NNPC/Agip/Ph
illips 
60   20   20   Agip 
NNPC/Mobil 60       40  Mobil 
NNPC/Chevro
n 
60     40    Chevron 
NNPC/Elf 60  40       Elf 
NNPC/Pan 
Ocean 
60        40  PanOcea
n 
Source: UNITAR (2008), NNPC (2011) 
 
Table 4.1 above shows that the Nigerian government holds sixty percent 
interest in five joint ventures and fifty-five percent in one joint venture. 
Appendix 3 shows the stages and modes of acquiring these interests by the 
Nigerian government. This shared-control suppresses information 
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asymmetry and upholds the good governance indicator that suggests the 
involvement of national oil companies in resource extraction (Likosky, 
2009; Chatham House, 2013). Due to the difficulties faced by the Nigerian 
government in meeting her cash call obligations (Agoro, 2001), the 
government switched to the production-sharing contracts considered below.  
 
4.3.3 Production-Sharing Contracts (PSCs) 
 
Unlike concessions, the Indonesian-made PSCs do not grant an ownership 
title of oil blocks to a company but only allows the company to explore for 
oil; only when oil is found the company will recover its costs and have a 
share in the profit 31  (Fabrikant, 1975; Machmud, 1993, 2000; Likosky, 
2009). The first PSC in Nigeria was signed in 1973 between NNPC and the 
Ashland Oil Company. Presently Nigeria has over thirty PSCs with IOCs 
(NNPC, 2011). The uncertainties surrounding the cost recovery issues led to 
the emergence of service contracts.  
 
4.3.4 Service Contracts (SCs) 
 
First used in Brazil, service contracts were developed as an improvement on 
the PSCs (Omorogbe, 1987; Nlerum, 2010). Here, the IOCs only accomplish 
clearly defined services in the host country and are not entitled to any 
share of the revenue gained. In this arrangement, the host government has 
to have access to capital as well as the requisite technology (Likosky, 
2009). In Nigeria, in the 1980s about eleven service contracts were entered 
into with Elf, Nigus Petroleum, and Agip (Omorogbe, 1987). The only 
surviving SC today is the one between NNPC and Agip (AENR). SC can be 
risk service, pure service or technical assistance contracts.  
  
                                                          
31 On successful operations, contractors recover all expenditure incurred from the cost oil. Cost oil refers to the 
available crude oil earmarked to the contractor which is enough to enable him to recoup all costs invested before 
ascertaining profits. After cost recovery, the remaining crude oil (called the profit oil) is what is going to be shared 
between the IOCs and the NNPC in accordance with the predetermined ratio. Note also that before these 
allocations are made royalty and tax oil have to be earmarked. This is the amount of oil allocated to the operator 
enough to generate an amount equivalent to the monthly royalty and petroleum profit tax. See Umar (2005) and 
Ariweriokuma (2009). 
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In spite of the enormous investment in the oil sector, the country and, in 
particular, the oil-producing communities are still suffering from the 
environmental, economic and social crisis which confirms the idea behind 
the resource curse theories (Auty, 1994; Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999). This 
necessitated the government to adopt the local content policy which will 
reverse the adverse impacts of oil and gas extraction and ensure 
widespread local participation and effective value-addition in the oil and gas 
operations. A survey conducted on the local value-addition capabilities of oil 
contracts awarded in 2002 has raised grave concern and confirmed the 
perceived marginalization, IOCs’ dominance and inadequate participation of 
local firms. The results of the survey coupled with other similar issues have 
re-ignited the need for strong policies on local content.  Table 4.2 below 
presents the contract categories awarded to local and foreign firms and 
their respective value-addition in both volume and value. 
Table 4.2: Major Contracts Awarded in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Sector 
2002 
Contracts/Services Firms with most value- 
addition in Nigeria 
Firms with most value- 
addition abroad 
Nigerian 
Companies 
($’000) 
Foreign 
companies 
($’000) 
Nigerian 
Companies 
($’000) 
Foreign 
companies 
($’000) 
Total 
companies 
($’000) 
Consultancy 6* 
(7,428)* 
0 
(0) 
8 
(2,778) 
0 
(0) 
14 
(10,206) 
Drilling & well 
completion 
9 
(41,847) 
5 
(135,939) 
13 
(35,091) 
33 
(593,284) 
60 
(807,153) 
Environmental 
services 
2 
(11,018) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(6,533) 
3 
(9,250) 
10 
(26,802) 
Exploration 2 
(1,262) 
4 
(11,056) 
0 
(0) 
10 
(90,413) 
16 
(102,731) 
Front-End-
Engineering 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(40,577) 
3 
(40,577) 
Gas development 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
3 
(27,978) 
3 
(27,978) 
Hotel & catering 5 
(11,760) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(5,454) 
5 
(31,637) 
15 
(48,852) 
ICT 5 
(17,107) 
1 
(526) 
11 
(11,328) 
4 
(17,520) 
21 
(46,482) 
Procurement 8 
(26,356) 
2 
(1,062) 
65 
(62,105) 
11 
(92,248) 
86 
(181,772) 
Production facility 
maintenance 
3 
(12,367) 
1 
(2,656) 
45 
(62,375) 
29 
(75,243) 
78 
(152,642) 
Project/ construction  6 
(83,253) 
5 
(269,778) 
13 
(28,193) 
30 
(657,668) 
54 
(1,038,875) 
Transportation 9 
(18,143) 
6 
(61,273) 
36 
(63,155) 
36 
(234,515) 
87 
(377,088) 
Total 55 
(231,526) 
24 
(482,284) 
201 
(277,015) 
167 
(1,870,338) 
447 
(2,861,165) 
12% 
(8%) 
5% 
(17%) 
45% 
(10%) 
37% 
(65%) 
100% 
(100%) 
Source: Kragha and Associates cited in Heum, et al. (2003) 
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*note that numbers that are not in brackets represent the number (volume) of the contract awarded. Numbers in 
brackets represent the monetary values of contracts. 
 
It can be shown from Table 4.2 that most of the contracts were awarded to 
companies with most value-add outside Nigeria. Nigerian and foreign firms 
with significant value-add in Nigeria received 12% and 5% of the total 
volume of the contracts and 8% and 17% of the dollar-value respectively. 
On the other hand, companies in Nigeria and abroad with value-add outside 
Nigeria received 45% and 37% of the volume and 10% and 65% of the 
dollar-value of contracts respectively.  
To reverse the above trend, the government came up with a 23-points 
short-term Presidential Directives on local content in 2005/2006 which 
sought the domiciliation of most of the oil and gas activities, contracts and 
projects in Nigeria (Mohammed, 2009; Audu, 2009; Nwoakoro, 2011). This 
belated attempt that came decades after other countries have applied the 
policy might not be unconnected to the country’s weak indigenous capacity 
(Balouga, 2012) during the periods. For the fact that the Presidential 
Directives of 2005 lacked a legal backing, and no independent monitoring 
agency was created, little success was recorded. As a result, the 
government found it necessary to enact a dedicated legislation on local 
content. The rest of this chapter pays close attention to the provisions of 
the new law and the functions of the oversight agency that was created by 
the Act. 
 
4.4 The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development 
(NOGICD) Act, 2010 
 
The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act (NOGICD) 
2010 was passed and signed into law on 22nd of April, 2010. Its primary 
purpose is to regulate and direct all petroleum activities in favour of local 
businesses. The Act stated that: 
“Compliance with the provisions of this Act and promotion of Nigerian Content 
development shall be major criteria for the award of licences, permits and any other 
interest in bidding for oil exploration, production, transportation and development or 
any other operations in the Nigerian oil and gas industry”. S. 3(3) 
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S. 4 of the Act provided that the Nigerian Content Development and 
Monitoring Board (NCDMB) will be responsible for making the “procedure 
that will guide, monitor, coordinate and implement the provisions of this 
Act”. The NOGICD Act contains 106 clauses divided into three (3) parts and 
a schedule. This is illustrated in Figure 9 below. 
Figure 9: Structure of the NOGICD ACT, 2010 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The NOGICD ACT 2010 
106 Clauses in 3 Parts & a Schedule 
Schedule A – 
Minimum Nigerian 
Content targets 
PART III – 
Financial Provisions 
PART I – Nigerian 
Content Devt. in 
Oil & Gas Industry 
PART II – 
Establishment of 
the NCDMB 
NCDMB’s finances, 
audit regulations, 
etc 
(17 Clauses) 
Performance 
metrics for 
contracts  
(17 main & 285 sub-
categories) 
Provision and 
Application of the 
Nigerian Content 
Law 
(68 Clauses) 
Structure, 
activities and 
roles of the 
NCDMB 
(21 Clauses) 
 
Source: Generated from the NOGICD Act 2010 
 
Hufbauer et al (2013: 115) have broadly categorised the contents of the 
NOGICD Act into three groups of policies: those that created the regulatory 
body to oversee the implementation of the policy, those that promote first 
consideration for Nigerian firms, and those that promote compliance with 
the reporting requirements of companies. The whole essence of the local 
content Act is to enhance the social, economic and environmental 
sustainability of Nigeria through the activities and contracts of the oil and 
gas sector. To understand its relevance to the sustainability in Nigeria, an 
overview of the sustainability conditions in the oil sector was considered 
important. This is dealt with below.  
 
4.5 Sustainability in the Nigerian Upstream Oil and Gas Sector 
       
Oil and gas activities in Nigeria and elsewhere have severe social, economic 
and environmental consequences, especially for the immediate 
communities. It was argued that the resultant solid, liquid and gaseous 
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wastes have significant impacts not only on human health but also on the 
general socio-economic conditions and destroy farming lands, grazing 
fields, forests, fishing and drinking waters, and rendered community 
members jobless (Tienhaara, 2010, 2012; Spence, 2011; Ite, et al., 2013). 
In addition, operating companies’ resistance to adopting best practices 
further complicated this issue (Ite, et al., 2013). Besides the environmental 
aspects, Ugbomeh and Atubi (2010: 104) have taken a more radical 
position and viewed the IOCs in Nigeria as exerting significant influence on 
host communities, reshaping the “local economies, local politics, local 
struggles and local conflicts”. According to them, many social vices were 
created out of this situation leading to bitterness, frustration, agitation and 
strains in IOCs-community relations. Hufbauer et al. (2013) have discussed 
how oil facilities were vandalised by aggrieved youth in the region. In 2006, 
there were over 3000 cases of destroyed pipelines and about 2768 cases in 
2011. This condition has long been in existence in the history of oil 
production in Nigeria and had significant environmental repercussions. For 
this and other reasons, the Nigerian government incorporated local 
requirements into oil and gas contracts in addition to the royalties and 
taxes.  
 
Local content may not be a panacea for all the accountability and 
governance challenges of the petroleum sector (UNCTAD, 2014) particularly 
when the policy is manipulated by political elites and public officials to 
favour their allies and cronies, or where the IOCs use local firms as fronts 
to secure contracts (Mwakali and Byaruhanga, 2011; Martini, 2014; Ovadia, 
2014; NRGI Reader, 2015). While this study justifies the sustainability 
nature of local content (see chapter two) other scholars viewed otherwise 
(Lahn et al, 2007; Lec, 2011; Hufbeaur, 2013; Ngoasong, 2014; Johnson, 
2015). There is, however, no empirical study conducted to assess the views 
of the stakeholders in the Nigerian oil sector on whether or not local content 
is a sustainability policy. For this reason, an investigation into the 
perceptions of the Nigerian stakeholders on whether or not local content is 
a sustainability policy is paramount. This led to the first research question 
of the study as follows: 
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1. To what extent do the stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
perceive local content to be a sustainability policy in petroleum contracts? 
 
Moreover, accountability is placed as the first principle of the first local 
content model as indicated by the conceptual framework (Figure 4). Hence, 
the local content policy is required to be implemented in a transparent and 
accountable manner. This led several countries to appoint dedicated 
agencies for this purpose (see Appendix 2 for the functions of these 
agencies). Alba (2009) argues that in order to achieve success in the 
implementation of local content, investors, contractors and subcontractors 
must be aware of clear and definite reporting guidelines including periodic 
reporting which would assist them to demonstrate compliance. The politics 
of the Nigerian local content, in particular, is characterized by allegations of 
corruption, elite wealth-accumulation, fronting, weak enforcement will, 
absence of full accounting records and vested interests (Nwosu, 2006; 
Balouga, 2012; Daily Trust, 2013; Ovadia, 2013, 2014; Okafor and Aniche, 
2014). To investigate the nature of accountability the second research 
question is formulated: 
2. What are the accountability expectations of local content in the Nigerian 
petroleum sector? 
 
The section below looks at some issues relating to the accountability and 
governance of local content in Nigeria. Its aim is to provide the context to 
discuss the soft and hard accountability of the two major accountors of local 
content in the Nigerian upstream oil and gas sector. 
 
4.6 Accountability and Governance in Local Content Sustainability 
and the Roles of the Major Stakeholders in the Nigerian Petroleum 
Sector 
 
 
Ngoasong (2014: 472) argues that “the political economy of petroleum 
production in developing countries has always been dominated by the role 
of the state (or government) and those of IOCs in ensuring that the 
petroleum industry contributes positively to economic development”. 
Therefore, governments and the IOCs are the first agents of sustainable 
development (Esteves, 2012; Easo and Wallace, 2014; Toulekima, 2015; 
Vaaland, 2015) because of the pivotal role they play in the majority of oil-
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producing countries. Local content policy cannot operate in a vacuum, but 
relies on the collaboration of various stakeholder groups. Although the 
study recognised the existence of several groups with explicit and implicit 
interests in the implementation of local content in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry, the main focus is on the assessment of the responsible and 
accountable behaviours of the two principal local content actors – the 
NCDMB and the IOCs. Easo and Wallace (2014) have argued that 
“compliance with, and the implementation of, local content is the joint 
responsibility of IOCs and national governments”32. The sustainability ideas 
introduced in Section 4.5 above would be useful here to help assess the 
relevance of local content in Nigeria.  
 
In discussing the different accountability of the two actors, the study firstly 
reviews their individual legal and ethical responsibilities by which they 
would be called upon to render account. The next section starts with the 
NCDMB. 
4.7 The Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
(NCDMB)  
 
The most important provision of the NOGICD Act is the establishment of the 
local content oversight agency – the NCDMB - which is saddled with the 
responsibility of monitoring, supervising and administering the 
implementation of the provisions of the Act. NCDMB’s responsibilities as the 
first actor and accountor are purely in the form of hard and mandatory 
accountability because all its conduct was defined by the law. S. 69 (1) 
provided as follows: 
There is established the Nigerian Content Monitoring Board (in this Act referred to as 
"the Board") which shall have the functions and powers conferred on it by this Act. 
 
S. 70 extensively provided for the functions of the Board to include 
supervision, coordination, administering, monitoring, managing and 
appraising the implementation of local content. Figure 10 below presents 
the organizational structure of the NCDMB. 
                                                          
32 Available at: www.natlawreview.com/article/understanding-local-content-policies-africa-s-petroleum-sector 
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Figure 10: Governance Structure of the NCDMB 
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The above chart shows that the NCDMB has a comprehensive governance 
structure consisting of various departments and directories handling 
different responsibilities. The Governing Council is made up of different 
representatives from various sectors in compliance with S. 71.  
 
NCDMB is charged with the responsibility of assisting the local contractors 
to develop their capabilities, administer the joint qualification system (JQS) 
and the petroleum e-market33 platform, and make auditing procedures and 
guidelines for the implementation of local content. The Board was created 
to fulfil the first principle of the first local content model (i.e., 
accountability) (Klueh et al., 2009; Cotula, 2010). It was observed by 
Cotula (2010: 49) that in order to ensure the actualization of sustainable 
development through local content there has to be “a properly staffed and 
clearly mandated government agency responsible for monitoring 
compliance; established channels that enable dialogue between the 
investor, the government and other stakeholders; as well as credible 
financial and other penalties in case of investor non-compliance”. Other 
agencies similar to the NCDMB are the UK’s Offshore Supply Office (OSO), 
the Norwegian Goods and Services Office (GSO), the Australian Industrial 
Supplies Office (ISO), the Brazilian National Agency for Oil, Gas, and 
Biofuels (ANP) and the Indonesian Interim Working Unit for Upstream Oil 
and Gas Business Activities (SKSPMIGAS) created to ensure accountability, 
governance and transparency in local content implementation. Other 
functions include participating in the design and conduct of bidding, 
monitoring and tracking of oil contracts and procurements, encouraging 
joint ventures and technology transfer, and ensuring compliance with 
accounting and reporting of performance (The Trinidad Guardian, 2007; 
Klueh et al., 2009; Barroso, and Macedo, 2010). The next section discusses 
the practical functions of the NCDMB in the petroleum value chain. 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Petroleum e-Market is an online platform that connects suppliers and customers of the Nigerian petroleum 
industry. It was formerly under the Nigerian Petroleum Exchange (NIPEX).  
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4.8 Sustainable Development Functions of the NCDMB 
 
Okusami (2010) has narrowed down the roles of the NCDMB to three out of 
the five tools/strategies of the second local content model repeatedly 
discussed (see Section 3.5). These are employment, ownership and supplier 
development. He argues that the Board’s main duties were the enforcement 
of the training and employment of locals, promotion of local ownership of 
firms, establishment of essential facilities and integration of local suppliers. 
This section considers the Board’s functions from a wider perspective. As 
stated earlier (see chapter one), the convenient way to describe the 
functions of the NCDMB is to apply the Alba’s (2009) petroleum value chain 
which consists of five key regulatory functions because local content is a 
government intervention which suppresses the IOCs’ efforts to displace the 
weak indigenous firms from the value chain (Lindner, 2014; Easo and 
Wallace, 2014). The major purpose of the Nigerian content policy is the 
development of local competence across the oil and gas value chain (Easo 
and Wallace, 2014). This section, therefore, uses the value chain to 
systematically organise the discussion of the functions and duties of the 
NCDMB while reflecting on the good governance indicators as well as the 
two local content models earlier discussed (Klueh, 2009; Chatham, 2013; 
EY, 2014). This value chain was previously used by Gboyega et al. (2011) 
to study the political economy of the Nigerian oil and gas sector. Figure 11 
below illustrates the regulatory responsibilities involved in a typical 
petroleum value chain. 
Figure 11: NCDMB’s Regulatory Functions in the Petroleum Value chain 
 
 
Source: Alba (2009) 
1
•Award of contracts and licenses
2
•Regulation and monitoring of operations
3
•Collection of taxes, royalties
4
•Revenue management and allocation
5
•Implementation of sustainable development policies and 
projects
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The NCDMB utilises the first model (regulatory provisions) to pursue the 
second model (strategies). Simply, the Board applies its regulatory capacity 
to achieve local content performance through the oil and gas companies. 
The starting point of the value chain is the award of licenses and contracts. 
The next section discusses the NCDMB’s responsibilities during the award of 
contracts and licenses.      
 
4.8.1 Award of Contracts and Licenses 
 
This stage provides the foundations for the design and negotiation of local 
content commitments contained in the second local content model, that is, 
local employment and training, local sourcing and supplier development, 
social programmes as well as many other benefits derived from taxation 
and ownership strategies (EY, 2014). These are achieved through the 
application of the first local content model – accountability (oversight duty 
for contract award), metrics (enforcing local content targets), transparency 
(openness in advertising, invitation to tenders, prequalification, etc), 
efficiency (matching targets with available capacity) and spin-off effect 
(ensuring adequate economic linkage).  
 
The first responsibility of the NCDMB is to ensure that contracts and 
licenses are strictly awarded to the indigenous oil firms that demonstrate 
ability in terms of technology, finance, and asset ownership. Although the 
authority to award oil licenses and contracts rests with the DPR and the 
NAPIMS respectively, the law requires the NCDMB to participate fully in the 
process to ensure that capable local firms receive first, exclusive and 
preferential consideration over and above their foreign counterparts. 
NCDMB is authorized to issue a certificate of compliance before any 
company gets a contract (Figure 12 below). Selection of suitable investors 
is the first governance indicator suggested by Chatham House (2013). 
Several provisions of the NOGICD Act have required the NCDMB to give first 
consideration for the Nigerian firms and workforce in the award of 
contracts, licenses or employment (S. 3(1-3), S. 12, S. 28, 34-35). On 
behalf of the operating and servicing segments of the industry, some of the 
most important sections provide as follows: 
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Nigerian independent operators shall be given first consideration in the award of oil 
blocks, oil field licences, oil lifting licences and in all projects for which contract is to 
be awarded in the Nigerian oil and gas industry subject to the fulfilment of such 
conditions as may be specified by the Minister. S. 3(1). 
And, 
There shall be exclusive consideration to Nigerian indigenous service companies 
which demonstrate ownership of equipment, Nigerian personnel and capacity to 
execute such work to bid on land and swamp operating areas of the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry for contracts and services contained in the Schedule to this Act. S. 3(2). 
 
It was further provided that during the bidding evaluation indigenous firms 
shall not be excluded on the lowest bidder basis. If any Nigerian firm is 
found to be capable of executing a project, the firm shall get the job as long 
as its bidding value is not up to 10% higher than the lowest bid (S. 16). In 
Section 2.7.2 the study has cited examples of countries including the US, 
Canada, Australia, Turkey and New Zealand, that use preferential margin in 
allocating licenses and contracts for the benefit of their local companies 
(Naegelen & Mougeot, 1998). This was provided in the NOGICD Act as 
follows: 
 
The award of contract shall not be solely based on the principle of the lowest bidder. 
Where a Nigerian indigenous company has capacity to execute such job and the 
company shall not be disqualified exclusively on the basis that it is not the lowest 
financial bidder, provided the value does not exceed the lowest bid price by 10 
percent. S. 16. 
 
The rationale behind these provisions is that Nigerian indigenous firms are 
mostly nascent and weak; lacking the ability to compete freely with the 
powerful IOCs due to incomparable market advantages. Further, the oil and 
gas sector is Nigeria’s live wire as such; this strategic sector should not be 
left under the total control of IOCs. This, in essence, justifies the application 
of the infant industry, market power, and strategic sectors arguments 
considered in Sections 2.7.1, 2.7.2 and 2.7.4 respectively. 
Moreover, when licenses and contracts are awarded, it is the sole 
responsibility of the NCDMB to ensure that local content provisions are 
attached to these contracts. Awardees are expected to submit their local 
content plans as part of the several documents to be reported (S. 12, 16, 
43-46). In Section 2.11 the study has reviewed the contents of the “Local 
Procurement Statement” of three countries – India, Namibia and Sierra 
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Leone, which required the reporting of all expenditure incurred on 
materials, services and components. To curb corruption, all relevant bidding 
information must be transparent. Effective prequalification assessment 
should be conducted, and auctions and open license biddings should be 
adopted (Chatham House, 2013). At this juncture, Alba (2009) argues that 
transparency is significantly required in the negotiation of appropriate fiscal 
and local content terms to achieve economic and social benefits and 
mitigate project risks. To illustrate the functions of the NCDMB during the 
award of contracts the following figure exhibits a typical contract award 
process and the appropriate roles the Board plays jointly with other 
agencies. 
Figure 12: Functions of the NCDMB during award of contracts/licenses 
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After the issuance of a certificate of compliance and the contract is 
approved the next task of the NCDMB is to undertake its monitoring roles to 
ensure that awardees have maintained and strictly adhere to the terms of 
the contract. 
 
4.8.2 Regulation and Monitoring of Operations 
 
This stage deals with the provisions of institutional and regulatory 
capacities and the ability to enforce them through two processes: assurance 
that government bodies have definite responsibilities commensurate with 
available resources, and that sufficient capacity for monitoring compliance 
is available (Alba, 2009: 7).  Some of the important and perhaps most 
difficult functions of the NCDMB in the petroleum value chain are the 
making of rules, regulations, guidelines, supervising, monitoring and 
measuring the performance of oil operators to ensure effective 
implementation of local content (S. 70). Appendix 2 illustrates the various 
monitoring functions of local content agencies of oil-producing countries 
including the NCDMB. The regulations are required to be favourable enough 
to attract investment and encourage oil companies to adopt voluntary 
reporting practices. Specifically, the NCDMB’s monitoring functions are 
classified into three: Intervention Monitoring, Compliance Monitoring and 
Performance Monitoring. Figure 13 below illustrates these functions. 
Figure 13: NCDMB’s Monitoring Process 
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Intervention monitoring is initiated after a complaint of non-compliance is 
received by the Board. Compliance monitoring focuses on making sure that 
all statutory reporting by companies are made in good time and are in 
conformity with the Nigerian content specifications. Scheduled and 
unscheduled visits to facilities (facility audit) are carried out to ensure that 
all activities including fabrication and engineering are done in compliance 
with the local content Act. Finally, the performance monitoring is conducted 
by the Board to ensure that oil companies’ day-to-day activities or 
performance are in line with the terms of their certificate of compliance 
(NCDMB, 2013). Under its monitoring functions, however, the Board 
embarked on Compliance, Monitoring and Enforcement Strategy (COMES), 
to monitor oil companies’ commitments to local content at every stage of oil 
biddings before issuance of the Nigerian Content Compliance Certificate 
(NCCC). In every contract award processes, the Nigerian content plan of oil 
companies including the advertisement, invitation to tenders (Appendix 1a), 
technical and commercial evaluations, and the final award would all be 
closely examined to ensure full compliance with local content. Monthly audit 
reports on performance would follow thereafter up to the completion of the 
project (Nwapa, 2012). In relation to the regulation and monitoring 
functions the Board was required to:     
provide guidelines, definitions and measurement of Nigerian content and Nigerian 
content indicator to be utilized throughout the industry. S.70(l). 
As was briefly stated in the first chapter and the detailed presentation in 
Appendix2, the various local content agencies of oil-producing countries 
usually apply appropriate accounting, auditing and other investigative 
functions to monitor and follow up on the local content performances of oil 
companies according to the accounting and reporting requirements 
embodied in license agreements and contractual provisions. Alba (2009) 
also emphasised that these accounting rules and processes, as well as 
regular auditing, are critical in ensuring compliance with local content, 
social compensation and procurement rules. For this purpose, the NCDMB is 
required to: 
make auditing procedures and conduct regular audits for the purposes of monitoring 
and implementing compliances with the provisions of this Act. S. 70(k). 
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The monitoring function is a shared responsibility of the NCDMB and the 
operating companies who secure licenses and award contracts to foreign 
and local service companies. This provision stated that: 
the operator shall effectively communicate its Nigerian content policies and 
procedures to its contractors and subcontractors and to monitor and enforce their 
compliance. S. 66. 
These and similar reasons are responsible for the adoption and modification 
of the stakeholder-accountability framework which took into consideration 
the network of relationships among all stakeholders not just between 
stakeholders and the NCDMB or the IOCs. Through its compliance and 
performance monitoring, the Board had detected that significant local 
value-added was captured through several commercial reports and Nigerian 
Content Compliance Certificates issued to oil companies between 2010 and 
2012. It was reported that in 2010 8 NCCC and 39 commercial reports were 
issued by the Board to oil operators; in 2011 67 NCCC and 147 commercial 
reports were issued; in 2012 6 NCCC and 87 commercial reports were 
issued. The results showed significant Nigerian content share retained in-
country as shown in Table 4.3 below.   
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Table 4.3: Local Content Values Captured through the Nigerian Content Compliance Certificate (NCCC) 2010-2012 
 
Description 
2010 2011 2012 
Cumulative 
value 
Value capture % Cumulative 
value 
Value capture % Cumulative 
value 
Value capture % 
Training 
man-hours 
- - - 355,674.8 355,674.8 100 889,187 889,187 100 
Employment 
(man-Hours) 
- - -  
1,384,850 
 
1,384,850 
 
100 
 
3,462,126 
 
3,462,126 
 
100 
Training 
expenditure 
- - -  
$77,716,137.29 
 
$77,716,137.29 
 
100 
 
$33,083,149.29 
 
$33,083,149.29 
 
100 
Estimated 
contract 
values 
 
$429,207,533.77 
 
$265,769,575,79 
 
60% 
 
$24,959,439,312 
 
£17,628,251,950 
 
74% 
 
£1,627,639,683 
 
£1,314,886,960 
 
72% 
Source: NCDMB Annual Performance Report (2012)
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From the above table we can observe the level of local content in volume 
and value generated through various activities ranging from labour hours to 
contract values. While the training and employment hours as well as 
training spend were 100% captured indicating optimal use of local labour, 
the significant portion of contracts locally captured showed the increased 
participation of local firms. The next section considers the NCDMB’s fiscal 
responsibility. 
 
4.8.3 Collection of Taxes and Royalties 
 
Although in Nigeria it is the duty of the Federal Inland Revenue Service 
(FIRS), the NNPC and the DPR to collect crude sales revenues, royalties, 
and petroleum profit taxes (Gboyega et al., 2011), the NCDMB as well has 
a specific fiscal responsibility of deducting a mandatory levy of 1% from the 
values of every contract awarded in the industry and keep in a fund called 
the Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF). The law stated that: 
the sum of one percent of every contract awarded to any operator, contractor, 
subcontractor, alliance partner or any other entity involved in any project, operation, 
activity or transaction in the upstream sector of the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
shall be deducted at source and paid into the Fund. S.104. 
  
The NCDF levy was considered another form of tax (PwC, 2012; Michael, 
2014; Deloitte, 2014). Hence, it was suggested that in collecting taxes the 
authority has to adopt the required accounting, auditing and reporting 
standards (Alba, 2009). Taxation is a tool in the second local content model 
(EY, 2014) used to influence local content performance by rewarding or 
punishing as appropriate. As an incentive, the NDCMB is required to liaise 
with other relevant agencies and secure favourable tax regime for firms 
that exhibit significant adherence to local content rules. The NCDF is a full-
pledged entity with well-established governance structure capable of 
owning assets and liabilities. It is under the custody and management of 
the NCDMB and hence, requires a high level of accountability in its 
administration. This implies that the Board has a duty to render accounts in 
respect of the receipts and payments of the Fund to the industry 
stakeholders particularly the oil companies who are the contributors, risk-
bearers as well as beneficiaries of the Fund (Post et al., 2002). As an 
international best practice, the EITI has required that all payments to 
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governments by extractive companies should be published. Figure 14 below 
exhibits the governance structure of the NCDF.  
 
Figure 14: Governance Structure of the NCDF 
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As indicated in the figure above, the Fund which is being overseen by an 
advisory committee to ensure accountability is to be applied as 70% 
commercial interventions and 30% developmental interventions. As of now 
the Fund is said to have hit $700m and is meant to tackle the financial and 
liquidity problems of the indigenous oil and gas companies and empower 
them to bid, win and execute oil contracts (The Nation, 2015). It was stated 
in the NOGICD Act that:  
the Fund shall be managed by the Nigerian Content Development Board and 
employed for projects, programmes, and activities directed at increasing Nigerian 
content in the oil and gas industry. S.104(3). 
 
These interventions are some of the sustainability initiatives the Board has 
been striving for and will be discussed in the next section. 
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4.8.4 Revenue Management and Allocation & Implementation of 
Sustainable Development Policies and Projects 
 
These are fourth and the fifth points on the value chain and refer to the 
ability of the authorities to manage and allocate the windfall to achieve 
sustainable development (Dobbs et al., 2013). That is why Myers and 
Mohammed (2015) contended that “resources in themselves are not a 
curse, but what a nation does with them can make it so or otherwise...” In 
view of this, the NCDMB on behalf of the government implements its 
sustainability performances through the local content policy to mitigate the 
gravity of the inherent resource curse in Nigeria. One of the fundamental 
mechanisms is the disbursement from the NCDF to effect the commercial 
and developmental interventions stated above. The two interventions are 
meant to assist indigenous firms to attain the needed financial and 
technological requirements over time up to the point where they can 
comfortably compete with their foreign counterparts. The sustainability 
relevance of these interventions is that indigenous operators and service 
providers would be able to generate employment and obtain specialised 
knowledge which has economic, social and environmental impacts. It was 
provided that the Board shall: 
assist local contractors and Nigerian companies to develop their capabilities and 
capacities to further the attainment of the goal of developing Nigerian content in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. S. 70(h).   
The following sections consider the two interventions. 
 
4.8.4.1 Commercial Intervention 
 
Commercial intervention is allocated 70% of the NCDF to undertake critical 
functions in favour of local firms which include financing of contracts and 
projects, enhancing working capital, acquisition of assets, facility upgrade, 
procurement of machinery and equipment, and other infrastructural 
investments (Aigboduwa and Oisamoje, 2013; Okafor and Aniche, 2014). 
These are made possible via partial guarantee which allows local firms to 
access credit facilities or cash-backed interest incentives which reduce the 
cost of capital for local companies when utilising the credit facilities and 
infrastructure finance (UBA Capital and BGL PLC, 2014). 
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4.8.4.2 Developmental Intervention 
 
Here, the Board utilizes the remaining 30% of the NCDF to undertake direct 
investment, capacity building, financing of training and development 
programmes as well as investing in the construction of infrastructure such 
as the on-going industrial park project. It also includes strategies and 
programmes that encourage the ownership and manning of oil and gas 
assets. The most important of these are the Offshore Rigs Acquisition 
Strategy (ORAS), the Marine Vessels Ownership Strategy (MAVOS) and the 
Equipment Component Manufacturing Initiative/Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (ECMI/OEM) (NCDMB, 2012, 2013). Following these 
initiatives, the Board recorded significant progress. The following sections 
consider each of these achievements. 
 
4.8.5 The Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy (ORAS) and the Marine 
Vessels Ownership Strategy (MAVOS)  
 
These two initiatives are aiming at encouraging indigenous oil firms to own 
or co-own drilling rigs and oil vessels. This will also enable these companies 
to attain the 50% asset ownership requirement of the law (NCDMB, 2013). 
Ernest Nwapa34 claimed that the Nigerian oil and gas industry has been 
spending about $2-$3 billion on drilling rigs in the offshore zone annually 
(Thisday, 2011). To respond to the challenge posed by domestic rig 
shortages which necessitate persistent rig leasing by oil firms the Board 
initiated the ORAS programme to boost rig availability in the industry. As 
reported by the Board, significant progress has been recorded, and many of 
the indigenous oil firms were said to own whole or part of these oil and gas 
assets. As at the 2012 global rig count, it was found that out of the world’s 
304 deepwater offshore drilling rigs only 14 operate in Nigeria. For the 
onshore rigs, out of the total of 864, only 5 were operating in Nigeria 
despite the country’s position among global oil producers (Baker Hughes, 
2012). The ORAS strategy is aimed at enabling sustainable financing plans 
for the acquisition of rigs as well as through partnerships between 
indigenous and foreign firms. Similar to the ORAS is the MAVOS programme 
                                                          
34 The Executive Secretary of the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB). 
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which is aimed at enhancing local ownership of oil vessels. As a 
comprehensive record of the actual achievements of these programmes is 
lacking, the study relied on stakeholders’ subjective assessment. This 
informed the adoption of the interpretive epistemology to acquire this 
knowledge.      
 
4.8.6 Equipment Component Manufacturing Initiative (ECMI)  
 
The issue of local manufacturing is a major concern of local content (Tordo, 
et al. 2010; Johnson, 2015). Johnson (2015) has presented a good account 
of the local manufacturing efficacies of local content policy which aims at 
creating jobs and facilitating exports in line with the balance of payment 
arguments reviewed in Section 2.7.3 and also recommended by the 
International Accounting and Reporting Issues in Section 3.12 above. One 
of the major achievements boasted by the NCDMB is its ongoing industrial 
park project meant to facilitate local manufacturing. The industrial park 
would consist of business units such as manufacturing, 
maintenance/repairing workshops, warehouses/load out centres, financial 
services, power plant, water supply, etc. (NCDMB, 2013: 43).   Another 
achievement of the Board is the creation of over 30,000 new employments 
within the areas of the three programmes above. This is shown in Table 4.4 
below. 
 
Table 4.4 New Employment in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Sector (2010-2012) 
Area of Specialization No. of new jobs created 
Marine vessel services 3000 
Rigs 1500 
Fabrication yard services 10792 
Design Engineering 2130 
Petroleum Technology 3000 
Oil and Gas Equipment Manufacturing 1500 
Management positions (in operating 
companies) 
2143 
Miscellaneous 6797 
Total of new employment 30862 
Source: NCDMB website (www.ncdmb.gov.ng) accessed 22nd Feb, 2013 
Despite the above achievements, some industry stakeholders are alleging 
exclusion from the three programmes as stated in the first chapter of this 
work. This made it imperative for this work to among other things, apply a 
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binary logistic regression on the three programmes to determine whether 
organizational membership or work experience influence stakeholders’ 
knowledge and awareness of the existence and operations of the 
programmes (see Sections 7.10). The rest of this chapter is dedicated to 
discussing the various forms of accountability of the two accountors 
(NCDMB and IOCs) that form the central aim of this work. The first part 
examines the mandatory accountability of the two actors as understood 
from the critically reviewed and content analysed NOGICD Act 2010 which 
spelt out the legal responsibilities and accountability requirements of the 
accountors. This is presented below. 
 
4.9 Accounting, Accountability and Governance Provisions in the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act (NOGICD) 
2010  
        
In line with the accountability indicators identified by the study from the 
general review of the literature, and the corresponding accountability 
indicators identified by Crofts and Bisman (2010) from the accounting 
literature (see Tables 5.1 and 5.3), this section has taken a general 
overview of the local content legislation to see how such accountability 
terms  were used in the Act. This would enhance the study’s ability to 
develop the rest of the research questions for the study which were around 
the accountability of the two accountors. Rixon (2007) argues that 
accountability in legislation “impacts the ability of an agency to adequately 
demonstrate accountability to its stakeholders”. This section, therefore, 
intends to use the NOGICD Act provisions to justify the question of why 
there should be accountability in local content implementation and why the 
Board (and in some instances, the IOCs) should be held accountable for the 
outcomes of the implementation. Table 4.5 demonstrates the accountability 
and governance requirements ‘explicitly’ provided in the NOGICD Act.  
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Table 4.5: Accountability Provisions in the NOGICD Act, 2010. 
Accountability Dimensions Sections of NOGICD Act 
Objective/Targets S. 4, 36, 41(1), 46, 90(d) 
Balancing target with capacity 3(1), 11(4), 16, 50, 96, 97  
Stakeholder engagement/collaboration S. 57, 54(b), 55, 58, 99  
Roles/Responsibilities of stakeholders S. 54(c) & 33(2) 
Governance S. 54(b) 
Reporting/disclosure S. 29(c), 63, 64 & 66 
Evaluation, measurement, review S. 12, 14, 17(1), 20(d), 22(g), 22(g)iv, 
56(c), 70(e) 
Auditing S. 54(b), 70(k), 91, 93(b), 94 
Transparency/information dissemination S. 17(2), 18(2), 21(f), 24(g), 29(d), 
33(d), 22(g)iv, S. 54(b), 57, 57(b), 64, 
65  
Sanctions S. 68 
Enforceability S. 66, 105 
Source: generated by Author from an analysis of the NOGICD Act 2010 
 
As such the accountability dimensions contained in the above table would 
be useful in assessing the accountability of the NCDMB. Besides this, the 
study had conducted a wider survey of the extant literature especially the 
accounting literature to expand the scope of these dimensions. The result 
was a comprehensive accountability scale which was used to construct the 
first part of the questionnaire used in the study (refer to Section 5.9). 
Basically, the assessment of the NCDMB’s performance follows the same 
pattern as that of any other public agency. In this regard, Bolton (2003: 
22) argues that public sector organizations have missions, and any 
performance measurement system should be in line with such a mission 
and will answer the questions of “how well does it fulfil its missions, how 
efficiently does it support that mission, and how does it report its 
achievements to its stakeholders?”. For this purpose, the research 
questions designed to examine the NCDMB’s performance are presented 
below: 
3. What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s general 
accountability performance in the implementation of local content 
sustainability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
4. What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s financial 
accountability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
5. What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s ability to 
enforce the provisions of the ‘first considerations’ to Nigerian oil and gas 
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firms in the award of petroleum contracts, licenses, employment, 
procurement of materials, and technology transfer?   
6. What is the extent of stakeholders’ awareness and effectiveness of NCDMB’s 
local content programmes? 
 
Having discussed the roles and accountability of the NCDMB, the next 
section introduces the IOCs operating in Nigeria with their local content 
roles and accountability in the petroleum value chain. 
 
4.10 The International Oil and Gas Companies (IOCs) in Nigeria 
 
The major IOCs’ roles in the petroleum value chain are investment, 
compliance with legal provisions, and collaboration with host governments 
to achieve sustainability through local employment and procurement, 
technology transfer, etc. In implementing local content in Nigeria, the IOCs 
have dual accountability – hard (mandatory) to the authorities and soft 
(voluntary) to the public.   
 
As stated by Hufbauer et al. (2013) the Nigerian local content regime 
focuses on two main activities: employment and procurement by oil and 
gas companies. These activities are significantly controlled by the IOCs, as 
such, the NOGICD Act had issued exclusive requirements that oil companies 
(especially the IOCs) must give priority to local firms when awarding 
upstream contracts such as seismic, fabrication, engineering, drilling or 
procurement of materials needed for the production of oil. The primary 
accountability of the IOCs in Nigeria therefore, is to comply with these legal 
provisions as their minimum (Eweje and Wu, 2010) which form their 
mandatory (hard) accountability besides the voluntary (soft) one such as 
sustainability reporting. As several IOCs are operating in Nigeria, this study 
focuses exclusively on the five major ones, namely: Shell, Chevron, 
ExxonMobil, Total and Eni-Agip. This is because they are the oldest 
operating IOCs in Nigeria, produce the largest portion of the oil (between 
80-95%), and operate the joint ventures (see Table 4.1), production-
sharing and the service contracts in the country. Table 4.6 below presents 
the distribution of oil produced by each of these IOCs. 
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     Table 4.6: Crude Oil Production by Company in Nigeria, 2010 
 
 
Company 
 
No. of wells 
operated 
Annual barrels 
produced 
(millions) 
Daily average 
production 
(thousands) 
 
Share of total 
(%) 
Joint ventures: 
ExxonMobil 
Shell 
Chevron* 
Total-Elf 
Agip-Eni 
Texaco* 
Pan-Ocean 
 Subtotal 
 
219 
NA 
331 
143 
211 
25 
12 
941 
 
166 
143 
95 
51 
41 
4 
3 
503 
 
454 
392 
259 
141 
114 
11 
8 
1,378 
 
28 
24 
16 
9 
7 
1 
<1 
84 
Production-
sharing 
contracts: 
Addax 
Esso 
 
 
90 
10 
 
 
30 
56 
 
 
83 
153 
 
 
5 
9 
Service 
contracts: 
Agip-Eni 
 
 
6 
 
 
2 
 
 
5 
 
 
<1 
Independent 
operators: 
NNPC 
 
7 
 
9 
 
25 
 
2 
Grand Total 1,054 600 1,643 100 
Source: Modified from Hufbauer et al. (2013) 
*Note that Chevron and Texaco have merged as ChevronTexaco. 
 
The five major IOCs are selected and included in the study on the basis of 
the above oil production figures which indicated their significance in the 
Nigeria’s upstream sector. The next section proceeds to discuss the roles, 
responsibilities and expectations of the IOCs as agents of local content 
implementation to serve the basis for the assessment of their accountability 
to their numerous stakeholders in the industry. 
 
4.11 Roles and Accountability of the IOCs in the Implementation of 
Local Content Sustainability in the Nigerian Petroleum Sector 
 
Frynas (2005) argues that the oil and gas sector is the one business 
segment of the economy that makes the strongest claims for ethical and 
corporate social performance including product and environmental 
accountability, protection of human rights, stakeholder rights, transparency 
and fighting corruption, good community relations, etc.  Consequently, 
IOCs assumed “leadership roles in developing good corporate practices and 
codes of conduct in the workplace and engagement with different facets of 
society” (Tuodolo, 2009: 531). This led to the involvement of various IOCs 
(eg, Shell, Chevron ExxonMobil, Total, Eni, etc) in different international 
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sustainability initiatives such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the 
UN Global Compact, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
 
IOCs’ roles in sustainable development in general and in local content35, in 
particular, were enshrined in the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD, 2011). The guidelines have expected multinationals to use 
developmental policies to “contribute to economic, environmental and social 
progress with a view to achieving sustainable development” of their host 
countries through capacity building, human capital formation, employment 
and training and promotion of local markets through local procurement (P. 
19 & 36). There are diverse arguments about the accountability of 
businesses. These arguments hang on two competing theories of 
accountability – the shareholder theory which emphasises wealth-
maximization accountability to shareholders (Jensen, 2002; Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004) and the stakeholder theory which focuses on the 
accountability to external constituencies (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Freeman et al., 2004; Jorg et al., 2004; Kaler, 2006). These theories will be 
discussed at length in the next chapter. Due to the increasing prominence 
of the stakeholder perspectives, corporations are coming to terms with the 
glaring facts as to why they ought to be accountable to stakeholders. Gray 
et al. (1996) opined that the increasing recognition by corporations of the 
broad duty of non-financial-stakeholder accountability on them, corporate 
social reporting had become the frequent medium of discharging such 
accountability. In acknowledging the reality that multinational corporations 
have an obligation to be accountable to the state as well as the general 
public, Leisinger (2013) was reported in Egbon (2014) to have stated as 
follows:  
The fact that a company knows what the state and the authorities should do or has 
identified governance deficits does not release it from its own obligation to behave 
responsibly … In concrete terms, if the government of a developing country fails to 
enact or enforce appropriate legislation regulating social and environmental matters, 
                                                          
35 The concept of ‘Local content’ was not explicitly used in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises but 
other concepts that represent local content such as local capacity building, local employment and local sustainable 
development were used.   
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a responsible company must not take advantage of these deficits and remain 
inactive itself....  
This is the impetus behind IOCs’ engagement in sustainability performance 
and reporting such information to stakeholders in host countries. 
Sustainability reporting is viewed as “the practice of measuring, disclosing, 
and being accountable to internal and external stakeholders for 
organizational performance towards the goal of sustainable development”. 
It involves the triple-bottom-line reporting on the “economic, 
environmental, and social impacts” of corporations (GRI, 2000-2001: 3). 
IOCs are increasingly adopting local content reporting in addition to the 
general sustainability reporting in line with the GRI/IPIECA sustainability 
reporting guideline as widely discussed in the previous chapter. Local 
content sustainability reporting is gaining ground to the extent that oil firms 
have begun to engage civil society and other professional groups to audit 
their local content reports (Ngoasong, 2014). Despite these attempts, 
Bowie (2013: 138) doubted the sincerity of the foreign multinationals in 
supporting host governments’ developmental policies as they may “use 
their influence and money to defeat or water down regulations ...” This may 
also affect local content as the policy may not be in the IOCs’ best interest. 
To incapacitate the positive impact of the policy, the IOCs may insist on 
subsidy, tax breaks or even bribe political elites to secure contracts 
(Esteves, 2013; Martini, 2014). In Nigeria for example, the IOCs use the 
current situation of crude oil crush to demand discounts of between 20-30 
percent on concluded contracts (Sanyaolu, 2015). These and many other 
reasons can arguably be a justification why the IOCs’ mandatory and 
voluntary accountability have to be examined. Against the above 
background the following research questions and hypothesis are 
formulated: 
 
7. To what extent do the IOCs operating in Nigeria comply with the mandatory 
local content reporting? 
8. To what extent do the IOCs operating in Nigeria voluntarily disclose and 
report local content sustainability indicators in their global sustainability 
reports before and after the creation of the Nigerian local content law?  
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9. H0 There is no significant difference in the volumetric local content 
sustainability disclosures of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before and after 
the creation of the Nigerian local content law. 
 
H1 There is a significant difference in the volumetric local content 
sustainability disclosures of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before and after 
the creation of the Nigerian local content law. 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the study context – the Nigerian oil and gas 
sector – with its two major local content actors – the NCDMB and the 
IOCs. A brief account of the various contractual arrangements in the 
industry and the dominance of the IOCs over their domestic 
counterparts were also discussed. One major essence of the chapter was 
the practical application of the petroleum value chain to illustrate the 
governance functions of the NCDMB in administering the local content 
policy. It demonstrated the practical responsibilities of the Board as well 
as its achievements so far. Besides the NCDMB, the IOCs were 
considered equally important accountors of local content. The nature of 
the accountability (mandatory and voluntary) of these actors were 
extensively reviewed where it was found that while the NCDMB’s 
accountability was purely mandatory as provided by the law, the IOCs 
have dual accountability – those required by the law (such as statutory 
disclosure of contract documents) and the recommendations of best 
practice. Based on these discussions the study has drawn and justified 
its research questions and hypothesis. On the backdrop of the chapter 
and its review of local content actors’ accountability and governance, the 
next chapter continues to provide the conceptual basis for the thesis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Accountability as the Theoretical Framework for Assessing Local 
Content Sustainability in Petroleum Contracts 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Previous chapters discussed local content sustainability, accountability, and 
accounting frameworks of local content within the context of the wider 
petroleum sector governance. Mandatory and voluntary accountability and 
their respective reporting frameworks were presented. This chapter is the 
heart of the thesis as it is the connecting chapter between the preceding 
chapters and the subsequent ones. It is intended to provide the theoretical 
lens through which local content accountability could be viewed so that a 
decision on the philosophical positions, methodology and methods of 
analysing data and discussing of results could be made. The chapter is 
premised on the conceptual model which systematically progressed from 
earlier chapters. The chapter would follow the model sequentially from two 
accountability theories to the selection of the appropriate approach to study 
local content sustainability.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Considerations  
 
To provide a concrete theoretical basis, the work draws on Ijiri’s (1983) 
accounting research frameworks classified into decision-based (otherwise 
called decision usefulness) and accountability-based. A decision-based 
accounting framework is unidirectional and focuses on the accounting 
information user alone in making economic-related decisions. On the other 
hand, an accountability-based framework is bi-directional and centres on 
the relationship between the accountee and the accountor, that is, the user 
and the provider of the financial and non-financial information (Ijiri, 1983: 
75). It was argued that the accountability-based purpose of accounting is 
the most popular (Skinner, 1985; Pallot, 1992; Nelson et al., 2003; Jones 
and Pendlebury, 2004 and Stanley et al., 2008; Blanco, 2011); especially 
when the public sector is involved (Coy, 1995; Nelson et al., 2003). Thus, 
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accountability undoubtedly forms the philosophical basis for the accounting 
practice (Andrew, 2001).  
Reflecting on these frameworks is of particular importance because the two 
broad purposes of local content reporting are to allow the shareholders to 
assess and take decisions on the costs and benefits of investing in oil 
companies which are currently under the host governments’ pressure to 
engage in local content activities. This may sometimes mean sacrificing 
resources and income by companies to undertake training of locals, transfer 
of technology and purchasing of local materials which may sometimes be 
more expensive than the imported ones. Principally this is where the 
decision-based accounting framework could apply. This is not the 
perspective taken by this research. The Second purpose of local content 
reporting is to inform all those negatively affected by oil companies’ 
operations including the communities whose environmental ecosystem, 
farming lands and fishing waters are being damaged that the companies 
involved are not only accountable but also taking appropriate measures to 
positively compensate for such performance. The theoretical direction taken 
by this study is, therefore, the accountability-based as it involves giving 
and receiving information between accountors (NCDMB and the IOC) and 
accountees (other industry stakeholders) in relation to local content 
sustainability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.  
 
Three accounting paradigms or worldview have emerged from the two 
frameworks. These are the mainstream, the interpretive and the critical 
accounting (Chua, 1986). The mainstream is predominantly underpinned by 
positivism while the interpretive and critical are dominated by the 
interpretivist/constructivist conception (Bebbington, 1999). This issue is 
purely philosophical and embedded in the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions to be discussed in the next chapter. Before going into that, it 
should be recalled that in chapter three the study had presented a 
conceptual model that had used the oil sector governance framework to 
derive two local content models. Also, the governance framework and the 
first model are used to discuss the concept of “accountability”. In the 
following section, the study continues with the “accountability” line of 
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discussion to justify the selection of the conceptual framework. Figure 15 
below exhibited the study’s conceptual framework. 
Figure 15: Conceptual Framework of the Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Local Content Model 
                         
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      Approaches to the study of Local Content Sustainability  
    
Source: generated by Author from literature  
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Business Case Theory 
Critical Theory 
 
In Figure 15 above the study’s conceptual framework focuses on the first 
local content model because of the ‘accountability’ element it shared with 
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the Governance framework. This follows that accountability is at the heart 
of the local content and the petroleum governance. This is evident from 
another natural resource governance framework developed by the 
Transparency & Accountability Initiative (Derby, 2010) which involves three 
principles of transparency, participation and accountability.  It was decided 
not to present this framework to avoid repetition, as all its indicators are 
contained in the accountability-scale developed in this study (see Table 
5.3).  
 
Accountability is underpinned by two conflicting theories: the shareholder 
and the stakeholder theories. Apart from these two theories, some scholars 
also view accountability from the critical perspective (e.g., Smyth, 2013). 
This informs the study’s methodological stance as these theories have some 
contributions to the understanding of accountability in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry. As such, the framework informs the various methods of 
gathering and analysing data. As will be discussed in the following sections, 
the shareholder theory is largely based on the mainstream accounting using 
quantitative data, while the stakeholder and critical theories are 
interpretive. In the following sections, the study discusses these prominent 
theories of accountability. The next section starts with the shareholder 
theory. 
 
5.3 The Shareholder Theory  
 
Shareholder theory will remain in partial agreement with this study because 
of its narrow focus of stockholder exclusivity the consequences of which is 
“legitimised greed” for those with sole profit maximization interest (Levy 
and Mitschow, 2009: 2). The idea behind the theory is that organizations 
have shareholders’ wealth maximization motive as their first and most 
important responsibility (Mansell, 2013). Friedman (1970) in Mansell (2013: 
585) asserted that “…there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition without deception and fraud”. The 
shareholder theory is narrow in focus and fails to carry along all parties into 
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the accountability relationship. The study’s issue at hand is the 
accountability engagement of a government agency, the IOCs and their 
constituents. As such, neither the government has shareholders nor wealth 
maximization preferences over the welfare of its citizens. Also, the creation 
of the sustainability reports by the IOCs indicated their interests in 
stakeholder affairs in addition to the wealth-maximization motives. An 
alternative accountability theory is presented below. 
 
5.4 The Stakeholder Theory  
 
Stakeholder theory perceives organizations as responsible for providing 
benefits not only to their shareholders but also to other individuals and 
groups that have interests in one way or the other in the running of the 
organizations (Mutti et al., 2012). Stakeholder theory is the theory 
specifically adopted in CSR and sustainability studies and found to be “a 
necessary process in the operationalisation of CSR, as a complementary 
rather than conflicting body of literature” (Matten et al., 2003: 111). Post et 
al (2002: 19) defined stakeholders as “the individuals and constituencies 
that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to firms’ wealth-creating 
capacity and activities and that are therefore its potential beneficiaries 
and/or risk bearers”. Another good definition of stakeholders was suggested 
by Clarkson (1995: 106) as: 
Stakeholders are persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or 
interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. Such claimed 
rights or interests are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the 
corporation, and may be legal or moral, individual or collective”.  
 
These definitions suggest that stakeholders as the beneficiaries and risk-
bearers have legal and moral rights to demand accountability from 
corporations. Reflecting the Nigerian local content issue, the NCDMB as a 
representative of the government has to account for its responsibilities of 
enforcing compliance and reporting performance to all stakeholders in the 
industry who may be positively or negatively affected by such policies. Also, 
the IOCs are accountable to the Board for mandatory reporting and are 
expected to also voluntarily report to stakeholders such as oil communities 
who are affected by oil and gas operations. Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
and Fassin (2012) used the normative and the instrumental views to 
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explain why organizations have to be responsive to their stakeholders. The 
normative view is based purely on ethics and morality and considers 
organizations to be ethically responsive to their stakeholders because it is a 
good thing to do. The instrumental view considers it as a “good business for 
organisations to be responsive to their stakeholders” (Barrett, 2001: 38; 
Levy and Mitschow, 2009). The instrumental view has a business-case 
undertone and assists organizations to maximize corporate values and 
goodwill through their relationship qualities with their stakeholders which 
subsequently impact on their financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 
1997a, 1997b; Agle et al., 1999; MacMillan and Downing, 1999; Barrett, 
2001). In relation to this win-win approach, Jensen (2001: 1) argues that 
“a firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interests of its stakeholders”. 
 
A large number of studies conducted on corporate social and environmental 
responsibility (Clarkson, 1995; Weaver, 1999; Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; 
Sharma and Henriques, 2005; Pater and Van Lierop, 2006) especially in the 
extractive sector (Mutti, et al., 2012) have used the stakeholder theory to 
explain the importance of businesses and organizations to the society. The 
normative and instrumental views of stakeholders are applied to all 
organizations whether private, public, for-profit or not-for-profit (Barrette, 
2001). This study is also aware of the ‘convergent stakeholder’ perspective 
which combines the normative and the instrumental views (Jones, 1999). 
The NCDMB is a government organization created specifically to attend to 
the needs of the society through designing regulations, monitoring 
performance, reporting and ensuring compliance with the Nigerian Content 
Act to ensure sustainable social, economic and environmental development. 
Hence, the stakeholder theory in its convergent perspective is the most 
appropriate in this case because the Board is simultaneously accountable 
for its financial and non-financial responsibilities including the utilisation of 
the NCDF described in the previous chapter. This is because performance 
“should be evaluated in terms of both profit and the accomplishment of 
social objectives” (Chen, 1975: 542). For the IOCs, their major 
accountability is their compliance with local content rules which will 
enhance their value maximization and goodwill (Jensen, 2001).The 
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following section considers the various units that made up the stakeholder 
theory. 
5.5 Components of the Stakeholder Theory 
 
Post et al. (2002) cited in Mutti et al (2012: 213) identified the essential 
components of the stakeholder theory to include: (a) flow of 
benefits/threats between organizations and stakeholders; (b) stakeholder 
networks and roles; (c) varied interests; and (d) stakeholder engagement. 
The study reviews these components in the following sections and utilises 
them to build the stakeholder-accountability model to be used in the study.  
 
5.5.1 Flow of Benefits and Threats 
 
Relationships between organizations and stakeholders are accompanied by 
benefits and costs or opportunities and threats. Each stakeholder group has 
its own objectives, rights, responsibilities and expectations, and contributes 
a specific resource to the organization. These responsibilities and 
expectations should be clearly and transparently stated for any 
accountability relationship to be built. While organizations benefit from the 
patronage of their stakeholders, they could also be affected when such 
contributions are withdrawn (Mutti et al., 2012). For example, the NCDMB 
was created to manage the expectations of various stakeholders in the oil 
and gas operations; as such, the Board cannot operate in isolation, but 
relies on the contributions from the industry stakeholders. The operations of 
the agency would be negatively affected if say, the IOCs decide to 
terminate or reduce the volume of their operations in the industry. In case 
the IOCs terminate operations, no contract may be executed; no oil may be 
extracted and there may not be any discussion of local content. It was 
recently reported that about 10,000 jobs were at risk due to the divestment 
of Shell and Chevron from an LNG project in the Nigerian oil industry (Eboh, 
2013). Similarly, if oil communities should withdraw their support to oil 
operations and maintenance of peace, oil companies will be badly affected. 
The contributions made by stakeholders in local content relationships are 
“valuable knowledge, resources and commitment” (IPIECA, 2011: 8). 
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5.5.2 Stakeholder Network and Roles 
 
This is about identifying and understanding the nature of the stakeholder 
groups involved and their roles. These stakeholder groups may be 
institutional/ regulatory, industrial/organizational, or social/community 
(Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Post et al., 2002). Organizations should 
respond to their stakeholders according to the nature of their group and the 
contribution they are able to offer. By this component, the present study 
identifies these three major stakeholder groups to form the Nigerian oil 
industry’s primary stakeholders for the purpose of local content 
accountability. Apart from the accountability relationships that exist 
between the organizations and these three groups, the groups may also be 
accountable to one another (Crane and Livesey, 2003). This point will be 
elaborated in Section 5.6 below. Stakeholder network and roles is the add-
on feature used by this study to modify the existing stakeholder model to 
investigate the local content governance and accountability in the Nigeria’s 
complex petroleum sector (see Figure 18).  
 
5.5.3 Varied Interest 
 
It is understood that satisfying the information and resource needs of all 
stakeholders may be problematic. As such, Mutti et al. (2012) considered it 
imperative for organizations to identify the nature of their stakeholders’ 
interests and needs. From the context of this study, local content actors, 
the NCDMB and the IOCs are expected to identify the needs of their diverse 
stakeholders. For example, the public expects visible benefits through 
enforcement of local content rules, and oil companies expect new 
opportunities and good policy directions from the Board. For the IOCs, 
stakeholders are mostly interested in their compliance with local content 
rules exhibited via the mandatory and voluntary reporting.  
 
5.5.4 Stakeholder Engagement 
 
This involves stakeholder inclusiveness in organizational processes and 
strategies (Post et al., 2002; AccountAbility1000, 2008) to ensure long-
term success and survival of the firm (Sirgy, 2002). For this purpose, the 
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wider view of accountability is required. Messner (2009) observes that 
discussions of accountability have previously focused on shareholders as 
supported by the agency theory; but, with the greater need for public 
accountability, the boundaries have been expanded to include the wider 
stakeholder groups. IPIECA (2011) argues that for any successful local 
content programme to be achieved, there has to be close and strong 
collaboration among industry stakeholders. OPEC (2011a) identified some 
key stakeholders whose engagement is inevitable in local content 
relationships to include national and international oil companies, service 
companies, local industries, local communities and governments. Levett and 
Chandler (2012: 11) made it clear that “involving all stakeholders ... from 
the earliest stages (of oil contracts) possible allows for greater 
understanding of both existing procurement patterns and real world barriers 
to expanding local content, and will deliver outcome with far greater 
efficiency and effectiveness”. The idea behind the local content is based on 
the stakeholder theory, in that an organization has to be concerned about 
its “impacts on the economic conditions of its stakeholders and on economic 
systems at local, national, and global levels” (GRI, 2012: 34). Scholars 
have designed models to depict the relationships between organizations and 
their constituents (Freeman, 1984; Hill and Jones, 1992; Burton and Dunn, 
1996; Mitchell et al., 1997). The next section presents the most commonly 
used stakeholder model highlighting its limitations and the reasons why it 
must be modified to fit the current study.  
 
5.6 The Stakeholder Models 
 
Initially, the Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) model was created to contrast 
and extend the traditional input-output model of business. Three groups - 
suppliers, investors and employees collectively contribute inputs to the firm 
which converts them into output and channels them to the customers. 
There was not much interest on the returns to the providers of the inputs. 
Figure 16 below illustrates the input-output model. 
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Figure 16: Input-Output Model of Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
 
The above model does not consider the reciprocities and exchanges 
between the firm and its stakeholders. Customers are the most important 
and the business is exclusively serving and protecting the interest of this 
group. The input-output model was criticized by Donaldson and Preston 
(1995: 68) who recognised that “all persons or groups with legitimate 
interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that 
there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over 
another”. Hence, the stakeholder model is favoured over the input-output 
model. Figure 17 below presents the adjusted model. 
Figure 17: Donaldson and Preston’s Stakeholder Model 
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From Figure 17, various stakeholders have varied interests in the firm and 
vice-versa. The government has an interest in the firm for the purpose of 
taxation and regulation; investors have an interest in financial return; 
political parties are after recognition; suppliers are after quality, delivery 
and credit worthiness; employees and trade associations are interested in 
conditions of service; communities are interested in social responsibility, 
and customers are after service and quality assurance. 
This study cannot use the above model unmodified because the model has 
failed to show that there is any network of relationship among the 
stakeholders as there are no arrows in-between the groups. The present 
study assumed a network of accountability relationships (Post et al., 2002) 
between the NCDMB/IOCs and stakeholders, and among stakeholders as 
absent in the Donaldson and Preston’s model. Besides the stakeholders’ 
expectations of new policies, opportunities, and sanctions from the NCDMB, 
similar expectations exist among themselves. For example, local 
communities, environmental activists and local oil servicing firms expect 
social responsibility programmes, local employment and training, 
technology transfer, local sourcing and resource conservation from the oil 
operating firms (the IOCs). The modified stakeholder model developed by 
the study is presented in Figure 18 below.  
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Figure 18: The Modified Stakeholder-Accountability Model for the Study 
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Source: Generated by Author from literature 
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developed the new model, the next task is to review and select the 
appropriate perspective to the study of local content sustainability.  
 
5.7 Approaches to the Study of Local Content Sustainability 
 
Brown and Fraser (2006) argue that the increasing interest among 
businesses, investors, environmentalists, unions, public policy-makers and 
governments in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Social and 
Environmental Accounting (SEA) led many companies to engage in 
publishing sustainable development reports based on reporting guidelines. 
Approaches to the study of CSR and SEA were classified into three – the 
business case (or managerialist), the critical theory, and the stakeholder-
accountability (or middle-of-the-road) (Tinker et al., 1991; Gray and 
Collison, 2002; Deegan, 2002; Brown and Fraser, 2006). These approaches 
can be underpinned by the mainstream, critical and interpretive accounting 
paradigms respectively. Being a sustainable development policy with a 
strong relationship with CSR (Ado, 2014), local content can be studied 
through these three approaches as discussed in the following sections.  
 
5.7.1  The Business-Case or Managerialist Approach 
 
This approach considers engagement with sustainability practices based on 
“what’s in it for business and shareholders”, that is, the financial return 
(Brown and Fraser, 2006: 104). CSR and SEA practices are viewed by 
business-case advocates as means to maximize shareholders’ wealth and 
provide new business opportunities (Hedstrom, et al., 1998). This approach 
is in line with the shareholder theory as it exclusively focuses on the 
business-shareholder relationship and disregards the conflict of interest 
between society and the business (O’Dwyer, 2003). The concern “is with 
society’s impact on business rather than business’s impact on society” 
(O’Dwyer, 2003: 527). Although many of the Nigerian Content General 
Managers of selected IOCs have argued in favour of the business-case of 
local content (Ovadia, 2014), this approach can only underpin the voluntary 
but not the mandatory local content reporting practices of the IOCs.  
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Even though the NCDMB is a not-for-profit agency, it has a fiscal 
responsibility for collecting 1% of contract values, disbursing the funds for 
commercial and developmental interventions and charging interests on 
loans issued to local oil firms. In this case, the Board’s revenue 
maximization tendency although not the primary motive, cannot be 
isolated. Therefore, the business-case approach has some relevance 
although little, to the understanding of local content accountability issues 
involved in this study. The critical theory approach is described below. 
 
5.7.2 The Critical or Radical Theory  
 
Critical theory criticizes both the business-case approach discussed above 
and the stakeholder-accountability discussed below. Proponents of this 
school doubt the existence of genuine accountability in a capitalist society 
as it is (Brown and Fraser, 2006). Burritt and Welch (1997) argue that 
although the concepts of stakeholders, democratic dialogue, and triple-
bottom-line are good things, their effectiveness to establish equity and 
social justice may be eroded and result in the opposite. Global capitalism 
was accused of producing a “democracy of elites” (Lehman, 2002: 223) and 
the sustainable development agenda (CSR & SEA) may be captured by 
businesses “and lead to mystification rather than liberation” (Brown and 
Fraser, 2006: 110). This argument will also have some relevance to the 
political economy of local content in this study where political elites may 
manipulate the policy or engage in corruption to award contracts. The 
stakeholders-accountability is discussed below. 
 
5.7.3 The Stakeholder-Accountability or Middle-of-the-road 
Approach 
 
This approach laid the foundations of the triple-bottom-line concerning the 
matters of “accountability or sustainability”, and “seeks to bridge between 
the managerialist and the critical” approaches (Gray and Collison, 2002: 
805; Hubbard, 2009). Stakeholder-accountability is understood to refer to 
the manner “in which people and records must interact to achieve 
accountability” (Yokel, 2001: 234). As such, it is commonly used to study 
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subjects such as social accounting, social auditing, and reporting (Rasche 
and Esser, 2006). Stakeholder-accountability is applicable in public 
organizations because they do not have shareholders (Blair and Whitehead, 
1998). To assess the accountability relationships between the NCDMB and 
the key stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, the stakeholder 
approach is the most suitable framework that would guide the study to 
achieve its intended objectives. This is because it is “the primary 
stakeholders (that) provide the best accountability perspective as their 
goals reflect, generally, the largest section of the community” (Harrison et 
al. 2012: 243). Stakeholder-accountability has a wider focus than the 
shareholder-accountability (Alam, 2006) and is applied to big organizations 
as they are viewed as quasi-public institutions aiming to promote openness, 
transparency and democracy in the society (Gray et al., 1996; Gray, 2002). 
Hence, external parties have the right to information from these 
organizations (Accounting Standards Steering Committee, 1975).  
 
The underlying philosophy of the three approaches – the stakeholder-
accountability, the business-case and the critical is similar as they all 
consider and account for the stakeholders, albeit in different degrees and 
intentions. The business-case considers the stakeholders because that 
would help the business and would maximize shareholders’ value. The 
critical took the radical and extreme position to fight against injustice and 
domination of one group over the other. The stakeholder-accountability is 
the moderator between the business-case and the critical and considers the 
stakeholders on the grounds of morality and ethics and views this as what 
should be done. In this light, the moderated approach will be utilised in this 
work. There are several reasons why stakeholders may demand information 
from organizations. These reasons are stated in the following section. 
 
5.8 Basis of Stakeholder-Accountability 
 
There are three reasons why organizations are accountable to their 
stakeholders: the interest-based, right-based, and duty-based (Werhane 
and Freeman, 1997). The interest-based purpose is related to the 
consequences of an organization’s operations. In Nigeria for instance, oil 
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firms and the civil society groups may be interested in the NCDMB’s policies 
that guide oil contracts and their impacts on companies and society. 
Similarly, trade unions, communities and civil societies may be interested in 
the sustainability activities of operating companies incorporating local 
employment and training, local procurement and supplier development, and 
other social programmes capable of compensating for the adverse 
environmental, economic and social impacts caused by oil operations.  
 
The right-based accountability entails an equitable distribution of benefits, 
resources and opportunities. For example, the Nigerian citizens especially 
the oil communities whose lives have been negatively affected by oil 
production have the right to a fair share of the benefits. They, therefore, 
have the right to investigate how the NCDMB and the IOCs enforce and 
comply respectively with the local content regulations including the financial 
and non-financial transactions between them as the first accountors of local 
content. It has been argued that when public agencies have fiscal mandates 
as in the case of the NCDF, they are under a relationship of trust with the 
providers of the resources to utilize the money objectively, honestly and 
prudently (Funnel et al., 2012). The local companies and communities will 
consequently exert pressure on the Board and the IOCs for accountability. 
This is why a section of the stakeholders had sued the Board for an alleged 
discrimination in favour of the IOCs. Lastly, duty-based accountability is 
seen as the most comprehensive form of accountability that looks beyond 
the mere commercial or profit-maximization activities (Werhane and 
Freeman, 1997) to the mandatory and voluntary duties of the accountors as 
in the case of the NCDMB’s and the IOCs’ soft and hard accountability 
discussed in Section 3.7.  
 
To sum up this discussion, the relationships among the three approaches to 
the study of sustainability discussed in Section 5.7 above can be 
represented as a continuum. On the two extremes are the business-case 
and the critical theory approaches; and at the centre is the stakeholder-
accountability approach which moderates the effects of the two sharply 
opposing perspectives. The business-case approach supports the 
shareholder accountability and focuses on wealth-maximization. The critical 
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approach supports the radical change and adopts a communal form of 
accountability as the ideal for a just society. The stakeholder-accountability 
took a path between the two approaches and shifts the focus from an 
agency-based to a more inclusive accountability that considers all parties 
based on any one or more of the interest-based, right-based or duty-based 
reasons explained above. This study finds this continuum useful in the 
selection of its pragmatic philosophical and mixed methodological bases in 
line with the multiple accounting paradigms guiding the use of quantitative 
and qualitative methods. Figure 19 below shows this continuum of 
approaches. 
Figure 19: Continuum for the approaches to the study of Local Content 
Sustainability 
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Source: Generated by Author 
 
5.9 Implications of Stakeholder-Accountability in Accounting 
Research 
 
From the stakeholder perspectives, accounting and accountability focus on 
a larger picture of organizations through performance measurement and 
reporting. To expand the accountability scope, organizations are engaged in 
financial and non-financial (social and environmental) disclosures to inform 
the stakeholders about the impact of their activities in the society (Gray et 
al., 1997). This has been the impetus behind the emergence of the social 
and sustainability accounting theories directed at informing the public about 
firms’ sustainability efforts including health and safety, community 
development, and local content activities for oil companies. The essence of 
accounting in this regard is to satisfy the information needs of its users. 
This resulted in various forms of guidelines, among which is the 
comprehensive sustainability reporting guideline – the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) (Accountability1000, 2003; Alam, 2006). GRI was discussed 
Business-Case Critical theory Stakeholder-Accountability 
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alongside the IPIECA guidelines in Section 3.11 as the accounting 
frameworks for assessing the voluntary sustainability reporting of the IOCs 
in Nigeria. The indicators contained in these two guidelines would be used 
as the coding guide to our content analysis in chapter nine. Another 
important aspect of stakeholder theory in accounting research is 
performance evaluation. Several calls were made to widen the frontiers of 
performance measurement beyond the mere financial performance 
(Mathew, 1993; Gray et al., 1997). This has given rise to the value-added 
and triple-bottom-line reporting. Burchell et al. (1985) observed that the 
value-added statement contains both commercial and social features. While 
it is mainly meant to measure economic performance, it also shows the 
contributions made by and to other stakeholders.  
 
Moving a little further down the conceptual framework chart (Figure 15) the 
next important and possibly most challenging task is measuring the 
‘accountability’ aspect of the ‘stakeholder-accountability’ concept. This is 
necessary to ascertain the level to which the two main accountors (NCDMB 
and IOCs) are responsible for their mandatory and voluntary accountability 
in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. For this purpose, the study conducted a 
content analysis of the NOGICD Act 2010 (see Section 4.9) to ascertain the 
dimensions of accountability explicitly used in the Act to require the 
accountability of the two accountors. The result was shown in Table 4.5 of 
the previous chapter. These results are found to be consistent with most of 
the indicators revealed by the work of Croft and Bisman (2010) who after 
reviewing over 100 journal articles of accounting research compiled a 
summary of the accountability dimensions in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1: Accountability Concepts in the Accounting Journals (2000-2007) 
Concepts Absolute count Relative count 
Reporting 4390 940 
Performance 2269 689 
Information (transparency) 1980 493 
Role (of stakeholders) 1494 504 
Audit 1330 324 
Governance 1053 356 
Disclosure 812 123 
Participants(participation& engagement) 640 221 
Source: Modified from Crofts and Bisman (2010) 
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The above table shows the degree of relevance of the listed terms to the 
accountability concept. These terms are found to be similar to those used in 
the NOGICD Act when stating the provisions of the hard accountability of 
the NCDMB and the IOCs. Further, considering the fact that local content is 
concerned with broad governance and accountability practices of both the 
regulators and the IOCs, this study undertook a wider survey of the 
literature to develop a more comprehensive accountability and governance 
measures. This will allow a more comprehensive assessment of the two 
local content accountors. The result of this survey is presented in Table 5.2 
below. 
       Table 5.2: Accountability Indicators Reviewed from Literature 
Author(s) Accountability indicators 
Davies, 2001  Standard setting 
 Obtaining account 
 Judgement and consequences 
Ebrahim, 2003  Reports and Disclosure Statement 
 Performance Assessment and Evaluation 
 Participation 
 Social audit 
Kingsbury, et al. (2005)  Transparency 
 Participation 
 Reasoned decision 
 Legality 
Koppell, 2005  Transparency 
 Liability 
 Controllability 
 Responsibility 
 Responsiveness 
Salawu and Agbeja, 2007) 
 
 
 
  
 Clear role and responsibilities 
 Clear performance expectation 
 Balanced expectations and capabilities 
 Credible reporting 
 Reasonable review 
  
Fowler and Kuyama, 2007   Clear objectives 
 Performance measurement 
 Communication, reporting and transparency 
Wood and Winston (2007)  Responsibility 
 Openness 
 Answerability 
Blagescu et al. (2005) (One 
World Trust) 
 Transparency 
 Participation 
 Evaluation 
 Complaint and response 
OECD, 2008 
 
 Setting objectives 
 Reviewing performance 
 Auditing performance 
 Reporting on Performance 
 Adequate disclosure and transparency 
AA1000, 2008   Inclusivity 
 Materiality 
 Responsiveness 
Darby, 2010  Standard Setting 
 Investigation 
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 Answerability 
 Sanction 
Weber, 2011   Established standard 
 Existence of readily available information 
 Sanction ability 
  Source: Compiled by the author 
As there is no single definition of accountability (Bovens, 2010), the 
procedures to measure accountability also vary, thus, the emergence of the 
above sets of accountability measures many of which have wide application. 
For instance, the One World Trust’s Global Accountability Report (GAR) 
(Blagescu et al., 2005) has been one of the most successful efforts to 
measure the accountability of several international organizations including 
the IMF, World Bank, WHO, ILO, WTO and OECD (Blagescu and Lloyd, 
2006; Bovens, 2010). The Fowler and Kuyama’s framework was dedicated 
to measuring the accountability of the United Nations. Darby’s (2010) scale 
was meant to measure the accountability and governance of the natural 
resources sector. The OECD’s (2008) indicators have measured the 
accountability of the state-owned enterprises. The Wood and Winston’s 
(2007) factor analysed indicators have measured the required leadership 
accountability in organizations. Ebrahim (2003) has provided the 
mechanisms for measuring the accountability of the NGOs. To assess the 
complex accountability and governance of the political-economic policy of 
local content, this study combined the above indicators into a single set of 
16 indicators to form a comprehensive accountability measurement scale as 
shown in Table 5.3 below.  
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Table: 5.3 Accountability Measurement Scale  
Accountability 
Dimensions/indicators 
Authors 
1) Clear Objectives and Standards Davies (2001), Fowler and Kuyama (2007), 
OECD (2008), Darby (2010), Weber (2011). 
2) Balancing expectations with 
capacities 
Salawu and Agbeja (2007). 
3) Clear roles & responsibilities Salawu and Agbeja (2007). 
4) Transparency McClellan (1999), Davies (2001), Koppell (2005), 
Kingsbury, et al. (2005), Fowler and Kuyama 
(2007), Wood and Winston (2007), Lloyd (2008), 
OECD (2008), Weber (2011). 
5) Participation, engagement and 
Inclusivity 
Ebrahim (2003), Kingsbury et al. (2005), Lloyd 
(2008), AA1000APS (2008). 
6) Performance review and 
evaluation 
Ebrahim (2003), Kingsbury et al. (2005), Salawu 
and Agbeja (2007), Fowler and Kuyama (2007), 
Lloyd (2008), OECD (2008a), Darby (2010). 
7) Performance Reporting & 
Disclosure 
Davies (2001), Ebrahim, (2003), Kingsbury et al. 
(2005), Salawu and Agbeja (2007), Fowler and 
Kuyama (2007), OECD (2008). 
8) Auditing Ebrahim (2003), OECD (2008). 
9) Responsiveness Koppell (2005), AA1000APS (2008). 
10) Responsibility\Legality Kouzes and Posner (1993), Kingsbury et 
al.(2005), Koppell (2005), Wood and Winston 
(2007). 
11)  Sanctions Frink and Klimoski (1998), Davies (2001), 
Koppell (2005), Weber (2011), Darby (2010). 
12) Complaint and Response Lloyd (2008), Hortsch (2010) 
13) Enforceability Newell and Bellour (2002); Goetz and Jenkins 
(2005) 
14) Answerability Frink and Klimoski (1998), Wood and Winston 
(2007), Darby (2010) 
15) Materiality AA1000APS (2008) 
16) Governance Hortsch (2010) 
  Source: Compiled by author from literature 
 
The 16 indicators or dimensions of accountability above were used to 
construct the survey instruments for this study. Analysis of the data 
collected was made on the basis of each dimension. Before concluding this 
chapter, it is imperative to remind ourselves that stakeholder-accountability 
only operates in a social setting in which the Weberian aspects of laws, 
performance standards, governance institutions, regulatory frameworks as 
well as mechanisms for enforcement are all available (Arugay, 2005). This 
undoubtedly refers to the developed democratic societies. Nigeria is a good 
example of the few complex and sophisticated democratic developing 
countries where stakeholder-accountability can operate to some extent. 
Thus, foreign and local companies in Nigeria, especially in the oil sector, 
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have to be accountable to stakeholders for their contributions to 
sustainability. 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
The chapter presented the conceptual framework of the study which was 
guided by an Oil Sector Governance Framework. The framework was 
utilised to develop the two useful local content models and show the 
intersection between local content and accountability. The stakeholder and 
the shareholder theories of accountability were reviewed, and the study 
found it convenient to adopt, modify and apply the existing stakeholder 
model. Three approaches to the study of sustainability were also 
considered, and the study selected the middle-range stakeholder-
accountability which is a path between the business-case and the critical 
approaches. The chapter finally developed sixteen (16) proxies of 
accountability to be used to construct the study’s survey instrument.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Research Philosophy, Methodology and Methods 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters have considered the concept of local content in 
petroleum contracts within the context of accountability and governance in 
the petroleum sector. As the study’s context the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry, with its major local content sustainability accountors – the NCDMB 
and the IOCs was reviewed. The middle-range stakeholder-accountability 
approach was adopted as the pragmatic approach to the understanding of 
local content sustainability relationships among the stakeholders in the 
Nigerian petroleum sector. This chapter aims at discussing the philosophy, 
methodology, methods and strategy used in this research to address the 
research questions and hypothesis formulated earlier. A mixed-method 
procedure based on the middle-range pragmatic philosophy is the method 
adopted by the study in order to acquire information from various sources. 
The various data sources and the analytical tools employed are also 
described. 
 
6.2 Philosophical Assumptions of the Study 
 
Research philosophies or paradigms are the windows through which the 
researcher views the real world. They are the assumptions, beliefs and 
perceptions of the nature of social reality and its knowledge. They influence 
the way a study is conducted from the very beginning through to the end. 
Exploration of philosophy in research assists the researcher to identify the 
appropriate methods to employ including the nature and the source(s) of 
evidence to be obtained and how such evidence would be interpreted to 
answer the research questions (Esterby-Smith et al., 1997). Basically, the 
five elements of research are the ontology, epistemology, methodology, 
methods and data sources (Grix, 2002; Scotland, 2012). Ontology is 
described as “a theory of being” which consists of assumptions and claims 
about the nature and constituencies of social reality including perceptions 
“about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these 
units interact with each other” (Blaike, 2000: 8; Mash and Furlong, 2002: 
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18; Tuli, 2010). It deals with the investigation into ‘existence’ and how 
individual considers the universe and its constituents to be; what exists, 
what is real and what is not (Ryan et al, 2002). Simply, it is about taking a 
stance by researchers on “how things really are and how things really work” 
(Scotland, 2012: 9). Two positions stand out from the ontological 
perspective – objectivism, and constructivism (or subjectivism) (Bryman, 
2012; Grix, 2002). Objectivism claims that “social phenomena and their 
meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors” (Bryman, 
2012: 33). This, in other words, is the philosophical position of realism 
(Cohen et al., 2007). For example, Crotty (1998: 8) argues that “a tree in 
the forest is a tree, regardless of whether anyone is aware of its existence 
or not...., when human beings recognize it as a tree, they are simply 
discovering a meaning that has been laying in wait for them all along”. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, views that “social phenomena and their 
meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors…” (Bryman, 
2012: 33). This follows that the social structures of the world are not real 
and did not exist before us but rather, are merely social constructs made by 
social actors and interpreted by researchers. Each of these branches of 
ontology has its own perspective of studying the social phenomena. The 
ontological position of this study is rather complex. While the understanding 
of whether or not local content is a sustainability policy, and some of the 
accountability and governance of the NCDMB depend on the stakeholders’ 
constructed meanings and perceptions, the IOCs’ voluntary accountability is 
measured through their pre-existing sustainability reports and not as 
perceive by stakeholders. 
 
Epistemology is another branch of research philosophy that deals with the 
nature of knowledge and theory, their methods, validation and limits 
(Blackburn 1996; Cohen et al., 2007; Grix, 2002; Mash and Furlong, 2002). 
It deals with “how knowledge can be created, acquired and communicated” 
(Scotland, 2012: 9) based on individual’s ontological stance. It is according 
to Blaike (2000: 8), “about how what is assumed to exist can be known”. It 
simply involves knowledge-gathering procedures (Bryman, 2001). There 
are two epistemological assumptions – positivism and interpretivism. While 
positivism is in line with the ontological position of objectivism and favours 
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the application of natural science process (quantitative), interpretivism is in 
line with the ontological position of constructivism and advocates an 
alternative process (qualitative) in studying the social reality.  
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) provided a schema that categorised research in 
social sciences into different orientations. The most attractive aspect of 
their schema according to Bebbington (1999: 182) is how:  
it provides a structure within which the underlying assumptions within a body of 
work can be explored and hence, the ontological and epistemological nature of an 
area of study can be delineated and linked in a logical way to methodological choices 
and research methods used. 
 
Burrell and Morgan’s framework was categorised into two dimensions with 
the first dimension reflecting the degree to which a subjective or objective 
world is believed to exist. This dimension was then positioned along the 
second dimension which views society as either “consensual” or “conflictual” 
(Bebbington, 1999: 182). Their classification formed a two-by-two matrix 
with four emerging paradigms, the functionalist, the interpretive, the radical 
humanist and the radical structuralist.  
 
Hassard (1991) opined that the functionalist paradigm advocates that 
society has a concrete and real existence based on regulations and order 
which are value-free and objective. It views the researcher as far away 
from the subject-matter through scientific procedures. This paradigm was 
viewed by Ryan et al (2002) as the philosophy that underpins the 
accounting research. Followers of this paradigm are purely positivists and 
are more inclined to use quantitative methods in their investigations. But 
under the interpretive paradigm, the social world neither has external 
existence nor concrete form. Social reality can only be understood from the 
perspectives and perceptions of the active participants. Meanings are 
therefore constructed by social actors. Researchers under this paradigm are 
subjectivists and use qualitative procedures in their inquiries. The radical 
humanist paradigm is in line with the interpretivism and assumes that the 
daily reality is constructed socially (Hassard, 1991) and the social actors 
were alienated in the social world which they themselves create. Lastly, the 
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radical structuralist paradigm regards social reality as a fact with an 
external existence just like the functionalist. In a nutshell, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) classified the radical humanist and interpretive paradigms 
as subjective, while the radical structuralist and functionalist as objective 
approaches. The Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) four paradigms can be 
illustrated in the following 2 x 2 matrix. 
Figure: 20 Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) paradigms for the analysis of social 
reality 
The Sociology of Radical Change 
 
 
 
                          
 
          Subjectivism 
 
    Interpretive            
 
 
 
The Sociology of Regulation 
 
Source: Modified from Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
 
Objectivism 
 
Radical 
Humanist 
 
Radical 
Structuralist 
 
Interpretive 
 
Functionalist 
     
Figure 20 above depicted the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Objective-
Subjective paradigms. From this figure, Table 6.1 made the following 
summary: 
Table 6.1: Summary of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Research Paradigms 
Paradigms Radical 
change/ 
Regulation 
Ontology 
(Objective/Su
bjective) 
Epistemology 
(Positivist/Inte
rpretive) 
Methodology 
(Quantitative/
Qualitative) 
Radical 
Humanist 
Radical Subjective Interpretive Qualitative 
Radical 
Structuralist 
Radical Objective Positivist Quantitative 
Interpretive Regulation Subjective Interpretive Qualitative 
Functionalist Regulation Objective Positivist Quantitative 
    Source: Author 
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Table 6.1 above shows that the radical humanist and the radical 
structuralist although both guided by “radicalism”, have different 
ontological, epistemological and methodological positions. Likewise, the 
interpretive and the functionalist paradigms though underpinned by 
“regulation” have different philosophy and methodology. Burrell and Morgan 
(1976) have argued that the four paradigms were mutually exclusive as 
each represents a different worldview. This claim was however criticised by 
later researchers especially with the advent of mixed-methods research. 
 
The major concern of this research is to firstly explore the relationships 
between local content and sustainability; and secondly to assess the 
accountability of the major actors, including the accounting and reporting 
practices of local content in upstream petroleum contracts in Nigeria. The 
local content policy, its mandatory accounting, accountability and 
governance practices have been regulated in Nigeria by the NOGICD Act 
while the voluntary accountability of the IOCs’ is regulated by the 
GRI/IPIECA guidelines. As such, these two layers of the research are 
basically about regulation, hence placed on the regulation axis of the Burrell 
and Morgan’s (1979) framework that is, along the interpretive and the 
functionalist paradigms. Similarly, the concept of accountability is also 
considered from the critical point of view where its concerns are extended 
beyond mere financial, to include other socio-political aspects such as 
stakeholder roles and engagement, enforceability, complaint and response, 
sanctions, etc. (see Table 5.3). This layer of the research is therefore 
guided by the radical humanist/structuralist.   
 
As a matter of fact, exploring whether or not local content relates to 
sustainability is based on subjective opinion, reasoning and the perceptions 
of stakeholders which are personal, context-specific and not a given. This 
knowledge can only be acquired by interacting with and interviewing the 
appropriate stakeholders who use their feelings, senses and personal 
experiences in evaluating the efficacies of local content policy. Simply put, 
the reality in this instance is not singular, concrete, or out there, but rather, 
a subjective construction of actors. In this regard, the ontological position 
of subjectivism/constructivism and the epistemological position of 
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interpretivism are the appropriate philosophy to adopt. Also, measuring 
accountability using specific indicators though produces quantitative data, is 
also based on the opinions and perceptions of stakeholders as guided by 
the subjectivist/objectivist paradigms. However, the content-analysed 
secondary data from sustainability and annual financial reports of the IOCs 
is a reality that is objective, concrete, unity, out there and independent of 
the researcher’s intervention. For example, even if this study is not 
conducted the reality that the IOCs engage in local content sustainability 
reporting will not be affected as it has been their established strategy. 
Hence, the objectivist’ ontology and the positivist’ epistemology would be 
the underpinning philosophies for this part of the study. In a nutshell, this 
study has a complex methodology and uses both quantitative and 
qualitative methods with the aim of obtaining a full understanding of the 
phenomena under observation. To eschew confusion or invoking the 
paradigmatic incompatibility debates of mixing methods, the accounting 
research paradigms derived from the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework 
were discussed alongside the underpinning pragmatist philosophy.  
 
6.3 Accounting Research Paradigms and their Relevance to the 
Current Study 
 
Later researchers (Hopper and Powell, 1985) have found the Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) framework useful to be modified and used in accounting 
research (Dillard, 1991; Baker and Bettner, 1997). For this purpose, 
accounting theories were classified into the mainstream, the interpretive 
and the critical (Chua, 1986; Ryan et al., 2002). Hopper and Powell’s 
(1985) classification is the most widely applied taxonomy of accounting and 
finance research among several others (Ryan, et al., 2002). This 
classification is presented in Figure 21 below. 
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      Figure 21: Hopper and Powell’s (1985) Taxonomy of Accounting 
Research 
                                                          Radical Change                                                           
Radical Humanism                                                         Radical Structuralism 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
Subjectivism                                                                                Objectivism 
 
 
 
 
 
  Interpretive                                                      Functionalism      
 
                                                                    Regulation                                                             
 
Critical Accounting 
Research 
Interpretive Accounting 
Research 
Mainstream 
Accounting Research 
Source: Ryan et al. (2002) 
 
Figure 21 showed Hopper and Powell’s (1985) taxonomy as fitted into 
the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 2X2 matrix. Occupying the radical 
humanist and radical structuralist quadrants is the critical accounting 
research paradigm. The two lower quadrants consisting of interpretive 
and functionalism are occupied by the mainstream and interpretive 
paradigms respectively. The following sections briefly discussed the 
mainstream, interpretive and critical accounting paradigms and their 
contribution to the present research. 
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6.3.1 The Mainstream Accounting Paradigm 
 
Mainstream accounting paradigm is an economic-based approach which 
investigates “what is out there” (Hines, 1992: 314). It assumes the world to 
be “rational, logical and analysable”. Accounting methods and measures 
supply the foundations for rational and efficient decision-making on 
resources and profits. It is more concerned with “material reality – goods 
and services. This is why the analysis of sustainability or integrated annual 
financial reports largely uses the mainstream accounting techniques 
because these documents contain analysable quantifiable economic 
information pertaining to local content on which the IOCs have to decide 
rationally as it has consequences on resources and profits. Studies have 
found that CSR and sustainability practices have impacts on companies’ 
financial performance or generally, value (e.g., Bartlett, 2012; Servaes and 
Tamayo, 2013; Kiran et al., 2015). Hence, as this study found a strong 
relationship between local content and the CSR/sustainability, it is very 
likely local content engagements may affect profitability in several ways. 
For example, local content sustainability reporting may be used to improve 
refutation, gain recognition and obtain a social licence to operate by IOCs.  
Mainstream accounting, therefore, provides objective information that 
facilitates the optimal allocation of economic resources (Gaffikin, 2010).  
 
From the mainstream point of view events are not seen as the results of 
power relations, and so, conflicts occur unnaturally and can be tackled by 
the use of technical accounting knowledge (Hines, 1992: 314; Madell, 
2010). For instance, the IOCs in Nigeria increasingly use the politics of local 
content disclosure in sustainability reports to show that they care for the 
communities. Mainstream paradigm leads to quantitative research dealing 
with numerical data which is statistically analysed to create meaning from 
the uncovered objective and singular truth that exists within the data while 
the researcher maintains their independence (Sale et al., 2002; Williams, 
2007). This paradigm will be used to guide the quantitative aspects of this 
study. Mainstream accounting paradigm has some practical limitations 
(Eldanfour, 2011) which make it incapable to single-handedly underpin this 
study. Chua (1986: 601) argued that the paradigm “with its emphasis on 
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hypothetico-deductivism and technical control, possesses certain strengths 
but has restricted the range of problems studied and the use of research 
methods”. For instance, while the local content accountability behaviour of 
the IOCs can be objectively analysed, the underlying reasons for such 
behaviour remain unknown. Rather, the ‘why’ of a social phenomenon is 
best answered through the interpretive approach (Hirschman, 1986; Kates, 
1998; Grace and O’Cass, 2002). The mainstream accounting paradigm is 
“incapable of addressing accounting’s complex social ramification” (Baker 
and Bettner, 1997: 293) involving for example, why the NCDMB does not 
disclose its financial dealings to the industry stakeholders, or why the IOCs 
disclose information on local hiring rates but not local wages and salaries. 
Chua (1986: 626) argued that the mainstream assumptions “offer certain 
insights but obscure others. By changing them, new insights may be gained 
which can potentially extend our knowledge of accounting”. These 
limitations gave rise to two alternative perspectives that incorporate the 
cultural, political, historical and linguistic issues (Baker and Bettner, 2010; 
Gaffikin, 2010) presented below.  
 
6.3.2 The Interpretive Accounting Paradigm 
 
Based on the needs to enhance the understanding of the effects of 
accounting on individuals, entities and society, Baker and Bettner (1997) 
suggested more application of the sociology-based (Modell, 2010) 
interpretive and critical accounting approaches. Interpretive accounting 
involves analysing, translating and deriving the meaning of 
accounting/economic phenomena occurring in the social world. In this 
regard, accounting was described as a “socially determined technology” 
(Dillard, 1991: 10) as it relies on subjectivism to deliver a better 
understanding of accounting reality (Hopper and Powell, 1985). It is the 
appropriate procedure to answer the question why local content can be 
regarded as a sustainability policy and what are its accountability 
requirements, or why the NCDMB discloses or fails to disclose its financial 
performance, or what factors impede the effectiveness of some of the 
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NCDMB’s programmes, etc. It could also explore deductively36 the social, 
non-financial relationships among NCDMB’s stakeholders. Interpretivism is, 
therefore, a social science technique that “challenges the purpose of 
disclosure” and requires accounting research to apply methods that are 
more informative to stakeholders “to facilitate critical intervention” 
(Lehman, 2010: 231). The interpretive paradigm is used to guide the 
qualitative part of this work. 
 
6.3.3 The Critical Accounting Paradigm 
 
Also sociology-based (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Modell, 2010) the critical 
paradigm deals with social relationships where domination, conflict and 
inequality are perceived. The theory drew heavily on the Marxist and the 
Frankfurt School traditions (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Gaffikin, 2010) to 
challenge the capitalistic settings and to investigate “the problem of 
reluctance to disclose information” (Greiling and Spraul, 2010: 355). It was 
dominated by the advocates of radical change who criticise the status quo 
and support reforms in the accounting practice. This paradigm would assist 
in discovering whether certain stakeholders have been denied the 
information they were entitled to or faced discrimination by the NCDMB.  
 
To summarise the above points, each of the three paradigms presented has 
some relevance to this mixed-methods research. Modell (2005) and Lillis 
and Mundy (2005) have recognised the rapid prominence of mixed-method 
research in accounting. It was therefore accepted that the Hopper and 
Powell (1995) taxonomy can be manipulated to accommodate the use of 
multiple paradigms in accounting. The advantage of mixed-method 
research is the freedom it gives the researcher to conduct an in-depth 
empirical investigation to validate findings (Creswell, 2003). The 
underpinning philosophy when mixing methods is ‘realism’ (Modell, 2010) 
or the dominant ‘pragmatism’ (Johnson et al., 2007). Chua (1986) 
contended that the traditional approach of mainstream accounting research 
                                                          
36 The use of interpretive epistemology and qualitative methodology in this work is only exploratory around the 
existing stakeholder-accountability theory. So the qualitative method is partially deductive (see for example, Hyde, 
2000).   
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is often fortified by the interpretive or critical as adopted by this study. 
Discussion of mixed-method research follows later in the chapter. The next 
section took a short overview of local content sustainability approaches 
reviewed vis-á-vis the three paradigms of accounting research.  
 
6.4 Local Content Sustainability Approaches and the Accounting 
Paradigms 
 
Anchoring the discussion that started from the framework of the study and 
extended to this chapter, it could be justified that the study is a mixed-
methods (quantitative and qualitative), mixed paradigms (mainstream, 
interpretive and critical) and mixed approach enshrined in the business 
case, stakeholder-accountability and critical theory perspectives. Although 
the dominant approach adopted is the stakeholder-accountability, it was 
shown that as a middle-range, the approach incorporated some elements of 
the business-case and the critical since they are all mindful of the larger 
constituencies, albeit for varied motives. While the business-case only 
considers the stakeholders for the benefit of the business, and the critical 
approach is concerned with the stakeholders to establish justice and 
equality, the stakeholder-accountability as a moderator uses ethics and 
morality to incorporate stakeholders based on the interest-, rights- and 
duty-based reasons (see Section 5.8).  
 
Moreover, as local content involves rules, regulations, policies and 
guidelines that direct and control the behaviours of oil and gas companies, 
the study had simultaneously used both the mainstream and interpretive 
paradigms which are founded on the “Regulation” axis of the Hopper and 
Powell’s (1985) taxonomy of accounting research. Also, as the policy was 
initially developed to address the resource curse issues and the domination 
of foreign oil companies, and compensate the deprived communities with a 
sustainable development, the critical perspective is also relevant. This is 
found on the “Radical Change” axis of the Hopper and Powell’s (1985) 
taxonomy (see Figure 21). Based on the above arguments, the Hopper and 
Powell’s (1985) schema is modified to accommodate the present study as 
shown in Figure 22 below.  
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   Figure 22: Accounting Paradigms and the Position of the Current Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: Author 
  
 
 
 
 
    Source: Author 
  
Figure 22 above shows that all the three paradigms have some 
contributions to answering the research questions raised in the study. 
Bebbington (1999) was found to have mixed the interpretive and the critical 
accounting paradigms contemporaneously in one study, but it has never 
come to the attention of the present study any research that has attempted 
to mix the three paradigms. This is one of the original contributions of this 
work. The following section presents the detailed account of the 
methodology adopted in the study. 
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6.5 Research Methodology and Methods 
 
Research methodology is “the general approach the researcher takes in 
carrying out the research project” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001: 14). The aims 
are "to describe and to examine the logic of the composition of research 
methods and techniques, to reveal their powers and limitations, to 
generalize success and failures, to find domains of appropriate application 
and to predict possible contributions to knowledge" (Krippendorft, 1980: 
10-11). This involves applying the quantitative, qualitative or mixed-
method procedures. Quantitative research is found to either be descriptive, 
experimental or causal-comparative (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001 in Williams, 
2007: 66). Except in a minor part of the work where a causal process was 
used to examine whether or not organizational membership and years of 
service determined stakeholders’ awareness of local content programmes, 
the present study would largely use the descriptive statistics. Using these 
procedures, the study examined how the local content accountability of the 
NCDMB and the IOCs is discharged. For example, the study measured the 
extent to which the NCDMB enforces the provision of the first considerations 
for indigenous oil firms in the award of contracts and licenses. It also 
examined and described the existence, extent, and variations in local 
content sustainability reporting practices of the IOCs Nigeria before and 
after the enactment of the Nigerian local content law. Qualitative research, 
on the other hand, may take the form of a case study, Phenomenology, 
ethnography, content analysis, grounded theory, narrative or action 
research (Williams, 2007; Saunders et al., 2012). This study uses the 
qualitative procedure as a complementary method to collect and analyse 
interview data. 
 
The heated debate among scholars on the application of either quantitative 
or qualitative methods in research is yet to be resolved (Sale et al., 2002; 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Migiro and Magangi, 2011). Rossman and 
Wilson (1985) cited in Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005: 376) observed the 
emergence of three different schools of thought related to the quantitative-
qualitative debates. These schools are the Purist, Situationalist and 
Pragmatist. Purists and pragmatists lie on the two extreme ends of the 
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continuum while situationalists are located in the middle. The Purists (either 
quantitative or qualitative purists) hold the view that the assumptions 
underlying the quantitative and qualitative methodologies are completely 
different because they emerge from different ontology and epistemology; 
as such, no successful attempt could be made at combining the two. They 
argued in favour of a mono-method research. The Situationalists, although 
believed in the mono-method of the purists, gave equal importance and 
value to the two conflicting approaches – the quantitative and the 
qualitative. To them, while specific research is more conveniently conducted 
through quantitative methods, others are done through the qualitative 
approach. Hence, researchers should use any one method at a time. The 
pragmatists’ view is that the issue of positivism and interpretivism might 
only be a false dichotomy and it is not necessary that quantitative 
researchers are positivist or qualitative researchers are interpretivist 
(Newman and Benz, 1998). They recommended the use of a combination of 
the two methods in a single design. Pragmatism is the foundation on which 
the idea of mixed-method research was built, hence, its philosophical 
underpinning (Pansiri, 2005; Somekh and Lewin, 2005). The above 
classifications are presented in Figure 23 below. 
 
Figure 23: Classifications of Research Methodology 
 
 
   
     Mono-method     Middle-of-the-road  Radical  
 
Source: Compiled by author from literature 
 
The research methods continuum illustrates the three main views discussed 
above. In summary, the purists believe in using the single method 
consistently (i.e., if quantitative, always quantitative; and if qualitative, 
always qualitative). This is in line with the Marsh and Furlong’s (2002) view 
that the research philosophy is a skin and not a sweater. Therefore, 
researchers must stick to a particular method. The situationalists have a 
Purists 
(Sticking to one method 
in every circumstance) 
 
Pragmatists 
(Mixing the two methods) 
Situationalists 
(The two methods have 
equal value but only one 
method is selected at a 
time, depending on 
circumstances) 
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more liberal position and give equal weight to the two methods; hence, 
researchers can select an appropriate method in a particular circumstance. 
The pragmatists believe in simultaneous mixing of the two methods in a 
single research. One of the justifications for mixing methods is that it has 
more strength than any one single method (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007). Thus, the following sections consider the mixed-methods research 
approach.  
 
6.6 Mixed Methods Research   
 
Mixed methods are usually cross-paradigmatic and involve the application 
of more than one method “that draw on different meta-theoretical 
assumptions” (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006: 46). Each of the quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed-methods research has its own specific strategy. 
Quantitative research inclines to the deductive approach; qualitative 
research is (often) attached to the inductive approach, and mixed-methods 
incline to the abductive approach (Saunders et al., 2012). These 
approaches apart from being one of the key bases for distinguishing the 
types of research, also explain the connections between data and theory. 
Deductive reasoning is ‘theory-driven’ and used in confirmatory research, 
inductive reasoning is ‘data-driven’ and used in qualitative research, and 
abductive reasoning is a movement between the two (Morgan, 2007: 71). 
Mixing method is viewed to have been influenced by post-positivist 
viewpoints (Lincoln and Guba, 2005) and is often complicated and time-
consuming because of the different data involved as well as the inherent 
philosophical crisis (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Onwuegbuzie and 
Johnson, 2004; Creswell, 2006). Mixed-methods research is underpinned by 
the pragmatic paradigm, and its design can either be sequential or 
concurrent. The concurrent design was considered more prominent (Plano, 
2006; Collins et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2007). Mixed methods prioritise 
the objective of gaining in-depth knowledge above any methodological 
norms and preferences. Hence, “the research questions, not ideologies or 
the researcher’s preference for quantitative or qualitative analysis, drove 
the study” (Christ, 2007: 237). Section 6.9 below presents the design of 
the study and makes the above point clearer.  
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6.7 Research Design of the Study: Mixed-Methods Design 
 
There are several mixed-methods designs. The most common are the 
Convergent Parallel Design, the Explanatory Sequential Design, and the 
Exploratory Sequential Design (Creswell, 2015: 35). Convergent Design 
aims to collect and analyse quantitative and qualitative data separately and 
independently, and then merge the results to assess convergence or 
divergence. The intent is to provide deeper understanding by examining the 
problem from different perspectives. Exploratory Sequential Design uses 
qualitative analysis to explore the problem, construct instrument and then 
collect and analyse quantitative data. Finally, the Explanatory Sequential 
Design utilises the quantitative component initially and then collect and 
analyses qualitative data to explain the quantitative result. It can be seen 
that in the last two designs the quantitative and qualitative strands are 
dependent on each other unlike in the first design. The appropriate design 
for this study is the convergent parallel because the study concurrently 
collects and analyses both data independently but merges as far as possible 
the results during the discussion. Figure 24 below illustrates the three 
designs. 
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Figure 24: Basic Mixed-Methods Designs 
a. Convergent Parallel Design 
 
 
Quantitative 
results 
Quantitative data 
collection and 
analysis 
Quantitative data 
collection and 
analysis 
b.      Explanatory Sequential Design 
Qualitative 
results 
Qualitative data 
collection and 
analysis 
Quantitative 
results 
Qualitative 
data 
collection and 
analysis 
Qualitative 
results 
Interpret how 
qualitative results 
explain quantitative 
results 
c.     Exploratory Sequential 
Design 
Qualitative data 
collection and 
analysis 
Qualitative 
results 
Use results to 
form variables, 
instruments 
Quantitative 
data 
collection and 
analysis 
Quantitative 
results 
Interpret how 
quantitative results 
provide new 
results, instruments 
Merge results 
for comparison 
Interpret or explain 
convergence or 
divergence 
Source: Modified from Creswell (2015: 56) 
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The rationale for adopting the convergent parallel approach is that the 
study wants to explore an inadequately theorized and un-empirically tested 
phenomenon (i.e., local content sustainability). It also wants to apply the 
accountability indicators and the sustainability reports to examine the 
mandatory and voluntary accountability of the local content actors. These 
tasks therefore call for the qualitative and quantitative data collection and 
analysis. This methodology is supported by the Edmundson and McManus’ 
(2007) methodological fit schema which divided the empirical research into 
nascent, intermediate and mature according to the levels and stages of 
theories involved. To fully understand the applications of mixed-methods in 
this research, the following table presents the Edmundson and McManus’ 
(2007) classifications. 
Table 6.2: Three Types of Methodological Fit 
Research Aspects State of Prior Theory and Research 
Nascent Intermediate Mature 
Research questions Open-ended inquiry 
about a phenomenon  
Proposed 
relationships 
between new and 
established 
constructs 
Focused questions 
and/or hypotheses 
relating to existing 
constructs 
Type of data  Qualitative, open-
ended data to be 
interpreted for 
meaning 
Hybrid (both 
qualitative and 
quantitative) 
Quantitative data; 
focused measures  
Possible data 
collection methods 
Interviews; 
observations;  
documents/ material 
from field/sites  
Interviews; 
observations; 
surveys; material 
from field/ sites 
Coded Surveys; 
interviews or 
observations 
Constructs and 
measurement 
New constructs, few 
formal measures 
One or more new 
constructs and/or 
new measures 
Relying heavily on 
existing constructs 
and measures 
Goal of data analyses Pattern identification Preliminary or 
exploratory testing of 
new propositions 
and/or new 
constructs against 
some existing ones 
Formal hypothesis 
testing 
Data analysis 
methods 
Thematic content 
analysis coding for 
evidence of 
constructs 
Content analysis, 
exploratory statistics, 
and preliminary tests 
Standard statistical 
analysis and 
inference 
Theoretical 
contribution 
A suggestive theory; 
invitation for further 
research on issues 
opened up  
A provisional theory, 
often one that 
integrates previously 
separate bodies of 
work 
A supported existing 
theory(ies) 
Source: Modified from Edmondson and McManus (2007: 1160) 
Edmondson and McManus (2007) presented an interesting diagram which 
summarises the above discussion. This is relevant to this study and is 
shown below. 
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Figure 25: Research Classification Curve  
    
 
 
 
 
 
    
   Nascent Intermediate          Mature 
 
 
Source: Edmondson and McManus (2007) 
 
The above figure presents a pictorial representation of Table 6.2 above. 
This research is within the hybrid-data and intermediate-theory range 
because it used two different data sources (quantitative and qualitative) in 
line with the mainstream, interpretive and critical accounting approaches to 
address the issue of local content-sustainability which has an intermediate 
theory. As has already been stated, the relationship between local content 
and sustainability calls for proper theorising, and that is one of the major 
contributions of the present work (see Figure 2.1). Having adequately dealt 
with the mixed-methods issue, the next target is to discuss the strategy 
and data collection methods adopted by the study. 
 
6.8 Strategy and Data Collection Methods for the Study 
 
Having classified the present research as an intermediate one, selecting the 
appropriate strategy and methods of collecting the required empirical 
evidence would be much easy. As previously stated (Section 6.6) the 
abductive reasoning is the strategy guiding the pragmatic mixed-methods 
research (Saunders et al., 2012). This strategy combines both the data-
driven (inductive) and theory-driven (deductive) reasoning. This study is 
more concerned with deductivism than inductivism because even the 
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qualitative data used is based on an apriori theory which makes it possible 
to undertake a selective and non-open coding for the data (Hyde, 2000). In 
line with the mixed-methods study this research collects and analyses data 
from questionnaires, interviews and sustainability/ integrated annual 
financial reports. These three methods are elaborated in the following 
sections.   
 
6.8.1 Primary Data: Questionnaire  
 
This study utilises self-administered questionnaires which measure the 
extent of stakeholders’ agreement or disagreement with the accountability 
and governance practices of the major accountors of local content 
sustainability in the Nigerian petroleum sector. Likert’s-scales are applied in 
which the respondents indicate the level of their agreement with certain 
statements based on discrete and restricted values (de Winter and Dodou, 
2012). The rationale behind the use of the questionnaire is that it is the 
most appropriate means to measure the accountability indicators identified; 
it is also the most frequent and standardised medium that allows the 
respondents to interpret and answer the same questions (Saunders et al, 
2003). The questionnaire developed for this study has been subjected to 
rigorous design and construction process before administered to the target 
audience. The variables used to construct the questionnaire statements 
were the sixteen (16) accountability indicators identified by the study (see 
Table 5.3). Figure 26 below illustrates some of the major steps that were 
undertaken during the design and construction of the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
Figure 26: Questionnaire Design/Construction Process 
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Source: Modified from Radhakrishna (2007) 
 
As shown above, the design starts by considering the study context and the 
type of audience (i.e., oil industry stakeholders). The study’s purpose and 
objectives stated in the first chapter of the work became the basis for 
generating the statements around the concept of accountability, upon which 
the stakeholders’ perceptions and opinions were sought. The constructed 
questionnaire was then submitted to the panel of experts (my able 
supervisory team) for vetting. The team considered every bit of information 
contained given the type of audience and the language used. Re-drafts and 
revisions were made several times to correct all noted errors so as to 
enhance stakeholders’ readability and understanding of the instrument. The 
questionnaire was also pilot-tested before it was administered. Three Ph.D 
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students from the Aberdeen Business School and four other knowledgeable 
Nigerian oil industry stakeholders participated in the pilot test. This exercise 
was necessary to detect all lapses and problems at the early stage and 
ensure the validity and reliability of the instrument. Validity and reliability 
as argued by Jopp (2000) are the probabilities that the instrument could 
test what it is designed to test, and could reproduce equal results under a 
common methodology. All observations were duly incorporated. To make 
the questionnaire useful for statistical analysis, the responses were pre-
coded using the numbers 1-5 as strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree and strongly disagree respectively. This quantification 
paved the way for the generation of ordinal data suitable for quantitative 
analysis. During the analysis, the statements will be coded according to the 
sections and the number in which they serially appeared on the instrument. 
For example, the statements in the first section of the questionnaire are 
coded as s1q137, s1q2, s1q3, etc.  
 
6.8.2 Primary Data: Interview 
 
A mixed-method study collects qualitative data on the participants’ 
subjective opinions, perceptions, experiences and views mostly through 
interviews (Munhall and Oiler 1986; Sim, 1998; Morse 1991; Somer and 
Somer 1991; Burnard, 1994) in addition to quantitative data. The 
justification for using interviews in this study is that it will help to obtain 
more information and explore other issues not covered by the 
questionnaires. For instance, the questions on the effectiveness of NCDMB’s 
programmes, enforceability of the first consideration requirements, and the 
NCDMB’s financial accountability are addressed by both the questionnaire 
and the interview. But testing whether or not local content is a 
sustainability initiative and its perceived accountability implications, are 
only addressed in the interview. As the other quantitative questions, the 
interview questions arose from the problem and the objectives of the study 
the answers of which will be guided by theories. The questions were piloted 
                                                          
37 This implies, section one question one, section one question two, and so on. 
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to some Ph.D colleagues and industry practitioners. All useful comments 
were duly incorporated. 
Although the interview was semi-structured, some degree of flexibility was 
allowed as one answer may lead to another question to get a deeper 
knowledge because interview “does not follow explicit steps and rule-
governed method” but rather, depends on interviewer’s skills and 
judgement (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015: 20). An account of how the 
interview questions have emerged as well as the protocol followed to 
conduct the interview is attached as Appendix 4.  
6.8.3 Secondary Data: Sustainability/Integrated Financial Reports 
 
Apart from using the two forms of survey techniques, an intermediate field 
of study (Edmundson and McManus, 2007) can also utilize a secondary 
source of data as a complementary means of obtaining a deeper 
understanding of the dimensions of a given phenomenon. For this reason, 
the present study uses the IOCs’ sustainability/integrated financial reports 
to answer the question and test the hypothesis relating to voluntary 
accountability raised in the research. This includes investigating the degree 
to which the IOCs disclose their local content performances over the years. 
This led to the adoption of the content analysis which is a flexible and 
reliable procedure for analyzing and codifying textual data into categories 
and groups based on predetermined criteria (Weber, 1988; Tesch, 1990; 
Abrahamson, 1993; Cavanagh, 1997; Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006). The 
sustainability data covers a ten-year period – 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 
(i.e., five years before and five years after the NOGICD Act). Data will be 
collected from fifty (50) sustainability and integrated financial reports. 
Methods of data analysis are discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.9 Methods of Data Analysis 
 
This research collects both quantitative and qualitative data. Each of the 
data collected has its own specific analytical procedures which are discussed 
in the following sections. 
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6.9.1 Analysis of Questionnaire Data: The Descriptive and 
Inferential Statistics 
 
 
The Likert-type questionnaire in this study uses the numerical values of 1-5 
(from strongly agree to strongly disagree) to convert the responses into 
ranks which will produce the ordinal data to be analysed using the non-
parametric statistical tools (Kuzon et al., 1996; Jamieson, 2004; Jakobsson, 
2004; Carifio and Perla, 2008; DeWinter and Dodou, 2010). The data will 
firstly be subjected to reliability test using the Spearman-Brown, Cronbach’s 
Alfa and Guttman Split-Half Coefficients to ensure that the questionnaire 
items are consistently measuring what they are supposed to measure.  
Descriptive statistics: this is the first step of the analysis. This statistics 
help to describe the data and present results in a clear, concise and 
summarised manner (Healey, 1990). For each of the questionnaire 
statements, medians38 are computed to determine the majority opinion on 
the agreement, indifference or disagreement with the statements. After a 
position is taken the result will be submitted to further inferential statistical 
analysis. 
Kruskal-Wallis test: this an among-group non-parametric test will be used 
to measure whether there are differences among the responses of the five 
stakeholder groups. A hypothesis that “there is no significant difference 
among the responses of the stakeholders’’ will be assumed. For any result 
that shows differences among the responses, further ad hoc test will be 
conducted.  
Mann-Whitney test: this between-group non-parametric test will be 
conducted to test each group with one another to test an assumed 
hypothesis that “there is no significant difference between the responses of 
the stakeholders”. Cross-tabulation will be used to analyse and provide the 
possible reasons for the differences. 
Logistic regression: this test will be conducted to analyse the impact of two 
categorical independent variables (organizational membership and years of 
experience) on one dichotomous dependent variable (awareness of three 
                                                          
38 The median is the most relevant statistic when dealing with ordinal data gathered from the Likert-Scale. Mean is 
not applicable as the data is not continuous. 
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local content programmes). SPSS Version 21 will be the statistical software 
package to be used in the analysis. 
6.9.2 Analysis of Interview Data: The Thematic Analysis Technique 
 
The recorded interview will be transcribed and read over and over to 
familiarize with the data and identify the major themes using the thematic 
analysis technique (Pope et al., 1999; Ritchie et al., 2004; Kelle, 2005; 
Burnard et al., 2008; Reichertz, 2010). Thematic analysis is a flexible and 
one of the most frequent procedures applied in almost all sorts of 
qualitative analysis including the bottom-up data-driven and the top-down 
theory-driven; and can answer almost all forms of research questions 
(Braun and Clarke, 2013). Its aim is to identify key themes from the data to 
facilitate coding.  
 
6.9.2.1 The Coding System 
 
Coding aims to identify elements of the data that relate to the research 
questions. There are two broad categories of coding – complete and 
selective (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Complete coding may involve the 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) and Charmaz’s (2006) open, focused and axial 
coding processes. This type of coding is mainly applied in grounded theory 
research where the aim is to identify “anything and everything of interest or 
relevance” to the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2013: 206). The 
selective coding which is the relevant process adopted in this research 
identifies and selects particular instances or corpus of interest to the 
research questions. This coding process is said to work with a pre-existing 
theory which will guide the researcher in selecting the relevant concepts 
from the data (Brau and Clarke, 2013). As stated earlier, the interview 
analysis in this study will largely be based on a deductive reasoning and the 
coding will be guided by pre-existing theory (Burnard et al., 2008). This is 
as Kirk and Miller (1986) contended that any good qualitative methods 
should balance between the inductive and deductive techniques. 
Specifically, the question of the relationships between local content and the 
three tenets of sustainability would be guided by the tentative theory 
presented in Figure 2.1 which forms one of the major contributions to the 
literature of the work. Therefore, concepts relevant to the three 
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sustainability dimensions are of interest. Similarly, all coding of qualitative 
data relevant to the research questions on accountability and governance of 
the local content actors will focus on the sixteen (16) accountability 
indicators that form part of the conceptual framework. Any new theme will 
be used to modify the framework. In a nutshell, the qualitative analysis 
involved in this research is theory-driven rather than data-driven, 
confirmatory rather than exploratory, and top-down rather than bottom-up 
(Hyde, 2000; Braun and Clarke, 2013).  
 
6.9.3 Analysis of Sustainability/Integrated Financial Reports: The 
  Mechanistic Content Analysis Technique 
 
Content analysis is the easiest way to detect the presence of information on 
corporate social responsibility and sustainability including local content 
(Kondracki et al., 2002; Patten and Crampton, 2004; GRI, 2013). It mainly 
uses frequencies or occurrence as indicators of the importance and 
relevance of a matter (Krippendorff 2004; Guthrie et al. 2004; 
Abdolmohammadi 2005; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). The method has 
received particular attention in social and environmental reporting and 
disclosure studies (Gray et al. 1995; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Guthrie et 
al., 2004; Guthrie and Farneti 2008; De´jean and Martinez 2009). Its major 
aim is to produce a quantitative account of a textual material (Neuendorf, 
2002; Krippendorff, 2004). Content analysis can either be mechanistic or 
interpretive. While mechanistic is form-oriented and depends on volumetric 
or frequency of terms (Beck et al., 2010), interpretive is meaning-oriented 
and focuses on the meanings embedded in communications (Smith and 
Taffler, 2000). The mechanistic content analysis is selected for this study 
because it is more objective and unbiased than the interpretive. The 
method detects the presence/absence and the volume of local content 
sustainability disclosure but not the meaning or the quality of information 
contained. Specifically, the purpose is to investigate whether or not certain 
local content information is disclosed as well as the disclosure trends before 
and after the enactment of the NOGICD Act 2010. This will tell how these 
companies are able to align the mandatory (hard) and the voluntary (soft) 
local content accountability. This method is guided by the objectivist 
ontology and positivist epistemology within the mainstream accounting 
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paradigm. The use of this deductive procedure was informed by the fact 
that the indicators to measure local content sustainability have already 
been determined by the GRI and the IPIECA (see Section 3.11, and Tables 
3.1, 3.2 and 6.3), and adopted and applied by the five oil companies; 
hence, the reality is concrete and out there to be studied. 
As stated earlier, the unit of analysis is the ‘word-count’ as applied in other 
studies (Zeâghal and Ahmed, 1990; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Ince, 1997; Neu et al., 1998; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). 
Since the five selected IOCs report their local content sustainability 
performances through their global sustainability or integrated financial 
reports, the procedure adopted by this study is to use the simple computer 
search function of “Ctrl + F + Nigeria”. This aims to identify all relevant 
passages where the term ‘Nigeria’ appeared in the reports because the 
companies present specific information of their activities in all the countries 
where they have significant local operations consistent with the IAS 14 
(now IFRS 8). On detecting the term ‘Nigeria’, the researcher then reads 
the sentence to ascertain whether they refer to local content activities and 
the specific categories. If that is the case, then the sentence would be 
copied and pasted into a word document which would automatically count 
the number of words contained in the sentence(s). The numbers are the 
data points to be inputted into the SPSS program for analysis. This method 
is selected because of its objectivity, reliability, replicability and frequency 
of application. For the purpose of this study, the local content sustainability 
categories of the GRI and the IPIECA guidelines are merged as both 
guidelines are concurrently used by the sampled companies. This is shown 
in Table 6.3 below.  
Table 6.3: Definition of the Sustainability Indicators Used 
Indicators GRI/IPIECA Definition 
SE5 IPIECA Local content policies 
EC5 GRI Local wages  
EC6/SE6 GRI/IPIECA Local hiring/hiring practices 
EC9 GRI Local procurement (monetary and non-monetary) 
DMA/SE7 GRI/IPIECA Local procurement practices/supplier development 
activities, programmes 
Source: Compiled from GRI & IPIECA  
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The study will firstly calculate and compare the disclosure index of the two 
periods (2005-2009 and 2010-2014) to detect variations. Disclosure index 
is a list of items supposed to be disclosed in company reports (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991) for specific purposes. In this context disclosure index is only 
used to show whether or not the items are reported, but not the quality at 
which they are reported. The disclosure index formula to be applied is as 
follows: 
 
Disclosure Index (di) = actual disclosure/total possible disclosure 
= ∑ di
m
i=1
/ ∑ di
n
i=1
 
 
The idea of the disclosure index was initially applied by Buzby (1975) and 
Stanga (1976) and formalized later by Cooke (1989a, 1989b).  Chavent et 
al. (2006) observed that the majority of studies on disclosure have used a 
dichotomous item-based approach which assigns ‘1’ if an item is disclosed, 
otherwise ‘0’. This is termed the unweighted approach as it treats the 
various disclosed information equally; any attempt to rank the disclosed 
items, i.e., the weighted approach, would amount to subjectivity as 
stakeholders give different values to same information item (Cooke, 1989). 
For example, local hiring information would be more important to the 
workforce of the oil industry while information on local supplier 
development would be more valuable to local entrepreneurs. For this 
reason, it would be highly biased for the researcher to decide to give weight 
to these variables. This work adopts the unweighted disclosure index 
approach to avoid these problems. The next section deals with the 
population and the sample of the study. 
 
6.10 Population of the Study 
 
The population of the study includes the various stakeholder groups who 
are directly related to local content implementation as understood from the 
OPEC (2011), and the suggestions of the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) and the Petroleum Technology Association of Nigeria 
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(PETAN). Thus, the study’s population is divided into five groups: (a) the 
government (all oil industry regulatory agencies) (b) the indigenous oil and 
gas firms (all local oil firms), (c) the IOCs (all IOCs operating in Nigeria), 
(d) the oil and gas trade unions (all oil and gas trade unions in Nigeria), 
and (e) the civil society (all relevant civil society groups). Since it is not 
practically possible to engage all the above stakeholders, sampling became 
necessary. The population and the sample are summarized in Appendices 4, 
5 & 6. The following sections discuss the sampling methods adopted by the 
study.  
 
6.11 Sampling and Sample Size of the Study 
 
Sampling is classified into probability and non-probability (Teddlie and Yu, 
2007). Probability sampling is usually applied in quantitative research and 
deals with a large portion of a population selected randomly (Tashakkori 
and Toddlie, 2003). Its major purpose is to select a representative sample 
size. Non-probability sampling consists of selecting units in a population for 
a particular purpose (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). It is viewed as a deliberate 
selection of people, settings or programmes in order to get the useful 
information that would assist in answering the research question(s) 
(Maxwell, 1997). Probability sampling is classified into random, stratified 
and cluster. The three techniques may also be combined to produce 
multiple probability sampling (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). While the random 
sampling gives participants an equal chance of being drawn, and the cluster 
sampling selects participants in groups (such as the IOCs, local oil firms, 
civil society, etc), the stratified sampling divides the population or groups 
into subgroups (such as the local content managers within the IOCs, or 
local content experts within the civil society groups). On the other hand, the 
non-probability or purposive sampling technique selects cases based on a 
particular purpose but not randomly. While the probability sampling focuses 
on representativeness and generalization of findings, the non-probability is 
more concerned with the depth of information to be obtained (Teddlie and 
Yu, 2007). The present study combined these techniques and used the 
purposive-mixed-probability technique as will be shown in the next section.  
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6.11.1 Purposive-Mixed-Probability Sampling Techniques  
 
Purposive-Mixed-Probability Sampling is the mid-point between the non-
probability and the probability sampling (Teddlie and Yu, 2007) used in 
mixed-methods research. Figure 27 below depicts five sampling points used 
in research. 
Figure 27: Purposive-Mixed-Probability Sampling Continuum 
 
Source: Teddlie (2005) in Teddlie and Yu (2007) 
The five sampling points above are elaborated in Table 6.4 below. 
 
Table 6.4: Classification of Sampling Techniques 
Categories Description Purpose 
A purely qualitative  in-depth knowledge acquisition; not 
usually generalizable 
B mixed but largely 
qualitative 
in-depth knowledge and some 
representativeness 
C purely mixed, equal 
relevance of purposive 
and probability sampling 
 
balance between in-depth knowledge and 
representativeness 
D mixed but largely 
quantitative 
more of representatives than in-depth 
knowledge 
E purely quantitative 
probability sampling 
adequate representation of population; 
usually generalizable  
Source: Author generated from Teddlie (2005) in Teddlie and Yu (2007) 
 
This study initially adopts the non-probability (purposive) sampling to 
identify all possible stakeholders and then proceeds to use cluster sampling 
to identify five most relevant groups within the stakeholders. For the oil 
C EA
 
B 
 
D 
QUAL MIXED QUAN 
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companies, stratified sampling is also used to exclusively select the staff of 
the local content/contract and procurement units. For the interview 
respondents, pure purposive sampling is used to select at least two (2) 
participants from each of the five groups. This is because in the qualitative 
aspect of the research representativeness is not the priority, but the depth 
of information to be obtained (Teddlie, 2007). The process, in some cases, 
would involve snow-balling (Heckathorn, 2011) where one respondent will 
be asked to recommend another. This is considered an easy way to reach 
out to the appropriate participants. 
 
A partial probability sampling will be used to select some of the 
questionnaire respondents. For example, for the indigenous firms a 
company has to be a PETAN member with a separate local 
content/contracts and procurement division and be located in the Lagos 
area for easy access. The other four groups will be selected based on 
purpose. The summary of the study’s population and the sample is in 
Appendix 6b. The stakeholder groups selected and the reasons for the 
selection are presented in the following paragraphs. 
Government:  this group involves the primary regulators of the Nigerian 
petroleum sector, namely: NCDMB, DPR, NEITI and NNPC. These are the 
agencies directly related to the award of petroleum contracts and licenses, 
local content implementation, and the accountability and transparency in 
the industry.  
 
International Oil Companies (IOCs): the IOCs are one of the most 
important players in the local content regime. Five major IOCs are selected 
for the study based on four reasons: they are the oldest and most visible 
(Bowen, 2000), they produce between 80%-95% of the Nigeria’s oil 
(Frynas and Paolo, 2007; Hufbauer et al., 2013), and they have up to 10-
year local content sustainability data. 
 
Indigenous oil and gas companies: indigenous/local companies are the 
vehicle through which local content aspirations are achieved. They serve as 
producers and contractors and work alongside their international 
counterparts. This study found it convenient to engage the companies that 
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are among the over 40 PETAN members but those located in Lagos39 for the 
reason stated above. Fifteen companies were found to have satisfied these 
criteria. 
  
Trade Unions: the major trade unions in the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
are the PENGASSAN and the NUPENG which are the associations of senior 
and junior oil workers respectively. They are local content advocates and 
also critical to industry practices. Their involvement in this research would 
have a moderating effect on the empirical data.  
  
Civil Society Groups: this group includes the Natural Resources 
Governance Institute (NRGI), the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre 
(CISLAC) and the Borderless Local Content Advocacy Group. These groups 
are directly working with stakeholders to ensure accountability, governance 
and transparency in local content. As the trade unions, this study would 
benefit from the critical point of view of this pressure group.   
 
6.12  Recruitment of the Respondents 
 
The researcher was able to get access to the respondents with the 
assistance of two oil and gas regulatory agencies namely: the Petroleum 
Technology Development Fund (PTDF)40 and the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR). The researcher firstly contacted the PTDF for an 
introductory letter to the oil companies. The PTDF instead, drafted a letter 
to the DPR (letter attached as Appendix 6a) requesting introductory letters 
to the various organizations since it is the agency that deals more directly 
with the industry stakeholders particularly the oil companies to whom it 
grants licenses. The DPR drafted several letters each to the various 
companies. For the interview, it was decided that the participants should be 
at the management level in order to gain from their strategic knowledge. In 
this case, some form of snow-balling was used where, in some cases, the 
                                                          
39 http://www.petan.org/downloads/petan_brochure_final.pdf  
It should be mentioned that the researcher has firstly attempted to access PETAN members located in Port 
Harcourt, but that proved difficult because many of the companies were not found at the addresses shown. This 
was shown to be a strategy to protect their staff from kidnappers and terrorists operating in the Niger-Delta. This 
made it necessary to use the Lagos location.   
40 PTDF is the sole sponsor of the researcher. Apart from the monetary funding, the Fund has also been guardian 
and councillor to the researcher throughout the exercise.   
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researcher asked participants whether they could recommend other people. 
Again, the two oil and gas conferences attended in Abuja and Aberdeen 
have contributed immensely in getting some questionnaires completed by 
participants. 
 
6.13 Ethical Considerations 
 
This research will be conducted in strict compliance with the research ethics 
of the Robert Gordon University. Research ethics refer to doing what is right 
in research and avoiding harming the participants (Orb et al., 2001). It is 
concerned with “the moral problems encountered in connection with 
scientific or other academic research by the researcher, their subjects or 
their social environment” (Berg and Tranoy, 1983 in Broom, 2006:152). In 
conducting the present research, sincerity, honesty and human respect are 
the basic elements to be considered in selecting the participants, collecting 
evidence as well as presenting and interpreting results (APA, 1992; 
Gravetter and Forzano, 2003). The research carefully identifies and selects 
the most important stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry who 
could provide the required information. To protect their rights, dignity and 
values, and to assure their voluntary consent (Lupto, 2004; Broom, 2006) 
each respondent will be informed of the aim and purpose of the study 
(Mcqueen and Knussen, 2002; Gravetter and Forzano, 2003). Efforts will be 
made to avoid any circumstance considered abusive or which could 
psychologically, emotionally or physically affect the participants (Gravetter 
and Forzano, 2003). This may include citing specific names or assessing the 
performance of specific persons from the NCDMB or the IOCs, except where 
terms not considered personal such as ‘the Minister’, ‘a manager’, ‘an 
activist’, ‘a unionist’ etc., were used. Another important aspect is respect 
for the respondents’ privacy and confidentiality (Broom, 2006). For the 
interview participants, codes will be used to represent their actual 
identities. No part of the information acquired will be directed for 
commercial purposes but rather, to conduct an academic research and to 
make recommendations to the policy-makers and oil and gas companies on 
the way forward concerning the mandatory and voluntary local content 
accountability in Nigeria and elsewhere.  
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6.14 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented and discussed the study’s philosophy, methodology 
and methods. Based on the nature of the research questions which are 
partly exploratory and partly confirmatory, it was considered appropriate to 
adopt the mixed-methods design based on the pragmatist paradigm which 
combines the objectivist and subjectivist ontology as well as the positivist 
and interpretivist epistemology. The study’s middle-range stakeholder-
accountability framework is considered in the context of the mainstream, 
interpretive and critical accounting paradigms. The study’s data sources 
(interview, questionnaire and sustainability reports) and the statistical and 
thematic analysis methods to be used were also discussed. The chapter also 
presented the population, sample and the sampling design compatible with 
the nature of the study. The chapter concluded with an overview of ethical 
considerations observed throughout the study.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Presentation and Analysis of Questionnaire Responses 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the responses gathered from the 
questionnaires. As pointed out earlier, the questionnaire involved the 16 
accountability indicators (see Table 5.3). These indicators were used to 
construct the accountability scale of the first part of the questionnaire which 
consists of 26 statements that test the NCDMB’s general performance. Data 
gathered are tested for reliability and validity to ascertain internal 
consistency. Part two of the questionnaire tests the NCDMB’s financial 
accountability; part three tests the ability of the Board to enforce 
compliance with the first consideration rules; part four tests the IOC’s 
compliance with the mandatory local content reporting; part five tests the 
stakeholders’ awareness and the effectiveness of the ORAS, MAVOS and 
ECMI programmes. The last part of the questionnaire considers the 
stakeholders’ demographic information.  
 
7.2 Questionnaire Response Rate 
 
This section considers the distribution, collection and the response rate 
achieved from the 360 questionnaires administered. Table 7.1 below 
presents the break-down. 
     Table 7.1: Questionnaire Response Rate 
Respondent 
Groups 
Questionnaire Statistics 
Administered Returned Excluded Valid Response Rate 
GV 110 91 6 85 77% 
LOC 100 83 4 79 79% 
IOCs 55 42 - 42 76% 
TU 60 46 - 46 77% 
CS 35 27 1 26 74% 
Total 360 289 11 278 77% 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade Unions; 
CS=Civil Society 
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From the above table, it was shown that a total of 360 questionnaires were 
distributed to various stakeholders, and 289 questionnaires were completed 
and returned; out of this total 11 were invalid as a result of being wrongly 
completed or not completed at all. Altogether, 278 valid questionnaires 
were analysed. This amounted to a response rate of 77% which is sufficient 
to draw conclusions about the stakeholders’ positions. The high response 
rate was achieved partly because of the assistance that was given by the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)41 and the Petroleum Technology 
Development Fund42, and partly because of the personal involvement and 
persistent follow-up by the researcher. Furthermore, the researcher’s 
participation at the Nigeria Oil and Gas Conference that took place at the 
National Conference Centre Abuja in 2013 as well as a conference organised 
by Shell Nigeria in Aberdeen have also helped in meeting with stakeholders 
in one place and getting many completed questionnaires.   
 
To repeat what has already been stated the respondents were drawn from 
different organizations directly related to local content implementation. 
When recording the responses in the SPSS software, some missing values 
were detected. These are the statements for which no responses were 
recorded for reasons best known to the respondents. As such the study 
applied one of the frequently used missing data tests, the Little’s MCAR 
test, to analyse and uncover the type of the ‘missingness’ (i.e., whether or 
not data are missing at random) before applying another procedure to 
impute those missing values for easier analysis. The next section 
considered these issues.    
 
7.3 Missing Data Analysis 
 
Ordinarily, it happens that in a survey of this magnitude missing values 
may occur. This survey has some missing values, that is, the unrecorded 
responses to some statement. The following table is a distribution of the 
                                                          
41 The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is the responsible agency in charge of the negotiations and 
awards of oil blocks in Nigeria. 
42 As this research was completely funded by the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF), the body has 
performed all that is possible to ensure its successful completion. 
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missing values according to the sections and statement numbers as they 
appeared on the questionnaire.  
                   Table 7.2: Missing Values 
S1 2 3 4 5 7 8 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
5 1 1 6 2 5 6 3 2 1 3 4 2 3 
20 23 24 26 
2 1 1 1 
S2 3 6 7 8 10 13 17 
1 1 2 2 1 1 3 
S3 10 12 13 14 15 1 3 5 
4 3 1 3 4 1 2 3 
S4 No missing value detected 
S5 4 7 
2 1 
                       Source: Author from Field Survey 
 
In Table 7.2 above, S1, S2, S3, S4 and S5 are the sections of the 
questionnaire in which statements have some missing values. Numbers in 
bold are the statement numbers on the questionnaire, and numbers in 
italics are the total number of values that are missing from each statement. 
For example, in section 1 (S1) there were five missing values under 
statement 2; 1 missing value under statement 3; 1 missing value under 
statement 4; 6 missing values under statement 5, and so on.  
 
When dealing with missing values, the major task is the decision on how to 
fill in these values so that statistical software could perform the analysis 
without any hindrance. However, before attempting to fill in the missing 
values it was recommended that the nature and patterns of the missing 
values should firstly be investigated (Little and Rubin, 1989). When 
applying the Little’s Test at 0.05 alpha level, results showed that data were 
missing completely at random (MCAR) at the significance level of 0.137 
which was greater than the alpha. This indicated that there was no 
systematic pattern of the missing data which may necessitate further 
investigation. The next task is to test the reliability and consistency of the 
first section of the questionnaire since it was intended to be a 
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comprehensive scale that measures accountability. This is the essence of 
the next section. 
7.4 Testing the Reliability and Consistency of the Accountability 
Scale 
 
In this section, the study presents the results of a reliability test conducted 
on the 26-item Accountability-Scale. This preliminary analysis was made to 
confirm that all items of the scale are testing a common thing (Iacobucci 
and Duhachek, 2003). Although the Cronbach’s alpha is one of the most 
prominent reliability tests (Eisinga, et al., 2012), researchers that it is more 
suitable for scales with multiple items on each factor (Sainfort and Booske 
2000; Cramer et al. 2006). When items on a scale are less than three the 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient is recommended (Hulin et al. 2001). Due to 
the fact that some of the factors that form the accountability scale do have 
only single items as shown in Table 7.3, the study used the split-half 
method and computed the Spearman-Brown Coefficient. The result is as 
follows: 
Table 7.3: Split-Half Reliability Statistics for the Accountability Scale 
Tests Values/Coefficients 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 
Part 1-           Value 
                  No. of items 
Part 2-           Value 
                 No. of items 
          Total No. of items 
Correlation between form 
 
.879 
13 
.863 
13 
26 
.818 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient- 
              equal length                                     
              Unequal length 
 
.900 
.900 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient .899 
Source: Computed by the author from field study 
The above table showed the reliability results for the Accountability scale 
constructed by the study. From the table, we can see that the Spearman-
Brown Coefficient and the Guttman Split-half Coefficient were 0.90 (equal 
length) and 0.899 respectively indicating very high reliability. Although the 
Split-half is more relevant due to the reasons stated above, Cronbach’s 
Alpha was also computed and showed a high reliability of 0.82 approx.  
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7.5 Analysis of the Questionnaire Responses 
 
This section presents and analyses the main questionnaire items. This will 
enable us to answer the research questions already generated in the first 
chapter and re-presented in the fourth chapter. To do this, each research 
question will be presented and followed by the analysed questionnaire 
statements relevant to the research question. Basically, descriptive 
statistics is used to estimate the mean and median values of the data. Also, 
for each statement, there is an assumed and implicit null hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference among stakeholders’ responses. Analysis of 
the possible differences called for the use of the non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests. The next section began with the 
respondents’ characteristics. 
 
7.5.1 The Respondents’ Demographic Information 
 
Before going into the main analysis, it is always important to present the 
demographic information of the respondents as this has the advantage of 
showing the calibre of people selected for the study and the 
appropriateness of doing so. Although the demographic section is the last 
part of the questionnaire, it would be the first to be analysed for the reason 
just stated. This is done in the following table. 
Table 7.4 Demographic Data of the Respondents 
Sex (%) Age (%) Qualification (%) Organization 
(%) 
Year of Service 
(%) 
Male 205(73.7) 20-29 32(11.5) Below 
degree 
32(11.5) GV 85(30.6) 1-5 101(36.3) 
Female 73(26.3) 30-39 131(47.1) First 
degree 
121(43.5) LOC 79(28.4) 6-10 92(33.1) 
 40-49 77(27.7) Masters 114(41) IOC 42(15.1) 11-15 53(19.1) 
50-
above 
38(13.7) PhD 3(1.1) TU 46(16.5) 16-
above 
31(11.2) 
 Others 8(2.9) CS 26(9.4)  
 Source: Author from Field Survey 
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Table 7.4 above shows the categories of stakeholders involved in the 
survey. It is considered important to show this spread in order to justify 
that the most appropriate respondents were selected for the study. The 
most important indicators in this instance are the stakeholders’ years of 
experience and their level of education rather than their actual age 
(Morgeson et al., 2008; Maheswari and Krishnan, 2014). As the current 
round of local content policy in Nigeria has started in 2010, that is five 
years ago, it logically follows that industry respondents with six and above 
years of experience in relevant the area could be assumed to have the 
required knowledge of the policy. From the table, the respondents with 6-
10, 11-15 and 16-above years of experience were 33.1%, 19.1% and 
11.2% respectively (collectively, 63.4%). It is also instructive to note that 
even the respondents with 1-5 years of experience that formed the 
remaining 36.3% have their own experiences with the policy in varying 
degrees. In addition, 43.5%, 41% and 1.1% of the respondents held a first 
degree, a masters and a Ph.D respectively. This spread showed that 85.6% 
of the respondents were adequately educated as against the remaining 
11.5% who attained qualifications below the first degree.  
 
The next section analyses the first section of the questionnaire which 
involves the 26-indicator scale built from the 16 accountability indicators 
(see Table 5.3). The aim is to investigate the general accountability 
arrangements of the NCDMB in the discharge of its statutory responsibilities 
in the implementation of local content in Nigeria.  
 
7.6 Stakeholders’ Perceptions of NCDMB’s General Accountability 
Performance  
 
This section presents the descriptive statistics results of questionnaire 
responses to statements on NCDMB’s accountability in the general 
administration of local content policy. Twenty-six statements were designed 
to explore this area of the Board’s mandatory accountability using sixteen 
accountability indicators generated from the literature. This section is 
designed to answer the following research question: 
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What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s general 
accountability performance in the implementation of local content in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry? 
Table 7.5 below shows the results of the descriptive statistics for the 26 
statements. For each statement, the mean, median, and percentages were 
computed based on the five categories of responses. 
 
Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics of NCDMB’s General Accountability 
Performance 
Statements Median 
(Mean) 
Responses 
1 
SA 
(%) 
2 
A 
(%) 
3 
N 
(%) 
4 
D 
(%) 
5 
SD 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1) NCDMB has clearly communicated the 
objectives it wants to achieve for the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry through the implementation of 
the Nigerian Content Development Act 
2.0000 
(2.0827) 
97 
(34.
9) 
106 
(38.1) 
47 
(16.9) 
11 
(4.0) 
17 
(6.1) 
278 
(100) 
2)  NCDMB has clearly defined the criteria/ 
metrics by which local content can be measured 
2.0000 
(2.2410) 
 
60 
(21.
6) 
134 
(48.2) 
52 
(18.7) 
21 
(7.6) 
11 
(4.0) 
278 
(100) 
3)  NCDMB has sufficient capacity (in terms of 
qualified staff) to fully implement the provisions 
of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
2.0000 
(2.6331) 
 
33 
(11.9) 
109 
(39.2) 
72 
(25.9) 
55 
(19.8) 
9 
(3.2) 
278 
(100) 
4)  NCDMB has sufficient funding to fully 
implement the provisions of the Nigerian 
Content Development Act 
3.0000 
(2.6942) 
 
38 
(13.7) 
88 
(31.7) 
80 
(28.8) 
65 
(23.4) 
7 
(2.5) 
278 
(100) 
5)  NCDMB has sufficient power in ‘practice’ to 
enforce compliance with all the provisions of the 
Nigerian Content Act on all oil and gas 
companies 
2.0000 
(2.2338) 
 
76 
(27.3) 
107 
(38.5) 
53 
(19.1) 
38 
(13.7) 
4 
(1.4) 
278 
(100) 
6)  NCDMB ensures that each stakeholder 
group in the oil and gas industry (regulators, 
companies, etc) effectively discharges its roles 
and responsibilities in the implementation of 
local content  
3.0000 
(2.8453) 
 
18 
(6.5) 
69 
(24.8) 
131 
(47.1) 
58 
(20.9) 
2 
(0.7) 
278 
(100) 
7)  NCDMB provides timely information about 
new local content policies and regulations to the 
key stakeholders involved in the industry  
2.0000 
(2.6187) 
 
47 
(16.9) 
95 
(34.2) 
61 
(21.9) 
67 
(24.1) 
8 
(2.9) 
278 
(100) 
8)  NCDMB provides relevant information about 
new areas and opportunities for indigenous 
participation in oil and gas activities 
2.0000 
(2.5791) 
 
32 
(11.5) 
120 
(43.2) 
69 
(24.8) 
47 
(16.9) 
10 
(3.6) 
278 
(100) 
9)  Whenever NCDMB fails to disclose certain 
important information to stakeholders, it 
provides reasons for the non-disclosure 
3.0000 
(2.7986) 
 
20 
(7.2) 
83 
(29.9) 
119 
(42.8) 
45 
(16.2) 
11 
(4.0) 
278 
(100) 
10)  NCDMB engages all the key stakeholders 
in major decisions concerning the 
implementation of the provisions of the Nigerian 
Content Development Act  
2.0000 
(2.3237) 
 
62 
(22.3) 
121 
(43.5) 
52 
(18.7) 
29 
(10.4) 
14 
(5) 
278 
(100) 
11)  NCDMB accepts advice from the key 
industry stakeholders if considered appropriate 
for the achievement of Nigerian content 
objectives 
 
2.0000 
(2.5755) 
31 
(11.2) 
113 
(40.6) 
85 
(30.6) 
41 
(14.7) 
 
8 
(2.9) 
278 
(100) 
12)  NCDMB maintains an effective system of 
internal auditing which ensures stewardship of 
financial and non-financial resources 
3.0000 
(2.5432) 
 
31 
(11.2) 
106 
(38.1) 
101 
(36.3) 
39 
(14) 
1 
(0.4) 
278 
(100) 
13)  NCDMB regularly conducts facility audit to 
assess the capacity of companies to execute oil 
and gas contracts in the industry 
3.0000 
(2.6439) 
 
38 
(13.7) 
73 
(26.3) 
120 
(43.2) 
44 
(15.8) 
3 
(1.1) 
278 
(100) 
14)  NCDMB conducts social audit to assess the 
impacts of its policies on the lives of the general 
public (in terms of job creation, etc) 
3.0000 
(2.6511) 
38 
(13.
7) 
81 
(29.1) 
104 
(37.4) 
50 
(18) 
5 
(1.8) 
278 
(100) 
15)  NCDMB reports its financial performance to 3.0000 14 73 112 70 9 278 
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all the key stakeholders in the oil and gas 
industry 
(2.9532) (5) (23.3) (40.3) (25.2) (3.2) (100) 
16) NCDMB reports its non-financial 
performance (process, achievements, etc) to all 
the key stakeholders in the oil and gas industry 
2.0000 
(2.4849) 
20 
(7.2) 
127 
(45.6) 
62 
(22.3) 
59 
(21.2) 
10 
(3.6) 
278 
(100) 
17)  NCDMB periodically (monthly, quarterly, 
yearly) conducts performance monitoring and 
evaluation exercises to assess the extent of 
compliance with local content requirements by 
the oil and gas companies 
3.0000 
(2.6079) 
25 
(8.9) 
77 
(27.8) 
127 
(45.6) 
44 
(15.8) 
5 
(1.8) 
278 
(100) 
18)  NCDMB operates in the best interest of the 
government to achieve the required level of 
local participation in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry 
3.0000 
(2.6187) 
 
25 
(9.1) 
71 
(25.4) 
126 
(45.5) 
46 
(16.5) 
11 
(4.0) 
278 
(100) 
19)  NCDMB considers the best interests of 
Nigerian oil and gas companies in the process 
of implementing the provisions of the Nigerian 
Content Development Act  
2.0000 
(2.3813) 
52 
(18.7) 
112 
(40.3) 
74 
(26.6) 
36 
(12.9) 
4 
(1.4) 
278 
(100) 
20)  NCDMB always responds to stakeholders’ 
demands to give account on actions undertaken 
to ensure effective implementation of the 
provisions of the Nigerian Content Development 
Act 
 
2.0000 
(2.5612) 
 
37 
(13.3) 
109 
(39.2) 
86 
(30.9) 
31 
(11.2) 
15 
(5.4) 
278 
(100) 
21)  NCDMB complies with all existing laws and 
due process in   discharging its responsibilities 
with regards to the implementation of the 
provisions of the Nigerian Content Development 
Act 
2.0000 
(2.2446) 
57 
(20.5) 
119 
(42.8) 
80 
(28.8) 
21 
(7.6) 
1 
(0.4) 
278 
(100) 
22)  NCDMB maintains effective complaint and 
response mechanisms to address matters 
raised by the key stakeholders with respect to 
local content implementation issues 
2.0000 
(2.4604) 
48 
(17.3) 
101 
(36.3) 
86 
(30.9) 
39 
(14) 
4 
(1.4) 
278 
(100) 
23)  NCDMB maintains an effective ‘whistle-
blowing’ system to consider complaints from the 
general public 
3.0000 
(2.6115) 
35 
(12.6) 
102 
(36.7) 
83 
(29.9) 
52 
(18.7) 
6 
(2.2) 
278 
(100) 
24)  NCDMB provides justification for all 
material (major) decisions it   embarks on in 
relation to the implementation of the Nigerian 
Content Development Act 
2.0000 
(2.2842) 
57 
(20.5) 
119 
(42.8) 
74 
(26.6) 
22 
(7.9) 
6 
(2.2) 
278 
(100) 
25)  NCDMB can effectively impose sanction on 
any company that violates the provisions of the 
Act 
3.0000 
(2.8914) 
18 
(6.6) 
70 
(25.1) 
126 
(45.3) 
37 
(13.3) 
27 
(9.7) 
278 
(100) 
Source: Author generated from field survey  
Note:  1 = strongly agree (SA); 2 = agree (A); 3 = neither agree nor disagree (N); 4 = disagree (D); 5 = strongly 
disagree (SD).  
 
The last indicator ‘governance’ was measured on a scale of 1-7 point. The 
results are presented in Table 7.6 below. 
Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics of NCDMB’s Overall Governance in the Implementation of 
Local Content 
Statements Median 
(Mean) 
1 
EE 
(%) 
2 
VE 
(%) 
3 
EF 
(%) 
4 
N 
(%) 
5 
IE 
(%) 
6 
VIE 
(%) 
7 
EIE 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
26)  Effectiveness of the 
overall governance of local 
content 
3.0000 
(3.2482) 
21 
(7.6) 
64 
(23) 
86 
(30.9) 
60 
(21.6) 
27 
(9.7) 
19 
(6.8) 
1 
(0.4) 
278 
(100) 
Source: Author generated from field survey  
Note: 1 = extremely effective (EE); 2 = very effective (VE); 3 = effective (EF); 4 = neither effective nor ineffective (N); 5 
= ineffective (IE); 6 = very ineffective (VIE); 7 = extremely ineffective (EIE).    
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Unlike the first 25 statements, above the 26th statement was assessed on a 
scale of 1-7 from ‘extremely effective’ to ‘extremely ineffective’. The 
rationale is that the statement is assessing the overall governance of the 
administration of local content in Nigeria, hence, requires a wider spectrum 
of assessment points. On applying the Kruskal-Wallis test to the 26 
statements in Table 7.5 and 7.6 above, differences in perceptions among 
the five respondent groups (GV, LOC, IOC, TU and CS) on certain 
statements (not all) were discovered. In order to locate where these 
differences occurred and to facilitate their interpretation in chapter ten, the 
between-group Mann-Whitney test was conducted on pairs of groups for 
each statement that showed the differences. For each test that revealed 
difference(s), a cross-tabulation test was further applied to enable 
comments as to the possible reasons for the differences. In order to avoid a 
type I error43 in using the Mann-Whitney multiple comparisons, the study 
applied the Bonferroni Correction method (Fenwick et al. 2012; Armstrong, 
2014) on the study’s alpha value of 0.05. Since ten comparisons are 
required to test ten hypotheses for each statement (i.e., five groups each 
compared with one another = 10 comparisons) the Bonferroni Corrected 
alpha is calculated as 0.05/10 = 0.00544. Hence, only values that are found 
to be less than or equals to 0.005 are considered significant.  
Tables 1a-7b (Appendix 7) presented the Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney 
multiple comparison results and the respective cross-tabulations for all the 
statements in Table 7.5 that showed differences in stakeholders’ responses.  
The next section considers the financial accountability of the NCDMB to its 
various stakeholders in administering local content. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Type I error is the risk of rejecting a null hypothesis (e.g., no differences, no association, etc) that is true. It 
amounts to “false positive” and sometimes called the alpha error (see Banerjee et al., 2009; Rothman, 2010: 223). 
44 As far as the Mann-Whitney multiple comparison tests are concerned the new 0.005 corrected alpha would 
substitute our existing 0.05 alpha level earlier selected.  Apart from this, our 0.05 alpha is retained for the logistic 
regression and the t-test involved in the study. 
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7.7 Perceptions of NCDMB’s Financial Accountability to 
Stakeholders   
 
This section aims to test whether or not the NCDMB is financially 
accountable to the stakeholders, specifically, on the positions of the NCDF. 
Four statements were prepared for stakeholders. Table 7.6 presents the 
descriptive statistics for these statements. The results were used to answer 
the following research question: 
What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s financial 
accountability in Nigerian oil and gas industry? 
 
Table 7.7: Descriptive Statistics on NCDMB’s Financial Accountability 
Statements Median 
(Mean) 
Responses 
1 
SA 
(%) 
2 
A 
(%) 
3 
N 
(%) 
4 
D 
(%) 
5 
SD 
(%) 
Total 
1) NCDMB ensures that all oil and gas 
operators/contractors remit the 
mandatory 1% of the contract sum to 
the Nigerian Content Development 
Fund (NCDF) 
2.0000 
(2.1187) 
78 
(28.1
) 
116 
(41.7) 
62 
(22.3) 
17 
(6.1) 
5 
(1.8) 
278 
(100) 
2) NCDMB reports the financial 
position (income and expenditure) of 
the Nigerian Content Development 
Fund to all key stakeholders in the oil 
and gas industry 
3.0000 
(2.6871) 
32 
(11.
5) 
71 
(25.5) 
138 
(49.6) 
26 
(9.4) 
11 
(4.0) 
278 
(100) 
3) NCDMB Consults with key 
stakeholders before spending any 
money from the Nigerian Content 
Development Fund 
3.0000 
(2.9784) 
20 
(7.2) 
50 
(18.0) 
132 
(47.5) 
68 
24.5 
8 
(2.9) 
278 
(100) 
4) the Nigerian Content Development 
Fund is achieving its purpose of 
providing easy access to finance for 
indigenous oil companies to execute oil 
and gas projects 
3.0000 
(2.8381) 
31 
(11.2
) 
61 
(21.8) 
112 
(40.4) 
59 
(21.2) 
15 
(5.4) 
278 
(100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
Note:  1 = strongly agree (SA); 2 = agree (A); 3 = neither agree nor disagree (N); 4 = disagree (D); 5 = 
strongly disagree (SD). 
Regarding the financial accountability, Table 7.7 above showed that three 
statements have medians of 3.00 each while one statement has 2.00. 
Further post hoc test revealed differences in responses. Tables 8a-9b 
(Appendix 8) used the multiple comparisons procedure to analyse the 
differences as well as the cross-tabulation tables to facilitate the 
interpretation of the reasons for the discrepancies. The next section 
considers the research question on the ability of the IOCs to give preference 
to Nigerian oil firms in their operations.      
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7.8 First Consideration for the Nigerian Oil and Gas Firms in the 
Award of Petroleum Contracts, Procurement of Materials, 
Employment and Technology Transfer 
 
This section presents the analysis of the NCDMB’s accountability to enforce 
the requirements that local oil and gas companies are to be given exclusive 
consideration when issuing petroleum licenses, contracts, procurements and 
employment and training provided under S. 3(1) and (2) of the NOGICD 
Act. This section would answer the following research question: 
What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s ability to 
enforce the provisions of the ‘first consideration’ to Nigerian oil and gas 
firms in the award of petroleum contracts, licenses, employment, 
procurement of materials, and technology transfer?   
 
To answer the above research question, fourteen (14) statements were 
presented to stakeholders for consideration. Table 7.8 below presented the 
descriptive statistic results of the statements. 
 
Table 7.8: Descriptive Statistics on whether Local Oil and Gas Firms and 
Local Labour are Given Preference in the Award of Licenses, Contracts and 
Employment 
Statements Responses 
Median 
(Mean) 
1 
SA 
(%) 
2 
A 
(%) 
3 
N 
(%) 
4 
D 
(%) 
5 
SD 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1) NCDMB ensures that Nigerian indigenous 
oil and gas companies are always given priority 
in the awarding of contracts that are within 
their capacity 
 
2.0000 
(2.2410) 
72 
(25.9) 
106 
(38.1) 
66 
(23.7) 
29 
(10.4) 
5 
(1.8) 
278 
(100) 
2) NCDMB ensures that Nigerian indigenous 
oil and gas companies are not excluded from 
the award of oil and gas contracts only on the 
‘lowest bidder’ basis as stated by the law 
 
2.0000 
(2.5324) 
39 
(14) 
103 
(37.1) 
87 
(31.3) 
47 
(16.9) 
2 
(0.7) 
278 
(100) 
3) NCDMB ensures that the minimum 
Nigerian content set by the law is always 
achieved before oil and gas contracts are 
awarded to any company 
 
2.0000 
(2.4388) 
63 
(22.7) 
86 
(30.9) 
77 
(27.7) 
48 
(17.3) 
4 
(1.4) 
278 
(100) 
4) NCDMB ensures that the indigenous oil and 
gas companies win more contracts after the 
enactment of the Nigerian Content legislation 
 
2.0000 
(2.5360) 
47 
(16.9) 
99 
(35.6) 
85 
(30.6) 
30 
(10.8) 
17 
(6.1) 
278 
(100) 
5) NCDMB ensures that all materials used in 
oil and gas operations which are available in 
Nigeria are sourced locally and not imported 
 
2.0000 
(2.2302) 
72 
(25.9) 
115 
(41.4) 
53 
(19.1) 
31 
(11.2) 
7 
(2.5) 
278 
(100) 
6) NCDMB ensures that International Oil and 
Gas Companies give priority consideration to 
the Nigerian banks for services that are within 
their capacity 
 
2.0000 
(2.2266) 
55 
(19.8) 
128 
(46) 
76 
(27.3) 
15 
(5.4) 
4 
(1.4) 
278 
(100) 
7) NCDMB ensures that International Oil and 
Gas Companies give priority consideration to 
the Nigerian insurance companies for services 
that are within their capacity 
 
2.0000 
(2.3633) 
56 
(20.1) 
107 
(38.5) 
77 
(27.7) 
34 
(12.2) 
4 
(1.4) 
278 
(100) 
8) NCDMB ensures that International Oil and 
Gas Companies give priority consideration to 
 
2.0000 
53 
(19.1) 
114 
(41) 
61 
(21.9) 
44 
(15.8) 
6 
(2.2) 
278 
(100) 
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the Nigerian legal firms for services that are 
within their capacity 
(2.4101) 
9) NCDMB ensures that International Oil and 
Gas Companies give employment priority to 
Nigerian labour for services that are within 
their expertise 
 
2.0000 
(2.5000) 
55 
(19.8) 
106 
(38.1) 
55 
(19.8) 
47 
(16.9) 
15 
(5.4) 
278 
(100) 
10) NCDMB is making all necessary efforts to 
ensure that International Oil and Gas 
companies set up offices and facilities in the 
communities they operate as required by the 
law 
 
  2.0000 
2.3705 
35 
(12.6) 
137 
(49.3) 
81 
(29.1) 
18 
(6.5) 
7 
(2.5) 
278 
(100) 
11) NCDMB ensures that all information on 
employment and training programmes are 
made public 
2.0000 
2.5432 
36 
(12.9) 
107 
(38.5) 
95 
(34.2) 
28 
(10.1) 
12 
(4.3) 
278 
(100) 
12) NCDMB ensures that only Nigerians are 
employed by the International Oil Companies 
in junior and intermediate cadre as required 
by the law 
2.0000 
2.5360 
36 
(12.9) 
114 
(41.0) 
78 
(28.1) 
43 
(15.5) 
7 
(2.5) 
278 
(100) 
13) NCDMB effectively involve the oil industry 
Trade Unions (NUPENG and PENGASSEN) in 
important training and employment decisions 
 
2.0000 
2.5683 
39 
(14.0) 
105 
(37.8) 
88 
(31.7) 
29 
(10.4) 
17 
(6.1) 
278 
(100) 
14) NCDMB effectively collaborates with 
International Oil and Gas Companies to 
facilitate technology transfer programmes to 
Nigerian workforce 
2.0000 
2.3561 
41 
(14.7) 
130 
(46.8) 
80 
(28.8) 
21 
(7.6) 
6 
(2.2) 
278 
(100) 
Source: Author generated from field survey  
Note:  1 = strongly agree (SA); 2 = agree (A); 3 = neither agree nor disagree (N); 4 = disagree (D); 5 = 
strongly disagree (SD). 
 
All the fourteen statements in Table 7.8 above have indicated a median of 
2.00. However, on a further check, the following significant differences were 
discovered and analysed in Tables 10a-13b (Appendix 9). The following 
section aims to present the results from the analysis of responses on the 
IOCs’ accountability to comply with the mandatory local content reporting 
provisions enshrined in the NOGICD Act. 
7.9 Perceptions of the Extent to which IOCs Comply with the 
Mandatory Local Content Reporting   
 
This section is concerned with the assessment of how oil companies (IOCs 
in particular) comply with the legal provision that required 
reporting/disclosing and submission of certain documents periodically 
before considered for any contract. These documents are: (i) the quarterly 
contracting plan of which values are in excess of $1 million, (ii) invitation to 
tenders for all contracts above $1 million 45 , (iii) quarterly procurement 
report, (iv) employment & training plan, (v) technology transfer plan, (vi) 
                                                          
45 Appendix 9 presented a sample invitation to tender and all the accompanying local content rules. In Nigeria, the 
local content section of the invitation to tenders form ‘a fatal flaw’ that is, deviating from these provisions will 
disqualify any company from the bidding process.   
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annual Nigerian Content performance report, and (vii) half-yearly financial, 
legal and insurance plans. The result will be used to answer the following 
research question: 
To what extent do Nigerian oil and gas companies comply with the 
mandatory reporting of local content performance? 
A single statement was used to assess this compliance as shown in Table 
7.9 below. 
 
Table 7.9: Descriptive Statistics of Mandatory Local Content Reporting by 
Oil Companies 
Statements Responses 
Median 
(Mean) 
1 
SA 
(%) 
2 
A 
(%) 
3 
N 
(%) 
4 
D 
(%) 
5 
SD 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1) Do you agree that oil and gas 
companies submit the above-
listed documents to NCDMB 
before they are awarded any oil 
and gas contracts?46 
 
 
2.0000 
2.4820 
29 
(10.4) 
115 
(31.4) 
108 
(38.8) 
23 
(8.3) 
3 
(1.1) 
278 
(100) 
Source: Author generated from field survey 2014 
Note:  1 = strongly agree (SA); 2 = agree (A); 3 = neither agree nor disagree (N); 4 = disagree (D); 5 = 
strongly disagree (SD). 
Table 7.9 above indicates that for the single statement, a median response 
of 2.00 was computed. No statistically significant differences in 
stakeholders’ responses were noted. As such, no further analysis is 
required. The last question that investigates the NCDMB’s accountability is 
presented in the following section. In this question, the awareness of 
stakeholders of certain NCDMB’s programmes and their effectiveness were 
assessed. 
 
7.10 Assessment of the Awareness and Effectiveness of NCDMB’s 
Programmes Initiated for the Smooth Implementation of Local 
Content Policy  
 
This section evaluated the effectiveness of the major programmes run by 
the NCDMB in an attempt to realise the maximum benefits from local 
content in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Three statements were 
developed under this section. Table 7.14 presents the descriptive statistics 
                                                          
46 These documents were listed on the questionnaire and included the Quarterly contracting plan, Invitations to 
tender, Quarterly Procurement Report, Annual Nigerian Content Performance Report, Technology Transfer Plan, 
and half-yearly Financial Services Plans. 
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of the three statements used to determine whether or not these initiatives 
are effective. The research question to be answered is as follows:    
What is the extent of stakeholders’ awareness and effectiveness of 
NCDMB’s local content programmes? 
 
To answer this research question the study firstly assessed the level of 
stakeholders’ awareness of the programmes by using binary logistic 
regression on the three NCDMB’s local content programmes (MAVOS, ORAS 
and ECMI) which were treated as the dependent variables. Each dependent 
variable is tested in a separate model against two predictors or independent 
variables namely: organisation and years of service. The aim here is to test 
whether organizational membership of stakeholders and the years they 
spent in service predict their awareness of the three NCDMB programmes. 
This is to address the allegations that certain stakeholder groups were 
excluded from some of these programmes (Ovadia, 2013). Secondly, the 
analysis proceeded to test the effectiveness of the three programmes from 
the stakeholders’ point of view.  
Three most important tables were produced by the binary logistic 
regression and presented here. These tables include the Omnibus test of 
model coefficient, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test and the model summary 
of the three local content programmes. The tables are presented below. 
Table 7.10: Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients for the Three Programmes 
 MAVOS ORAS ECMI 
Chi-Sq df Sig. Chi-Sq Df Sig. Chi-Sq Df Sig. 
Step1    
Block 
Model 
 
22.946 
22.946 
22.946 
 
 
7 
7 
7 
 
.002 
.002 
.002 
 
18.634 
18.634 
18.634 
 
 
7 
7 
7 
 
.009 
.009 
.009 
 
25.862 
25.862 
25.862 
 
 
5 
5 
5 
 
.014 
.014 
.014 
Source: Author from Field Study 
Note: MAVOS=Marine Vessels Ownership Strategy; ORAS=Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy; ECMI=Equipment 
Component Manufacturing Initiative 
The above Omnibus test of model coefficients is the goodness of fit test 
which indicates how well the overall model works (that is, the model 
consisting of all the three programmes). High significant values (p<.05) are 
preferred in this model (Pallant, 2007). The above table showed significant 
results in all the three cases as: MAVOS = .002, Chi-square and degree of 
freedom = 21.071 and 5; ORAS = .009, Chi-square and degree of freedom 
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= 18.634 and 7; ECMI = .014, Chi-square and degree of freedom = 25.862 
and 5. All the three models have exhibited good fit for the data. To further 
examine the usefulness of the models, the next table presented another 
important test – the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test.   
Table 7.11: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for the Three Programmes 
Step MAVOS ORAS ECMI 
Chi-Sq. Df Sig. Chi-Sq. Df Sig. Chi-
Sq. 
Df Sig. 
1 8.023 7 .331 30.676 8 .000 7.889 7 .343 
Source: Author from Field Study 
Note: MAVOS=Marine Vessels; ORAS=Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy; ECMI=Equipment Component 
Manufacturing Initiative  
Results from Table 7.11 above support the results provided in Table 7.10. 
This test is one of the most reliable tests of model fit (Pallant, 2007). As 
oppose to the criteria used in the Omnibus test, this test prefers results 
that are not significant (p>.05). In support of our Omnibus model, the 
above results showed that both of the MAVOS and the ECMI models had a 
good fit of .331 and .343 respectively (p>.05), but the ORAS had a poor fit 
of .000 (p<.05). This is because there was a large variation between the 
expected and the observed frequencies which created a large Chi-square 
value. The next task is to measure the amount of variations in the 
dependent variables that were explained by the model. This is called the 
Pseudo R-square statistics (Pallant, 2007). In a simple term, the degree to 
which the independent variables (organization & year of service) explain or 
determine the stakeholders’ awareness of the three programmes. These 
variations are presented in the following table. 
Table 7.12: Model Summary of the Three Programmes 
Ste
p 
MAVOS ORAS ECMI 
-2Log 
likelihoo
d 
Cox 
& 
Snel
l R 
Sq. 
Nagelkerk
e R Sq. 
-2Log 
likelihoo
d 
Cox 
& 
Snel
l R 
Sq. 
Nagelkerk
e R Sq. 
-2Log 
likelihoo
d 
Cox 
& 
Snel
l R 
Sq. 
Nagelkerk
e R Sq. 
1 344.626 .079 .108 353.704 .065 .088 356.182 .050 .068 
Source: Author from field study 
Note: MAVOS=Marine Vessels Ownership Strategy; ORAS=Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy; ECMI=Equipment 
Component Manufacturing Initiative 
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The variations in each of the dependent variables explained by their 
respective models were simplified and summarised in the following table. 
Table 7.13: Variations in the Dependent Variables Explained by the Models 
Dependent variables Variations explained by models 
MAVOS Between 7.9% and 10.8% 
ORAS Between 6.5% and 8.8% 
ECMI Between 5% and 6.8% 
Source: Author from field study 
Note: MAVOS=Marine Vessels Ownership Strategy; ORAS=Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy; ECMI=Equipment 
Component Manufacturing Initiative 
The above results showed no significant predictive ability of the 
independent variables (organization and years of service) on the dependent 
variables (MAVOS, ORAS and ECMI). For example, only 7.9% and 10.8% of 
the awareness of the MAVOS programme were due to the stakeholders’ 
organizations and years of service while the remaining 92% and 89.2% 
were due to other things outside the model. The ORAS and the ECMI 
programmes also followed same patterns. 
After determining the extent of stakeholders’ awareness of the above local 
content programmes, Table 7.14 below presented the assessment on 
whether or not the three programmes are effective. Five-point scale (from 
very effective to very ineffective) was used as provided below. 
Table 7.14:  Descriptive Statistics of the Effectiveness of NCDMB’s 
Programmes 
Statements 
Responses 
Median 
(Mean) 
1 
VE 
(%) 
2 
E 
(%) 
3 
N 
(%) 
4 
IE 
(%) 
5 
VIE 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
1) Marine Vessel Ownership 
Strategy (MAVOS) 
3.0000 
2.6043 
38 
(13.7) 
78 
(28.1) 
119 
(42.8) 
42 
(15.1) 
1 
(0.4) 
278 
(100) 
2) Offshore Rig Acquisition 
Strategy (ORAS) 
3.0000 
2.6978 
25 
(9.0) 
84 
(30.3) 
125 
(45.0) 
38 
(13.7) 
6 
(2.2) 
278 
(100) 
3) Equipment Components 
Manufacturing Initiative (ECMI) 
3.0000 
2.7122 
27 
(9.7) 
88 
(31.7) 
114 
(41.0) 
36 
(12.9) 
13 
(4.7) 
278 
(100) 
Source: Author from Field Study 
Note: 1 = very effective (VE); 2 = effective (E); 3 = neither effective nor ineffective (N); 4 = ineffective (IE); 5 =  very 
ineffective (VIE). 
From the above table, all of the three statements have shown a neutral 
stance with a common median score of 3.00 in each case. This will be 
explained in chapter ten.  
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7.11 Conclusion 
 
The chapter presented the analysis of questionnaire data which formed part 
of the three data collection procedures used in the present study on the 
basis of the convergent parallel mixed-methods design. The analysis was 
based on the sixteen (16) accountability indicators obtained from literature 
as well as the NOGICD Act (2010). For each section, descriptive statistics 
were presented together with tests for differences (Kruskal-Wallis and 
Mann-Whitney Tests) and cross-tabulation tests where applicable. It was 
explained earlier that in order to suppress the effects of type I error, a 
Bonferroni corrected alpha of 0.005 was applied. Inferential binary logistic 
regression was also conducted to determine the predictors of stakeholders’ 
awareness of three NCDMB’s programmes – ORAS, MAVOS and ECMI. The 
analysis in this chapter aims to contribute to answering the research 
questions on NCDMB’s and IOCs’ accountability in local content 
sustainability. The analysis in this chapter and the two subsequent chapters 
are followed by detailed discussion in chapter ten. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Presentation and Analysis of Interview Results 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the interviews conducted with the oil 
industry stakeholders using the thematic analysis technique (see Section 
6.9.2). The results of these interviews will be interpreted alongside other 
quantitative results to provide more understanding and more insight into 
the issues at hand. The chapter is divided mainly into five sections in line 
with the objectives of the research formulated in the first chapter of the 
work. As it has already been stated, the deductivism would be applied to 
the thematic analysis as the interview was guided by the local content, 
sustainability and accountability theories. All relevant themes will be 
identified and discussed in line with the theories reviewed. Both open and in 
vivo coding systems will be utilised to identify as many codes as possible to 
form the themes. 47 The relevant transcripts from the interviews will be 
quoted to demonstrate the emerging themes in situ (Burnard, 1994) while 
making the necessary minor adjustments to tenses or sentence 
construction errors (Bebbington, 1999) 48 . Irrelevant sections of the 
transcripts will not be presented. The following section starts by analysing 
stakeholders’ views on local content and sustainability.  
 
8.2 Analysis of Stakeholders’ Perceptions of Local Content as a 
Sustainability Policy Pursued through the Petroleum Contracts 
 
There are several arguments in the literature (see chapter two) that show 
that local content policy is a variant of sustainability or the triple-bottom-
line49. It has been provided that local content has social, economic, and 
environmental implications for the countries hosting oil and gas operations. 
This line of argument lacks empirical grounding. One of the major 
significant aims of this study is to explore this argument by collecting, 
                                                          
47 In vivo coding is the type of coding based on the concepts or phrases used by the participants in the text. Open 
coding is where researchers use their own words and constructs to represent an idea within the text.  
48 The corrections were put in brackets within the transcripts. 
49 These terms are often used interchangeably (see Pavlova, 2006; Lozano, 2008; Fauzi, et al., 2010). 
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analysing and drawing conclusions from stakeholders on this issue. The 
coding and analysis in respect of this are deductive and guided by the 
sustainability/local content theory developed by this study from pieces of 
literature and proposed for testing. The coding was therefore done around 
the three tenets of sustainability – social, economic and environmental. 
After the rigorous exercise, the several codes generated were gathered 
under the main codes using selective coding in order to make a meaningful 
analysis. The emergent themes are considered in the following sections. 
  
8.2.1 Economic Growth and the Business-case 
 
Other themes identified from stakeholders’ responses were the policy’s 
contribution to economic development at the macro (national) and micro 
(firm) levels. The policy was also particularly viewed as having a business-
case. An IOC manager argues that: 
“.....so it’s part of the business imperatives that you do local content. Your own 
motivation for driving it depends on what business principles and where you want to 
place it in your strategy as an organization. So for me I think it’s the right thing to 
do even without being compelled, even without legislation you should do business in 
a way that engenders the most sustainability; and local content provides the 
platform to do that”.                           [IPI02] 
An official of a government agency who was at the helm of the affairs of the 
Board observed more business-case in local content as he stated that:  
“....there are collaborators in local content development which we see their 
participation as enhancing their own businesses. When you empower your vendors; 
when your vendors are able to provide quality service to you, you will reduce the 
cost of running your business. So, developing a local supply-chain means that you 
have the supply-chain at your finger-tips. You don’t need to go outside the country 
to fly in expatriates, fly in goods, equipment, materials. So developing these vendors 
as part of the local content philosophy means that there is more reliability. So they 
see it as part of a deal to enhance their own business success and sustainability”.
                   [IPG02] 
 
As part of its economic benefits, it was pointed out by the participants that 
local content had a role to play in mitigating economic damaging activities 
caused by the absence of indigenous capacity. One of the contributors was 
a manager in one of the petroleum industry trade unions who opined that: 
“First of all, you will find that if the policy works as it is expected to be (sic) we will 
be able to increase employment and stop capital flight”.            [IPT01] 
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This increase in employment of the local people reduces the cost of 
maintenance of oil facilities spent in billions of dollars as a result of 
sabotage: 
“So when you empower the youth (by providing jobs) you have protected the 
infrastructural facilities. This is another way of providing security on which billions 
(money) were spent”.                [IPG01] 
 
Another similar opinion was submitted by an indigenous firm staff who also 
confirmed the policy’s corrective economic measures: 
“Local content is a sustainable development tool that developing countries use to 
encourage local capacity growth and contain capital flight”.   
                     [IPL04] 
An employee of a trade union further observed the destructive effects of 
economic drains especially when coupled with unemployment. But with 
proper implementation of local content: 
“....most of the technology will be domiciled in the country, which means it will be 
able to check capital flight,...job flight. ..”.          [IPT02] 
 
It was further pointed out that the national economic benefits of local 
content are almost a given. A government official and a manager in an 
implementation agency gave a comprehensive account of the policy and its 
major relevance to economic growth. He stated that: 
“... I can elaborate and give some evidence on how local content leads to sustainable 
development. Now when we talk about local content we are actually talking about in-
country value addition, and value addition means in-country participation along the 
exploration and production value chain. When we talk about value creation or value 
generation we are talking about harnessing our natural resources, we are talking 
about engaging our youths in contracts and employment and also optimizing the 
potentials of our youth for development. Now when you put all these together, you 
are seeing wealth creation in communities, you are seeing sustainable development”.
                    [IPG01] 
 
As a result of the above activities that involve the local workforce, local 
content was viewed as an easy avenue to transfer technology by the foreign 
partners with the superior know-how to the local personnel. A local operator 
appreciated this by saying that the policy: 
“helps to transfer technology at a faster pace....”.      [IPL04]
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8.2.3 Social Stability 
 
On the relevance of local content to social stability a unionist considered the 
policy from the angle of job provisions and concluded that: 
“...most of the crises in Nigeria are being perpetrated by people that do not have 
job”.                    [IPT02] 
                         
Substantiating on this claim, a top industry regulator made a further 
assertion and cited specific example:   
“The existence of youth restiveness and vandalisation in the Niger-Delta 50  is a 
common knowledge. So when you empower the youth (by providing jobs) you have 
protected the infrastructural facilities. This is another way of providing security on 
which billions (money) were spent”.                       [IPG01] 
             
The above comment showed that the social dimension of local content also 
affects the economic dimension as it leads to cost-saving. More of this was 
presented by the above participant where he concluded that: 
“The moment there is something for everybody from (sic) the community level to the 
local government, the state and the national level you will find out there will be 
tranquillity, there will be peace; everybody is engaged, everybody is happy, 
everybody has a stake. The oil companies will be happy because their platforms will 
be secured; people are looking up to these platforms, there will be no more 
destruction, the country is happy because Nigerians are being engaged, Nigerians 
have stopped taking jobs outside, revenue is being retained, the pressure on foreign 
exchange will reduce because of the reduction in foreign supplies. People will see 
their government accountable”.            [IPG01] 
 
8.2.3 Environmental and Intergenerational Survival 
 
In emphasizing the roles of local content to sustainability, stakeholders 
have shown a strong connection between local content and the survival of 
the present and the future community members as well as the 
environment. For example, a high-ranking officer in one of the local oil 
firms makes the following assertion: 
“Yes. My opinion on this is that if you look at local content efforts in Nigeria it 
actually, you know, fulfils a lot of the criteria of what sustainable development is all 
about, ok. Now sustainability or sustainable development is ... they are trying to look 
at what is good in the interest of mankind, you know, today without compromising 
what is going to happen further down in the future. In other words, it is built on the 
                                                          
50 The oil-producing region of Nigeria where constant restiveness as a result of the operations of the oil and gas 
companies have been experienced. 
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simple principle (that), everything that we need for our survival today depends 
either directly or indirectly on our national environment”.         [IPL01] 
            
The above opinion was supported by a manager in the PETAN who placed 
particular emphasis on the engagement of local people in petroleum 
activities: 
“Well, definitely local content is a sustainability policy because the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry generally cannot survive without the input and involvement of the 
locals, and if the industry must survive the locals must be involved. Local content 
policy is that local players can participate in the oil industry. One, it helps sustain the 
industry, two it also helps to sustain the people whose environment is subjected to 
destruction”.                          [IPL02] 
 
The suggested engagement of local people and its impact were upheld by 
two other participants. One of the expressed that: 
“Local content seeks to ensure that host communities get their end on the bargain in 
a specific, measurable and sustainable way. ..... it empowers local people, and it has 
a multiplier effect on the lives of local communities”.           [IPC02]
         
As such, the other observed that: 
“... local content is all about converting the natural resources or the resources of a 
particular people of a country or communities into jobs and opportunities, so that is 
sustainability”.                           [IPI02] 
 
In an apparent show of acknowledgement of the above facts, oil companies 
appeared to be making some moves to promote the policy within their 
operating environmental. A CEO in one of the local firms claimed that:  
   
“I agree that the local content as a tool has contributed to the social, economic and 
environmental development. I see that from the perspective on (the) ground. There 
is no doubt that some of us who are players in the industry have been empowered 
by the local content policy. .... what I can say is this: there is no doubt that the local 
content policy has been further taken to communities by the operators, the 
contractors like us”.                  [IPL01] 
 
Engagement with local communities has appeared to have a direct 
correlation with the reduction of social crisis (as claimed by IPT02) and the 
promotion of environmental protection. By engaging the youths: 
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“Platforms, pipes, etc will actually be secured, and pollution-free environment will be 
achieved and the enormous costs for clean-up be saved51. So if you look at the 
pillars that local content is trying to promote, you will find out that yes, it is a source 
for (sic) sustainable development and economic prosperity.”          [IPG01] 
      
Apart from protecting the environment through curbing social unrests, local 
content was also believed to support the green environment through the 
transfer of technology which is one of the major concerns of the policy. A 
respondent from local firm agreed that local content:  
“helps to transfer technology at a faster pace. It often brings in environmental 
concerns at a larger scale”.                 [IPL04] 
              
From the view of one activist it appeared that local content instils good 
citizenship in the minds of the local people at it was argued that: 
“Yes... I am one of those persons that will agree that local content actually will 
contribute to environmental development... we are dealing with the international oil 
companies ..., the tendency for us (is) to begin to see the issue from the perspective 
of: “...we (IOCs) are only here in this country to do business”, and after that they 
are eventually going to find their way to the various countries where they came 
from. But local content...(gives) a sense of belonging to those taking the resources 
given that they (i.e., locals) are not only to make money; they also know that they 
don’t have any country other than Nigeria to call their own. So, to such an extent it 
(not only) involves making profit through oil exploration and production, it also 
means even in profit-making...., putting it at the back of minds that they also need 
to sustain the environment given that they are from this country. So they are going 
to be exploiting with care with all the caution knowing fully that there are 
environmental hazards that come with it”.                        [IPC01] 
 
This good citizenship tendency emanated from the government itself as one 
manager from the agency in charge of awarding oil and gas exploration and 
development licenses made a strong claim which showed the supremacy of 
national/intergenerational interest over the economic benefits when it 
comes to the oil and gas drilling and production.  He stated that: 
“...for us the first is national interest. Well, you have oil like 100 million barrels; you 
get a recovery factor of 30%. We don’t want you to extract it within two, three, or 
four years because you can harm the reservoir. It may not be in the interest of the 
future generation to do so. You have to do it in such a way that technology may 
exist (in the future) to improve your recovery factor from 30% to 60%. If you harm 
the reservoir the country losses (and) you win, you take your money and go”. 
                       [IPG02] 
 
                                                          
51 Whatever loss is suffered by the oil-producing companies particularly the IOCs that are in JVCs is shared with the 
Nigerian government according to equity holdings of 60:40. For those companies in PSCs most of these losses are 
recoverable costs. 
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The above good citizenship and the discussions before it concerns with the 
survival of human, environment and resources; and this upholds the notion 
that sustainable development is the “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to 
meet their own needs” (UNCED, 1987: 8).   
Table 8.1 below exhibits the summary of the findings for the above 
interview data. 
Table 8.1 Summary of the Interviews on Local Content as Sustainability 
Policy  
Research Question: To what extent do the stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry perceive local content to be a sustainability policy pursued through the petroleum 
contracts? 
Participants Major themes 
IPL01, IPL01, IPI02, 
IPG02, IPC02, IPL01, 
IPG01, IPL04, IPC01, 
IPG02, IPG01, IPT01, 
IPT02 
Sustainability relevance of local content policy: 
 
 Economic growth and business-case 
 Social stability 
 Environmental and intergenerational survival 
Source: Author from field survey 
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8.3 Analysis of Stakeholders’ Perceptions of the Accountability 
Expectations of Local Content in the Nigerian Petroleum Sector 
 
Having observed the stakeholders’ acknowledgement that local content was 
a sustainability policy the study moved on to assess the accountability 
implications of local content. From this point to the rest of the chapter, the 
study’s conceptual framework – the stakeholder-accountability – with its 
sixteen (16) accountability dimensions (Table 5.3), will be the guiding 
theory in the selection of the relevant themes, codes and the interview 
quotations. The themes that have emerged from the data about the 
accountability aspects of the local content are discussed below. 
 
8.3.1 Setting of Realistic Targets 
 
Setting performance targets is often the first step in achieving 
accountability, hence, became one of the themes of interest to the 
stakeholders. A CEO in one of the local oilfield servicing companies made 
this general statement: 
“When you are setting a target it should be articulated, achievable, you know, it 
should be realistic and determined. Once you don’t follow that way then the level of 
what you get will be in dissonance and it will not be in consonance”.     [IPL01] 
          
   
8.3.2 Understanding, Engagement and Commitment to Targets  
 
Targets should be understood by stakeholders who are expected to show a 
strong commitment to performing in a transparent manner. An industry 
insider alleged that: 
“The people or body (i.e., NCDMB) invested with implementation (of local content) 
are either ignorant of the goals or deliberately acting to frustrate it because of selfish 
interests or do not actually have the empowerment to drive it successfully. It would 
appear that there are several local investors who are more interested in becoming 
brief case local content champions rather than investing.”          [IPL04]
           
Based on the allegation above the sustainability aims of the local content in 
Nigeria might have been compromised. Instead of the policy to produce 
strong entrepreneurs it may end up creating weak business people. As 
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such, a local firm official put the first burden of accountability on the 
shoulders of the Board as he submitted that: 
“A key aspect of the local content is the level of understanding of the process, the 
extent, milestones and the expected outcomes. Where there is understanding the 
will to be transparent is crucial to its success. The regulators must demonstrate a 
commitment to supporting the process rather than stifling it. The demonstrated 
commitment of support will bring out openness from the participants or 
stakeholders. The growth would then be rapid.... Where the regulator has no weight 
or intent to lend support, the other stakeholders would not be transparent in working 
towards realisation of the goals.”                     [IPL04] 
   
Concurring on the above opinion another local operator pointed at the 
regulatory body as the first accountor in local content. He observed that: 
“Well, so far I want to say that the pillars are that the govt is committed and also 
the oil industry is committed”.          [IPL02]
              
A civil society advocate also viewed the government as the first point of 
reference when he viewed that: 
“The highest level of accountability is expected from all relevant stakeholders, 
especially the government. It is expected that the government and agencies involved 
in the Local Content remain committed to this development policy...”.     [IPC03]
        
 
Some stakeholders have taken interest in the Board’s opportunity to 
engage all parties in meaningful implementation of the policy; one of them 
stated that:  
“The expected mode of operation should be that of working with both IOCs and local 
investors in a way that will identify gaps and make efforts to fill them. This will 
ensure a steady (and) rapid transformation of the local content.”      [IPL04]
         
Another respondent with similar opinion mentioned that: 
“Going forward, it is expected that they (i.e., the Board) continuously and 
systematically increase encouragement to birth partnership (sic) with the private 
sector while still maintaining adequate relationship with the foreign companies since 
the aim is not to frustrate foreigners out of the industry”.               [IPC03]
         
An industry participant made an elaboration on the nature of engagement 
with stakeholders expected and the roles of the Board in ensuring that: 
“There should be an interrelationship between the government, the private sector, 
the organised sector comprised of entrepreneurs and the industry as a whole. You 
understand? So if you look from the other point of view the role of government in 
that interaction is basically to be able to create the enabling environment that would 
be able to drive and stimulate you know, growth. Definitely, if you look at it from 
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that point of view I think that the government has very much to play”.       [IPL03]
          
One informant expressed an acknowledgement that the Board has so far 
been doing well in its efforts to engage other stakeholders: 
“...so the NCDMB started from nothing. So far they have been trying, they have 
been engaging, they have been committed, they have been passionate about local 
content. So far, the engagement has been ok.”                    [IPL02]
          
 
8.3.3 Measurability and Predictability of Performance 
 
Stakeholders expressed the needs to have local content targets and 
performance capable of being predicted and measured:  
“Well, I mean... a high level of accountability is expected. Because as local content 
is; it is designed in such a way that it should be specifically measurable. As such, 
‘measurable’ means to know exactly what progress has been made.”         [IPC02]
         
Only when targets are measurable that predictions are possible as pointed 
out by one participant: 
“It is expected that the government and agencies involved in the Local Content 
remain committed to this development policy, ensure that there is no disconnect 
between policy formulation (strategy) and policy implementation (action) while 
enshrining the core value of transparency and predictability in driving the policy to 
the attainment of desired outcomes.”                [IPC03] 
            
Whether or not any credible measurement mechanism existed remained 
unclear. An informant strongly alleged that: 
“The local body (i.e., NCDMB) does not have any measurement process by which its 
success or lack of it can be evaluated”.                             [IPL04]  
 
8.3.4 Transparency and Reporting 
 
Objectives, targets, rules and regulations are meant to be communicated to 
all stakeholders. Without effective communication of targets, local content 
policy cannot be actualised. An informant commented that the government 
should: 
“ensure that there is no disconnect between policy formulation (strategy) and policy 
implementation (action) while enshrining the core value of transparency and 
predictability in driving the policy to the attainment of desired outcomes”.        
       [IPC03] 
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On the need for full transparency in local content, one advocate who has 
taken an extreme measure to enforce his civil rights to information on local 
content activities presented thus:  
“......as such we need information, we need data. That is why we at (the) Borderless 
Local Content Advocacy we are in court seeking access to information on local 
content implementation in Nigeria. As with us, accountability and transparency are 
sine qua non to the success of local content policy”.           [IPC02]
  
           
As a measure to avoid an occurrence similar to the one submitted above, 
another activist suggested that: 
“Government and (other) relevant stakeholders are expected to involve the media in 
their processes particularly in issues regarding the upstream sector in a bid to foster 
transparency and contributing to public information which will equip citizens to 
engage in informed debates and keep the government and agencies progressively 
accountable”.           [IPC03]
                 
In a likely reaction to the above suggestion an IOC member reminded those 
concerned that local content reporting by the IOCs was not a new thing, but 
something that has been in place: 
“Well it’s a requirement basically and that’s why different entities willingly subscribe 
to reporting it (i.e., local content). It’s all about being good corporate citizen, it’s all 
about oil companies’ belief that the best way to do business is to adopt the 
sustainability approach. It’s also to do with access to new opportunities. For instance 
now if you want to go into a new territory of course, they will look at your record on 
sustainability. What have you done in other places where you worked; how much in-
country capacity have you created from the work you’ve done?”.         [IPI02]
              
8.3.5 Enforcement 
 
Regulators have to be capable of enforcing local content targets and 
performances. An observation of one advocate from the Natural Resources 
Governance Institute read: 
“Yes, efforts have been (made) to put the right laws and policies in place, but it is 
difficult to completely say that they are currently working. Some of the programmes 
currently running, you find them on paper but it is difficult to actually say that they 
are translating policies into implementation. So to this extent, at the level of 
paperwork we have done very well but at the level of implementation the pace has 
been very, very slow”.              [IPC01] 
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To sum up the discussion, an informant concluded that: 
“.... Presently, it is all about enforcement”.    [IPL04] 
        
8.3.6 Complaint and Response 
 
A local operator made an important observation in favour of the Board by 
showing that the Board was responsible and listens to stakeholders. He 
mentioned that: 
“.....and you can also access them (i.e., NCDMB); they are very accessible if you 
have any complaint on any issue that you want (to be) addressed”.          [IPL02] 
          
8.3.7 Sincerity of Purpose 
 
Another informant concluded by arguing that the success or failure of the 
policy is in the hands of the government: 
“Well I want to say fundamentally (that it) is all about the sincerity of purpose; if the 
government is sincere in the implementation of local content then definitely the 
programme will succeed.”                 [IPL02] 
        
8.3.8 Cost- profit Effects 
 
Some industry participants, especially from the IOCs, have raised the alarm 
that local content rules impact on their cost structure. An IOC executive 
observed that: 
“.... It (local content) also touches the issue of cost and profitability. It depends on 
how it is looked at. In most cases it (local content) is initially costly because you will 
have to invest to build the capacity, but in the long-term it could lead to cost saving. 
Take for example the case of training the local labour. This needs initial investment 
but in the long run will save cost as local labour is significantly cheaper than the 
expatriate”.                [IPI02] 
 
Another local operator shared the same view as: 
 “It (local content) has significant impact on the operating costs of IOCs. When 
properly deployed it is supposed to bring down cost at the medium to long-term 
outlook. It initially escalates cost of operation as the local skill and infrastructure are 
not originally available locally. Huge investment is required for local infrastructure, 
skill, training and quality assurance. These costs are passed (on) to the IOCs. ....the 
initial cost of environmental management can also be high. But on (sic) the long run, 
the IOCs would have lower operating costs”.          [IPL04] 
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This discussion was followed by a recommendation from one activist of 
balancing interests in local content relationships. After expressing opinion 
that local content policy is compatible with the capitalist system of 
economy, he concluded that:  
“.... local content can be classified as sustainable development policy within the 
capitalist system. Because the principle governing the capitalism is that investors are 
entitled to their profits and their host communities are also entitled to the value of 
those investments. This is development.”          [IPC02]
           
8.3.9 Corruption 
  
Corruption is often a political issue that characterised petroleum and natural 
resource contracts in developing countries.  A unionist raised the issue of 
the politics of corruption which poses serious challenges to the 
implementation of local content in Nigeria. He pointed at the regulators as 
having the highest burden of accountability and said that: 
“...whatever we get, good or bad will be a reflection of the government of the day.... 
The IOCs are very powerful; they can buy their way and breach this law as much as 
possible with connivance of people from government and even some regulatory 
authorities....”            [IPT01]
      
Another manager from an operating company viewed that doing the right 
thing in implementing a critical policy such as local content is a necessity 
and not an option for anybody. Therefore, the government and other 
stakeholders must only stick to the rules:   
 “I am not sure that question is very relevant to local content in Nigeria because 
local content is already a law. So you just have to comply with it.... transparent or 
not transparent you do according to what the law has said”.          [IPI01] 
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Table 8.2 Summary of the Interviews on the Accountability Expectations of 
Local Content 
Research Questions: What are the accountability expectations of local content in the 
petroleum sector? 
Participants Major themes 
IPL04, IPL02, IPC02, 
IPL01, IPC01, IPC03, 
IPL03, IPL02, IPL04, 
IPI02, IPL04, IPI01, IPI02 
Factor influencing local content accountability:  
 
 Setting of realistic targets 
 Understanding, engagement and commitment to 
targets 
 Transparency and reporting 
 Enforcement 
 Predictability and measurability of performance 
 Complaint and response mechanisms 
 Sincerity of purpose 
 Cost-profit effects 
 Corruption 
Source: Author from field study 
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8.4 Analysis of Stakeholders’ Perceptions of the NCDMB’s Financial 
Accountability to the Stakeholders in the Nigerian Petroleum Sector 
 
The NCDMB maintains two types of funds – the fund to finance its routine 
administrative functions and the fund to finance the implementation of the 
local content policy that is, the NCDF (see chapter four). This section 
gathered responses on the level of accountability to which the Board 
manages and reports its financial performances as required by the law. A 
number of themes have arisen from the data, and the major ones are 
presented below.  
 
8.4.1 Transparency and Accessibility of Financial Information 
 
It has been ascertained from stakeholders’ responses that transparency, 
disclosure and reporting of information are sine qua non to the financial 
accountability in respect of the NCDMB. That is why an activist who closely 
followed the trend of actions of the Board and whose major interest was on 
how local firms access the NCDF to execute contracts, stated that: 
“The level of access to the funds remains unsatisfactory….. (but) As a way of 
improving the structure and transparency of their (i.e., NCDMB’s) processes 
particularly regarding access to (the) funds (i.e., NCDF), the NCDMB in 2013 
appointed a fund manager and set up an advisory committee....”      [IPC03] 
              
In support of the above statement a top member of the Board contended 
that: 
“It (the NCDF) is for use in the oil and gas business around the stakeholders, it is a 
stakeholders’ fund. The Board could better be described as a custodian of that 
fund.... We are only allowed to use that fund to an extent granted to us by the Act. 
And even as that you need the express permission of the National Assembly, so the 
basic issue is with the administration of the fund. To the best of my knowledge the 
necessary procedures have been drawn up, agreements have been reached by 
various stakeholders. Stakeholders have engaged some fund administrators which 
you could go further to know.... I know at the level of the Board we have the power 
to key in to create some projects. Like we talk of pipe-mill project which a Chinese 
consortium is interested in coming down to Nigeria to do. To the extent of what the 
law allowed us to do we are getting to that level”.        [IPG03] 
 
From the stakeholders’ observations above it can be shown that the Board 
was willing to be transparent in the custody and disbursement of the funds 
from the NCDF. In spite of this effort another informant from the IOC 
argued that:  
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“The level of disclosure is zero. ... what is going on there is not known to the 
operators. We don’t know the balances, we don’t know how much was disbursed, 
how much came in, we don’t know”.     [IPI01] 
             
The above situation has raised more stakeholders’ concern as another IOC 
member stated that: 
“Yeh, stakeholders have been asking how far has the fund been used to support 
(the) in-country capacity development and how far that has been reported. These 
monies are from invoices from work done by local oil companies and most of these 
companies are in need of funds to build capacity and buy equipment that will enable 
them (to) employ more people, compete for bigger jobs and actually increase our 
local content levels.”          [IPI02]   
               
The perceived stringent measures taken by the Board in allowing access to 
the funds may not be unconnected with one manager’s opinion that: 
“May be they (the Board) don’t want it to be a fund that you can just go and collect 
your share as a national cake. The rules have been stringent.... PETAN companies 
that tried to access the fund.... it’s been difficult.. but they have been able to access 
it. So of course what they provide is 30% guarantee and you pass through the 
normal procedure which is also very stringent. But I believe with time some of the 
bottlenecks should be removed”.      [IPL02] 
                
An industry insider and one of those controlling the funds made some 
clarifications on the modalities of reporting the Board’s financial records 
including all receipts to, and disbursements from the fund. He stated thus:   
“There are two methods now (for reporting). One is to report to our ministry. So 
every month we render accounts of our expenditures, the budget approval and also 
the NCDF. So we report these to the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources. The 
second one is we report to the National Assembly – that is on request. So National 
Assembly can write to us and ask us to supply them some information on our budget 
performance for the year. So we now tell them how much we have received from 
govt, how much we spent”. 
 
In contrast to stakeholders’ understanding of some sections of the NOGICD 
Act (2010) that mandates the Board to prepare and maintain annual 
audited accounts, the informant claimed that the Board had only 
discretionary but not legal mandate to make such disclosure public:  
“We don’t have legal obligation to render financial performance to other 
stakeholders. However, we have constituted Nigerian Content Development Fund 
Advisory Committee. The committee advises us on how to go about expenditures on 
NCDF alone. You know it is a contribution from the industry of 1% of all upstream 
contracts. It is because it is an industry fund we have established this committee. So 
we meet every quarter to discuss the NCDF expenditure”.     [IPG01] 
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In support of the above submission, another official from the regulator 
supported the position of the Board: 
“Any agency that is responsible for collecting any money meant to be for (the) 
government as revenue, that must be declared to the National Assembly and they 
must say this is what we generate, this is what we are going to spend, and this is 
what will go to the treasury of government. So the level of disclosure is in the public 
domain. That is why you can hardly see a report published by NCDMB on their 
income and expenditure as it is; because they do it annually through the budget 
office, through National Assembly, so the documents are there. That is how it is 
arranged. That’s the law”. 
 
On commenting on the issue of the preparation of annual financial reports 
by the Board, the respondent maintained his position as he insisted that: 
“Am, the Act says that the Board needs to publish a financial report. There is no govt 
organization in Nigeria that do not submit its budget to the National Assembly, and 
budget to National Assembly is a public document when it is approved...... So you 
cannot charge them (the Board), because they submit their budget to public domain 
to assess their performance. So the level of disclosure is like any other govt 
organizations”.              [IPG02] 
 
Countering the above views that put a limit on the Board’s financial 
disclosure responsibility, an activist made the following observation making 
a case for the roles of civil society in the accountability of government 
agencies: 
“So, although the National Assembly has its own role to play, civil society also has its 
own role to play in accessing information. From our own part, we have requested for 
information on this (i.e., the NCDF) and the Board has not been forthcoming to 
provide information.  So whether or not it is (the revenue) allocated by the govt or 
generated internally, they have a duty to stakeholders and the general public to 
make that information available based on the provisions of law”.          [IPC02] 
        
But another civil society member overseeing the functions of the legislators 
though showing some level of satisfaction with the insufficient verbal 
disclosure summaries of the Board, also expressed some reservations and 
insisted that: 
“The NCDMB does disclose its financial performance to the public. As of 2013 at 
the Practical Nigerian Content Workshop, it was disclosed by the Executive Secretary 
of the Board that the funds were totaling $350million and were already being 
accessed by reputable indigenous service companies, providing access to single digit 
interest rate and aiding the attainment of local capacity. Aside this, the NCDMB has 
yet to make public relevant data of the local content development, its relationship 
with the IOCs nor its non-financial performance”.       [IPC03] 
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Another local operator with somehow similar view asserted that: 
“Well, the Board as much as possible has been transparent.... From what has been 
published they have been transparent... (but) it (implementation) has not been as 
smooth as expected.”            [IPL02]
         
 
On the Board’s reluctance to adequately disclose certain information one 
activist alleged that: 
“In terms of financial transparency the NCDMB’s contention is that disclosing 
information may harm the interest of leading International Oil Companies”. 
               [IPC02] 
 
8.4.2 Honesty and Professionalism 
 
Within the empirical data some interesting themes – honesty and 
professionalism – that were not part of the conceptual framework have 
emerged. These concepts have shown relevance to the NCDMB’s financial 
accountability as will be presented. A civil society member expressed high 
expectation of the Board as he stated that: 
 “...the NCDMB upholds the core values of transparency, professionalism, honesty 
and hard work from collecting the 1% from upstream contracts which constitutes the 
fund, to disbursing the funds.”       [IPC03] 
 
Hence, an IOC member urged the Board to live up to its expectation: 
“We think that the fund should be more actively utilised for the purpose (which) it 
was meant for – development of local content. We need to see more activity in that 
area. Because it is not just accumulating fund without using them for what they are 
needed for (sic)”.       [IPI01] 
                    
A member of the Board showed the need for caution and professionalism in 
managing the funds and mentioned that: 
“You know issues of fund administration you don’t rush it; you must be guided by 
the rules”.         [IPG03] 
                   
8.4.3 Monitoring, Auditing and Verification of Financial and non-
Financial Performance 
 
Stakeholders have indicated the relevance of the application of monitoring, 
auditing and verification exercises in the Board’s financial activities and 
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processes. An insider commented on some of the Board’s monitoring 
engagements: 
“So the Board has access to 30% (of the NCDF) for specific type of intervention at 
the level of the Board; the remaining 70% involves the stakeholders. It is for loan 
guarantees. For example, you have a platform to build, you don’t have the 
wherewithal, but you have the brain, you have the facility, you can access the fund, 
it is like a guarantee fund. You go to your bank to give you the loan for that purpose, 
and this fund is meant to guarantee you, and the Board will now monitor how you go 
about using that facility. What is very important is the level of relationship between 
the administrators of the fund that is the BGL and UBA with your bank. So 
management of the fund is a shared responsibility between NCDMB and the fund 
managers because you don’t give somebody an assignment and you don’t follow it 
up.”                     [IPG03] 
 
Considering the monitoring arrangement and other efforts of the Board to 
safeguard the funds, a local content manager in one of the IOCs submitted 
that: 
“So, our expectation is that at this point there need to be a very clear auditable 
process known to all through which we can determine the companies that will be 
supported with these funds, and when they are supported we (should) know, and we 
can also track the jobs they created and other things”.     [IPI02]
             
 
Instead of living up to the above stakeholders’ expectations an informant 
commented that: 
“...the Board as said earlier simply declared that (it) is doing well, without any 
evidence or independent assessment or any form of verification”.   [IPC02]
          
8.4.4 Stakeholder Engagement 
  
The final theme under this part is engagement with industry stakeholders to 
achieve successful local content. As has been seen from the preceding 
discussion, all stakeholders’ eyes were on the NCDF, which may not be 
enough to go round given the industry needs. An IOC official revealed an 
alternative arrangement for securing funds to supplement the NCDF:  
 “So in terms of financing, in combination with the fund (i.e., the NCDF), the IOCs 
themselves have collaborated with Nigerian banks to set up traditional funding from 
banks. They are (also) looking at venture capital, they are looking at trade credit 
from foreign partners, they are looking at offshore export financing scheme like the 
UKEF (UK Export Finance) from which some Nigerian companies are benefiting. So 
it’s a combination including NCDF. The funds required to build capacity is huge, so 
every Naira, Kobo or Dollar helps”.          [IPI02] 
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Table 8.3 Summary of Interviews on the NCDMB’s Financial Accountability 
Research Question: What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s financial 
accountability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
 
Participants Major themes 
IPC03, IPI01, IPI02, 
IPG03, IPG01, IPC02, 
IPG02, IPL02, IPC02, 
IPI01, IPC03, IPI02,  
 
        Determinants of NCDMB’s financial accountability: 
 
 Transparency and accessibility of financial information 
 Honesty and professionalism 
 Monitoring, auditing and verification of financial and 
non-financial performance 
 Stakeholder engagement 
Source: Author from field survey 
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8.5 Analysis of Stakeholders’ Perceptions of Compliance with the 
Provision of the First Consideration for the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Firms in the Award of Petroleum Contracts, Licenses, Procurement 
of Materials, Employment, and Technology Transfer 
 
This section assessed the implementation of one of the basic foundations of 
the local content policy in Nigeria that is, giving first and preferential 
consideration for the local firms in the award of oil license and contracts. 
Some themes were generated from the data and discussed in the following 
sections. 
  
8.5.1 Effective Enforcement and Compliance Mechanisms 
 
Some stakeholders have expressed their contentment with the manner in 
which the Board discharges its monitoring and enforcement duties which in 
their opinion, has led to so many achievements in the implementation of 
local content. An IOC representative stated in favour of the policy:  
 
“Yes, there is more patronage of local companies for their goods and services more 
than pre-Act. Obviously there has been significant uptake... all operators have been 
considerate in implementation, they give first consideration to local suppliers...”.
                    [IPI01] 
 
A CEO of a local oil firm although without any concrete evidence believed 
that the implementation was going in the proper direction when he 
mentioned that: 
“Well, there is no empirical data to support this. I cannot say I have any data, but, 
what I can tell you, I see more local companies developing capacities and getting 
involved in areas that they used not to.”        [IPL01]
             
A regulator, however, showed the Board’s readiness to work by the rules 
and enforce the Nigerian content requirements in all contracts including the 
award of upstream licenses: 
“......there is no license round to date ... What happened was that there was a move 
in 2013 although it wasn’t concluded but we were asked to submit Nigerian content 
requirements. So every bidding round has a Nigerian content requirement where we 
say the prospective operator should prepare a Nigerian content plan at (the) 
exploration stage, at field development stage and at production stage. So we have 
that in place and the DPR and the Ministry of Petroleum are the ones to conclude the 
bid rounds. So they are now incorporating the Nigerian content requirements into 
the overall proposal for the bidders. Any time they want the bid round, when 
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submission have been received they (will) call us to look at the Nigerian content 
section only and tell them the bidders that have met (sic) the Nigerian content 
requirements and they will now add it to the overall score for the bidder, and then 
they will know the bidder that is successful”.   
 
The official went on to elaborate on the Board’s controversial claims of 
creating tens of thousands of new jobs as a result of proper management of 
local content policy. He submitted that:   
“.... you know this is a productive industry, so when we calculate employment we 
are talking about..., for every year that somebody survives in the industry it counts. 
Because, in terms of the accounting productivity, if there is no job the business 
owners have no business to pay you in the employment. So when we are calculating 
our own employment statistics, we are saying these are jobs retained, and jobs 
added. Because it is productive employment; it is not that sort of employment when 
you are coming today you say I have thirty-five years to spend. So the moment 
there is no work, it is unemployment. So we count these jobs every year to know 
whether we are creating employment or not. And that is how we come with our 
employment figures”.             [IPG01] 
 
Some problems were also identified from the empirical data which are 
presented below. 
 
8.5.2 Vested Interest, Corruption and non-Disclose of Beneficial 
Owners of Oil Companies 
 
Apart from the purported achievements mentioned above, stakeholders 
have also identified several issues believed to have inhibited the 
effectiveness of local content policy in the Nigerian petroleum sector. An 
official from the regulators expressed a lack of confidence in the whole 
process and gave a dual opinion on the practical applications of the ‘first 
and preferential consideration’ rule. He said: 
“Well, it is yes and no. Yes, some companies do have preferential treatment, some 
don’t have... So there is issue of vested interest, there is issue of politics- elements 
of nepotism, elements of corruption ...”.                     [IPG02]
          
A number of stakeholders argued that in spite of the existence of the law 
some companies have been manipulating the policies for their selfish 
interest. One of them expressed as follows: 
 
“Well, the law is there but a lot of companies both operators and service companies 
appear to be circumventing that law. For instance, there is a law that says a 
particular kind of service as long as it’s being done on land or in the swamp must be 
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awarded to Nigerian companies; if it is offshore or deep offshore it is given to 
multinational companies. What happens is that these multinational companies they 
team up with Nigerian companies that do not have the capacity as such, and then 
they now win the work in the name of the Nigerian company and the Nigerian 
company on the back end allows them to do the work. So it’s all circumvention”.  
               [IPL03] 
 
Amidst this controversy an official supported a claim made by the Minister 
of Petroleum Resources in the national dailies that local firms have won 
most of the contracts in the industry: 
“Ah, when the Minister talked about 80% of oil contracts awarded to Nigerian 
companies, that is a major achievement on the older position of less than 15%. That 
80% is just saying that ok Abdul Malik & Co. won this contract, Usman & Co. won 
this contract, Joseph & Co. won this, and they are all Nigerian companies. That’s the 
first level. The second level is that these contracts that are won by Nigerian 
companies are they really delivered in Nigeria? That’s where you will begin to see 
the real value creation; and that’s where our robust monitoring and evaluation 
system comes into play. So it’s one thing to award contracts to Nigerian companies, 
it’s another thing for the Nigerian company to deliver the contract using Nigerian 
resources. So we have put in place an M & E (Monitoring & Evaluation) system that 
ensures that contracts awarded to Nigerians with commitment to deliver in Nigeria 
are actually delivered in Nigeria”.          [IPG01] 
 
Rejecting the above comment, and challenging the non-disclosure of the 
actual owners of some oil firms, a civil society advocate argued that: 
 “That report (i.e., the Minister’s evidence) may not be the true reflection of what is 
on ground, it is misleading. ... who are the beneficial owners of the companies? 
That’s the issue... If the beneficial owners are not Nigerians, I think it is a form of 
grand deception”.       [IPC02] 
                
The beneficial ownership controversy has attracted a global attention with 
the issue being discussed at an international forum. A witness who attended 
the meeting reported thus: 
“At the end of the EITI meeting in Australia, some radical decisions were taken and 
(it was) expected that countries incorporate them into their EITI reporting system. 
The first one is the issue of beneficial ownership (of oil companies). It is about 
disclosing the identity of those behind the reporting company under the EITI law. It 
will reveal the identities of those behind the oil companies that are currently 
operating including the indigenous ones. Even where ownership of some of these 
companies has changed hands for a period of time, how this change of ownership 
occurs, from whom to whom, will also be disclosed. So that will help the issue of 
indigenous participation”.                      [IPC01] 
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8.5.3 Financial and Technological Constraints 
 
Another inhibitor of local content success was claimed to be the lack of 
sufficient capital to finance projects by small and medium local oil firms. An 
activist argued that: 
“(the) Major reason is (the) inability of our banks to lend the needed fund that is 
required for oil and gas projects. Everybody is aware that oil and gas projects 
require quite a lot.  Despite all the merger(s) they have done between 2005 and 
2006 up to the moment, our banks are still not capable to mobilize the capital that is 
required. So, local companies link up with some Western companies who will bring in 
money and get the jobs through the locals in the name of local participation”.       
               [IPC01] 
 
Another activist also supported the funding issue and added that: 
“These issues (funding) contribute to a general lack of independence in (sic) regard 
to the local companies as they often have to rely on other foreign companies for 
equipment, technical support and partnership in executing their contracts. This, in 
turn, most a times leads to the entire projects being executed in foreign domain 
thereby limiting the objective of the local content, which is to engender indigenous 
capacity building, develop the local supply chain as well as the use of local resources 
and manpower.”             [IPC03] 
 
Table 8.4 Summary of Interview on First Consideration for the Nigerian 
Firms   
Research Questions: What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s ability 
to enforce the provisions of the ‘first consideration’ to Nigerian oil and gas firms in the award 
of petroleum contracts, licenses, employment, procurement of materials, and technology 
transfer?   
Participants Major themes 
IPG02, IPL03, IPI01, 
IPL01, IPG01, IPC02, 
IPC01, IPG01, IPC01, 
IPC03, IPG01 
Factors affecting compliance with the ‘first 
consideration’ rules: 
 
 Effective enforcement and compliance mechanisms 
 Vested interest, corruption and non-disclose of 
beneficial owners of oil companies 
 Financial and technological constraints 
Source: Author from Field Study 
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8.6 Analysis of Stakeholders’ Perceptions of the Awareness and 
Effectiveness of the NCDMB’s Programmes 
 
This section examines the perceptions of whether some programmes 
initiated by the Board are effective so far. These are the major programmes 
which are the Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy (ORAS), Marine Vessel 
Ownership Strategy (MAVOS) and Equipment Component Manufacturing 
Initiative (ECMI). Important themes were found within the available data 
and presented below.  
 
8.6.1 Cooperation and Support  
 
As a result of the perceived enforcement capacity and support of the 
NCDMB as well as the cooperation experienced from stakeholders, it was 
identified by some commentators that the three NCDMB’s programmes 
were recording success. One participant stated that:    
“Ah, these three programmes are working well; if they have not achieved significant 
results it is just because of lack of willingness from NCDBM to implement these 
strategies or lack of co-operation from the vendors...Like marine vessel, many 
Nigerian companies now own marine vessels and are still acquiring vessels to be 
deployed to oil and gas business. And, equally equipment, you see a lot of 
companies establishing manufacturing facilities to meet increased demand. So they 
are working and working well.”                 [IPI01] 
 
Another informant who supported the above assertion also emphasized 
support as a major factor for success:  
“The Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy of the NCDMB is progressively attaining its 
desired outcome which is to encourage the use of Nigerian contractors owning their 
own equipment and technology. Therefore, more and more indigenous offshore rig 
companies are obtaining and installing rigs and establishing relationships of support 
with relevant foreign companies who also are utilizing the potential present in the 
Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy to help develop indigenous capacity. The 
Equipment Component Manufacturing Initiative is also progressively gaining 
momentum as a 2 pronged approach involving the Macro production involving 
products such as (line pipes, umbilical’s, pumps etc) and Micro production involving 
products such as (flanges, chemicals, PPEs, bolts & nuts etc) has been adopted to 
encourage manufacturing culture and enhance the use of made in Nigeria goods in 
the oil and gas sector.”                [IPC03] 
 
Two unionists admitted that some of the programmes have yielded results 
while some have not. One of them attributed some of the success to the 
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IOCs’ divestment and relinquishment of some oilfields that supported the 
local firms: 
“The last one (ECMI) is the one that seems to be making the impact...  we have 
companies that have started making these local inputs that the oil companies use for 
pipeline and stuff like that. But as for rig acquisition, I’m not too sure, but I know 
that there has been a lot of buying-over from some of these territorial fields that 
were divested by some of these major oil companies to indigenous companies...”
                     [IPT01] 
The other stated that: 
“The rig ownership may not be as effective...(but) the marine ownership is effective; 
I give it pass mark...”            [IPT02] 
             
8.6.2 Asset Ownership Strategies 
 
NCDMB was said to be strategizing to boost asset ownership of oil firms in 
order to meet the mandatory asset requirements of the law. These assets 
involve the drilling rigs and the marine vessels. A stakeholder from the civil 
society group showed lack of full awareness of these programmes and 
complained that: 
 “In terms of Marine Vessels Ownership Strategy of the Nigerian Content Board I 
think that at the civil society level, at the level of Nigerian Indigenous Ship Owners 
Association, they know little or next to nothing about it because they are yet to be 
properly informed or aware of the strategy in that line. For the Offshore Rig 
Acquisition Strategy ... there is little information available, and I am not aware of 
any company that benefitted directly from that. In terms of Equipment Component 
Manufacturing I am aware that the Board is setting an industrial park to encourage 
alliance between OEM that is, Original Equipment Manufacturer and local companies 
....”               [IPC02] 
 
 
Another activist considered the asset ownership targets set by the Board as 
too ambitious, unrealistic and unattainable. He doubted that: 
“...every company that operates in Nigeria is expected to have up to 50% local 
ownership (of assets) by 2015. Given the recent evaluation or appraisal actually 
conducted by the Board, up to March this year (2014) it is obvious that the 
indigenous ownership (of assets) only stand at the level of 10%, and yet you are 
saying you want to reach 50% by 2015. And, on the basis of this, the Board is 
actually threatening to apply sanctions. Put it together, the possibility of stopping 
these firms from taking up contracts if they don’t get this process straight now. So if 
between 2010 and now we can just move up to the level of 10%, there is no miracle 
we can do to take us to 50% by next year”.           [IPC01] 
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On making a clarification on the above matter, an official of the Board 
argued that all arrangements were made to make the ownership procedure 
easier and less challenging to local oil firms. He stated that: 
“On the contrary, ours (policy) was even conceptualised in the full recognition of the 
fact that it is a very expensive venture. So we did not deceive ourselves to say 
Nigerians must own oil rigs, (rather), we said Nigerians should be co-owners of rigs. 
You are talking about a $700 million investment, and you are talking about a 
sophisticated knowledge requirement, you understand? So we said that Nigerians 
should co-own the rigs, but the Nigerian entity should be seen as the face of the 
transaction, aha. So, ORAS is saying let Nigerians start by owning 10%, 20%, 
etcetera, of rigs. So it’s easier for Nigerians to pay $70 million to have 10% stake in 
a rig than expecting (them) to go and pay $700 million”.  
 
This arrangement seems to be working well as the respondent continued 
to mention some progress: 
“As at the last count, the rig count, we discovered that at least twenty percent of 
offshore rigs now have that co-ownership between Nigerians and offshore rig owners 
(foreigners). And for the land and swamp rigs we have over eighty percent wholly 
owned by Nigerians, wholly-owned (emphasis) and the remaining twenty percent are 
co-owned. So that’s the extent we have gone in ORAS”.        [IPG01] 
            
Moving further, the same respondent progressed to the higher level, that is, 
the level of manufacturing of some of these assets in-country. He 
mentioned that: 
“Having achieved that (i.e., vessel ownership) in 2015, we are moving to the next 
horizon. We are promoting construction of marine vessels because we have sufficient 
Nigerian-owned vessels now. We have started thinking of actually making sure that 
those new vessels that are going to be used are constructed in Nigerian yard. So 
very soon you will see an advert from us that we are only going to support vessels 
that are constructed in Nigeria”.             [IPG01] 
              
8.6.3 Cost Effectiveness of Local Production of Oil and Gas Assets 
 
In relation to the manufacturing aspect of local content, it was opined that 
cost-effectiveness and comparative advantage should be considered. The 
information given by the NCDMB’s official about the Board’s intention to go 
into the manufacturing of marine vessels may not be feasible. A top IOC 
official logically concluded that thinking of producing everything locally may 
not always be in the best interest of the economy as he stated thus: 
“When we talk of local content it does not mean you must manufacture or produce 
everything you need within that local environment. No, you can look for areas where 
you have comparative advantage, areas where you can do that in a way that is cost-
effective and efficient. You also have to look at all opportunities you have, assess 
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your gaps, and go for the ones that give you the most value and least cost.” 
                 [IPI02]
          
Although it may not be cost-effective or even possible to use local firms to 
locally produce everything as observed by the above respondent, it was 
also observed that through the ECMI programme of the NCDMB the 
economy would benefit from localisation of manufacturing activities by the 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) themselves. This was seen to 
have crippling effects on the IOCs’ transfer pricing manoeuvres. An African 
Coordinator of the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) 
contended that: 
“... I strongly think at the moment we still don’t have the technical knowledge 
required. So we always encourage these companies to come and set up here so as to 
be able to have close monitoring of the industry and deal with the issue of transfer 
pricing. What this really makes us to achieve is addressing transfer pricing issue 
where companies go out there and put a huge price on what is spent in buying this 
equipment. So if you have them here, and you are able to follow up with them, then 
we will be able to curtail some of the over-blown figures put on the cost of these 
equipment”.                         [IPC01] 
 
Even as presented by the above participant that foreign manufacturers 
could be invited to set up businesses, a local operator cited other 
fundamental bottleneck that must be taken into consideration before 
embarking on that mission: 
“Like in manufacturing, we have local challenges; top challenges of power (i.e., 
electricity) and others. So when you talk of manufacturing.... if the cost of 
manufacturing is higher than the cost of importation, then the aim will be 
defeated...”.                  [IPL02] 
       
8.6.4 Fronting  
 
Not only lack of technology or cost considerations may prevent the local 
manufacturing of the oil and gas assets, but fronting and corruption are 
other major inhibitors. An industry insider made a startling revelation when 
he said that: 
“....  all the vessels being assembled in Nigeria are not fabricated in Nigeria. You get 
the metals together, you make the cones somewhere, you bring them, you weld 
them together –it is actually not made in Nigeria, but assembled in Nigeria. Are we 
getting the value? The real value is (with) the person that actually produced the 
parts and exported them. Because (it is) in the production (activities) that you get 
more employment, more technology, more money, more, more, more. So it has to 
be two ways - as you are managing the assembly line the production line (also) 
needs to be looked into... “. 
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On the offshore rigs, the informant continued to demonstrate the 
devastating effects of fronting: 
”It’s good to have Nigerian companies owning oil rigs but the foreign companies that 
own these rigs..., when this policy is about to set they set up local companies. From 
behind they own them, you understand, and they brought Nigerians to manage 
them. (Again), if that rig owned by Nigerians gets spoilt, there is no industry that 
could come and comfortably get all the physical components and fix it. Everything is 
foreign, and you get it at high cost”.    
 
The issue did not stop only to marine vessels and offshore drilling rigs. The 
participant talked about a general area of the oil and gas assets: 
 “... it happens with (the) engineering houses, design houses. When they 
(regulators) say oh, Nigerian companies should be designing, they (foreign 
companies) get Nigerians (and) trained them; but from the back door, they own the 
companies because your own is (just) to see everything Nigerian. But they own the 
companies; they provide all the money”.           [IPG02]   
       
8.6.5 Enforcement 
 
Having observed the pros and cons of owning and local manufacturing of 
marine vessels, offshore rigs and similar assets, stakeholders also showed 
concern about the implementation of these requirements. For this purpose, 
the theme ‘enforcement’ emerged. A respondent from a local company 
complaint that: 
“I think they are very good initiatives. I think the challenge is implementation. And I 
know a couple of people (firms) who have even acquired vessels but those vessels 
are not able to get job. I think the programme should be thought through; it is not 
just acquiring vessels or manufacturing....”        [IPL02]
             
On the above comment, the officer of the Board submitted that: 
“... if you invest in acquiring a marine vessel the procedure allows you to get first 
consideration, which is category “A”. So when there is a need for marine vessels 
those that are in category ‘A’ will be given first consideration. We have achieved 
significant progress in that space. From the last quarter three 2014 it was ...49% of 
were in category “A” which means they belong to Nigerians”.   [IPG01] 
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Table 8. 5: Summary of Interview on Local Content Programmes 
Research Question: What is the extent of stakeholders’ awareness with and the effectiveness 
of NCDMB’s local content programmes? 
Participants Major themes 
IPG02, IPI01, IPG01, 
IPC02, IPC01, IPC03, 
IPG01, IPI02, IPT01, 
IPT02, IPL02 
Determinants of the effectiveness of local content 
programmes: 
 Cooperation and support  
 Asset ownership strategies 
 Cost effectiveness of local production of oil and gas 
assets 
 Fronting 
 Enforcement 
Source: Author 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
The chapter presented and analysed the second data set in the study’s 
mixed-methods design. Part of the qualitative analysis was conducted to 
answer some exploratory research questions while the other part was to 
support or oppose quantitative results obtained from the analysis in the 
previous chapter. The analysis in this chapter and its discussion in chapter 
ten were all guided by subjectivist ontology, interpretive epistemology 
within the interpretive and critical accounting paradigms. The analysis 
found divergent responses on several issues presented to stakeholders. 
Chapter ten was designed to discuss and make sense of these issues. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Presentation of Content Analysis Results of the Sustainability and 
Integrated Annual Financial Reports 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the results of the secondary data drawn 
from the sustainability and integrated annual financial reports of the 
selected IOCs using the mechanistic content analysis procedure based on 
the GRI and the IPIECA sustainability reporting guidelines. As stated in the 
earlier chapters, the study is investigating the hard and the soft 
accountability practices of the two major accountors (NCDMB and IOCs) in 
the implementation of local content policy in the Nigerian oil and gas sector. 
The study has reviewed the literature and the legal documents and 
extracted the sections guiding the mandatory local content accountability of 
both the NCDMB (accountability for enforcement) and the IOCs 
(accountability for compliance). The present chapter aimed to present the 
soft and voluntary accountability of the IOCs in reporting local content 
sustainability in their integrated annual financial or stand-alone 
sustainability reports. Since there is no specific benchmark to measure 
whether the IOCs react to the Nigerian local content law in their global 
reporting, the study chooses to compare the pre- and post- local content 
reporting levels of these corporations. Hence, the need for the application of 
a disclosure index as well as the paired-samples t-test.  
  
9.2 Analysis of Sustainability Reports of the Five Major IOCs 
Operating in Nigeria 
 
This section takes a firm-level approach and analyses the sustainability 
reports of the five major IOCs operating in Nigeria using the mechanistic 
content analysis methodology. The local content information contained in 
the sustainability reports was prepared by the selected IOCs with a 
reflection on the IFRS 8 and the IAS 21 (see Section 3.8). The rationale for 
this analysis is to ascertain the level of voluntary accountability of the 
selected firms by tracing the evidence of their extent and trends of local 
208 
content sustainability disclosure practices. A total of fifty (50) 
sustainability/integrated annual financial reports of the selected IOCs were 
analysed to answer and test one research question and one hypothesis. 
Firstly, a disclosure index for the periods 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 is 
calculated using the unweighted52 disclosure item approach to answering 
the following research question: 
To what extent do the IOCs voluntarily disclose and report local content 
sustainability indicators in their global sustainability reports before and 
after the creation of the Nigerian local content law?  
To answer this research question, Table 9.1 below presented the local 
content sustainability disclosure indices for the two periods (2005-2009 and 
2010-2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Disclosure index is unweighted if it only considers the presence and not the value or importance of an item of 
information. It treats each item with the same degree of importance. See for instance, Tai et al., (1990) and Chen 
and Jaggi (2000).  
209 
Table 9.1: Computation of Unweighted Local Content Sustainability Disclosure Index of the Five Major IOCs in Nigeria 
(2005-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Source: Sustainability/integrated annual financial report
Local Content 
Sust. Indicators  
2005-2009 2010-2014 
Chevron  Shell  ExMobil  Eni  Total  G. Total Chevron  Shell  ExMobil  Eni  Total  G.Total 
SE5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EC5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EC9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
EC6/SE6 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 4 
DMA/SE7 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 4 
SE5 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 
EC5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC9 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 
EC6/SE6 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 0 0 3 
DMA/SE7 1 1 1 1 0 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
SE5 0 0 1 1 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 2 
EC5 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC9 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 
EC6/SE6 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 0 1 4 
DMA/SE7 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 
SE5 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 
EC5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC9 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 
EC6/SE6 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 3 
DMA/SE7 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 1 3 
SE5 1 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 4 
EC5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EC9 0 1 1 1 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 
EC6/SE6 1 1 1 1 1 5 0 1 1 0 1 3 
DMA/SE7 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Total Disclosures 57  56 
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To compute the disclosure index, the following formula is adopted (Chavent 
et al. 2006): 
Disclosure Index (di) = actual disclosure/total possible disclosure, 
Thus: 
 [∑ 𝐝𝐢𝐦𝐢=𝟏 / ∑ 𝐝𝐢]
𝐧
=𝟏
           
d = 1 where item i is disclosed otherwise, 0;  
m = no. of items disclosed; 
n = maximum no. of possible item disclosures  
 
Therefore,  
-For the period 2005-2009 di = 57/125 = 0.456 or 0.46 approx. 
-For the period 2010-2014 di = 56/125 = 0.448 or 0.45 approx. 
 
It is clear from Table 9.1 above that there is little difference between the 
two periods. That is, the disclosure index for 2005-2009 is 0.46 (slightly 
higher) than 0.45 index for 2010-2014 accounting periods. A point that 
should be emphasised is that the disclosure index only shows whether an 
item is disclosed or not, and not the volume of its disclosure. Having 
calculated the unweighted disclosure index for the two periods, the next 
task is to use the volumetric disclosure (volume of disclosure represented 
by the word-count) to determine which between the periods before and 
after the local content law has higher disclosure volume in word count. It 
will also show which among the five GRI/IPIECA items has the highest 
volume of disclosure. To do this, we summed up the disclosure volumes of 
the items involved (SE5, EC5, EC9, EC6/SE6 and DMA/SE7) to get the total 
disclosure for each item before and after the NOGICD Act. The results are 
presented in Table 9.2 and the two pie-charts in Figures 28 and 29 below. 
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Table 9.2: Item-level Disclosure 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 
Disclosure Items 2005-2009 (word count) 2010-2014 (word count) 
SE5 319 259 
EC5 39 13 
EC9 275 623 
EC6/SE6 1811 1247 
DMA/SE7 808 1395 
Total (words) 3252 3537 
Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
SE5=Local content policies; EC5=Local wages; EC6/SE6=Local hiring/hiring practices; 
EC9=Local procurement (monetary and non-monetary); DMA/SE7=Local procurement 
practices/supplier development activities, programmes 
 
 
The following pie-charts exhibit the above computation. 
Figure 28 and 29: Local Content Sustainability Reporting Levels  
     
 
 Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
SE5=Local content policies; EC5=Local wages; EC6/SE6=Local hiring/hiring practices; 
EC9=Local procurement (monetary and non-monetary); DMA/SE7=Local procurement 
practices/supplier development activities and programmes 
 
The results from Figures 28 and 29 above are the reflection of our 
discussion in Section 2.9 where the study presented and content analysed 
the local content requirements contained in the Model Petroleum Contracts 
of several oil-producing countries. Moreover, an analysis was also made 
using the volumetric content analysis (volume of disclosure using the word-
count) to further determine the changes in local content sustainability 
reporting by the selected IOCs in Nigeria. This result will test the following 
research hypothesis: 
SE5
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H0 There is no significant difference in the volumetric local content 
sustainability disclosure of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before and 
after the creation of the Nigerian local content law. 
H1 There is significant difference in the volumes of local content 
sustainability disclosure of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before and 
after the creation of the Nigerian local content law. 
 
To conduct this assessment, a t-test based on the volumetric data obtained 
from the content analysis of the sustainability reports of the IOCs was 
applied. The analysis started with the descriptive before the inferential 
statistics as presented below. 
 
9.3 Descriptive Statistics of Volumetric Local Content Sustainability 
Disclosure 
 
The first stage of this section is to present the descriptive statistics of the 
two sets of data (local content sustainability before and after the NOGICD 
Act) as in Table 9.3 below. 
 
Table 9.3: Descriptive Statistics of Local Content Sustainability Data 
 N Minim
um 
Maximu
m 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statist
ic 
Statist
ic 
Statistic
s 
Statist
ic 
Statistic
s 
Statist
ic 
Std. 
Error 
Statisti
c 
Std. 
Error 
locsus_
before 
125 0 349 27.88 58.365 3.71
1 
.217 15.70
2 
.430 
locsus_
after 
125 0 346 31.93 57.887 2.85
9 
.217 9.741 .430 
Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
locsusbefore=local content sustainability before NOGICD Act; locsusafter=local 
content sustainability after NOGICD Act 
 
From the above table, the values of skewness of 3.711 and 2.859 (both 
positive) for the before and the after periods respectively indicated that the 
data was not normally distributed in both cases. The skewness values were 
also more than twice their respective standard error values and cannot, 
therefore, be tolerated as they are (Pallant, 2007). The preliminary 
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normality test conducted on the data revealed the results in Table 9.4 
below. 
 
Table 9.4: Normality Tests of Local Content Sustainability Data 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistics Df Sig. Statistics df Sig. 
locsus_before .316 125 .000 .519 125 .000 
locsus_after .291 125 .000 .611 125 .000 
Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
locsusbefore=local content sustainability before NOGICD Act; locsusafter=local content 
sustainability after NOGICD Act 
 
The results of the above normality tests showed that both Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk were significant (p<.05), indicating a total 
departure from normality. These results were supported by the values of 
skewness and the standard error of skewness in Table 9.3 above. In order 
to satisfy the normality assumption, the data was checked again and some 
outliers53 were detected and treated accordingly (Cousineau and Chartier, 
2010). A further logarithmic transformation was conducted on the data. 
Since our data contains zero values the procedure involved an addition of 
‘1’ to the values during the transformation of the data, thus: log10 
(locsus_before+1) and log10 (locsus_after+1) = loglocsus_before and 
loglocsus_after. Table 9.5 below presented the new descriptive statistics of 
the transformed data. 
 
Table 9.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Log-Transformed Local Content 
Sustainability Data 
 N Minim
um 
Maximu
m 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statist
ic 
Statist
ic 
Statistic
s 
Statist
ic 
Statistic
s 
Statist
ic 
Std. 
Error 
Statisti
c 
Std. 
Error 
loglocsu
s_befor
e 
125 .70 2.54 1.587
4 
.42230 .104 .316 .024 .623 
loglocsu
s_after 
125 .23 .55 .4070 .07259 -.369 .316 .075 .623 
Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
locsusbefore=local content sustainability before NOGICD Act; locsusafter=local content 
sustainability after NOGICD Act 
                                                          
53 Outliers are the extreme values (either high or low) that may distort an analysis of data and may increase the 
chances of committing type I or type II errors. Their presence may not allow the application of parametric tests. See 
generally, Zimmerman (1998) and Cousineau and Chartier (2010).  
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The second normality test is performed in the following table. 
 
Table 9.6: Normality Tests of the Log-Transformed Local Content 
Sustainability Data 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistics df Sig. Statistics df Sig. 
loglocsus_before .062 57 .0200 .981 57 .516 
loglocsus_after .072 57 .0200 .975 57 .280 
Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
loglocsus_before=logarithm of the local content sustainability data before the NOGICD Act; 
loglocsus_after=logarithm of the local content sustainability data after the NOGICD Act 
 
The results above showed that the distribution of the data became 
approximately normal after the transformation. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test showed non-significant values of .200 for each of the ‘before’ and the 
‘after’ data indicating normality (i.e., p>.05), and the Shapiro-Wilk test also 
showed non-significant values of .516 for the ‘before’ and .280 for the 
‘after’ data suggesting that the data was normal in both cases (i.e., p>.05). 
Appendix 11a and 11b showed the histogram with the normal distribution 
curve, the Q-Q plot, and the Box-plot for the normality tests of the two data 
sets. The next task is to present the paired-samples t-test results using the 
log-transformed data. Two tables were the most important among the 
tables produced by the SPSS program for this test. These are presented 
below. 
 
9.4 Pooled Paired-Samples t-test  
 
The following tables presented the results of the pooled paired-sampled t-
test conducted by the study to test variations in local content disclosure 
before and after the NOGICT Act 2010.  
Table 9.7: Paired Samples Statistics of the Log-Transformed Local Content 
Sustainability Data 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair 1   loglocsus_before 
             loglocsus_after 
1.5874 
.4070 
.42230 
.07259 
.05594 
.00962 
Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
locsusbefore=local content sustainability before the NOGICD Act; locsusafter=local content 
sustainability after the NOGICD Act 
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Table 9.8 below showed the actual values and significance of the result.  
 
Table 9.8: Paired Samples Test of the Log-Transformed Local Content 
Sustainability Data 
 Paired Differences    
Mean Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
t Df Sig. 
(2-
tailed
) Lower Upper 
loglocsus_before
- 
loglocsus_after 
1.1804
1 
.35026 .0463
9 
1.0874
7 
1.2733
4 
25.44
4 
5
6 
.000 
 Source: Content Analysis Results from Sustainability/Integrated Annual Reports 
locsusbefore=local content sustainability before NOGICD Act; locsusafter=local content 
sustainability after NOGICD Act 
The t value obtained showed a significance level of .000 (p<0.05). After a 
statistical computation of this nature, it was recommended that the ‘effect 
size’ of the differences should also be reported (Vacha-Haase and 
Thompson, 2004). Effect size is a method of quantifying the extent to which 
sample results deviate from the expectations as to differences or 
relationships (Cohen, 1994; Thompson, 2003). The analysis below shows a 
large effect size as the variation between the two periods was also large. 
That is 3252 words for the 2005-2009 period and 3537 words for the 2010-
2014 period.  
The effect size was calculated using the following formula (Pallant, 2007): 
Eta2 =              t2        .                 
 t2 + (N – 1) 
Therefore the effect size = Eta2 =     (25.444)2  
    25.4442 + (57-1)   = 0.92 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the content analysis results of the 10-years 
sustainability/integrated annual financial reports of the five major IOCs that 
are operating in Nigeria. The aim of the analysis is to facilitate the 
answering of two of the study’s research questions on the voluntary local 
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content accountability of the participating IOCs in addition to their 
mandatory accountability of complying with legal provisions of the local 
content law. The analysis started by computing the local content 
sustainability disclosure indices using data covering 2005-2009 and 2010-
2014. The analysis also used the paired-samples t-test on the volumetric 
data of local content sustainability to determine disclosure volumes before 
and after the creation of the local content law to observe any changes or 
impact of the law on voluntary reporting. Interpretations of these results 
are conducted in the following chapter.     
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CHAPTER TEN 
Discussion of Results 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the results of the qualitative and quantitative data 
analysed and presented in chapters 7-9. The intention is to evaluate in a 
less technical way the underlying information contained in the empirical 
results against what is available in the literature. Chapter seven presented 
the results of the structured questionnaires; chapter eight presented the 
interviews conducted with the managers and executives of the oil industry, 
and chapter nine presented the results from the mechanistic content 
analysis conducted on the fifty (50) sustainability reports of the five major 
IOCs operating in Nigeria. This chapter utilizes the convergent mixed-
method design (see chapter six), the stakeholder-accountability framework 
(see chapter five) and the three paradigms of accounting research (chapter 
six) to discuss the information obtained from the three sources of data in 
order to draw valid conclusions. The discussion in this chapter followed the 
order in which the study’s research questions appeared. For the research 
questions that both quantitative and qualitative analyses were conducted, 
discussion of the quantitative results will be presented first and then 
followed by the qualitative one.  
 
10.2 Local Content as a Sustainability Policy  
  
This section adopts the interpretive and critical accounting paradigms to 
discuss the social and environmental consequences of oil and gas 
operations and the relevance of local content sustainability in addressing 
them. The idea of the mainstream paradigm will partially be adopted to look 
into the business-case of local content. From the literature reviewed and 
the theory built in chapter two, there was a cogent theoretical evidence that 
local content and sustainability are connected terms (see Figure 1). 
According to the empirical data which was deductively guided by the 
sustainability theory (chapter two) and presented in Section 8.2, almost all 
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the interview participants were in agreement that local content was a policy 
that relates to sustainability as far as the Nigerian oil and gas industry was 
concerned. This fact is in agreement with the several arguments presented 
in Sections 2.6-2.8. The emergent themes under this section were 
categorised according to the three tenets of sustainability – economic, 
social and environmental.  
Basically, in the ideal situation, in any discussion of sustainability and the 
petroleum activities the bottom-line is that exploration and production 
should bring not only financial benefits to the investors but also a positive 
balance of payment, clean technology, equity, life improvement, as well as 
alleviation of the sufferings of the populace (Olawuyi, 2012). Hence, for 
local content policy to be regarded as a sustainability policy, it has to fulfil 
these conditions. Also, the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 
2011: 19) had required the multinational firms to “contribute to economic, 
environmental and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable 
development” of the host countries. These propositions would serve as the 
litmus test for our empirical evidence to draw conclusions on whether or not 
the Nigerian oil industry stakeholders perceive local content as a 
sustainability policy. 
Consistent with the argument that sustainability involves the concurrent 
pursuit of social equity, economic prosperity and environmental quality 
(Elkington, 2002), the themes identified from the data were: (1) Economic 
growth and the business-case (2) Social stability, and (3) Environmental 
and intergenerational survival. The following sections discuss these themes. 
 
10.2.1 Economic Growth and the Business-case 
 
Analysis has shown that local content is a win-win policy that ensures 
economic prosperity at the national, sub-national (Esteves, 2013; Ovadia, 
2014; Nwapi, 2015), and firm levels. The economic aspect of local content 
is mainly represented by the ownership, taxation and employment variables 
of the second local content model (EY, 2013). The policy strikes a balance 
between the maximization of return to investors and the well-being of the 
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local economy (Ovadia, 2014). All the stakeholders are viewed as 
instrumental to the successful implementation of the policy (Jensen, 2001). 
In this case, local content can be situated within the context of the study’s 
conceptual framework built from the shareholder and the stakeholder 
theories of accountability (Jensen, 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004; Jorg et al., 2004; 
Kaler, 2006). This is why the study had used the middle-of-the-range 
approach that also involves the managerial approach to sustainability 
(Brown and Fraser, 2006).   
 
Empirical data has pinpointed the anecdotal evidence of the economic value 
of local content. Consistent with many views (Nwosu et al., 2006; Ogbodo, 
2008; Heum et al., 2011; Gbegi and Adebisi, 2013; Abdulwahed, 2014; 
Okafor and Aniche, 2014) the policy derives in-country value-addition, job 
creation, wealth generation, foreign exchange improvement, domiciliation 
of technology, and mitigation of the capital and jobs flight which threaten 
Nigeria’s sustainable development efforts. Evidence has further reaffirmed 
the ability of local content to reduce imports and enhance favourable 
balance of payment by localising the major oil and gas activities (WTO and 
UNCTAD, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2014; WTI Advisors, 2013). To show this 
effect, literature had suggested that oil companies should classify their local 
and foreign purchases in their annual financial reports (International 
Accounting and Reporting Issues, 2007, 2008). Evidence of the nature of 
petroleum operations and the associated economic impacts leading to 
resource curse is well documented (Auty, 1990, 1994, 2001, 2008; Karl, 
1997; Ross, 1999; Frynas and Paolo, 2007; Spence, 2011; Pitkin, 2013). 
Thus, consistent with Monday (2015), the stakeholders’ argument that local 
content could lead to wealth creation and economic prosperity may 
effectively help reverse the resource curse symptoms. Another important 
revelation from the empirical data is the belief that local content promotes 
technology transfer and empowers local contractors and suppliers (Alba, 
2009; Tordo, 2010; Olawuyi, 2012; EY, 2014). Moreover, local content was 
indicated to have a positive influence on the expected economic loss which 
might have been occurred as a result of the sabotage and vandalism of oil 
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pipelines, platforms and other facilities due to agitations over perceived 
exclusion from jobs as well as the absence of proper compensation for that 
(Warner, 2011).   
At the firm level, engagement of oil companies in local content assures 
great economic benefits. For example, as one of the elements of the second 
local content model (EY, 2014; see also Section 3.5), empirical evidence 
has indicated that local supplier development could foster reliability, 
efficiency and delivery and reduce the total operating expenditure (OPEX) of 
the oil firms (Fossgard-Moser, 2003; Ovadia, 2014). This notwithstanding, 
local content was also viewed as likely to increase costs in the short run 
which would make IOCs oppose it (Bowie, 2013). In a nutshell, local 
content is viewed by the stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry as 
an economic policy that has multiplier effects on the lives of the people 
(Scot et al., 2013).  
 
The preceding discussion showed that local content has a business-case in 
the same way as the sustainability or corporate social responsibility (Dyllick 
and Hockerts, 2002; Perceva, 2003) because the oil firms have the 
advantage of increasing their profits in the long run by reducing their labour 
costs. Some Nigerian Content Managers have opined that local content not 
only reduces the contracting cycle, lead-time and transportation costs but 
also “increases our relevance and our relationships with the country, giving 
us a social license to operate” (Ovadia, 2014: 8). Research has also shown 
that in most of the oil-producing countries the costs of hiring local labour 
were cheaper than those of the imported labour. For example, the Oil & Gas 
Global Salary Guide estimated the average salary for the local and foreign 
labour to be $68,900 and $100,600 respectively (Hays, 2013). 
 
10.2.2 Social Stability 
 
The social dimension of local content is the equivalent of the corporate 
social responsibility (Ado, 2013) and the social programme aspect of the 
second local content model (EY, 2013). However, it was viewed by the 
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Nigerian stakeholders from the angle of social crisis and instability which 
ravaged several communities around the oilfields. Indeed, and as a matter 
of fact, the politics of the Nigeria’s oil and gas industry is one that facilitates 
the connivance of the IOCs and the ruling elite to deprive the local people 
from meaningful benefits that could offset the social and environmental 
damages, the situation that “brought a legacy of death” (Chitando, 2013: 
34). To serve their selfish interests, the IOCs and the elites cause and 
explore the divisions among the oil communities (Tangonyire and Achal, 
2012). One of the perceived remedies for the resultant social instability is 
the effective utilization of the local content policy. Substantial evidence has 
shown that the first champions of local content implementation - the 
government and the IOCs (Easo and Wallace, 2014) - have significant roles 
to play to sustain the peaceful co-existence of the society. Stakeholders 
have severally linked local content sustainability issues to the terms ‘people’ 
or more specifically, ‘communities’, and their engagement and welfare as 
suggested by AA1000APS (2008). This reflects the fact that the resources 
belong to the people – present and future (Wiig and Ramalho, 2005). It was 
empirically indicated that the sustainable development benefits of local 
content policy can only be achieved through proper engagement with all 
stakeholders (Vaaland et al., 2012). It was shown from the analysis that 
local content instils the sense of belonging, survival, equity, engagement, 
inclusiveness and the feelings of ‘our government is accountable’ among the 
citizens. These feelings would be further enhanced by corporate social 
responsibility or other community content activities by oil companies 
(Oguine, 2011). CSR as a relevant tool of local content was put at the lower 
bottom of the local content accountability shown in Figure 8 and supported 
by Ado (2014). This stakeholder concern of local content would bring back 
our discussion on the interest, right and duty-based accountability 
(Werhane and Freeman, 1997) where it was argued that oil communities 
have rights to benefit from their resources and government and IOCs have 
a duty to be accountable for that (see Section 5.8). Through local content 
programmes, many of the social vices that instigate conflict and violence 
within the Nigeria’s oil communities as a result of a redundant manpower 
would be eliminated, or at least, mitigated (Janus, 2011, Warner, 2011; 
Gunasekaran and Spalanzani, 2012). This, according to the empirical 
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evidence would enhance the security of the oil facilities which has several 
economic and environmental repercussions (NEITI, 2013).  
 
10.2.3 Environmental and Intergenerational Survival 
 
On the environmental aspects, stakeholders seemed to have believed that 
local content was a platform for sustainability as consistent with the 
literature in the second chapter of this work. As such, the policy lends 
considerable weight to human and resource conservation for the well-being 
of the present and the future generations (Toulekima, 2015). Stakeholders 
have gone to the extent of linking the local content to the survival of the 
people, sustenance of the environment, and the oil industry. This supports 
a recent claim that local content is directly related to the national security 
of Nigeria (Okpe, 2015; SweetCrude, 2015) as it addresses the problem of 
“environmental terrorism” (Gunasekaran and Spalanzani, 2012; Erhun, 
2015: 111). It also supports Cairns (2011) argument that sustainability is 
founded on the idea of intergenerational equity which implies depleting the 
natural resources (e.g., oil) and investment in assets (e.g., human) to 
maintain social well-being. On this argument, Keutiben (2014: 542) 
asserted that: 
“a special feature of non-renewable resources is that they are in fixed supply and 
any unit consumed today will not be available in the future. So, suppliers will be 
willing to sell the resource only at a price that includes the opportunity cost 
associated with having less of the resource available for later sale”.  
 
The appropriate price to include the opportunity cost in the above 
statement is making sure that the oil firms have invested in the sustainable 
development of the host countries. For this reason, the stakeholders have 
maintained that the human and environmental survival depends on such 
investment. Diesendorf (2000) identified some overlaps among the three 
tenets of sustainability. Hence, many of the economic and social 
implications of local content reflect directly on the environment because of 
their interdependence (Barbier, 1987). For example, job creation (economic 
sustainability) reduces community crises (social sustainability), secures oil 
facilities from destruction and damage to the environment (environmental 
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sustainability) and saves asset replacement and clean-up costs (economic 
sustainability). Our theoretical proposition that mitigating certain social 
conditions of oil communities conserves the environment holds true (see 
Section 3.8.4). Furthermore, the local supplier development (economic 
sustainability) discussed above has coincided with the literature which 
indicated that the long transportation of labour, materials and equipment to 
serve the oil industry has severe environmental consequences (Endresen et 
al., 2003, 2007; Corbett and Kohler, 2003; Eyring et al., 2005; Holt and 
Watson, 2008; Moldanova et al., 2009). As such, closeness to suppliers 
reduces environmental emissions (Holt and Watson, 2008) and ensures 
long-term sustainability. Stakeholders have also raised the issue of 
environmental ethics which signals the corporate citizenship of oil 
companies as crucial to sustainability. It was evident that local content 
enhances technology transfer which promotes the local expertise and know-
how and leads to the development of the renewable energy market and the 
reduction of the climate change risks (Karakosta et al., 2010; Johnson, 
2015). The environmental dimension of local content is very vital because 
the entire sustainability and sustainable development agenda had initially 
emerged to address the environmental and ecological challenges (Pisani, 
2006). As such, many authors have used the environmental reporting as a 
proxy of sustainability accounting (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2010; 
Ngwakwe, 2012; Accounting, Organizations and Society Editorial, 2014).  
  
The preceding discussion confirms that there is a strong accountability 
relationship between the Nigerian citizens (particularly the oil communities) 
on the one hand and the government and oil companies on the other. The 
discussion also confirms our local content arguments and the proposed local 
content-sustainability theory in Figure 2.1. Recognizing the fact that 
sustainability can only be achieved with strong accountability 
arrangements, the next section discusses the results of the relevance of 
accountability to local content. 
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10.3 Accountability Expectations of Local Content 
 
Accountability has played a leading role throughout this study. Stakeholder-
accountability as the pragmatic approach to sustainability (Brown and 
Fraser, 2006; Ngwakwe, 2012) was selected to conceptualize the 
accountability relationships between the first accountors (NCDMB and IOCs) 
and their various stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry. This section 
discusses the accountability requisites of local content sustainability in line 
with the available data. As a bedrock of sustainability (Schaltegger and 
Buritt, 2010), accountability in local content had generated interesting 
insights from the stakeholders and had given rise to some interesting 
themes. Importantly, some accountability dimensions were discovered; 
some have already been reviewed in the literature (see Tables 4.5, 5.1 and 
5.3) while the others have emerged from the empirical data. Many of the 
findings were consistent with the sixteen accountability indicators used to 
construct the study’s survey instruments (see Table 5.3). The themes 
include (1) setting of realistic targets (2) understanding, engagement and 
commitment (3) transparency and reporting (4) enforcement (5) 
measurability and predictability (6) complaint and response (7) cost-profit 
effects (8) corruption, and (9) sincerity of purpose. These points are 
discussed one after the other. 
 
10.3.1 Setting of Realistic Targets 
 
Consistent with many scholars (Davies, 2001; Fowler and Kuyama, 2007; 
OECD, 2008; Darby, 2010; Weber, 2011), the study has found that setting 
of achievable and attainable local content targets was one of the 
accountability elements emphasized by the stakeholders. Setting 
unachievable targets may only compromise the oil industry governance54 
and promote illegal practices in Nigeria (Esteves, 2013), because every 
operator or service provider may act desperately to achieve targets and 
avoid sanctions. For example, some of the NCDMB’s objectives were found 
                                                          
54 The governance of the Nigerian petroleum sector is very weak, as such; any stringent local content targets may 
exacerbate the situation (see Sayne et al., 2015).   
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to be vague and unattainable (such as asset ownership requirements) 
which are capable of instigating corruption (Ovadia, 2014; Martini, 2014). 
Consistent with the IPIECA (2011), stakeholders were more concerned with 
targets that are within their competence. Some stakeholders have made a 
complaint about the strictness of some targets. In Section 10.5.1.2 
stakeholders would further be asked to express their opinion on the clarity 
or otherwise of the NCDMB’s local content objectives and the performance 
metrics.  
 
10.3.2 Understanding, Engagement and Commitment to Targets 
 
Although engagement has been an established dimension of accountability 
(Table 5.3), the concepts of understanding and commitment have appeared 
for the first time as indicators of accountability in this research. Interview 
results have shown that stakeholders have to have a full understanding of 
the targets and the commitment to pursue them. This finding was 
consistent with the IPIECA’s (2011: 4) opinion that “successful local content 
programmes are shaped by a clear understanding of the business benefits 
and a well-defined strategic plan”; hence, a “detailed understanding of the 
local context is imperative”. Ironically, a section of the stakeholders has 
strongly alleged that even the authority in charge of implementation (i.e., 
the NCDMB) was either lacking the proper understanding of the local 
content rules, the capacity to implement it, or deliberately sabotaging the 
process. Although this was a minority opinion, it was supported by Ovadia 
(2015: 40) who argued that under the NCDMB, “progress is hard to 
demonstrate because there is still some difficulty in understanding how to 
measure local content”. If this position were to hold true, then the whole 
implementation processes of the policy would have been eroded. The rest of 
the recommendations from the stakeholders have hinged around the 
commitment and collaboration among the participants in the Nigerian 
petroleum sector, the exercise that was faulted by Vaaland et al (2012).  
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10.3.3 Measurability and Predictability of Performance 
 
These emergent accountability indicators have emanated from stakeholder’s 
responses. Stakeholders have expressed their opinion that only targets that 
can be measured and predicted were achievable. This follows our earlier 
arguments that targets must be clear and unambiguous. Before setting 
targets, policy-makers must be aware of the industry requirements (e.g., 
materials, labour, equipment, and component) and what is obtainable from 
the local suppliers. This implies the reconciliation between the demand-side 
and the supply-side for optimal decisions (IPIECA, 2011). It is only when 
measurable targets are set that progress could be determined. 
Measurability as accountability element was supported by Paul (1991) who 
argued that accountability is concerned with holding organizations or 
individuals accountable for their objectively ‘measured’ performance. 
Stakeholders were concerned with knowing the actual results from 
implementation. Some informants have emphasised the ability to predict 
possible outcomes as an important accountability variable. Viewed as 
complementary to transparency (Ramdoo, 2015), predictability has been 
connected to the principles of governance and is also one of the factors to 
consider in setting public policy (Argűden, 2011). A compelling allegation 
that the Board (NCDMB) did not have any of such measures on the ground 
was made. If this allegation were real, then the Board has a long way to go 
in its accountability practices. This result should not be confused with the 
results in Section 10.5.1.2 where questionnaire respondents expressed 
positive view that the Board had clear performance metrics. Having 
performance metrics in volume and value such as the percentage of the 
local workforce or suppliers in headcount or expenditure on wages and 
salaries, tonnes or total spend on materials, etc (Munson and Rosenblatt, 
1997; NOGICD Act, 2010) may not be enough to ascertain progress. But, 
there has to be available and verifiable data to rely on.     
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10.3.4 Transparency and Reporting 
 
Credible and verifiable data was required by the stakeholders in order to 
measure performance against target. Transparency and reporting as 
leading accountability indicators are the basic mechanisms through which 
stakeholders can obtain relevant and reliable information on local content 
(Table 5.3). Although quantitative findings in Section 10.5.5.2 have shown 
the stakeholders’ satisfaction that they get relevant and timely information 
from the Board on new opportunities in the industry, interview results 
showed that not all information was available to stakeholders, especially 
financial information. A section of the stakeholders has to rely on the 
freedom of information law and instituted a court action against the Board 
who failed to make certain information available. It was therefore advised 
by one participant that there was a need for the government and all 
stakeholders to involve the media in all activities concerning local content. 
 
10.3.5 Enforcement 
 
This is an established accountability indicator reviewed in the study (Table 
5.3) and became one of the themes that arose from the data to which some 
informants have subscribed. The expectation is simply that the Board could 
only be able to enforce compliance after it sets realistic, attainable, 
accessible, predictable and measurable targets. As pointed out earlier, 
results have indicated that the largest burden of accountability started from 
the government (NCDMB and related agencies) who was expected to create 
a conducive environment to effectively drive the policy to ensure 
compliance of other stakeholders (e.g., IPL04). Evidence from the literature 
has confirmed the importance of enforcement ability of any public oversight 
agency to ensure accountability (Newell and Bellour, 2002; Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2005). The stakeholders have acknowledged the existence of well-
designed policies and programmes but were sceptical about the ability of 
the rules to be enforced. This was in spite of their previous agreement that 
the Board was able to enforce compliance (Section 10.5.3.1). This may not 
be unconnected with the political-economic nature of the Nigerian oil 
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industry with its free-for-all violation of rules. More empirical evidence on 
the needs for strong enforcement ability would be presented in the coming 
sections. 
 
10.3.6 Complaint and Response 
 
As the last resort to enforce rights (Blagescu and Lloyds, 2006), complaint 
and response are important elements of accountability (Blagescu et al., 
2005) through which stakeholders express their concern about matters 
affecting them. A stakeholder has shown confidence that the Board 
(NCDMB) was accessible and entertained complaints. It was reviewed that 
the Board has a comprehensive arrangement for complaint and whistle-
blowing through which anomalies are addressed (see chapter four). This 
finding has coincided with the results in Section 10.5.13.1 where it was 
believed that the Board listens to and takes actions on complaints. 
 
10.3.7 Sincerity of Purpose 
Another accountability dimension new to this study is sincerity. An 
informant has used this term to charge the government (NCDMB) to live up 
to its expectations. As reviewed earlier (Sections 5.8 and 8.3.2) the 
government is the first accountor who is expected to show commitment and 
support, and provide an enabling environment for the policy to achieve its 
aims. Viewed as the opposite of hypocrisy, sincerity means the “congruence 
between avowal and actual feeling” (Trilling, 1972: 2). Simply, it means 
how true organizations are to their mission statements and value 
declarations (Fassin and Buelens, 2011). For the NCDMB, its three mission 
statements were clear, thus: (1) opening the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
for Nigerian people (2) cementing access to the oilfield for higher 
productivity, and (3) building capabilities in Nigeria to support increased 
investment. The most important thing is how sincere are these mission 
statements. This forms part of the accountability of the Board as Hortsch 
(2010) argues that loyalty to the mission statement is one of the elements 
of accountability.  
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10.3.8 Cost-profit Effects 
 
A large part of the accountability of the private sector concerns costs and 
the ability to generate revenue and maximize the wealth of the 
shareholders, rather than job creation (Bacon and Kojima, 2011). This is 
purely guided by the shareholder theory and the business-case approach to 
sustainability. Since the pragmatic stakeholder-accountability approach 
adopted in this study also incorporates the business-case, then local 
content accountability should also incorporate the return to investors 
issues. This is because without the investors oil companies would not 
operate and local content could not exist. Stakeholders have claimed that 
instead of reducing costs as claimed (Fossgard-Moser, 2003; Petrofac, 
2013), local content may end up increasing their costs of production (NRGI, 
2015) as a result of input price increase (Grossman, 1981; Lewis and 
Wiser, 2005; Veloso, 2006). Again, similar to the Indonesian case (IMF, 
2005) the Nigerian government has created an additional levy of 1% of 
contract values payable by oil companies who have successfully won 
contracts. Many scholars have considered this as another form of taxation 
capable of further increasing contract costs (PwC, 2012; Hufbauer et al., 
2013; Michael, 2014; Deloitte, 2014).  
 
Moreover, the initial investment in local employment and training, 
technology transfer, supplier development, and all activities to buy the 
social license to operate is very high and may create tensions between the 
economic sustainability of firms on the one hand and the social and 
environmental on the other (see Section 2.8.4). It was however shown that 
balancing the social and environmental requirements and the local content 
rules often poses difficulty to oil and gas companies (Barbier, 1987; Cotula, 
2013). It has also been reported that besides affecting the operating costs, 
local content may also impact on the NPV, IRR and the payback periods of 
the operating firms (Warner, 2010; Esteves and Barclay, 2011; Nishikimi 
and Kuroiwa, Hansen et al, 2015). For instance, as an additional cost of 
investment, it may increase the length of the period a firm recoups its 
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investment, or may affect the time-value of money and increase the cost of 
capital when a firm has to make an initial investment in training and 
technology transfer. The cost-profit impact of local content is, therefore, a 
very important determinant of accountability because there is the tendency 
that oil companies could indulge in illegitimate practices for the purpose of 
saving cost and increasing revenue. This may include deliberate 
concealment of facts and fraudulent exaggeration of achievements in their 
attempt to report lower corporate tax as in the transfer pricing issues 
(Belderbos et al., 2000), avoid sanctions, or present more favourable 
balance sheets to their shareholders. This was why a stakeholder from the 
government organization (IPG02) expressed doubts about the authenticity 
of local content information the IOCs reports to the authorities. Oil 
companies, therefore, find themselves between the devil and the deep blue 
sea.  
 
For the smooth implementation of local content, governments may decide 
to make compromises and trade-offs including giving tax incentives for 
compliance as evident in several countries including Nigeria (Barbier, 1987; 
Swamidass, 1994; Munson and Rosenblatt, 1997; NOGICD Act, 2010; 
Cotula, 2013). This practice also has its own limitations as it reduces the 
public funds (Kolstad and Kinyondo, 2015). Some of the governance 
responsibilities of the oil industry authorities are the utilization of local 
content for early returns to the state and the long-term benefits to 
government and the investors (Chatham House, 2013). The dilemma is that 
even the expected long-run benefit may be overridden by corruption, price 
hikes, and project delays resulting from the tensions between the national 
and the international oil companies with each trying to have an edge 
(Grossman, 1981; WTO/UNCTAD, 2002; Aneke, 2002; Heum, et al., 2003; 
INTSOK, 2003; Neff, 2005; Lahn, 2007; Hao et al., 2010; Lec, 2011). It is 
however viewed that local content has to strike a balance between 
investors’ profits and community development (IPC02). 
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10.3.9 Corruption     
 
Several findings from the literature have attested to the fact that local 
content, if not well-managed, could instigate the culture of corruption 
(Lindner, 1998; Lec, 2011; Heller, 2011; Esteves, 2013; Martini, 2014). 
Consistent with Martini (2014), the empirical data has indicated the 
stakeholders’ fear for the undue influence of the IOCs that gave them the 
advantage to manipulate and connive with the regulators at the expense of 
the local firms. This may re-affirm Okafor and Aniche (2014) arguments 
that the Board lacks the capacity to regulate, monitor and enforce 
compliance on the IOCs. The World Trade Institute (2013) for example has 
faulted the excessive power given to the Minister of Petroleum Resources in 
Nigeria to single-handedly decide and waive local content obligations for 
any company. Irrational waivers would undoubtedly encourage importing 
goods and services that are available in the local market which will 
consequently affect the balance of payment arguments of local content and 
sustainability (WTO and UNCTAD, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2014; Olawuyi, 2012; 
WTI Advisors, 2013: 8). It was also found by Mwakali and Byaruhanga, 
(2011) that in Nigeria, the costs of oil contracts were deliberately inflated 
and the periods of the projects were unnecessarily prolonged. Interview 
findings have revealed that in a typical oil contract in Nigeria, about 50% of 
the total value is shared between the contractor and the client’s 
representative while only the remaining half is actually for the contract 
(Vaaland, 2012). This violates the World Bank’s (2012) requirement for 
strict monitoring, and reporting and disclosure of local content information 
because of the size of the investment involved.  
 
10.4 Assessment of the NCDMB’s General Accountability 
Performance  
 
In this section, the data presented on the general performance 
accountability of the NCDMB (chapter seven) in managing the sustainable 
development policy of local content is assessed using an original 
accountability scale developed from literature. The accountability scale is 
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based on the stakeholder theory of accountability presented in Figure 15 
and further elaborated in Section 5.4.  The scale involves 16 indicators 
which were used to construct the first part of the questionnaire. The scale 
consisted of 26 statements to test the Board’s overall accountability for 
managing the local content policy. The section is entirely guided by the 
positivist epistemology using descriptive and inferential statistics. Where 
appropriate, however, empirical evidence collected through interviews will 
be used to support or oppose some issues revealed by the quantitative 
analysis. Table 10.1 below shows the accountability indicators used and the 
number of the statement(s) representing each. 
Table 10.1: The Accountability Indicators used to Construct the 
Questionnaire  
No. Accountability indicators measured No. of statements 
representing each 
indicator 
1 Objective/target 2 
2 Balancing objectives with capacity 2 
3 Enforceability 1 
4 Roles & responsibility of stakeholders 1 
5 Transparency 3 
6 Stakeholder engagement 2 
7 Auditing 3 
8 Disclosure & Reporting 2 
9 Performance monitoring & evaluation 1 
10 Responsiveness 2 
11 Answerability 1 
12 Responsibility 1 
13 Complaint & response 2 
14 Materiality 1 
15 Sanctions 1 
16 Governance 1 
Total no. of statements 26 
Source: Author 
 
The above accountability indicators were obtained by the author through a 
wide review of the literature. Some of these indicators appeared in the 
accounting literature (Crofts and Bisman, 2010), and most of them were 
explicitly stated in the NOGICD Act constituting the hard accountability of 
the NCDMB and the IOCs. Stakeholders’ responses were collected for each 
of the statements based on the Likert-Scale as explained in chapter six. The 
Accountability Scale was firstly tested for reliability and consistency using 
the split-half reliability test (see Table 7.3). The result showed high 
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reliability with Spearman-Brown Coefficient (equal length) of 0.900, and 
Guttman Split-half Coefficient of 0.899. For all the statements, null 
hypotheses that there are no significant differences among stakeholders’ 
responses were assumed. This section aimed to answer the following 
research question: 
What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s general 
accountability performance in the implementation of local content 
sustainability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
 
The following sections interpreted the results from the first part of the 
questionnaire to answer the above research question. Each accountability 
indicator was firstly presented and briefly reviewed before the 
representative statement(s).   
 
10.5 Assessment of the NCDMB’s General Accountability 
Performance 
 
10.5.1 Objective/Target 
 
In any accountability relationship, objectives have to be clearly stated and 
communicated to all parties (Adeh, 2004). Local content is an 
accountability-based policy and needs clear and realistic objectives or 
targets to achieve its potential benefits through the petroleum sector 
(Levett, et al., 2012; OECD, 2012). Too ambitious targets deter the FDI 
inflows (UNCTAD, 2007). These objectives or targets hold the regulatory 
agencies accountable (Weber, 2011) and induce oil firms to report their 
performances (IPIECA, 2011; Esteves et al., 2013; Chatham, 2013). Two 
statements (Table 7.5) were used to represent this accountability indicator 
as shown below. 
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10.5.1.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB clearly communicates the 
objectives/targets it wants to achieve for the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
through the implementation of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
 
In Section 10.3.1 above, stakeholders have shown concern about the 
nature of local content objectives and targets set by the Board. To 
complement the results of the qualitative analysis, this section would add to 
our understanding of this issue.  Results from the quantitative data showed 
that the respondents have overwhelmingly agreed with this statement with 
34.9% and 38.1% strongly agree and agree positions respectively (median 
= 2.00) (Table 7.5). This shows the stakeholders’ satisfaction with the 
clarity in which the NCDMB’s objectives were communicated. From the 
Board’s website, three basic objectives of the Nigerian content were found 
to include (1) opening the Nigerian oil and gas industry for Nigerian people 
(2) cementing access to the oilfield for higher productivity, and (3) building 
capabilities in Nigeria to support increased investment55. These objectives 
were broken down into the various programs and functions of the Board. 
These results, however, were contrary to Ovadia (2014) and Martini (2014) 
who considered the stated objectives as unclear, unattainable, and potential 
to promote corruption. For instance, an interview respondent from a Civil 
Society group (IPC01) has questioned the possibility of the indigenous oil 
and gas firms to attain the required 50% assets ownership by 2015 when 
the actual achievement at the end of 2014 was only 10%. Nwaokoro (2011) 
has also accused local content targets in insurance due to Nigeria’s weak 
local capacity in the area. It was conclusively argued that unattainable local 
content targets pose “governance risk”, and promote “perversive 
behaviour” and fronting (Esteves, 2013: 7). This view was supported by 
some interview participants. 
 
Significant differences were detected among the stakeholders’ responses 
based on the Bonferroni adjusted alpha of .005 (Table 1a Appendix 7). 
Cross-tabulation results (Table 1b Appendix 7) showed that CS had the 
lowest agreement level at 8.5% compared to other groups possibly because 
                                                          
55 NCDMB website: http://www.ncdmb.gov.ng/ 
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of the group’s impartiality when it comes to the assessment of public 
organizations, as the government is often regarded as a “potential culprit” 
(Abraham and Santos, 2010: 7). Objectives and targets must not just be 
set; they must be realistic, measurable and achievable as shown in the next 
section. 
 
10.5.1.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB has clearly defined the 
criteria/metrics by which local content can be measured 
 
In a local content situation, metrics are crucial in driving the behaviours of 
the regulators and the oil firms (Tordo, 2013). It is the objectives, targets 
and standards identified in 10.5.1.1 above that are translated into the 
performance metrics. Metrics is one of the five fundamental principles of the 
first local content model (Klueh et al., 2009). This statement like the 
previous one has attracted positive responses from the stakeholders with 
21.6 %, and 48.2% strongly agree and agree levels (median = 2.00) (Table 
7.5). This position was expected considering the stakeholders’ approval that 
the objectives were clearly spelt out. This agreement was supported by the 
provisions of the NOGICD Act which categorically stated the percentages, 
volumes and values of capital expenditure (CAPEX), operating expenditure 
(OPEX), number of jobs, tonnes of fabricated equipment, labour-hours, 
subcontracting, etc., to be achieved in oil and gas contracts  (see also, 
Hilary-Nwokonko, 2004; Bordmann, 2010). Local content in most of the 
engineering work in Nigeria is calculated based on man-hours; fabrication 
and construction are based on the volumes and tonnage of materials; 
petroleum technology, well drilling, rig, supply vessels, etc., are based on 
expenditure and man-hours. These metrics equip the oil firms with the 
basis for reporting performance mandatorily to the authorities or voluntarily 
to the public. Outside of the NOGICD Act, these metrics were incorporated 
in the GRI and the IPIECA sustainability guidelines (see Tables 3.1 and 
3.2). These guidelines were applied by the study to investigate the IOCs’ 
voluntary local content accountability (see chapter nine). Be that as it may, 
interview informants have expressed reservation on whether the NCDMB 
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has a system that could track and measure progress and deviations for the 
purpose of improvement. 
 
Statistically significant differences were found in respect of this statement 
(Table 2a Appendix 7). Based on the Bonferroni corrected alpha (.005) only 
one difference appeared to be a genuine difference. Cross-tabulation results 
(Table 2b Appendix 7) showed that the CS (8.2%) was different from the 
TU (27.6%). This may be either due to the fact that the TU as consisting of 
employees across all oil companies was in a better position to have full 
knowledge of the situation of local content in the industry, or because of 
the ensuing debate and disagreement among the oil operators as to the 
appropriate metric to measure local content – whether to use the quantum 
of the trained workers or the quantum of the entrepreneurs created (Alike, 
2014). Objectives and targets must always be matched with capability. This 
is the next accountability indicator.  
 
10.5.2 Balancing objectives with capacity 
 
Targets have to be matched with capacity and capability for them to be 
realistic and achievable in any meaningful accountability relationship 
(Salawu and Agbeja, 2007; Bolton, 2003). It has been strongly emphasised 
that the host governments are always at a risk of failure when they resort 
to setting unrealistic local content targets out of their eagerness to get 
instant results (IPIECA, 2011; Heller, 2011). Balancing local content 
objectives with the targets is like trying to reconcile the demand-side 
requirements and the supply-side capability (IPIECA, 2011). Two 
statements were used to investigate whether or not the NCDMB had what it 
takes to implement the local content objectives identified above. The 
statements were on the issues of staffing and funding.  
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10.5.2.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB has sufficient capacity (in 
terms of qualified staff) to fully implement the provisions of the Nigerian 
Content Development Act  
 
The majority of the respondents have either strongly agreed (11.9%) or 
simply agreed (39.2%) (median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). This position was 
against the neutral, disagree and strongly disagree positions of 25.9%, 
19.8% and 3.2% respectively, which were also significant. Part of the local 
content best practice is having an enforcement agency with qualified staff 
that is knowledgeable about the industry and the accounting practice (Klueh 
et al., 2009; Cotula, 2010). It was for a similar reason that most of the 
NCDMB’s personnel were experienced workers drawn from the NNPC. This 
result is inconsistent with Okafor and Aniche (2014) who claimed that the 
Board lacked both administrative and institutional capacity to monitor and 
enforce compliance with local content provisions. This success may not be 
absolute, because, even though the Board had tried to show 
professionalism in its control of the Nigerian Content Development Fund 
(NCDF) many stakeholders have expressed dissatisfaction with the 
management of the Fund (Section 10.6 below).  
 
10.5.2.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB has sufficient funding to fully 
implement the provisions of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
 
Public agencies such as the NCDMB have to be independent and fully 
funded by the government. It would have negative consequences for 
agencies operating in highly sensitive sectors that are vulnerable to 
corruption such as the Nigerian oil and gas industry, to be under-funded 
(Lindner, 2014; Nwapi, 2015). Response to this statement (Table 7.5) 
showed agreement and strong agreement at 45.4% (31.7%+13.7%) 
(median = 2.00) against the 21.8% neutral and the 23.4% and 2.5% 
disagreement, indicating a weak acknowledgement that the Board was fully 
funded to carry out its functions. This result, however, does not form the 
ground to underestimate the negative influence of the controversial section 
of the NOGICD Act (i.e., S. 92) which allows the NCDMB to accept gifts of 
money, land or other properties from the stakeholders. This, in fact, will 
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affect the Board’s independence to fight corruption or impose local content 
rules indiscriminately (Hufbauer, 2013; Nwapi, 2015). In this regard, Nwapi 
(2015: 93) asserted that:  
“Allowing the Nigerian Content Board charged with overseeing the implementation of 
the local content policy and supervising companies' compliance with the 
requirements of the policy to accept gifts from the very companies it is charged to 
supervise creates a potential conflict of interest within the Board”.  
 
Due to impaired independence, it was found that many local content 
agencies around the world have suffered political interference (World Trade 
Institute, 2013). If this were the case, then the scholars’ argument about 
local content’s ability to promote corruption might hold true (Mauro, 1998; 
Lec, 2011; Heller, 2011; Lindner, 2014). The fact that the 1% NCDF 
remittance was not enough to finance the implementation of the policy 
because of the need for enormous investment in infrastructure, facilities 
and assets, might have forced the Board to succumb to gift-taking from 
private parties. It was therefore observed that there was a need for 
subventions directly from the government to supplement the 1% collection 
(Abdulwahed, 2014). Supporting this view, an informant from one of the 
major IOCs (IPI02) suggested other funding schemes including venture 
capital, trade credit and export finance to supplement the NCDF. The next 
important accountability requirement of the Board is its powers to enforce 
local content rules on oil operators. This is the function of the following 
section. 
 
10.5.3 Enforceability 
 
Enforceability is another dimension of accountability which suggests the 
ability or power to enforce compliance and the assurance that accounts are 
rendered, and corrective actions are taken as appropriate (Newell and 
Bellour, 2002; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). Without the power to enforce 
compliance, accountability is considered meaningless (Fang-Jing, 2000; 
Boni et al., 2011). The totality of this research is about enforcement and 
compliance accountability. In examining whether the NCDMB has the 
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required power to practically enforce compliance one statement was used 
as below. 
 
10.5.3.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB has sufficient power in 
‘practice’ to enforce compliance with all the provisions of the Nigerian 
Content Act on all oil and gas companies 
 
The majority of the responses to the above statement were within the 
ranges of agree (38.5%) and strongly agree (27.3%) (median = 2.00) 
(Table 7.5). In this case, stakeholders have believed that the NCDMB has 
sufficient power to enforce the policy. These include, for example, the 
Board’s legal powers to mandate oil operators to engage in community 
content activities and maintain offices in communities of their significant 
operations (S. 27), or its power to get performance reports from operators 
including all plans and expenditure on local purchases, local wages and 
salaries, etc., (S. 59). Although a positive position was recorded for the 
quantitative analysis, qualitative evidence has shown some areas of concern 
about the Board’s ability to put some policies into implementation. Overall, 
the qualitative results showed that enforcement was the most important 
accountability indicator at present. It was further pointed out that before 
any enforcement power is contemplated there has to be realistic, 
measurable and predictable targets (Section 10.3.4) above.  
 
A post hoc test has revealed statistically significant differences among 
stakeholders’ responses (Table 3a Appendix 7). The only genuine difference 
after applying the Bonferroni corrected alpha was between the CS and the 
LOC. Cross-tabulation results indicated that the CS has 5.6% whilst the LOC 
has 33.6% agreement (Table 3b Appendix 7). The low agreement of the CS 
could be explained partially by their neutral stance in assessing the 
government, and the higher agreement of the LOC’s might be to protect its 
culture of fronting for the IOCs. The next accountability indicator is 
concerned with the nature of the roles and duties of various stakeholders in 
the local content relationships. 
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10.5.4 Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders 
 
In the 2003 report that formed the basis for the Nigerian content, the 
Norwegian Oil and Gas Partners (the INTSOK) had clearly stated the need 
to define stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities by regulating agencies 
(Nwaokoro, 2011). Defining the roles and responsibilities of local content 
actors is one of the Chatham House’s (2013) governance framework 
discussed in chapter three. This was supported by S. 54(c) of the NOGICD 
Act. Salawu and Agbeja (2007) believe that parties in accountability 
relationships have to agree and be clear about their different responsibilities 
which would serve as the basis for their performance. In this section, the 
NCDMB’s ability to ensure that these responsibilities are unequivocally 
defined and complied with by stakeholders was examined. One statement 
was generated from this accountability indicator and presented as follows. 
 
10.5.4.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that each stakeholder 
group in the oil and gas industry (regulators, companies, etc) effectively 
discharges its roles and responsibilities in the implementation of local 
content 
 
On presenting this statement the majority of the respondents showed a 
neutral position at 47.1% (median = 3.00) against the agreement at 31.3% 
(6.5%+24.8%) and disagreement at 21.6% (20.9%+0.7%) (Table 7.5). It 
could be interpreted that stakeholders were not certain whether these roles 
were clearly defined and discharged. Role conflicts might have existed 
among stakeholder groups. For example, the NNPC who was the former 
custodian of the local content policy has dual roles as a regulator as well as 
a player. This has made the conflict of interest inevitable (Alba, 2009). Even 
with the coming of the NOGICD Act and the transfer of the local content 
oversight functions to the NCDMB, NNPC still believes that it has some 
control over the local content implementation. This is because other 
national oil companies such as Petrobras, Petronas, Statoil, etc., are 
instrumental in the implementation of local content as the primary reason 
for their creation (Hilary-Nwokonko, 2004; Nwokeji, 2007; Klueh et al., 
2009; Awe, 2014).  
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Controlling the NNPC by the NCDMB may pose difficulty. As already stated, 
most of the NCDMB’s personnel were previously NNPC’s staff, so they may 
tend to maintain loyalty to their former bosses. Another conflict between 
the NCDMB and the NNPC is the control of the Nigerian Petroleum Exchange 
(NIPEX)56 which had previously been in the custody of the NAPIMS before it 
was transferred to the NCDMB. Up to the present, this transfer is yet to be 
concluded. Conflict of interest/roles have been prevalent in local content in 
Nigeria and elsewhere, especially pertaining to undue loyalty which also 
leads to corruption (Martini, 2014). Although each stakeholder group has its 
own roles and mandates, the need to collaborate and work together was 
emphasized by stakeholders interviewed. It was pointed out by the 
participants (e.g., IPL04 and IPC03) that the authorities (i.e., NCDMB) must 
encourage collaboration between government, local and foreign oil firms, 
entrepreneurs and all other industry participants to achieve a successful 
local content (Section 8.3.2). This collaboration was found to be flawed by 
corruption and secrecy in the Nigerian petroleum industry (Vaaland et al., 
2012). 
 
A significant difference was discovered between the responses of the TU 
and the IOCs with the IOCs having a lower neutral response (Tables 4a, 4b 
Appendix 7). The higher neutral response of the TU might have been 
informed by the fact that members of the group have cut across all oil and 
gas activities and are engaged with both foreign and local firms. Hence, 
they have more experience with role conflict than the IOCs. The 
effectiveness of all the accountability indicators so far discussed depends on 
information efficiency and effective communication among stakeholders. 
That is why the next section addresses the issue of transparency. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Nigerian Petroleum Exchange is a virtual platform that connects suppliers/contractors with oil firms.  
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10.5.5 Transparency  
 
Transparency is the root of accountability (Adeh, 2004; Koppell, 2005; 
Blagescu and Lloyd, 2006; Gray, 2006; Bovens, 2007; OECD, 2008; 
Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Greiling and Spraul, 2010; Zahran, 2011). 
Concerned with the provision of visible information (Power, 1991) 
transparency becomes, undoubtedly, the most critical and vital tool among 
all other accountability dimensions (Koppel, 2005). Accounting theorists like 
Gray (1992) and Shearer (2002) have argued that accountability is only 
achieved through enhanced rights to information. This section aimed to 
assess the extent to which the NCDMB is transparent to its various 
stakeholders. Three statements were used to undertake this assessment. 
 
10.5.5.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB provides timely information 
about new local content policies and regulations to the key stakeholders 
involved in the industry 
 
From Table 7.5 results have shown that the majority of the respondents 
have agreed or strongly agreed (34.2% and 16.9%) (median = 2.00) that 
they received timely information from the Board about new policies and 
regulations concerning the local content policy. Information on clear local 
content rules was considered a determinant of the success of the policy 
(Vaaland et al., 2012; Martini, 2015). Unlike the quantitative results, the 
qualitative findings on the Board’s transparency have shown mixed 
reactions (Section 8.4).   
 
10.5.5.2 Perceptions on whether the NCDMB provides relevant information 
about new areas and opportunities for indigenous participation in oil and 
gas activities 
 
Similar to the response patterns obtained in 10.5.5.1 above, the majority of 
stakeholders were in agreement that they received information that was 
relevant to their activities and decisions in the industry with 43.2% and 
11.5% of the respondents either strongly agreed or simply agreed with the 
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statement (median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). Industry stakeholders need 
information from the regulators on new opportunities, new tenders and new 
rules and regulations to further their local content performance. That is why 
it was strongly recommended that authorities must be aware of the industry 
needs regarding the workforce, equipment, materials and components 
(demand-side requirements), and what is available in the local market 
(supply-side capabilities) (IPIECA, 2011).  
 
10.5.5.3 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB provides reasons for non-
disclosure of important information to stakeholders  
 
Contrary to the results obtained from the two statements on transparency 
presented in 10.5.5.1 and 10.5.5.2 above, the majority of the stakeholders 
have a neutral opinion that the Board gave reasons for none disclosure of 
some information (median = 3.00) (Table 7.5). This result was against the 
37.1% (7.2%+29.9%) that agreed and the 20.2% (4%+16.2%) that did 
not agree. Although it may be understood that the oil and gas contracts 
may contain commercially sensitive information, information on core 
aspects of local content should be released to the stakeholders (NGRI, 
Publish What You Pay, Global Witness, & others, 2012). Where such 
information is confidential, there should be an explanation of that fact 
(Lahn, 2007). For example, there are no full and detailed information or 
facts and figures on the level of local value-added achieved. Stakeholders 
were only presented with summaries that the Board has achieved certain 
percentages57. Secondly, neither the actual accounting records of the NCDF 
nor the audited annual reports of the Board were available to stakeholders. 
That is why some interviewees (e.g., IPI01, IPI02 in Section 8.5) were 
bothered by the obscurity of several important pieces of financial 
information. Also, the evidence of an expectation gap between the NCDMB 
and stakeholders on whether the Board owed a duty to release financial 
performance to the public was found (e.g. respondents IPG01 and IPC02). 
Statistically significant differences existed between CS on the one hand, and 
GV and TU on the other (Table 5a Appendix 7). Cross-tabulation (Table 5b 
                                                          
57 See interview results in chapter eight. 
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Appendix 7) indicated that the CS had the lowest neutral level because the 
group may likely be contemplating the reasons purportedly preventing the 
Board from being fully transparent. One such reason was given by 
participant IPC02 that the Board might have been avoiding to hurt the 
interests of the IOCs. Another critically important accountability aspect 
close to transparency is engagement which is discussed below.  
 
10.5.6 Stakeholder Engagement 
 
Stakeholder participation or engagement with organizations is essential in 
any accountability relations (Rixon, 2010) as it involves eliciting the support 
of, and consultation with stakeholders on issues relating to their 
relationships with the entity (Cornwall et al., 2000; Fang- Jing, 2000; 
Adams and Evans, 2004; Friedman and Miles, 2006). This is the rationale 
for modifying the stakeholder-accountability model (Figures 17 and 18) to 
incorporate the ‘network of roles’ element. Empirical evidence has shown 
the importance of engagement, support and commitment to the execution 
of the NCDMB’s accountability. Although some stakeholders have shown 
contrary views, the majority opinion was that the level of engagement of 
the Board was satisfactory (Section 8.3.2). Two statements were generated 
to assess the adequacy of stakeholder engagement practices of the NCDMB. 
 
10.5.6.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB engages all the key 
stakeholders in major decisions concerning the implementation of the 
provisions of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
 
The majority of the respondents have either agreed (43.5%) or strongly 
agreed (22.3%) with the statement (median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). This 
agreement might be justified by the Board’s creation of the Nigerian 
Content Consultative Forum (NCCF) which comprises of the representatives 
of all relevant sectors – oil, manufacturing, fabrication, finance, shipping 
and logistics, insurance, legal and banking. This forum was recognised by 
the NOGICD Act as providing an avenue for information-sharing and 
collaboration about new projects, local capabilities as well as other relevant 
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policies (see S. 57 & 99). Participation of these stakeholders in decision-
making would not only clarify the procurement patterns but would also 
provide the basis for an effective reporting system (AccountAbility, 2011; 
Levett et al., 2012).  
 
10.5.6.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB accepts advice from the key 
industry stakeholders if considered appropriate for the achievement of the 
Nigerian content objectives 
 
Similar to the above results stakeholders have responded in the agreement 
that apart from being engaged in the Board’s affairs, their advice and input 
were also accepted if considered appropriate. This was evident from the 
statistical findings of 40.6% and 11.2% agree or strongly agree levels 
(median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). This was in spite of the overwhelming neutral 
result of 30.6% and 17.6% (14.7%+2.9%) disagreement. Through 
consultation, stakeholders’ interests would be protected to achieve local 
economic growth, capacity building and enhanced return on investment 
(Atsegbua, 2012). In spite of this result, a section of the stakeholders has 
alleged non-involvement in some of the Board’s programmes. As such, this 
work conducted a binary logistic regression on some critical local content 
programmes to verify these claims (see Section 7.10). The following section 
presents statements on auditing.  
 
10.5.7  Auditing 
 
One of the key and necessary elements of accountability is auditing (Gray 
et al., 1987; Tower, 1993; OECD, 2008). It is about checking and cross-
checking to ascertain how resources and financial dealings as contained in 
accounting records are being utilised by an organization. It serves as a 
measure of probity, regularity and legality (Stewart, 1984; OECD, 2008). S. 
70(k) of the NOGICD Act empowers the Board to “make auditing 
procedures and conduct regular audits for the purposes of monitoring and 
implementing compliances with the provisions of this Act”. Additionally, S. 
91 requires the Board to prepare and submit its own accounts for statutory 
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auditing. Under this dimension of accountability, three financially- and non-
financially-related statements were generated as below.  
 
10.5.7.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB maintains an effective system 
of internal auditing which ensures stewardship of financial and non-
financial resources 
 
Based on the fact that the stakeholders are engaged in the financial and 
non-financial transactions with the NCDMB, they are in the right position to 
assess the strength and weaknesses of its internal operations. Oil firms 
engage in bidding for and awarding of contracts and licenses and submitting 
contract documents to the Board for review and approval at the 
prequalification 58 , technical and commercial stages; remitting the 
mandatory 1% NCDF levies and applying for loan guarantees from the fund. 
Oil companies also engage in various disclosures and reporting with the 
Board including disclosure of local content plans, estimated expenditure on 
accounting, legal and insurance services, registering with the JQS and 
Petroleum e-Marketplace 59 , and so on (NOGICD Act 2010). These are 
enough to allow the respondents to have some knowledge of the internal 
audit functions of the Board. Results showed 49.3% (38.1%+11.2%) 
agreement, 36.3% neutral, and 14.04% (14%+0.4%) disagreement 
positions (Table 7.5). This suggested that although the overall stakeholders’ 
position was in agreement, there was still a large portion that was in doubt 
or in disapproval. The effectiveness of the Board’s internal audit system 
does not, however, substitute for its failure to have its own accounts 
externally audited as required by the law (Hufbauer, 2014). The Board’s 
failure to have audited accounts will be discussed in the later sections. 
 
  
                                                          
58 This stage is often skipped due to the introduction of the Joint Qualification System (JQS) which is the database 
for qualified contractors. The effectiveness of the Nigerian JQS was examined by this work. 
59 Petroleum e-Marketplace is a virtual platform for the petroleum trade. It is the environment where suppliers and 
customers meet and serves as the conduit that facilitates petroleum transactions. Registering with the platform has 
been very expensive and, therefore, presents challenges to local firms. This issue was addressed by the study.  
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10.5.7.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB regularly conducts facility 
audit to assess the capacity of companies to execute oil and gas contracts 
in the industry 
 
As part of its monitoring and evaluation (M & E) functions, the NCDMB 
claims to be conducting an audit of oil companies’ facilities to ascertain their 
technical capabilities to carry out contracts. Stakeholders’ majority opinions 
on this issue were 43.2% neutral (median = 3.00) a position that was 
slightly above the 40% (13.7%+26.3%) agreement, and far above the 
16.9% (15.8%+1.1%) disagreement (Table 7.5). This may confirm the 
allegations that some companies with no tangible assets on the ground 
were executing contracts in violation of the 50% assets ownership 
requirement (The Will, 2013). This function may further be negatively 
affected by the provision of S. 92 of the NOGICD Act, which allows the 
Board to take gifts from companies. 
 
10.5.7.3 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB conducts social audit to 
assess the impacts of its policies on the lives of the general public (in 
terms of job creation, etc) 
 
Stakeholders have expressed a slightly positive opinion by agreeing or 
strongly agreeing at 29.1% and 13.7% respectively as against the 37.4% 
neutral position (Table 7.5). This position countered some newspaper 
reports that many of the oil communities in Nigeria were not aware of the 
existence of the local content policy. The result supported an interview 
respondent’s stance that oil companies’ were doing enough to enhance 
community content (IPL01). This fact upholds the social sustainability 
effects of local content which involves the engagement of community 
members in oil and gas activities as compensation for their economic, social 
and environmental sufferings as a result of oil operations (Ogri, 2001; 
Warner, 2011; Tordo, et al., 2013). Following the auditing is the issue of 
disclosure which is also critical to accountability. 
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10.5.8  Disclosure and Reporting  
 
Chisholm (1995: 411) argues that “fuller disclosure of information to the 
public” is the most effective avenue for improving accountability. For this 
reason, some authors (Edward and Hulme, 1996) viewed accountability as 
the avenue through which organizations and individuals report to a 
legitimate authority and are held accountable for their actions. Most 
research on corporate social responsibility and sustainability accounting use 
disclosure and reporting to represent whether or not organizations are 
accountable. Reporting can be financial or performance. In this regard, this 
study developed two statements to assess the NCDMB’s disclosure and 
reporting practices to the stakeholders.  
 
10.5.8.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB reports its financial 
performance to all the key stakeholders in the oil and gas industry 
 
Although the sustainability accounting practices focus more on the 
disclosure of non-financial performance, yet financial matters have a great 
deal of relevance for the management and execution of local content 
sustainability initiatives because of the tremendous amount of funds 
invested (World Bank, 2012). For example, it was reported that in 2014 
alone Chevron Plc had spent $3.9 billion on Nigerian content (Chevron, 
2009). To demonstrate full accountability, the NCDMB has to report all 
financial in- and outflows to the stakeholders and the higher authorities as 
required by the law. Despite this, the majority of the stakeholders have 
maintained a neutral position on this statement at 40.3% (median = 3.00) 
far above the agreement at 28.3% (23.3%+5%). The disagreement 
position was also significant at 28.4% (3.2%+25.2%) which made this 
aspect a source of concern (Table 7.5). The respondents’ lack of agreement 
may confirm the allegations that the Board was not fully transparent in its 
financial dealings especially the administration of the NCDF (Nigerian 
Tribune, 2015; Sahara Reporters, 2015). The Board’s financial 
accountability was further examined through interviews with some industry 
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stakeholders, and the results were also not in favour of the Board (see 
respondents: IPI02, IPC02, IPI01, IPL03).  
 
10.5.8.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB reports its non-financial 
performance (process, achievements, etc) to all the key stakeholders in 
the oil and gas industry 
 
The majority of the stakeholders showed agreement and strong agreement 
at 45.6% and 7.2% (median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). This position, however, 
was a weak agreement because of the 22.3% neutral and 24.8% 
(21.2%+3.6%) disagreement positions. This may be supported by the 
publicly acknowledged fact that the Board publicises and showcases its 
performances especially through its website, publications and conferences. 
This, notwithstanding, some activists had, during the interview, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the information on the Board’s non-financial matters 
including some claimed achievements (IPC03, IPC01) which were said to be 
mere press releases (Ovadia, 2013; Hufbauer, 2014).  
 
10.5.9  Performance Monitoring & Evaluation 
 
Performance monitoring and evaluation is a follow-up exercise vested in 
oversight agencies (Salawu and Agbeja, 2007). Any interpretation of 
performance has to be referenced to accountability (Harrison et al., 2012). 
This is possibly why Paul (1991) defines accountability as holding 
organizations or individuals responsible for their objectively measured 
performance. For the NCDMB, a dedicated department or unit was created 
to be responsible for the conduct of this function (see chapter four). The 
following statement was developed to represent this dimension of 
accountability. 
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10.5.9.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB periodically (monthly, 
quarterly, yearly) conducts performance monitoring and evaluation 
exercises to assess the extent of compliance with local content 
requirements by oil and gas companies 
 
The majority of the responses to this statement were 45.6% neutral 
(median = 3.00) against the 37.6% (8.9%+27.8%) agreement and 17.6% 
(15.8%+1.8%) disagreement (Table 7.5). This result was not surprising as 
the activities involved in the performance monitoring and evaluation were 
similar to that of the auditing upon which deficit existed (see 10.5.7 above). 
This result may have serious repercussions to the Board because of the 
literature suggestions that the monitoring and evaluation of local content 
performances of oil and gas firms were the major and most important task 
of local content agencies around the world (Appendix 2). Next to the 
performance evaluation is the responsiveness element. 
 
10.5.10  Responsiveness 
 
Government agencies such as the NCDMB are faced with the duty to 
concurrently satisfy their two principals – higher authorities that directly 
assigned responsibilities to them, and the general public who have 
legitimate claims on their activities (Mulgan, 2000). Responsiveness is 
simply concerned with the agencies’ ability to satisfy the interests and 
wishes of the various stakeholders generally (Koppell, 2005; de Haan and 
Bardoel, 2012). Under this accountability dimension, two statements were 
prepared to examine the NCDMB as seen below.  
 
10.5.10.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB operates in the best interest 
of the government to achieve the required level of local participation in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry 
  
This statement has yielded an average stance of neutrality at 45.5% 
against 34.5% (9.1%+25.4%) agreement and 20.5% (16.5%+4%) 
disagreement (median = 3.00) (Table 7.5). This position may be supported 
by the opinions of some interview informants (e.g., IPL04, IPG02, IPC01, 
251 
IPL03, IPT01) who have alleged corruption, nepotism and connivance in the 
implementation processes, and the likely absence of understanding of the 
oversight process by the Board. This result is consistent with the Oxford 
Policy Management (2012) findings that resource rent may be directed to a 
specific group based on ethnic or political affiliation. Another reason is that 
the Board might be intentionally allowing the fronting problem to persist 
(World Trade Institute, 2013) or abusing the expatriate quota policy or 
mismanaging its powers and negotiates a fiscal regime that is unfavourable 
to the government (Esteves, 2013). 
 
10.5.10.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB considers the best interests 
of the Nigerian oil and gas companies in the process of implementing the 
provisions of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
 
Surprisingly, this statement was responded to in agreement at 59% 
(40.3%+18.7%) (median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). This showed that the 
majority of the stakeholders had believed that the Board was serving the 
interest of the local oil firms. To reconcile the results with that of the 
statement in Section 10.5.10.1 above, we may conclude that it may likely 
be that some of the stakeholders were legitimising the fronting issues which 
may in many cases favour some local companies who acquire benefits from 
those practices. The next indicator tests whether the NCDMB responds to 
the calls to render account as a fulfilment of accountability. 
 
 
10.5.11  Answerability 
 
Answerability is the ability of the accountor to render accounts to the 
accountee (Newell and Bellour, 2002; and Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Wood 
and Winston, 2005) including giving details of actions or inactions and 
reasons for that (Morley, 1989; Siegel-Jacobs and Yates, 1996; Manwaring, 
1997; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Giorgiov, 2002). A single statement was 
used for this accountability dimension to ascertain whether the NCDMB 
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responds to stakeholders’ demands for explanations about actions 
undertaken. 
 
10.5.11.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB always responds to 
stakeholders’ demands to give account on actions undertaken to ensure 
effective implementation of the provisions of the Nigerian Content 
Development Act  
 
Interestingly, positive responses were recorded for this statement with 
39.2% and 13.3% agree and strongly agree (median = 2.00), indicating 
stakeholders’ acknowledgement that the Board rendered accounts of its 
performance and achievements when demanded to do so (Table 7.5). This 
result was not surprising considering the manner in which the Board 
engages stakeholders as found in Sections 10.5.6.1 and 10.5.6.2 above. 
Differences were however identified between the CS and the TU and 
between the TU and the LOC (Table 6a Appendix 7). Table 6b Appendix 7 
showed the CS (9.2%) had a lower agreement than the TU (25.7%) 
possibly because of its experience with the Board where it had to institute a 
legal action in order to obtain certain financial information (see respondent 
IPC02 in Section 8.4).    
 
10.5.12 Responsibility 
 
Responsibility is often used interchangeably with accountability (Mulgan, 
2000; Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003) because accountability is considered 
the acceptance or feeling of responsibility and sticking to the rules by the 
accountors (Bavly, 1999; Erdogan et al., 2004). It, therefore, implies that 
the NCDMB as the accountor has to adhere to the laws, norms and rules in 
accountability relationships rather than to the aspirations of its accountees 
(stakeholders and higher authorities). It follows that an agent is not 
accountable to their principal in circumstances where the law is violated 
(Koppell, 2005). Under this aspect of accountability, one statement was 
developed and presented to stakeholders as below.  
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10.5.12.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB complies with all existing 
laws and due process in discharging its responsibilities with regards to the 
implementation of the provisions of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
 
This statement attracted overwhelming positive responses with 42.8% and 
20.5% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed (median = 
2.00) (Table 7.5). This is in spite of the Board’s inability to prepare and 
submit annual financial statements for external auditing and releasing the 
same to the public, the failure which may be attributable to the expectation 
gap discovered in Section 10.6.5.1 regarding the auditing and reporting of 
the Board’s accounting books. In its attempt to follow the rules of law, 
however, the Board claims to have effective complaint procedures. The next 
section looked at this important accountability element. 
 
10.13 Complaint and Response 
 
This accountability dimension allows stakeholders to express their opinion 
or complaint about matters that affect their interest in organizations 
(Blagescu et al., 2005). It is considered by Blagescu and Lloyds (2006) as 
the last option available to stakeholders to enforce accountability on private 
or public agencies. Complaint and response procedures are some of the 
major functions of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) division of the 
NCDMB. Under this programme, two types of mechanism for complaint and 
redress were identified to include (i) formal complaint from the industry, 
and (ii) whistle-blower alert for non-compliance from an industry insider 
(NCDCMB, 2010: 17). This dimension of accountability produced two 
statements in line with the two procedures mentioned. These were 
considered below. 
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10.5.13.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB maintains effective 
complaint and response mechanisms to address matters raised by the key 
stakeholders with respect to local content implementation issues 
 
This statement generated positive responses with agree and strongly agree 
levels of 36.3% and 17.3% respectively (median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). This 
result was in spite of the 30.9% neutral and 15.4% (14%+1.4%) 
disagreement which were also large. This showed satisfaction of the 
majority of the stakeholders with the manner in which their complaints 
were attended to by the Board. This fact can be supported by an interview 
informant from a local firm (IPL03) whose company was satisfied with the 
manner its complaints were attended to (see Section 8.3.6). 
 
10.5.13.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB maintains an effective 
‘whistle-blowing’ system to consider complaints from the general public 
 
The average response to this statement indicated an agreement and strong 
agreement at 36.7% and 12.6% against the 29.9% neutral and 20.9% 
(18.7%+2.2%) disagreement (Table 7.5). This result, which could be 
complemented by the results in Section 10.5.13.1 above, has pointed out 
the existence of strong informal complaint and response procedures. It also 
showed that the Board has recognised that neglecting the whistle-blowing 
mechanisms which are some of the basic measures to deal with corruption 
(Martini, 2015), might be detrimental to the realisation of the sustainability 
benefits of the local content policy. Hence, complaints that are genuine and 
material have to be dealt with. For this reason, an important accountability 
indicator of materiality is presented below.  
This positive result was not as strong as the one in Section 10.5.13.1 above 
as the statement also generated strong neutral and disagreement positions 
of 29.9% and 20.9% (18.7%+2.2%) respectively.  
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10.5.14  Materiality 
  
Materiality as an element of accountability is critical in the accounting 
literature (FASB, 1975; Messier et al, 2005). It is concerned with the 
determination of the significance and relevance of an issue to organizations 
and their stakeholders (AA1000, 2008). Any issue may be considered 
material if it can change or influence organizations’ decisions or actions. 
One statement was presented to stakeholders to assess the NCDMB’s ability 
to prioritize and justify material matters over less important ones as shown 
below. 
 
10.5.14.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB provides justification for all 
material (major) decisions it embarks on in relation to the implementation 
of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
 
The majority of the responses to this statement were in agreement with 
42.8% and 20.5% of the stakeholders either agreeing or strongly agreeing 
(median = 2.00) (Table 7.5). This can be interpreted as representing the 
stakeholders’ acknowledgement that the Board justifies its actions and 
decisions on matters of great importance. For example, the Board has 
justified the conception of its ORAS, MAVOS, and ECMI programmes which 
were initiated to change the trend of heavy reliance of the local industry on 
the foreign suppliers of offshore rigs, marine vessels, and other oil and gas 
equipment. In the absence of compliance with the local content rules, the 
Board has been conferred the power to sanction any defaulting company by 
applying fines or cancellation of contracts. Therefore, the next indicator is 
the accountability dimension of sanctions. 
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10.5.15 Sanctions 
 
Gray and Jenkins (1993) referred to sanction as the hallmark of 
accountability. In this regard, accountability was defined as the “perceived 
need to justify or defend a decision or action to some audience which has 
potential reward and sanction power, and where such rewards and 
sanctions are perceived as contingent on accountability conditions” (Frink 
and Klimoski, 1998: 9).  
For the NCDMB to fulfil its accountability duties and efficiently discharge its 
legal responsibilities, it has to have adequate power to impose sanctions on 
non-compliant companies. This accountability element is the extension of 
the enforceability aspect of accountability discussed in Section 10.5.3. In 
addition, it involves taking measures in the form of punishment for the 
defaulters. The NOGICD Act has equipped the Board with the power to 
cancel contracts or charge a fine of 5% of the contract value when local 
content rules are violated by oil companies. The following statement was 
developed to test this aspect.  
 
10.5.15.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB can effectively impose 
sanctions on any company that violates the provisions of the Act 
 
This statement attracted a neutral position of 45.3% against the agreement 
(6.6%+25.1%) and disagreement (13.3%+9.7%) positions (median = 
3.00) suggesting stakeholders’ doubts about the matter (Table 7.5). 
Although the Act has given enough powers to the Board to impose 
sanctions, yet the stakeholders have decided to take this position. This 
might not be surprising considering the fact that despite several allegations 
of violations, up to the present there has been no incidence of sanction. 
Supporting an argument that the Board has not lived up to expectation, the 
Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) had insisted 
that the Board has failed in its mandate to enforce the provisions of the first 
consideration for Nigerians for employment and training, and the 
employment of a maximum of five percent (5%) of the expatriates and a 
minimum of sixty percent (60%) of Nigerians in the management positions 
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in the oil and gas companies. Also, the Board’s ability to examine and 
scrutinize the Nigerian Content Performance Reports issued by companies 
was queried (Ahiuma-Young, 2014). There is, therefore, the tendency that 
the oil firms could submit counterfeit local content reports (Informant 
IPG03). 
During an interview, a respondent who was knowledgeable about the 
Board’s activities admitted that the lack of the application of sanctions 
should not be misconstrued as a weakness on the part of the Board rather; 
the Board has chosen to use amicable procedures to resolve issues. This 
has also coincided with the latest report that it was at present that the 
Board “will start” to chase companies for non-remittance of the 1% NCDF 
levies (Nigerian News Direct, 2015). Further, to respond to the Board’s 
lackadaisical attitude, a National Assembly Report has indicated a legislative 
decision to intervene and punish defaulters (The Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 2013). This further showed the Board’s inherent weaknesses. 
Significant differences were revealed (Table 7a Appendix 7). A cross-
tabulation result (Table 7b Appendix 7) disclosed that GV (32.3%) was 
different from TU (8.1%) and CS (9.1%) regarding the neutrality about the 
statement. The highest doubt showed by the GV may not be unrelated to 
either the groups’ resolution that all necessary cordial measures have to be 
taken before any sanction is contemplated or the groups recourse to the 
National Assembly for help (The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013).  
 
10.5.16 Governance 
 
The concept of governance has been playing a major role in this research. 
As the research is basically on the accountability of local content actors, it is 
inevitable that we discuss the aspect of governance because accountability 
was viewed as the bedrock of modern governance (Dubnick, 2002). In 
chapter three the study comprehensively reviewed an oil and gas good 
governance framework which provided the foundation for the conceptual 
framework of the study. In this part of the work, a statement was made to 
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examine stakeholders’ overall assessment of the governance effectiveness 
of the NCDMB in managing local content. The statement was as below. 
 
10.5.16.1 Perceptions of the effectiveness of the overall governance of 
local content 
 
Governance was identified as one of the four pillars of achieving 
sustainability through local content (Schlumberger, 2014). This statement, 
unlike the others already considered, was designed on a 7-point scale. The 
measurement ranges from 1 = Extremely effective to 7 = Extremely 
ineffective. The aim was to gather stakeholders’ final assessment on the 
overall accountability of the Board. This statement attracted varied 
responses with 61.5% (7.6%+23%+30.9%) satisfied that the Board’s 
overall governance was effective (median = 3.00). This stance should not 
over-shadow the 35.6% neutral and the 16.9% (9.7%+6.8%+0.4%) 
ineffective positions. Overall, we can conclude that the Board has effective 
governance provisions.  
After getting the information on the general performance of the NCDMB, the 
next section aims at investigating the Board’s financial accountability in 
isolation. 
 
10.6 NCDMB’s Financial Accountability to the Stakeholders in the 
Nigerian Petroleum Sector   
 
In Section 4.8.3 we reviewed the NCDMB’s fiscal responsibilities located in 
the third and the fourth stages of the petroleum value chain (Alba, 2009). 
In these stages, we have seen how the Board receives and disburses 
monies from the NCDF in line with the provisions of S. 104 for its 
commercial and developmental interventions (Sections 4.8.4.1 and 
4.8.4.2). This section tests whether or not the Board manages and reports 
its financial activities with respect to the NCDF. Four statements were 
prepared to serve this purpose. The results were then combined with other 
qualitative evidence to answer the following research question: 
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What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s 
financial accountability in the Nigerian oil and gas industry?  
  
The following sections discuss the results of the four statements first before 
considering the interview data. 
10.6.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that all oil and gas 
operators/contractors remit the mandatory 1% of the contract sum to the 
Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF) 
 
Stakeholders have expressed their approval with 41.7% and 28.1% either 
agreed or strongly agreed that oil companies remit these monies to the 
NCDF (median = 2.00) (Table 7.7). This agreement indicated oil companies’ 
compliance with the legal provisions of S. 104(2) and (3) which provided 
that all contractors, subcontractors or alliance partners who are awarded 
contracts in the industry have to remit the mandatory levy of 1% of the 
total contract value to the NCDF. This has usually been the norm in many 
countries that implement local content (IMF, 2005). This position 
notwithstanding contradicted a very recent newspaper report about the 
government’s resolve to launch a forensic audit to trace defaulting firms 
(Nigerian News Direct, 2015; see also Section 10.5.15.1). This action has 
clearly confirmed that not all oil operators abide by these provisions, and 
these sanctions might already have been belated. A post hoc test revealed 
statistically significant differences between GV (26.7%) and CS (7.8%) 
(Tables 8a & 8b Appendix 8). Whilst the GV group believes highly that these 
monies were constantly remitted, the CS has a reservation. Considering the 
newspaper report above, it appeared that the CS had a good reason for its 
low agreement. 
10.6.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB reports the financial positions 
(income and expenditure) of the Nigerian Content Development Fund 
(NCDF) to all the key stakeholders in the oil and gas industry 
 
Stakeholders have registered an overwhelming 49.6% neutral stance on 
this statement (median of 3.00) (Table 7.7). Interestingly, this result has 
coincided with the results in Section 10.5.8.1 on the Board’s failure to 
disclose and report its financial transactions to its various stakeholders. By 
260 
implication, this revealed the Board’s fiscal deficiency. This result was also 
in agreement with interview responses on similar issues as none of the 
interviewees were certain about the actual situation of the NCDF (e.g., 
IPC02, IPC01 and IPI01). This showed that inquiring into whether or not 
stakeholders were involved in decisions concerning the fund is important. 
 
10.6.3 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB consults with key stakeholders 
before spending money from the Nigerian Content Development Fund 
(NCDF) 
 
In support of the results in 10.6.2 above, this statement has also generated 
an overwhelming 47.5% neutral response against the 25.2% (7.2%+18%) 
agreement and the 27.4% (24.5%+2.9%) disagreement, from the 
stakeholders (median = 3.00) (Table 7.7). This result may be thought of as 
contradicting the positive results in Sections 10.5.6.1 and 10.5.6.2 on 
stakeholders’ engagement and consultation. This might not be the case as 
this statement is concerned with financial matters while the others were 
not. This indicated that the Board was more willing to engage, involve and 
consult stakeholders on issues other than financial. The result was not 
consistent with an interviewee’s (IPG01) argument that the Board had 
constituted a stakeholder committee as a consultation forum to consider 
matters relating to the Fund (see Section 8.4). It was also in conflict with 
what was exhibited in the NCDF’s structure (Figure 14) which involved an 
advisory committee in the administration of the fund. The next section 
concluded this issue by assessing whether, in the overall, the Fund was 
achieving the purpose for which it was created.  
 
10.6.4 Perceptions of whether the Nigerian Content Development Fund 
(NCDF) is achieving its purpose of providing easy access to finance for 
indigenous oil companies to execute oil and gas projects 
 
A slightly neutral opinion of 40.4% was obtained for this statement (median 
= 3.00) (Table 7.7). Also, an agreement level of 33% (11.2% and 21.8%), 
and a disagreement level of 26.6% (21.2%+5.4%) were also achieved. This 
result confirmed the varied opinions of the interview participants about this 
issue. Besides the above quantitative analysis, corroborating qualitative 
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evidence was also collected to provide more insight into the financial 
accountability of the Board. This will be discussed below.  
 
10.6.5 Qualitative Results of the NCDMB’s Financial Accountability 
 
Section 8.4 has presented the interview data of the financial accountability 
of the NCDMB in order to supplement the quantitative data. The initial 
coding of the data has revealed several sub-themes from which four major 
themes have emerged. These themes are: (1) transparency and 
accessibility to financial information (2) honesty and professionalism (3) 
monitoring, auditing and verification of financial and non-financial 
performance, and (4) stakeholder engagement. These points are discussed 
below. 
 
10.6.5.1 Transparency and Accessibility of Financial Information 
 
Results have shown stakeholders’ mixed reactions on the NCDMB’s 
transparency of financial information. Contrary to the quantitative findings, 
many issues have been raised concerning how the Board manages the two 
funds in its custody. In spite of all the efforts made by the Board to be 
transparent by engaging funds managers to oversee the NCDF (BGL Plc and 
UBA Capital, 2014), the stakeholders have indicated dissatisfaction with the 
disclosure and access to the funds (e.g., IPC03 and IPI01). This result has 
partially supported the quantitative results in Section 10.6.4 above. The 
stakeholders have projected the expected financial accountability duties of 
the NCDMB to include professionalism, transparency, hard work and 
honesty. Consistent with Nwosu, (2006) it was evident that there was 
neither any credible data on the financial positions of the fund nor any track 
record of its capacity development functions. This has made stakeholders 
sceptical about the possibilities of the NCDF to achieve its targets of 
executing projects, programmes and other related activities that promote 
Nigerian content as provided in S. 104(3) of the Act (NCDMB, 2013).  
 
262 
Although Hufbauer et al. (2013) had claimed that the modalities of the Fund 
were vague, the stakeholders have surprisingly shown a good 
understanding of the divisions of the Fund into 30% developmental 
interventions and 70% commercial interventions (S. 70(h) NOGICD; UBA 
PLC and BGL Capital, 2014; see also, chapter four). The stakeholders’ calls 
for reporting of the NCDF as evident from the empirical data were in line 
with the several calls from the civil society groups about the Board’s 
transparency and the accessibility of the Fund (Nigerian Tribune, 2015). It 
was reported that the stakeholders “want a clearer and less cumbersome 
process of accessing the Nigerian Content Fund”, according to a civil society 
group. It was pointed out that the difficulty in accessing the fund came at 
the time when companies were in a pressing need to develop capacity and 
finance projects. Since the Fund is meant to encourage local employment, 
training, local sourcing, etc., the stakeholders have shown interest in 
traceable records to that effect, or else, the value addition expectations of 
the Fund would be vitiated. 
 
From the perceptions gathered, it seemed that not a single informant was 
aware of the actual financial position of the Fund as none had responded to 
such question. This reaffirmed the possibility that the stakeholders were 
mainly engaged or consulted by the Board on non-financial matters as 
obtained in Sections 10.5.6.1 and 10.5.6.2. Although local content 
implementation in Nigeria has a history of opacity (Nwosu, 2006), the 
Fund’s transparency was said to be what the Board has been trying to 
ensure (Ovadia, 2013). According to the Board’s claims, the Fund has hit 
$500m. Abdelwahed (2014) viewed that the Fund alone was inadequate to 
satisfy the industry needs, and recommended that there should be a special 
subvention from the government. This has made some of the stakeholders 
to suggest the utilization of the venture capital and trade credits. Another 
area of the Board’s financial accountability is the management of its internal 
finances including budgetary allocations meant to finance salaries and other 
statutory affairs. Although the law has made an explicit requirement in S. 
90 of the NOGICD Act, the Board has persistently failed in preparing annual 
reports of its financial transactions (Hufbauer et al., 2013). This implied 
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that the stakeholders’ concern over the need for external auditing of the 
Boards’ finances was genuine.  
 
A very important discovery from the available evidence was the existence of 
an expectation gap between the Board and the stakeholders with respect to 
financial accountability. Whilst the stakeholders were expecting information 
about the Board’s financial dealings, the Board was claiming to have no 
duty to supply such information to any stakeholder group other than the 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the National Assembly. This 
controversy seemed to be as a result of different interpretations of the law. 
While the stakeholders were relying on the literal meaning of accountability 
in line with its stakeholder features, the Board was relying on the customs 
and practices of public agencies in Nigeria where budgets and financial 
reports were allegedly said to be only disclosed to the House of Assembly. 
Although a stakeholder has suggested that the Board’s financial records 
were publicly accessible through the National Assembly, access to such 
information remains a challenge. A court action has to be instituted by a 
civil society group to enforce a public right to information on the Board. It 
was surprisingly alleged that the Board might not want to disclose certain 
information in order to please or protect the interests of some IOCs. This 
fact may confirm the allegations that the IOCs’ strength and political 
influence have been beyond the control of the NCDMB (Okafor and Aniche, 
2014). Conclusively, it can be confidently argued that the Board has 
relatively moderate financial accountability.  
 
10.6.5.2 Honesty and Professionalism 
 
Some of the expectations of the stakeholders were honesty and hard work 
on the part of the Board to collect, manage and disburse funds. The 
stakeholders showed their eagerness to see more efforts by the Board 
within a short period. The Board has pointed out that the procedural delay 
in managing the fund was a strategy to professionally act within the laid 
down policies and best practice. This supported the results in Section 
10.5.12.1 that the Board follows the rules and due process in its activities. 
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10.6.5.3 Monitoring, Auditing and Verification of Financial and non-
Financial Performance   
 
Some important aspects concerning the Board’s financial accountability 
were stakeholders’ persistent need for a clear, auditable and verifiable 
process to measure the Board’s performance instead of just press releases 
showcasing purported achievements (Hufbauer et al., 2013; Ovadia, 2014). 
Evidence has also shown that some stakeholders might have misunderstood 
the strategies deployed by the Board about the NCDF and its activities. As 
the Fund is just a loan guarantee, the Board claimed that it was the 
individual banks that would issue funds to the oil firms against which the 
NCDF would stand as a guarantor. Part of the functions of the Board is to 
monitor the companies that benefit to ensure effective utilization of the 
money.  
 
10.6.5.4 Stakeholder Engagement 
 
Consistent with the OPEC (2011) and as part of the accountability of the 
Board, engagement and collaboration among the industry stakeholders 
were viewed as necessary for the smooth implementation of the policy. The 
concept of engagement was found to be a sensitive accountability 
mechanism (AccountAbility1000, 2008; also Table 5.3). Some results from 
the analysis have confirmed the effectiveness of the Board’s engagement 
(Section 10.5.6) despite the lapses noted by Vaaland (2012). The next 
section examines the compliance with the provision that required special 
consideration for local oil firms in carrying out contracts.  
10.7 First consideration for the Nigerian oil and gas operating and 
servicing firms in the award of petroleum contracts, procurement of 
materials, employment and technology transfer 
 
This section considers assessing the NCDMB’s and the IOCs’ mandatory 
accountability to respectively enforce and comply with the legal 
requirements that local oil and gas companies are given exclusive 
consideration when issuing petroleum licenses, contracts, procurements and 
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employment and training as provided by S. 3(1) and (2). The section aimed 
to answer the following research question: 
What is the extent of stakeholders’ perceptions of the NCDMB’s 
ability to enforce the provision of the ‘first consideration’ to Nigerian 
oil and gas firms in the award of petroleum contracts, licenses, 
employment, procurement of materials, and technology transfer?   
 
To answer the above research question, both quantitative and qualitative 
information were gathered. For the quantitative information, fourteen (14) 
statements were presented to stakeholders for consideration (Table 7.8). 
These statements were guided by the accountability element of 
“enforceability” since they were testing the Board’s ability to enforce 
certain local content requirements. These are presented below.  
10.7.1 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that the Nigerian 
indigenous oil and gas companies are always given priority in the 
awarding of contracts that are within their capacity 
 
As a sustainable development policy, local content is achieved through local 
participation in petroleum contracts. This statement has tested whether the 
provision of the first consideration for the local operators in awarding 
contacts was enforced by the NCDMB. This, however, depends on the local 
capacity, personnel and assets to execute contracts (Monday, 2015). 
Responses to this statement showed that 38.1% and 25.9% of the 
respondents have either agreed or strongly agreed (median = 2.00) (Table 
7.8). This position may support the Petroleum Minister’s controversial claim 
that because of the Act, the local companies have won about 87% of the 
total contracts (NOGIntelligence, 2012). This claim has however been 
faulted by some of the interview informants on the basis of their 
experiences that the majority of the said contracts were won by foreign 
firms who disguised as local. Differences were recorded for this statement 
although not genuine according to the threshold produced by the Bonferroni 
Corrected Alpha. Hence, no further analysis was required. 
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10.7.2 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that the Nigerian 
indigenous oil and gas companies are not excluded from the award of oil 
and gas contracts on the ‘lowest bidder’ basis as stated by the law 
 
Contracts are usually won by the lowest bidders given the quality and 
delivery (Caplice and Sheffi, 2003). But, a departure from this normality 
was found to be a good practice and in the interest of sustainable 
development in Nigeria and in many other countries that implement local 
content. A margin of preference was applied to help local firms obtain more 
contracts (Naegelen & Mougeot, 1998; Cimino et al., 2014). In Nigeria for 
instance, a 10% margin of preference in favour of the local firms was 
provided by S. 16 of the NOGICD Act. Positive responses although not very 
strong, have shown that 37.1% and 14% of the respondents have agreed 
and strongly agreed with this statement (median = 2.00) against the 
equally significant 31% neutral and 17.6% (16.9%+0.7%) disagreement 
(Table 7.8). Significant differences were also calculated (Table 9a), and the 
cross-tabulation (Table 9b Appendix 9) showed that GV (29.1%) has a 
higher agreement than the LOC (22.3%) and TU (16.5%) possibly because, 
as the authority was trying to follow the due process in the award of 
contracts, some stakeholders might interpret it as an attempt to manipulate 
the process. This could, however, be possible because of the public 
authorities’ perceived bad records (Abraham and Santos, 2010). This result 
was also supported by the NUPENG’s allegation that most of the contracts 
in the drilling sub-sector were either awarded to non-local companies or to 
local companies that did not have the required drilling rigs (Ahiuma-Young, 
2014).    
 
10.7.3 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that the minimum 
Nigerian content set by the law is always achieved before oil and gas 
contracts are awarded to any company 
 
Oil-producing countries that implement local content policy often provide 
in their petroleum contracts, the minimum requirements for local 
employment and training, contracts and procurement, and technology 
transfer (see Table 2.2). These requirements are represented either by 
volume (number of labour hours, labour headcounts, and tonnes of 
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materials) or value (wages and salaries and total expenditure on 
procurement). Consistent with Munson and Rosenblatt (1997) the Nigerian 
local content rules have provided for the specific proportions of local 
content volumes and values in various petroleum activities in the industry 
(NOGICD Act, 2010). These provisions apply uniformly to the foreign and 
local firms for the onshore, offshore and deep-offshore operations 
(Ayonmike and Okeke, 2015). The values are recorded on a specially-
designed project template and form the basis for reporting by oil firms 
(Hilary-Nwokonko, 2004; Bordmann, 2010; Warner, 2011). Because of 
their double reporting responsibilities, the IOCs, apart from reporting these 
indices to the host authorities as a mandatory duty, also voluntarily 
disclose them using the GRI and the IPIECA sustainability reporting 
guidelines. This was considered in chapter nine. 
 
The above statement has generated positive responses (Table 7.8) with 
30.9% and 22.7% of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed (median 
= 2.00). This is especially possible as the Board had taken the strictest 
stance that no contract would be awarded to any company if the minimum 
requirements were not achieved (Kazzazi and Nouri, 2012; Okafor and 
Aniche, 2014).  
10.7.4 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that the indigenous oil 
and gas companies win more contracts after the enactment of the Nigerian 
Content legislation 
 
It was argued that it is only after implementation that the success of a 
policy can be assessed (Odumosu-Ayanu, 2012). Whether local oil firms 
obtain more contracts above the little 5% they used to get before the local 
content law (see Table 4.2) remains an issue that only the industry 
participants could assess as there is no verifiable evidence. Some 
interviewees were of the opinion that most of the contracts supposedly 
won by the local firms were executed by the foreign companies. Local 
companies were only fronting for their international counterparts (Esteves, 
2013). Nonetheless, this statement has also attracted overwhelming 
35.6% and 16.9% agreement and strong agreement (median = 2.00). 
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This showed that the majority of the participants were satisfied with the 
level of improvement achieved in the industry as far as the award of 
contracts was concerned.  
 
10.7.5 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that all materials used 
in the oil and gas operations which are available in Nigeria are sourced 
locally and not imported 
  
The philosophy behind the local content policy is not only to encourage local 
participation in oil and gas activities but also to use policies such as joint 
ventures to develop local manufacturing sector (Hallwood, 1993). 
Unfortunately, some of the impediments to the local content policy in 
Nigeria are weak industrial base, undeveloped capital markets and 
“structural bottlenecks” (Balouga, 2012; Oxford Business Group, 2013: 
127).  
 
It was argued in the literature that most of the developed countries 
(including Britain and the US) have achieved industrialization through local 
content (Shafaeddin, 2000; Jie-A-Joen, et al., 2002; Enderwick, 2011). One 
of the green environmental arguments of local content proposed by this 
study (see Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2) has been manifested through the 
industrial policies (Johnson, 2015). Several pieces of evidence of the rise of 
local manufacturing of oil and gas assets in Nigeria were also witnessed.  
 
This statement was responded to in agreement with a bloc of 41.4% and 
25.9% of the respondents agreeing and strongly agreeing (median = 2.00) 
(Table 7.8). This position did not come as a surprise because of the efforts 
of the NCDMB to directly invest and encourage investment in manufacturing 
through its programme, the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industrial Park Strategy 
(NOGIPS). Some of the objectives of this programme include the attraction 
of domestic investment and FDI in the oil-related manufacturing sectors, 
encouragement of collaboration between the SMEs and the Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), and making locally produced goods 
competitive internationally (NCDMB, 2013). The analysis revealed 
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statistically significant differences among the responses (Table 10a 
Appendix 9). Cross-tabulation (Table 10b Appendix 9) revealed that CS 
(5.2%) had the lowest agreement compared to GV (29.6%), LOC (30.4%), 
and TU (22.6%). The CS may have lower agreement due to the claims by 
some activists that the so-called contract awards to local firms were either 
executed outside Nigeria or in Nigeria but by foreign firms as reported by 
Balouga (2012).  
 
10.7.6 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that International Oil 
and Gas Companies give priority consideration for the Nigerian banks for 
services that are within their capacity 
 
Local content policy means the involvement of all sectors of the economy 
through the spirit of linkage (Adewuyi and Oyejide, 2012). The financial 
sector is very instrumental in the implementation of local content as it is a 
major provider of capital. Local content benefits are not fully actualised in 
environments with an inefficient financial sector. In Nigeria, the local banks 
were unable to positively impact on local content policy as they lack a 
strong financial base to finance energy businesses couple with the fact that 
most local contractors do not even have a proper structure (Balouga, 
2012). A study by Ihua (2010) has revealed that many of the local banks 
did not even understand the actual nature of the oil and gas business, and 
so, they do not have any dedicated sections that deal with the oil and gas 
matters. 
 
This, notwithstanding, stakeholders have responded in agreement that the 
IOCs give preference to Nigerian banks with 46% and 19.8% agreement 
and strong agreement levels (median = 2.00) (Table 7.8). This result has 
refuted a stakeholder’s opinion (IPC01) that in spite of all the mergers 
conducted in the Nigerian banking sector, the banks were still not able to 
adequately finance oil and gas business. This result may, however, suggest 
possible improvements over what used to be the case. The result may also 
be supported by the current legal requirement that every operator, 
contractor or sub-contractor must retain at least 10% of its total accrued 
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revenue in Nigerian banks (S. 52(3)f NOGICD Act, 2010). Complying with 
this directive would enhance the local bank’s financial positions.  
 
10.7.7 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that International Oil 
and Gas Companies give priority consideration for the Nigerian insurance 
companies for services that are within their capacity 
 
The insurance business is one of the sectors with a critical importance to 
the economy. Together with the banking and the legal sector they provide 
the basis for local content implementation. Stakeholders are in agreement 
that the Nigerian insurance companies are patronised by the IOCs as 
evidenced by the 38.5% and 20.1% agreement and strong agreement 
(median = 2.00) (Table 7.8). This agreement may be supported by the fact 
that the NOGICD Act required that all oil and gas operators and contractors, 
foreign or local  
shall insure all insurable risks related to its oil and gas business, operations or 
contracts with an insurance company, through an insurance broker registered in 
Nigeria under the provisions of Insurance Act as amended.  
 
10.7.8 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that International Oil 
and Gas Companies give priority consideration for the Nigerian legal firms 
for services that are within their capacity 
 
NCDMB is required to mandate oil companies to use the local law firms for 
their operations in the industry. S. 51(1) of the NOGICD Act requires all 
operators and contractors to “retain only the services of a Nigerian legal 
practitioner or a firm of Nigerian legal practitioners whose office is located 
in any part of Nigeria”. This may be the reason why the agreement of 
60.1% (41%+19.1%) was recorded for this statement (median = 2.00) 
(Table 7.8). 
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10.7.9 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that International Oil 
and Gas Companies give employment priority to Nigerian labour for 
services that are within their expertise 
 
The requirement to give priority to local personnel is one of the most 
common provisions in petroleum contracts worldwide (see Section 2.9). It 
is one of the five tools or strategies of local content suggested by Ernst & 
Young (EY, 2014).  
This statement has attracted positive responses with 38.1% and 19.8% 
either agreeing or strongly agreeing (median = 2.00) (Table 7.8). This 
position could support the Nigeria’s Petroleum Minister’s claim that over 
30,000 jobs were created in eight areas of specialization (see Table 4.4) as 
a result of the enactment of the NOGICD Act (NCDMB, 2013).  
 
10.7.10 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB is making all necessary efforts 
to ensure that International Oil and Gas companies set up offices and 
facilities in the communities they operate as required by the law 
 
Community content is a micro perspective of local content in which local 
communities participate in contracts and employment (Warner, 2007; 
Oguine, 2011). Community content was treated as a micro-mandatory 
activity in Van Alstine’s (2014) modified resource governance typologies 
(Figure 8). Localisation by the IOCs may be seen in two different stages: 
localisation in the country and localisation in the community of operations. 
The G4-SO1 indicator of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is quite 
elaborative in explaining how companies affect local communities and how 
that should be reported. The NOGICD Act requires oil firms to establish 
offices in the localities they operate (S. 27). The rationale for this is to 
foster sustainable development and intergenerational equity in those 
communities (Cairn, 2006). Some of the informants have provided further 
support for this position (e.g., IPL01). 
The majority of the stakeholders responded to this statement in agreement 
with 49.3% and 12.6% either agreeing or strongly agreeing (median = 
2.00) (Table 7.8).  
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10.7.11 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that all information on 
employment and training programmes are made public 
 
It is the responsibility of the Board to announce all opportunities and 
challenges to the industry stakeholders. This is part of the accountability 
dimensions of transparency and engagement. The majority of the 
stakeholders have shown positive response to the statement with 38.5% 
and 12.9% agree and strongly agree levels (median = 2.00) (Table 7.8). 
This position was consistent with the results of Sections 10.5.5 and 10.5.6. 
As a result of its transparency and engagement with the stakeholders, the 
Board had claimed to have achieved significant success in employment and 
training in various areas (see Table 4.4). 
  
10.7.12 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB ensures that only Nigerians are 
employed by the International Oil Companies in junior and intermediate 
cadre as required by the law 
 
Nigeria has copied from the international best practice in local content and 
specified positions to be occupied by nationals in the IOCs (Cotula, 2010). 
The law has required the IOCs to give up certain positions to the nationals 
(S. 34 NOGICD Act, 2010). This has the potential to reduce unemployment, 
economic hardship and grievances that often suppress sustainable 
development. The GRI and the IPIECA have provided in their sustainability 
reporting guidelines the descriptions of how categories and proportion of 
local personnel should be reported by companies (IPIECA, 2011; GRI, 
2013).  
 
The majority of stakeholders have agreed or strongly agreed with this 
statement at 41% and 12.9% respectively (median = 2.00) (Table 7.8). 
This view may be supported by the fact that besides being a legal 
requirements oil companies find it cost effective to hire the local labour 
rather than the imported (Hays, 2013). The result was also consistent with 
Fossgard-Moser’s (2003) cost perspective (Section 3.3.4). 
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10.7.13 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB effectively involves the oil 
industry Trade Unions (NUPENG and PENGASSEN) in important training 
and employment decisions 
 
Trade unions are very important stakeholders in any accountability regime 
as they symbolise the basic constitutional rights to assembly, expression of 
opinion and speech. In the Nigerian oil and gas sector, there are two main 
trade unions – the PENGASSAN and the NUPENG, representing the senior 
and the junior oil workers respectively. Any issue of employment or training 
directly involves these unions. There were strong allegations that these 
unions were not adequately involved in many aspects of local content 
despite their importance (Ahiuma-Young, 2014). But, contrary to this 
allegation, the stakeholders have agreed (37.8%) and strongly agreed 
(14%) that these unions were engaged by the Board (median = 2.00) 
(Table 7.8). This agreement was however weak because the neutral level of 
31.7% and the disagreement level of 16.5% (10.4%+6.1%) were also 
reasonable. The allegation was further challenged by our analysis in Section 
10.8 where the study used the logistic regression tests to examine whether 
stakeholders were discriminated from local content programmes on the 
basis of their organizations. In spite of this, an activist (IPC02) maintained 
that civil society groups were not carried along in some of the NCDMB’s 
matters. 
 
10.7.14 Perceptions of whether the NCDMB effectively collaborates with 
International Oil and Gas Companies to facilitate technology transfer 
programmes to Nigerian workforce 
  
Technology transfer, though the least applied by countries (Section 2.9), is 
the backbone of every local content policy. Collaborations between the IOCs 
and the local firms through partnerships, joint ventures and alliances help 
significantly in transferring technology (Ihua, 2010). Stakeholders have 
agreed and strongly agreed with this statement with 46.8% and 14.7% 
(median = 2.00) (Table 7.8). This indicated the Board’s success in enforcing 
the provisions of technology transfer (S. 43-46). This result has 
contradicted the findings of Vaaland et al. (2012) of weak collaboration 
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among the local content actors, with the powerful IOCs as well as the 
institutional actors taking the blame. 
The above quantitative analysis was supported by qualitative information 
gathered through interviews with key stakeholders. The results are 
presented below. 
  
10.7.15 Qualitative Results of the ‘first consideration’ to Nigerian 
Oil Companies 
 
In addition to the quantitative data, evidence was also obtained through 
interviews (chapter eight). Two major categories of themes discovered were 
the factors that facilitate compliance with the provision of the first 
consideration, and those that inhibit its progress. The major themes that 
appeared were: (1) effective enforcement and compliance mechanisms (2) 
vested interest, corruption and non-disclosure of beneficial owners of oil 
companies, and (3) financial and technological constraints. These points are 
discussed below. 
 
10.7.15.1 Effective Enforcement and Compliance Mechanisms 
 
It was shown that only effective enforcement and compliance mechanisms 
could induce the IOCs to award contracts to the indigenous firms. The 
concept of enforcement is very important in accountability (see Table 5.3). 
Throughout this study, stakeholders have been repeating the concept as the 
sole element that will ensure compliance with local content rules. This is in 
spite of the claims that provision of training facilities and incentives were 
enough to boost local skills rather than enforcing mandatory rules 
(Abdulkabir, et al., 2015).  
 
Evidence has shown that as a result of the enforcement powers of the 
Board, more local companies were patronized, and more local workforce 
was engaged. An elaboration was also made concerning the Board’s claims 
of creating over thirty thousand jobs in various oil and gas fields (see Table 
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4.4). It was revealed that for every year new jobs created are added to the 
retained jobs to give the total jobs for that period. Therefore, it may not be 
that all the jobs in Table 4.4 were new jobs.  The Board was, however, 
viewed as prioritising the enforcement of ‘local content’ rather than ‘local 
content development’ (Abdulkabir et al., 2015) that is, the percentage of 
expenditure and wages and salaries, rather than the long-term training and 
development of the locals (see Tordo et al., 2013 for this differences). The 
analysis also found an allegation that the ‘first consideration’ rules were 
discriminatory among local firms. That is simply to say that some local firms 
enjoy the first consideration for contracts over others on no just grounds 
besides the political patronage and the failure of the Board’s enforcement 
and control mechanisms.  
 
10.7.15.2 Vested Interest, Corruption and non-Disclosure of 
Beneficial Ownership of Oil Companies 
 
In a sharp contrast to the positive responses to the fourteen questionnaire 
statements presented in Section 10.7 above, the interview respondents 
have severally expressed their reservations on many of the purported 
achievements of the first consideration rules. This gave rise to the factors 
that inhibit the growth of local content. These factors included vested 
interest, corruption, and concealment of the identities of the actual 
beneficial owners of some oil companies that win and execute contracts 
(Martini, 2014; NRGI Reader, 2015). Upstream licensing and contract 
award were viewed as the “loci of corruption” in Nigeria (Gillies, 2009: 2). 
These practices have allowed some firms that have no tangible assets in the 
country to execute contracts worth billions of dollars (The Will, 2013; 
Akpata, 2014). Other discovered impediments of local content besides 
corruption were nepotism, favouritism and rent-seeking through political 
interference (Abdulkabir et al., 2015). The IOCs have resorted to giving 
various forms of gratifications to secure contracts (Martini, 2014; Nwapi, 
2015). Vaaland, et al. (2012) and Nwapi (2015) have found serious 
manipulations and corruption in oil bidding and licensing process from the 
advertisement to the execution of the contracts in Nigeria. For instance, 
back in 1994, the giant Halliburton was involved in a bribery scandal worth 
276 
$180 million to secure an LNG contract (George and Lacey, 2006) in the 
country. In chapter three, the study has elaborately discussed the issues of 
corruption in local content as one of the major governance failures. Also, 
lack of verifiable data has made some stakeholders to doubt the Petroleum 
Ministers’ claims that 87% of the contracts were won by the local firms and 
viewed it as a “grand deception” (e.g., respondent IPC02). A section of the 
stakeholders has held the opinion that the local firms only acted as fronts to 
their foreign counterparts. This has coincided with the Balouga (2012) and 
Esteves (2011) arguments that the imposition of too stringent or unrealistic 
local content targets could lead to pervasive behaviours by contractors.  
 
The analysis has shown an overall agreement that the IOCs have found 
several ways to bend the rules to fit their interests with the connivance of 
the locals, sometimes even with the authorities. It was also opined that if 
the authorities were not diligent in ascertaining the beneficial ownership of 
firms, the fronting problems would persist (NRGI, 2015). Scholars have 
suggested that any comprehensive local content report must involve the 
percentage of local ownership of firms especially in Angola, Nigeria, Ghana 
and Uganda (Kalyuzhnova, 2012; Ramdoo, 2015).60 Ownership was one of 
the five basic ingredients of the second local content model (EY, 2014), and 
one of the two criteria61 used to determine the size of value-addition to the 
national economy (see Section 3.5; see also, Koopman et al., 2012). In the 
Nigerian situation, oil and gas contract procedures were said to have been 
marred by secrecy, corruption and manipulation of the bidding process 
(Vaaland, et al., 2012) resulting into awarding of contracts to “shell 
companies” with unascertained beneficial ownership (Martini, 2015: 5).  
 
 
                                                          
60 Some countries place emphasis on company ownership in determining the level of local content. For example, 
Nigerian local content regulators categorised oil and gas companies into six classes (see Hilary-Nwokonko, 2004) 
according to local percentage of share ownership, number of nationals in executive, management and supervisory 
positions, assets ownerships, etc. Based on this categorization, governments determine value additions made 
specifically to the local economy.  Some governments only consider the location of the company and not share 
ownership that is, the local address of companies. That is to say, a company does not necessarily have local 
ownership for it to add value to the local economy.  
61 The two most essential criteria to derive value-addition through local content are ownership and location of 
firms. See section 3.5.1. 
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10.7.15.3 Financial and Technological Constraints 
 
Consistent with Balouga (2012) and Vaaland (2012), other inhibitors of 
local content discovered from the empirical evidence were the technological 
and financial challenges faced by the local firms. These factors, coupled 
with the discovery that the NCDF was not enough to fund the oil and gas 
operations (Abdulwahed, 2014), has left the local companies at the mercy 
of their foreign counterparts (see for example, IPC03).  
 
The following section discusses the determinants of the awareness with 
some critical local content initiatives in order to address the allegations that 
some sections of the stakeholders were not fully aware of, and engaged 
with some of these initiatives.   
 
10.8 Awareness and Effectiveness of the NCDMB’s Local Content 
Programmes 
 
This section is interested in testing the extent of the awareness and the 
effectiveness of a selection of critical local content programmes developed 
by the NCDMB. The section used a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
evidence to conduct this task. Firstly, logistic regression was applied to test 
the determinants of the awareness of these programmes before proceeding 
to determine their effectiveness. The aim is to answer the following 
research question: 
What is the extent of stakeholders’ awareness and the effectiveness 
of the NCDMB’s local content programmes? 
  
Part of the quantitative analysis used the binary logistic regression to 
examine whether place of work (i.e., organization) and work experience 
(i.e., years of service) determined stakeholders’ awareness of the three 
major local content programmes, namely: (1) Offshore Rig Acquisition 
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Strategy (ORAS), (2) Marine Vessels Ownership Strategy (MAVOS), and (3) 
Equipment Component Manufacturing Initiative (ECMI)62.  
 
After conducting the logistic regression, results from the Omnibus test of 
model coefficients and the Hosmer and Lemeshow tests showed a good 
model fit for the MAVOS and the ECMI and a poor fit for the ORAS (Table 
7.10 and 7.11). Subsequently, the model summary showed the individual 
contributions of each of the independent variables (organization and years 
of service) to the explanation of the dependent variables (the ORAS, 
MAVOS and ECMI) (Table 7.12). The MAVOS model explained between 
7.9% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 10.8% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the 
variance of the awareness with the MAVOS programme. The ORAS model 
explained between 6.5% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 8.8% (Nagelkerke R 
Square) of the variance of the awareness with the ORAS programme. 
Finally, the ECMI model explained between 5% (Cox and Snell R Square) 
and 6.8% (Nagelkerke R Square). In all the three cases, the predictive 
values of the independent variables on the dependent variables were very 
small and insignificant signifying that the stakeholders’ awareness of the 
three programmes did not depend on the organizations they worked or the 
number of years they served (see Table 7.13). These results have disputed 
the allegations that certain groups of stakeholders such as the civil society 
and the trade unions were excluded from some of the NCDMB’s 
programmes (e.g., IPC02; Ovadia, 2013). 
 
On measuring the effectiveness of each of the three programmes, Table 
7.14 showed the stakeholders’ neutral positions, albeit weak, as the results 
were very close to an agreement. Hence, stakeholders seemed almost 
convinced by the Board’s achievements in these areas. For example, the 
Board has claimed that indigenous ownership and manning of marine 
vessels and offshore rigs have significantly increased as a result of the local 
content policy. Strong commitments worth billions of dollars were also 
                                                          
62 A comprehensive document for the ECMI programme can be found at: 
http://www.ncdmb.gov.ng/images/GUIDELINES/NCEC.pdf   
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received from Original Component Manufacturers to domicile activities in 
the country (NCDMB, 2012, 2013).  
 
To support the above quantitative results, an interview was conducted with 
local content managers and industry experts to explore the effectiveness of 
the three programmes. The results are discussed below.  
 
10.8.1 Qualitative Discussion of the Effectiveness of the NCDMB’s 
Programmes 
 
These results were not better than the ones obtained above. However, 
there were mixed comments on the feasibility of the three local content 
programmes. The responses were divided into three categories: those that 
have commended the programmes in their totality, those that have partially 
agreed, and those that have totally disagreed with their effectiveness. 
Visible differences between the responses of the Board itself and that of the 
other stakeholders were noticed. While the Board emphasised the 
effectiveness of the programmes as was logically expected, some of the 
stakeholders showed a lack of confidence. The obvious themes that have 
emerged from the empirical data were: (1) cooperation and support (2) 
asset ownership strategies (3) enforcement (4) cost effectiveness of local 
manufacturing of oil and gas assets, and (5) fronting. These themes are 
elaborated below.  
 
10.8.1.1 Cooperation and Support 
 
Stakeholders have given various comments about the three programmes, 
but the most important were cooperation, support and encouragement from 
the government and the foreign manufacturers of the oil and gas assets. 
After acknowledging that the industry was enormously relying on foreign oil 
marine tankers and offshore rigs, stakeholders have also raised many 
problems and challenges associated with these programmes including the 
lack of cooperation of the original manufacturers and the likely 
280 
unwillingness of the NCDMB to pursue them in earnest. Even as such, the 
programmes were largely commended by some stakeholders. 
 
10.8.1.2 Asset Ownership Strategies 
 
It was understood from the empirical data that the NCDMB was deploying 
some strategies to encourage ownership of oil and gas assets in order to 
achieve the legal requirements of the 50% asset ownership by the oil 
companies. The good news was the revelation that at present about 20% of 
the total offshore and land and swamp rigs operating in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry was jointly owned by the local and the foreign firms. Similarly, 
the overwhelming 80% of the total land and swamp rigs were completely 
owned by the local firms. Also, the industry was said to be ready to 
commence local manufacturing of marine vessels. This is a welcome 
development because it was consistent with the balance of payment and 
the technology transfer arguments of the local content (Johnson, 2015) 
which have a direct impact on the GDP (Toulekima, 2015). Simply put, the 
economy would not only benefit from the domiciliation of activities by the 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) themselves, but also in curtailing 
transfer pricing manoeuvres of the IOCs. Literature has examined the 
instances where increased local content rules reduce transfer pricing 
leverage of the multinational corporations and increase tax revenues to the 
state (Belderbos et al., 2000; PwC, 2012; Sigam and Gacia, 2012; African 
Transformation Report, 2014).  
 
While there was a widespread awareness of these programmes, a 
stakeholder showed no such awareness except for the ECMI programme63. 
Also, a section of the stakeholders has described the assets ownership 
targets as too ambitious, unrealistic and did not warrant the intended 
sanctions the Board wanted to impose on defaulters. Putting realistic, 
                                                          
63 One of the aims of this study was to use a logistic regression analysis to verify the claims that some stakeholders 
have not been involved in some of these programmes. The results were not able to substantial this claim but 
rather, revealed that organizational membership and years of experience did not impact on stakeholders’ 
awareness of the ORAS, MAVOS and ECMI programmes. 
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predictable and measurable local content targets was found to be part of 
the accountability indicators; but unrealistic targets only induce firms to 
adopt illegitimate schemes (Esteves, 2011). Other issues raised were the 
financing and skills requirements to own, manage and repair rigs. While 
research has shown the inability of the Nigerian banks to finance such 
ventures (Balouga, 2012), it was equally acknowledged that the Nigerian 
firms were lacking the required technical know-how to manage them (e.g., 
respondents IPC01, IPG02). A dilemma, however, existed as to the cost and 
benefit of local production of the oil and gas assets. This is considered in 
the next section. 
 
10.8.1.3 Cost-effectiveness of Local Production of Oil and Gas 
Assets 
 
An important discovery from the empirical evidence was the stakeholders’ 
observation that it might not always be in the best interest of the economy 
to produce everything locally. This argument was made on the basis of the 
principles of comparative advantage. It, therefore, follows that a cost-
benefit analysis was required before engaging in such a venture in line with 
Tordo, et al. (2013). Another view was that besides the cost implications of 
local manufacturing, the local technology was also weak. So, the viable 
option might be to invite the original manufacturers to set up business in 
Nigeria, the initiative the NCDMB calls the Equipment Component 
Manufacturing Initiative (ECMI). Even as such, it was argued by the 
stakeholders that due to other local economic and political challenges such 
as the instability of power supply, the locally manufactured components 
might be more expensive than the imported ones.    
 
10.8.1.4 Fronting 
 
The fronting issue has been consistently repeated throughout the discussion 
because of its momentous impacts on the Nigeria’s oil sector. In this 
situation, stakeholders have indicated that the so-called local manufacturing 
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of some machines claimed by the Board, was a mere exaggeration as it was 
not actually manufacturing but assembling. Also, the companies that 
embark on the manufacturing were not local as widely assumed, but rather, 
foreign firms in disguise. This is another problem with the identity or the 
beneficial ownership of oil firms discussed earlier. The issue of fronting in 
local content implementation in the industry has a long history. Back in 
2004, Ofurhie (2004) cited in Ovadia (2013: 68), had made the prediction 
that: “...we have also been warned on (sic) the possible danger of 
manipulating the new policy to promote local fronts instead of local 
content...”. With the local firms fronting for their foreign counterparts to 
secure contracts, local content cannot be a panacea for any of the 
accountability and governance challenges of the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry (Mwakali and Byaruhanga, 2011; Martini, 2014; Ovadia, 2014; 
UNCTAD, 2014; NRGI Reader, 2015).  
 
10.8.1.5 Enforcement  
 
Another line of argument was that while it was clear from the empirical data 
that fully locally-owned marine vessels (i.e., category ‘A’ 64) were to be 
considered first when awarding contracts, evidence has shown that some 
fully-owned Nigerian vessels were not able to secure jobs. This may take us 
back to our finding that the first and preferential consideration rules of the 
NOGICD Act were discriminatory (Section 10.7.15). These issues might be 
related to corruption and absence of transparency. The NRGI (2015) has 
suggested that to tackle the problems of corruption and fronting in the oil 
industry, the contracting processes have to be transparent, and the civil 
society must be involved. This claim was refuted by an NCDMB official and 
argued that the Board sticks to prioritizing marine vessels for contracts 
based on the existing categorization of local ownership or manufacturing 
(see Appendix 12 for the revised categorization).  
                                                          
64 The NCDMB has devised a categorization scheme based on which contracts are awarded to marine vessel 
vendors. For example, a wholly-owned or locally-built Nigerian vessel (i.e., category A) will be given the first 
consideration. Vessels that are 50% and above constructed locally will be considered next, etc. A notice of the 
revised categorization is attached as appendix 12. 
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The next section presents the discussion on the degree to which the IOCs in 
Nigeria comply with their mandatory local content reporting required by the 
law. This is to reconcile between their mandatory and voluntary 
accountability.  
 
10.9 The Extent to which the IOCs Operating in Nigeria Comply with 
the Mandatory Reporting of Local Content Performance 
 
This section interprets the empirical data obtained on the compliance with 
the mandatory reporting of designated contract documents by the IOCs. It 
relies solely on the quantitative procedure although some qualitative 
evidence was also found to be relevant. The results will be used to answer 
the following research question:   
To what extent do the IOCs operating in Nigeria comply with the 
mandatory reporting of local content performance? 
 
Empirical results from the questionnaire (Table 7.9) showed stakeholders’ 
agreement with a range of 10.4% and 31.4% strongly agree and agree 
(media = 2.00) that the IOCs were complying with the mandatory reporting 
requirements and were engaged in the compilation and submission of 
specific contract documents listed by the Act (NOGICD Act, 2010). These 
documents include the:  
(a) quarterly contracting plan which exceeds $1,000,000  
(b) invitation to tenders for all contracts exceeding $1,000,000  
(c) quarterly procurement report  
(d) employment and training plan  
(e) technology transfer plan  
(f) annual Nigerian content performance report  
(g) half-yearly financial services plan  
(h) half-yearly legal services plan, and  
(i) insurance plans  
 
 
This legal requirement was used to regulate the local content accounting 
and disclosure practices in order to mitigate the information asymmetry 
between the Nigerian government and the IOCs (Gaffikin, 2005; Chatham 
House, 2013). This is part of the hard or mandatory local content 
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accountability of the oil firms in Nigeria (see Figure 8). Fulfilling such 
mandatory reporting rules confirms companies’ compliance with the host 
government’s policies (Cowan and Gadenne, 2005). Several countries were 
said to have used their respective agencies to achieve similar reporting and 
monitoring aims (see Appendix 2).    
 
This examination was important particularly; with a stakeholder (IPT01) as 
well as the literature argument (Egbon, 2014) emphasising the strength 
and influence of the IOCs and their potential to connive with the political 
elites to bypass the law. The convergence between this result and that of 
Section 10.10 below would help the study to ascertain whether or not the 
IOCs in Nigeria concurrently discharge their hard and soft local content 
accountability in the Nigeria’s petroleum value chain.  
 
10.10 The Extent of the IOCs’ Voluntary Local Content Reporting in 
the Global Sustainability Reports 
 
In this section, the study focuses particular attention on the extent of the 
soft or voluntary accountability engaged by the IOCs usually to achieve 
legitimacy and social license to operate (Patten, 1992; Brown and Deegan, 
1999). This is in the form of local content reporting practices of the IOCs in 
their global sustainability reports (Higgins, 2014). In this part of the study, 
the work adopted the sustainability accounting methodology and computed 
the disclosure index on a set of fifty sustainability reports of the sampled 
IOCs for the periods 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 based on the five 
categories of the local content indicators derived from the GRI and the 
IPIECA sustainability reporting guidelines (see Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 6.3). The 
result is to be used to answer the following research question: 
  
To what extent do the IOCs operating in Nigeria voluntarily disclose and 
report local content in their global sustainability reports before and after 
the creation of the Nigerian local content law?  
 
It was quite interesting to find out that all the five IOCs involved have 
subscribed to both the GRI and the IPIECA sustainability reporting 
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guidelines for all the relevant years. They have also adopted the EITI 
recommendations for general transparency. It should be recalled that the 
EITI has made comprehensive recommendations on local content disclosure 
as part of corporate accountability (Section 3.13) and in this direction, it 
was observed that some oil companies engage the professionals and the 
Civil Society groups to audit their local content performance reports 
(Ngoasong, 2014). Four of the five sampled IOCs (Shell, Chevron, 
ExxonMobil and Total) have maintained reports separate from the main 
annual financial reports which they variously named Sustainability Reports, 
Corporate Citizenship Report, Environment and Society, and Corporate 
Responsibility Reports. Only Eni-Agip was operating an integrated annual 
report where the sustainability information is incorporated into the financial 
reports. Whatever the case, these reports serve the same purpose of 
reporting the triple-bottom-line (social, economic and environmental) 
sustainability (Milne and Patten, 2002; Higgins et al, 2014). 
 
The remaining sections of this work largely adopted the business-case face 
of the stakeholder-accountability and the mainstream accounting paradigm 
to determine how and why the IOCs voluntarily account for, and report 
their local content performances. Consistent with literature findings, 
business entities tend to report sustainability issues in areas they have high 
performance rather than those with low performance (Mitnick, 2000). 
Hence, the study assumed that the indicators disclosed by the IOCs were 
those on which they have the highest performance. Also, as the local 
content policy is a social and regulatory issue used to simultaneously 
comply with the law and obtain the social license to operate, the study also 
assumed that the contents of the sampled IOCs’ sustainability reports 
analysed represented the extent of their local content disclosure. 
 
The results of the disclosure analysis presented in chapter nine have shown 
an almost consistent disclosure index (i.e., whether or not an item was 
disclosed) of the two reporting periods with indices ranging from 0.46 to 
0.45 ‘before’ and ‘after’ the local content law respectively. These indices are 
within the range of a moderate disclosure. This came as a surprise as the 
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study had expected to find higher disclosure levels following the creation of 
the Nigerian local content law and the establishment of the dedicated 
enforcement agency (the NCDMB), to monitor the implementation of the 
policy. These results showed no impact of the local content law. Also, in 
spite of the claims made by the five IOCs of adopting the GRI and the 
IPIECA sustainability guidelines, most of the items disclosed were not in 
strict compliance with the prescriptions of the guidelines (Tables 3.1 and 
3.2). 
 
A closer look at the disclosure volumes of each of the five items (Table 9.1) 
led to the results in Figures 27 and 28. From the two pie-charts it was 
shown that between 2005 and 2009 local content disclosures for the 
respective indicators were recorded as: SE5 = 10%; EC5 = 1%; EC9 = 8%; 
EC6/SE6 = 56% and DMA/SE7 = 25%. Also, the results between 2010 and 
2014 showed: SE5 = 7%; EC5 = 0%; EC9 = 18%; EC6/SE6 = 35% and 
DMA/SE7 = 40%. This indicated that the indicators with the highest volume 
of disclosure in 2005-2009 were indicators for local hiring and hiring 
practices (EC6/SE6) and the local supplier development practices and 
programs (DMA/SE7). This result was similar in 2010-2014 where these 
same indicators have attracted the highest disclosure. These two indicators 
were among the five strategic tools of the second local content model 
discussed extensively throughout this work (Section 3.5). These results 
were consistent with the ones obtained from the analysis of the model 
petroleum contracts of 23 countries (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2) where 
contracts and procurement and employment and training had the highest 
application indicating more emphasis on the economic and social 
sustainability of local content. The results were further supported by Frynas 
and Paulo (2007) and EY (2014) who argued that almost all IOCs were 
engaged in local employment and training activities to boost local capacity.  
 
The lower disclosed indicators were those relating to local content 
objectives, approaches, policies and strategies (SE5) as well as the 
proportion of spending on local purchases (EC9). This showed failure by the 
IOCs to properly articulate and disclose their local content objectives and 
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strategies which are fundamental to the local content and accountability 
principles (OECD, 2008; Cotula, 2010; Tordo, 2011; Levett, et al., 2012; 
Esteves et al., 2013). For the local purchases, this may not be unconnected 
to the oil companies’ scepticism about publishing and publicising 
information relating to their suppliers and contracts since they are 
competing with many rivals for the same thing (World Bank, 2012). The 
results have partly coincided with the survey results which found that most 
of the sampled Chinese firms have largely reported the local supplier 
development rather than the local purchases among other local content 
sustainability indicators (International Accounting and Reporting Issues, 
2007). 
 
The least disclosed item was the local wages (EC5) which were disclosed in 
relation to the minimum wages by category of personnel. The next section 
extended the above analysis and went beyond the mere determination of 
whether or not an item was disclosed. In the coming section the volumes of 
disclosures were determined and, as there was no benchmark for local 
content disclosure performance, a comparison was conducted between the 
two periods – before and after the local content law – to observe if there 
were significant changes in the volumes (in word count) of disclosure.  
 
10.11 Testing the differences in volumetric local content 
sustainability disclosures before and after the creation of the 
Nigerian local content law 
 
This section aims at testing the following research hypothesis: 
H0 There is no significant difference in the volumes of local content 
sustainability disclosure of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before and 
after the creation of the Nigerian local content law. 
H1 There is a significant difference in the volumes of local content 
sustainability disclosure of the IOCs operating in Nigeria before and 
after the creation of the Nigerian local content law. 
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To test the above hypothesis, the content-analysed volumetric data on local 
content sustainability was used to conduct a pooled paired-samples t-test. 
The data has undergone the rigorous normality tests after which it was log-
transformed (refer to Tables 9.4-9.6 and Appendix 11a and11b). Table 9.8 
presented the results of the paired-samples t-test. The test was conducted 
to evaluate the impact of the Nigerian local content sustainability law on the 
voluntary local content disclosure practices of the IOCs operating in Nigeria. 
The result obtained showed statistically significant difference in the volume 
(word count) of disclosures with a mean = 1.18041, SD = .35026, and t = 
25.444. In this case, the null hypothesis that there was no significant 
difference in the volumes (word count) of disclosure between the two 
periods will be rejected. The effect size of 0.92 was also large enough to 
corroborate the significance of the difference.  
 
This result was quite interesting and likely to be perceived as contradictory 
to the results in Section 10.10 above where it was found that the disclosure 
index of ‘before’ was higher than that of ‘after’. This was not the case as it 
was already explained that the disclosure index was only concerned with 
whether or not an item was disclosed while the volumetric disclosure was 
concerned with the amount of words or sentences used to disclose an item. 
So, an item can be disclosed a single time but in many words. It was 
therefore not surprising to find that the index of disclosure was higher 
during the ’before’ period but the number of words or sentences used in the 
‘after’ period were larger. These results, coupled with those in Section 10.9 
where stakeholders showed their satisfaction with the manner the IOCs 
reported some designated contract documents, indicated that the IOCs in 
Nigeria are complying with their hard (mandatory) and soft (voluntary) 
local content accountability to a large extent.  
 
For this reason, as far as the IOCs’ hard and soft accountability were 
concerned, their performance was commendable. The results also showed a 
likely impact (in terms of volume of reporting and not the index) of the 
Nigeria’s local content law on the voluntary reporting of the IOCs. It was 
further revealed that some of the major reasons the IOCs report their local 
289 
content sustainability performances to stakeholders include compliance with 
the law, marketing and publicity, showcase of governance and 
accountability, impressing the stakeholders, and social license to operate. 
These reasons were in line with Schaltegger and Burritt’s (2010) 
greenwashing, legislative and industry pressure, business-case, among 
others, which motivate firms to report social performance. They were also 
consistent with the mainstream accounting which views that conflicts are 
confronted with technical accounting knowledge (Hines, 1992; Modell, 
2010). As such, these results may inform the aggrieved oil communities 
that the IOCs operating in their midst have concerns for their social, 
environmental and economic lives. This is an aspect of a social license to 
operate (IPIECA, 2011). The results also supported an IOC interviewee 
(IPI01) who contended that local content reporting has been in place, 
recognised and implemented by the IOCs even before the creation of the 
Nigerian local content law (Section 8.3.5).  
10.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative 
results presented in chapters 7-9. The discussion started with the 
qualitative arguments that local content was a sustainability policy which 
has accountability implications. These views were largely supported by the 
stakeholders pointing to the social, economic and environmental relevance 
of the policy. New dimensions of accountability were also found to include 
understanding, measurability and predictability.  
 
Quantitative and qualitative results of the NCDMB’s financial and non-
financial accountability were also presented, where it was found that 
although the Board’s performance on many fronts was positive, certain 
areas of challenges were revealed. These areas include auditing and 
disclosure of financial records, management of the NCDF and the failure of 
the Board to eliminate corruption, fronting and discriminatory treatment of 
local firms. Although the quantitative results of the Board’s power to 
enforce the ‘first consideration’ provision were all in favour of the Board, 
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the qualitative evidence had reservations in some areas. Overall, the Board 
has performed relatively well. The last part of the chapter discussed the 
voluntary reporting practices of the five major IOCs operating in Nigeria 
based on the GRI and the IPIECA sustainability reporting guidelines. It was 
found that the disclosure indices of the sampled firms were within the 
moderate level with the ‘before’ period slightly higher than the ‘after’ 
period. Results also showed that the Nigeria’s local content law had some 
impact on the IOCs’ volume (word count) and not the index (frequency) of 
local content disclosure.    
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Summary of Findings, Contributions and Policy Implications 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
This research was conducted to evaluate the mandatory and the voluntary 
accountability of the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
(NCDMB) and the International Oil Companies (IOCs) towards the effective 
implementation of local content sustainability in the Nigerian oil and gas 
sector. The nature in which the IOCs engage in the accounting for, and 
reporting of, local content performances in their sustainability and 
integrated annual financial reports were also examined. Accountability was 
studied within the context of the resource governance practices. As such, 
the Chatham House (2013) good governance in the oil and gas sector 
framework was used. This framework has technically led to the Klueh et 
al.’s (2009) and the Ernst and Young’s (EY) (2014) local content models 
that were used to provide the solid foundation for the study.  
 
The research was basically mixed-method guided by the pragmatist 
philosophy and the combined mainstream, interpretive and critical 
accounting paradigms. To achieve its aim, the study addressed eight 
research questions and one hypothesis as outlined in chapter one. The 
research questions included perceptions of whether or not local content was 
a sustainability policy and its accountability implications, and the two 
accountors’ (NCDMB and IOCs) mandatory and voluntary accountability. 
The hypothesis was designed to test the IOCs’ levels of local content 
disclosure before and after the enactment of the Nigerian local content law. 
This chapter aims at reviewing in a summary form, the major findings from 
the research, the contributions, policy implications, limitations and 
recommendations for further study.  
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11.2 Major Findings  
 
Based on the literature reviewed and the various empirical evidence 
collected through the questionnaires, interviews and the 
sustainability/integrated annual reports of the five oil majors operating in 
Nigeria, this study uses this final chapter to highlight the major issues that 
have arisen in the course of the research. The systematic procedure to do 
this is by presenting and addressing the research objectives individually in 
the order in which they appeared in chapter one. The next sections present 
each of the research objectives (although not in their exact construction) 
and the summarised findings.       
 
11.2.1 Local Content as a Sustainability Policy  
 
It was found in this study that local content and sustainability were closely 
related concepts. Although the study was unable to claim absolutely that 
the policy creates sustainability, it was found that as far as the Nigerian oil 
and gas sector is concerned, local content was perceived by the 
stakeholders to be a sustainability driver, at the least. To justify this 
argument, three major themes related to the three pillars of sustainability 
were identified from the stakeholders’ responses: economic growth and the 
business-case, social stability, and environmental and intergenerational 
survival.  
 
It was overwhelmingly acknowledged that the economic relevance of local 
content included revenue and job retention, development of local supply 
chain, reduction in operating costs and project delays, decrease in imports 
and foreign currency pressures, and mitigation of transfer pricing 
manipulations by the IOCs, among others. On the social aspects of local 
content, it was found that the policy generally promotes welfare, local 
community engagement and the feeling of belonging and involvement 
within the oil communities. These factors were found to have significant 
social impacts that reduce many social vices such as insurgency and 
vandalism of oil facilities caused by local grievances. On the environmental 
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dimension of local content, empirical evidence had suggested that the 
reduction in the long transportation of materials, equipment and 
components, and its replacement by local sourcing could significantly 
reduce carbon emissions and promote a greener environment. Also, by 
engaging the local people who communicated their grievances by disrupting 
oil operations and vandalising pipelines to cause massive oil spills, 
companies were viewed as capable of saving the replacement, maintenance 
and clean-up costs. Moreover, through the technology transfer aspect, local 
firms could gain improved production efficiency that minimizes waste. In 
addition, overwhelming evidence has linked local content to the overall 
human, environmental, and the oil sector survival. Apart from these 
positive impacts of local content, it was also found that the policy may turn 
to be a win-loss to the IOCs because of its potential to reduce profit by 
increasing the corporate tax and the overall operating costs. This may 
possibly be through the allocation of resources for local training and 
development, local content levies65, as well as in some cases, expensive 
local input. 
 
11.2.2 Accountability Expectations of Local Content 
 
From the review of the recommendations of different accountability and 
governance bodies such as the EITI, TI, and NRGI as well as the empirical 
evidence gathered, it was concluded that local content rules require strong 
accountability commitments from all stakeholders involved. Consistent with 
many of the 16 accountability dimensions identified in the study (see Table 
5.3), the stakeholders have identified some of the local content 
accountability requirements within the context of the Nigerian petroleum 
sector: setting of realistic targets; understanding, engagement and 
commitment; transparency and reporting; enforcement; measurability and 
predictability; complaint and response; cost-profit effect; corruption, and 
sincerity of purpose.    
                                                          
65This is in line with the arguments that the additional toll brought about by the Nigeria’s local content policy in the 
form of 1% of contract values, was another form of taxation. See section 4.8.3. 
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The analysis discovered that the NCDMB was the first party to bear the 
burden of accountability and was expected to confront the implementation 
with strong commitment, engagement, and sincerity. The need for setting 
achievable, measurable, predictable and enforceable local content targets 
was discovered. Although the complaint and response measures were found 
to be effective, concerns were also found about the lapses in the Board’s 
understanding of local content rules, transparency, financial disclosure, 
independence, enforcement power, and performance assessment 
techniques. Some mitigating challenges facing the local content 
sustainability were also discovered to include the negative impacts on 
companies’ operating costs, and corruption. Within the context of the 
Nigerian oil and gas sector, however, it was found that as part of the 
accountability arrangements, compliance with local content rules accords oil 
companies with more security and more opportunities to win contracts. 
 
11.2.3 NCDMB’s General Accountability Performance 
 
After testing the 16 dimensions of accountability on the general 
performance of the NCDMB, important discoveries were made. It was quite 
interesting to state that most of the quantitative findings were in favour of 
the Board; albeit, in some instances, not very strong. For example, 
quantitative evidence found that the Board’s objectives and performance 
metrics were clearly defined and communicated to the stakeholders. This, 
however, contradicted some of the qualitative results which accused some 
of the targets as being unrealistic. It was also found that the Board had the 
capacity and powers to influence compliance but with less ability to ensure 
all stakeholders have discharged their local content roles. Both the 
qualitative and quantitative analyses have found that the Board has 
engaged in non-financial transparency to some extent; but failed in most of 
its financial disclosure, auditing, and verification responsibilities. Complaint 
and response systems of the Board were found to be effective as proved by 
both the qualitative and the quantitative evidence. Many of the positive 
results produced by the quantitative analysis were however refuted during 
the executive interviews with some local content managers and experts. 
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The most visible evidence was that the Board had financial accountability 
deficit and that the enforcement powers and the political will to curb 
corruption have remained the major challenges. An overall governance 
assessment of the Board was also conducted on a 7-point scale and 
quantitative results indicated average positive responses showing 
stakeholders’ appreciation with the Board’s governance provisions. The 
neutral responses found among the results were pointers to stakeholders’ 
doubts about some of the issues raised. The overall results showed the 
need to tighten up the regulatory functions of the Board.   
 
11.2.4 NCDMB’s Financial Accountability  
 
In furtherance of acquiring a deeper understanding of the Board’s 
performance in specific areas with a particular interest in financial 
management, quantitative analysis was made on four financially-related 
statements. Results showed that the Board was not reporting or consulting 
with stakeholders on the NCDF despite it being a stakeholders’ fund as 
claimed by the Board. Notwithstanding the finding that all the oil firms 
remit the mandatory 1% levy, evidence has also established that the NCDF 
might not be achieving its purposes as expected. Besides its accountability 
deficits in managing the NCDF and its persistent failure to report its income 
and expenditure to the public, NCDMB was also found wanting for its failure 
to engage in external auditing as required by the law. Qualitative results 
have also found vital themes that would enhance our understanding of the 
Board’s financial performance. These were: transparency and accessibility 
of financial information; honesty and professionalism; monitoring, auditing 
and verification of performance, and stakeholder engagement. 
 
It was found that the Board was expected to exercise professionalism and 
honesty in its dealings. The Board’s cautious management of the NCDF was 
however interpreted by some stakeholders as a tactical denial of access to 
the funds. Although results have shown that the Board has effectively 
engaged the stakeholders, the Board’s financial transparency and 
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monitoring and verification functions were found to be unsatisfactory. 
Conclusively, an expectation gap was found to have occurred between the 
NCDMB and its stakeholders as to whether or not the Board was 
accountable to publicly report its audited accounts. 
 
11.2.5 First Consideration for the Nigerian Oil Firms for the Award 
of Contracts and Licenses 
 
Analysis of the quantitative and qualitative evidence about whether local 
firms were enjoying the first and preferential considerations in the award of 
contracts and licenses has produced mixed results. On the one hand, the 
quantitative results showed the stakeholders’ agreement with all the 14 
statements presented which included inquiry into whether indigenous oil 
firms have won more contracts and local products were more patronised 
after the local content law. It was found that the IOCs have complied with 
the minimum local content requirements and also patronised local 
materials, banks, insurance and legal services, and built local offices, 
among others. These positive responses were strong indicators of local 
value-addition. On the other hand, the qualitative evidence has revealed 
that some of the positive responses from the questionnaire were just 
guided by illusion or misconception. The important themes revealed were: 
effective enforcement and compliance mechanisms; vested interest, 
corruption and non-disclosure of beneficial owners of oil companies, and 
financial and technological constraints. 
 
It was found that even if the preferential consideration rule had existed in 
the industry, it might have been discriminatory, politically influenced and 
marred with corruption and misrepresentation of the real identities of the 
owners of some oil companies. These practices have given way to some 
IOCs to disguise as local companies and execute contracts. Therefore, the 
need for stronger enforcement efforts on the part of the Board was 
emphasised. Some of the basic elements inhibiting the capability of local 
firms to successfully execute contracts were found to be the banks’ failure 
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to provide funds for oil businesses as well as the technological weaknesses 
of the indigenous firms.     
 
11.2.6 Effectiveness of the NCDMB’s Local Content Programmes 
  
Quantitative findings have shown that the awareness with the three local 
content programmes involving crucial oil and gas assets (ORAS, MAVOS and 
ECMI) was not determined by the stakeholders’ organizations or their work 
experience as hypothesised. Some qualitative evidence, even though weak, 
has attempted but failed to counter this claim. On the effectiveness of the 
programmes, quantitative results have indicated that the programmes had 
the potential for success. The qualitative data indicated more improvement 
as a section of the stakeholders showed relative satisfaction with the 
programmes. The emerging themes included cooperation and support; 
asset ownership strategies; cost effectiveness of local production of oil and 
gas assets; fronting, and enforcement. 
It was pointed out that the success of these programmes depends on the 
support and cooperation from the Board and other stakeholders including 
the original manufacturers of the oil and gas assets. Although the Board has 
deployed what seemed to be viable strategies to facilitate local ownership 
and manufacturing of offshore rigs and marine vessels, the problem of 
fronting was identified as one of the key mitigating factors. Critics of these 
programmes have focused on the lack of a good implementation strategy 
and persistent fronting where the rigs and vessels purportedly owned by 
the local companies were indirectly owned by the foreign firms. The cost-
benefit aspect of the local manufacturing of these assets was also queried. 
Unanimously, stakeholders have required enhanced enforcement 
mechanisms from the Board.  
 
11.2.7 IOCs’ Compliance with the Mandatory Local Content 
Reporting  
 
This section discussed the results of the analysis in Section 7.9 to 
determine whether the IOCs comply with certain mandatory local content 
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disclosure and reporting requirements. This involved disclosing and 
reporting the local content performance report, invitation to tenders, 
insurance, legal and financial plans, etc., to the NCDMB during the 
prequalification, technical and commercial stages of the oil and gas 
contracts. Empirical analysis of quantitative data had showed stakeholders’ 
satisfaction with the level of the disclosure of these contract documents by 
the oil companies, thereby fulfilling part of their hard and mandatory 
accountability.  
 
11.2.8 Extent of the IOCs’ Voluntary Local Content Disclosure and 
Reporting  
 
In addition to the hard and mandatory accountability, the work also 
investigated the soft and voluntary local content accountability of the IOCs. 
The study applied the disclosure index method to investigate whether or not 
the five IOCs disclosed their local content sustainability performances in line 
with the GRI and the IPIECA sustainability reporting guidelines. This was 
done by scoring 1 if an item was disclosed and 0 otherwise (no matter the 
number of words used). The results have revealed that the disclosure index 
of the five years before the Nigeria’s local content law was (very) slightly 
higher than that of the five years after the law. This might be an indication 
that the Nigerian local content policy may be lacking enough incentives to 
induce the IOCs to enhance their local content performances. It was also 
established that the five sampled IOCs were reporting their local content 
performances pre-NOGICD Act in the rank order of: Local hiring/hiring 
practices (1st); Local procurement practices/supplier development 
programmes (2nd); Local content policies (3rd); Local procurement (4th); and 
Local wages (5th). But post-NOGICD Act the rank order: Local procurement 
practices/supplier development programmes (1st); Local hiring/hiring 
practices (2nd); Local procurement (3rd); Local content policies (4th); and 
none of the local wages were reported. 
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11.2.9 Changes in the Volume of Voluntary Local Content 
Sustainability Reporting of IOCs in Nigeria 
 
The final part of the empirical analysis in this work conducted a t-test to 
test the hypothesis that there was no statistically significant difference 
between the volumes (in word count) of local content disclosure of the IOCs 
before and after the enactment of the Nigerian local content law. After 
comparing the five-year pre- and five-year post- NOGICD Act disclosures, 
results confirmed that statistically significant difference existed between the 
two periods. The number of words used to disclose local content information 
in the period ‘after’ was higher than that of the period ‘before’. It was 
concluded that the Nigerian local content law might have some impact on 
the voluntary local content disclosure practices of the IOCs operating in 
Nigeria.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, the study makes some important policy 
recommendations in the following sections. 
 
11.3 Recommendations and Policy Implications 
 
Based on the conclusions drawn from the study, some useful 
recommendations that would assist all stakeholders including the IOCs and 
the regulators are highlighted. The policy recommendations are divided into 
two parts – the short-term and the long-term. These are considered below:   
 
11.3.1 Short-term Recommendations 
 
1. From the study it was evident that, in spite of the existence of the 
NCDMB, the effects of corruption, fronting and the use of political power 
for undue advantage by the local elite have become devastating. The 
NCDMB should address its enforcement, monitoring and verification, and 
financial accountability deficits as noted by the stakeholders. Specifically, 
the Board may want to conduct a SWOT analysis on its own performance 
in order to identify and address its challenges.  
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2. As a matter of urgency, the central government should review the 
policies governing the oil and gas sector with a view to understanding 
and blocking all possible loopholes and leakages likely to cause 
compromise and connivance of the local content agency and the powerful 
oil firms. For example, the identities of the beneficial owners of all oil 
companies must be ascertained, and all registration documents must be 
confirmed with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). 
 
 
3.  The government should review the controversial section of the NOGICD 
Act that allows the NCDMB to accept a gift in money or in kind from 
individuals or corporate bodies as this poses a serious threat to the 
Board’s independence.  
 
4. As the Nigeria’s petroleum sector becomes the most politicized, the 
government should have a strong political will to strengthen and make 
good utilization of the existing corrupt practices prevention agencies – 
the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and the 
Independent Corrupt Prevention Commission (ICPC), to tackle the 
persistent corruption at every stages of oil licensing, contracting and 
crude lifting in the industry. 
  5. Although results have shown the impact of the NOGICD Act on the 
voluntary reporting of the selected IOCs, the government may still 
consider incorporating more incentives into the local content regulations 
or making the rules less stringent and less hostile. The government may 
want to incorporate import duty waivers, unringfencing and cross-fencing 
of costs, or allow some training and development costs to be recoverable 
against the OPEX. This is likely to encourage more investment in the 
frontier areas at this moment of dwindling oil prices and mass divestment 
by the IOCs from several oilfields in Nigeria. Moreover, the government 
should focus on the provision of S. 48 of the NOGICD Act 2010 that 
allows favourable fiscal terms for the foreign firms that establish local 
manufacturing.  
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  6. Throughout the analysis, the concept of “enforcement” has appeared to 
be the keyword. As such, the central government should deploy more 
enforcement powers to the Board and isolate all political interference that 
could temper with the Board’s independence and hamper the smooth 
implementation of the policy. The Board should also be able to effectively 
utilise its legally endowed enforcement powers and shun from all 
suspicious practices.  
  7. The IOCs should enhance the impact of their presence and the value of 
their efforts towards the sustainable development of host countries. 
Specifically, they should ensure that the negative impacts of their 
operations in Nigeria have been compensated with effective local content 
sustainability performances including job creation, local capacity building, 
technology transfer and participation in local manufacturing. The IOCs 
should avoid all negative practices such as involvement in corruption or 
fraudulent use of local firms as fronts to secure contracts. Rather, they 
should be preoccupied with activities that could renew their social license 
to operate. Part of this includes the enhancement and sustainment of 
local content accounting and reporting practices in line with the 
internationally recognised sustainability accounting and reporting bodies.  
 
11.3.2 Long-term Recommendations 
 
The long-term recommendations are more concerned with the core political-
economy of the country which needs to be strategically planned and 
executed by the government. It is recommended by the study that: 
 
1. The government should provide an enabling environment for businesses 
to thrive against all the perceived economic and political sabotage. This 
concerns the provision of the necessary facilities including adequate 
power supply, security measures, and eradication of all politically-
motivated crises. It was found from this study that the lack of adequate 
power supply in Nigeria was viewed as one of the factors likely to hinder 
the local manufacturing initiatives of the NCDMB (i.e., the ECMI 
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programme) including the intended industrial park project. Again, the 
persistent insecurity in the country in general and the oil communities in 
particular, including insurgency, attacks on oil facilities and kidnapping of 
oil workers, has to be effectively addressed through the proper utilization 
of local content in order to attract investment in the industry.  
 
2. Although local content has several sustainability benefits, the government 
should, in the long-term, initiate a phase-out plan to gradually scrap the 
policy and allow the local firms to compete freely in the international 
market. It was shown by the international experience that the local content 
policy should not exist permanently, but, as local firms become matured, 
they should be phased out as in the cases of the UK and the US. Leaving 
the policy permanently in place, may turn to work against the interest of 
the local economy.  
 
11.3.3 Recommendations for the Accounting Standards Setting 
Bodies 
 
Due to the short- and long-term influence of local content on the oil 
companies’ financial positions as a result of local expenditure commitments, 
the study recommended that the accounting standard-setting bodies 
particularly the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) should 
issue dedicated accounting standards that address the computation and 
presentation of local content expenditure in annual financial statements of 
oil and gas companies that operate in countries where the policy is 
practiced. Alternatively, the provisions of the IFRS 8 (operating segments) 
and the IAS 21 (effects of changes in foreign exchange rates) should be 
expanded to properly accommodate local content issues. Proposed 
provisions should include the computations of the volumes and values of 
local materials and equipment, local wages and salaries, local equity 
ownership, expenditure on local employment and training, technology 
transfer expenditure, etc. This will complement the local content reporting 
guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the IPIECA.   
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11.4 Contributions of the Study  
       
The study has made two broad contributions to knowledge – theoretical/ 
methodological contributions and contributions to practice. The following 
sections explain each of the contributions in detail. 
 
11.4.1 Theoretical Contributions  
 
The present research has made several contributions to the academic 
literature on local content, accountability, governance, sustainability and 
disclosure and reporting. Specifically, the study has made both theoretical 
and methodological contributions. It has immensely contributed to the 
extant but scanty literature on local content accountability and governance. 
The study has made the first attempt to use the accountability and 
governance models to contextualize local content within the scope of 
petroleum contracts. The study has further developed the little evidence of 
the linkages between local content and sustainability into a complex 
academic discourse where a tentative theory was built from unorganized 
pieces of literature and tested within the Nigerian oil and gas sector, and 
generalizable results were obtained. Another contribution is to the 
sustainability and the sustainable development accounting literature and 
the accounting practice. The study has brought to light the hidden and less 
researched area of linkage between local content and sustainability. 
Similarly, the emerging issue of local content accounting and reporting 
practices of oil and gas companies was brought to the fore by the study. 
Moreover, the application of the GRI and IPIECA sustainability reporting 
indicators by the research would further open the frontiers of accounting 
research and practice in general. 
 
Another theoretical contribution arose from the innovative conceptual 
framework built on the first principle consisting of natural resource 
governance indicators, local content models and accountability theories that 
had progressed from earlier chapters and tightened up together the various 
parts of the study. The original stakeholder-accountability model developed 
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after modifying the existing Donaldson and Preston (1995) model and the 
extensive review of literature that produced the sixteen (16) accountability 
indicators, as well as the emergence of new accountability indicators from 
the study, were original contributions to the accountability and the 
stakeholder literature.  
 
11.4.2 Methodological Contributions 
 
Mixing quantitative and qualitative methods is still evolving in the 
accounting research which is believed to be grounded in the traditional 
deductive methods. Based on the pragmatic paradigm, this study used the 
combination of the mainstream, interpretive and critical accounting 
paradigms in an innovative manner. This approach has fitted well into the 
Ryan et al.’s (2002) taxonomy of accounting research founded on the 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 2x2 schema. For example, the issues 
concerning the voluntary reporting of local content to achieve legitimacy 
and social license, and the stakeholders’ concerns over the consequences of 
local content rules on the operating costs and profits are aligned to the 
mainstream accounting. But the stakeholders’ complaints about 
discrimination in the enforcement of local content, exclusion from some 
programmes, denial access to the Board’s financial records, and their 
opinion on local content as sustainability are aligned to the critical and the 
interpretive accounting paradigms.   
 
11.4.3 Contributions to Practice 
 
Apart from the academic contributions considered above, the present 
research has also contributed immensely to the promotion of sustainable 
local content based on the good governance practices of the oil sector. The 
application of the practitioner models – the Chatham House and the Ernst 
and Young – has provided a good ground to harmonize and synergize the 
academic-industry relationships that could ensure the quality of knowledge, 
theory and practice. Hence, oil companies in Nigeria and elsewhere would 
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find the voluntary local content reporting beneficial in gaining goodwill, 
securing oil facilities, and reduction in the maintenance and replacement 
costs. The study has also highlighted the importance of compliance with 
local content as a precondition for winning oil contracts in Nigeria. 
 
11.5 Limitations and Further Study 
 
This study was conducted with the aim of being a pioneer empirical 
research in local content accounting, accountability and governance in the 
Nigerian oil and gas sector. This informed the utilization of various sources 
of data and the adoption of mixed-methods to study local content 
sustainability from different dimensions. Although the study was 
successfully conducted, it was not without some shortcomings in relation to 
the methodology, conceptual framework, coverage, sample size, and 
generalizability of findings.  
 
The first limitation of the work is that each of the data analytic techniques 
adopted has its peculiar drawbacks. For example, the closed-ended 
questionnaire has restricted the respondents from making further 
comments on issues of interest. This deficiency was however not 
adequately offset by the qualitative part of the work because the interviews 
themselves did not comprehensively cover the contents of the 
questionnaires, as it was considered impracticable. Again, the interview, 
apart from being restrictive by established theories had also used a 
relatively small number of participants. The study may benefit from the 
more informative grounded theory methodology and larger sample size. The 
study was also limited to measuring local content disclosure based on an 
unweighted volumetric index to determine whether or not disclosure was 
made and the number of words used. Although a large number of studies in 
sustainability accounting rely on this procedure, the method might not have 
been the best. Further studies may be interested in investigating the 
disclosure quality of local content sustainability using the meaning-oriented 
(weighted) disclosure index to compare what are actually disclosed against 
how they should be disclosed. For example, a quick scan through the local 
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content sustainability information disclosed by the sampled IOCs revealed 
significant deviations from how the GRI/IPIECA required some information 
to be disclosed. Such issues were not considered by this research, as the 
study was a starting point for this argument. 
Secondly, both the theory and the framework used in the study also have 
shortcomings. The local content-sustainability theory in chapter two was 
proposed and tested by this study for the first time; hence, it may not be 
expected to work accurately as shown by the findings. Similarly, the 
stakeholder-accountability framework has fallen short of capturing other 
concepts outside the sixteen (16) dimensions of accountability (Table 5.3). 
There is, therefore, the need to incorporate the concepts of sincerity, 
understanding, measurability, predictability, professionalism, and honesty 
into the framework.  
 
Thirdly, the investigation was context-specific and focused exclusively on 
the Nigerian petroleum sector. The findings may only be generalised to 
similar developing economies. A comparative analysis among local content 
implementing countries is needed to examine their level of accountability as 
well as their perceptions of local content as sustainability policy. The 
present research was also limited to assessing the accountability of only 
two local content actors (NCDMB and IOCs) and leaving out the bulk of 
others. Future studies may consider the contributions of other key 
stakeholders such as the indigenous oil firms, financial institutions, etc. This 
will allow the whole of the network of relationships among the stakeholders 
in our modified stakeholder model to be comprehensively assessed.  
 
Fourthly, the study had focused exclusively on the hard and soft local 
content accountability of the regulators and the IOCs. An investigation into 
the hybrid local content accountability such as the EITI requirements 66 
                                                          
66 The study has argued that the EITI provisions although originally voluntary, are made mandatory in other 
jurisdictions. For example, Nigeria enacted the NEITI Act in 2007 while Ghana is yet to make its GHEITI into a Law.   
307 
which, depending on the jurisdiction, may or may not be backed by the law 
is highly needed.  
 
Another important area of possible research is a study of the impact of 
corporate governance on the local content disclosure by oil companies. This 
will fill a significant gap in the empirical literature in this field. One of the 
most likely corporate governance variables to have an impact on the local 
content disclosure is the Board of Directors, as it is the board that decides 
on disclosure policies (Michelon and Parbinetti, 2012). A vital corporate 
governance issue uncovered by the study was the discovery that some 
foreign oil firms that engage in petroleum contracts in Nigeria were 
fraudulently hiding the identities of their beneficial owners. An investigation 
into the impact of ownership (based on nationality) on local content 
performance is needed. A number of studies have investigated the roles of 
nationality and diversity of managers and board members in organisational 
performance (Peterson, et al., 1996; Wang, et al., 1998; Delios and 
Björkman, 2000; Richards, 2001; Harvey and Richey, 2001; Ruigrok et al., 
2007), but none was conducted on local content.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 
References 
 
AA1000, 2008. Accountability Principles Standards 
http://www.accountability.org/images/content/0/7/074/AA1000APS%2020
08.pdf 
ABDOLMOHAMMADI, M.J., 2005. Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Market 
Capitalization. J. Intellect Cap., 6, pp. 397-416. 
ABDULWAHED, G.H., 2014. Evaluation of the Determinants of the Nigerian 
Manufacturing Sector Ability to Benefit from the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry Content Development Bill Using Vector Auto Regressive Model 
(VAR). Journal of Research in Economics and International Finance (JREIF), 
3(2), pp. 33-40. 
ABDULKABIR, N., SHAUFIQUE, S., ABD. RAHMAN, A., and HOOK, L.S., 
2015. Relationship among Local Content Policy, Indigenous Oil Firms’ 
Participation and Job Creation in Nigeria: A Theoretical Concept. The Journal 
of Developing Areas, 49(4), Fall. 
ABLO, A.D., 2015. Local Content and Participation in Ghana’s Oil and Gas 
Industry: Can Enterprise Development Make a Difference? Extractive 
Industries and Society, 2(2), pp. 320-327. 
ABRAHAM, A., and SANTOS, R.B., 2010. Towards a Research Framework for 
Mainstreaming Social Accountability in the Oil, Gas and Mining Industries of 
Selected East Asia Pacific (EAP) Countries. Affiliated Network for Social 
Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP).  
ABRAHAMSON, M., 1993. Social Research Methods. NJ: Prentice Hall: 
Englewood Cliffs.  
ABUTUDU, M. and GARUBA, D., 2011. Natural Resource Governance and 
EITI Implementation in Nigeria. Current African Issues 47, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. 
ACCOUNTABILITY, 2003. AA1000 Assurance Standards. London, UK: 
Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability.  
ACCOUNTING, ORGANIZATIONS and SOCIETY EDITORIAL, 2014. Academic 
Contributions to Enhancing Accounting for Sustainable Development. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, pp. 1-10.  
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS STEERING COMMITTEE, 1975. The Corporate 
Report. London: ICAEW. 
ACET, 2012. African Transformation Report: Growth with depth. African 
Centre for Economic Transformation. 
309 
ADAMS, C.A., and EVANS, R., 2004. Accountability, Completeness, 
Credibility and the Audit Expectations Gap. JCC, 14 Summer, pp. 97-115.  
ADEWUYI, A.O., and OYEJIDE, T.A., 2012. Determinants of Backward 
Linkages of Oil and Gas Industry in the Nigerian Economy. Resources Policy, 
37, pp. 452-460.  
ADO, R., 2013. Local Content Policy and the WTO Rules of Trade-related 
Investment Measures (Trims): The Pros and Cons, International Journal of 
Business and Management Studies, 2(1), pp. 137–146. 
ADO, R., 2014. In Search of the Link between Local Content (LC) and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Petroleum Operations. 
International Journal of Business and Management Studies, 3(1), pp. 207-
218.  
AFRICA CENTRE FOR ENERGY POLICY, 2014. Local Content Development in 
the Petroleum Upstream Sector: A Comparative Analysis of Ghana, Nigeria 
and Angola. Africa Against Poverty Programme.  
AGLE, B.R., MITCHELL, R.K., and SONNENFELD, J.A., 1999. Who Matters to 
CEOs? An Investigation of Stakeholder Attributes and Salience, Corporate 
Performance, and CEO Values. Academy of Management Journal, 42(5), pp. 
507–525. 
AGORO, B., 2001. Impediments to Expansion: Why is the Upstream Sector 
of Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry not Growing? Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law, 19(1), pp. 16-30.  
AHIUMA-YOUNG, V., 2014. NUGENG Tasks NCDMB on Employment of 
Nigerians. Vanguard Newspaper, May, 6, 2014. 
AIGBODUWA, J.E., and OISAMOJE, M.D., 2013. Promoting Small and 
Medium Enterprises in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry. European 
Scientific Journal, 9(1), pp. 244-261.  
AKINRELE, A., 2003. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company at 
Crossroads: An Analysis of the Challenges of Funding, Commercialization 
and Autonomy. Oil, Gas, and Energy Law Intelligence (OGEL), 3. 
AKPATA, U., 2012. Review of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry 2014. 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers.  
ALAM, M., 2006. Stakeholder theory. In Hoque,Z. (ed.). Methodological 
Issues in Accounting Research: Theories and Methods. London: Spiramus.  
ALBA, E.M., 2009. Extractive Industries Value Chain: A Comprehensive 
Integrated Approach to Developing Extractive Industries. A working paper 
by the Oil, Gas and Mining Policy Division and the Africa Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management Department. The World Bank.  
310 
ALIKE, E., 2015. Oil, Gas Industry Operators Differ on Measurement of 
Nigerian Content. ThisDayLive, 25th November, 2014. 
AMADI, S., GERMISO, M., and HENRIKS, A., 2006. Statoil in Nigeria: 
Transparency and Local Content Report No. 1/2006. 
ANCHONDO, D.J., 2010. Local content requirements in the oil and gas 
sector: A Way of Life or an Emerging Trend? Oil and Gas Law Newsletter, 
1(1), October ed. Pride International, Inc. Houston: International Bar 
Association Legal Practice Division.  
ANDREW, J., 2001. Environmental Accounting and Accountability: Can the 
Opaque be Transparent? Interdisciplinary Environment Review, 2(2), pp. 
201-216. 
ANDREWS-SPEED, P., and ROGERS, C.D., 1999. Mining Taxation Issues for 
the Future. Resources Policy, 25, pp. 221-227.  
ANDREWS-SPEED, P., 2009. Mineral and Petroleum Taxation, Distance 
Learning Manual Unit 10: Further Issues in Tax Policy. Dundee: CEPMLP.  
ANDREWS-SPEED, P., BLEISCHWITZ, R., BOERSMA, T., JOHNSON, C., 
KEMP, G., and VANDEVEER, S.D., 2012. The Global Resource Nexus: The 
Struggles for Land, Energy, Food, Water, and Minerals. Trans-Atlantic 
Academy. 
APA, 1992. Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. 
American psychologist, 47, pp. 1597-1611.  
APPIAH-ADU, K. and SASRAKU, F.M., 2013. Revenue Management in the Oil 
and Gas Sector, in APPIAH-ADU, K., 2013 (eds.) Governance of the 
Petroleum Sector in an Emerging Developing Economy, Gower: England. 
APPIAH-ADU, K. and APPIAH-ADU, N.K., 2013. Towards Good Governance 
in Ghana’s Petroleum Sector, in APPIAH-ADU, K., 2013 (eds.) Governance 
of the Petroleum Sector in an Emerging Developing Economy, Gower: 
England. 
ARGŰDEN, Y., 2011. Keys to Governance: Strategic Leadership for Quality 
of Life. Palgrave MacMillan.  
ARIWERIOKUMA, S., 2009. The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Africa: 
The Case of Nigeria. Routledge.  
ARMSTRONG, R.A., 2014. When to Use the Bonferroni Correction. 
Ophthalmic & Physiological Optics, 34, pp. 502-508.  
ATSEGBUA, L.A., 2012. The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act 2010: An Examination of its Regulatory Framework. OPEC 
Energy Review, 36(4), pp. 479-494.  
311 
AUTY, R.M., 1990. Resource Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight 
Exporting Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
AUTY, R.M., 1994. Industrial Policy Reform in Six Large Newly 
Industrializing Countries: The Resource Curse Thesis. World Development, 
22(1), pp. 11-26. 
AWE, S.O., 2014. Nigerian Content Development in the Oil and Gas 
Industry – Exploring the Spectrum of Assertive and Encouraging Modes of 
Implementation. Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE-172452-MS).  
AYODELE, O. R., FRIMPONG, S., 2003. Economics of Nigeria Marginal Oil 
Fields. SPE Paper 81998 Presented at the Hydrocarbon Economics & 
Evaluation Symposium, 5th - 8th of April, Dallas, Texas. 
AYONMIKE, C.S., and OKEKE, B.C., 2015. The Nigerian Local Content Act 
and its Implication on Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(TVET) and the Nation’s Economy. International Journal of Education, 
Learning and Development 3(1), pp. 26-35.  
AZAPAGIC, A., 2004. Developing a Framework for Sustainable Development 
Indicators for the Mining and Minerals Industry. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 12 pp. 639–662.  
BACON, R., and KOJIMA, M., 2011. Issues in Estimating the Employment 
Generated by Energy Sector Activities. Sustainable Energy. The World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
BAKER, C.R., and BETTNER, M.S., 1997. Interpretive and Critical Research 
in Accounting: A Commentary on its Absence from Mainstream 
Accounting Research. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 8, pp. 293-310.  
BALASUBRAMANYAN, V., 1991. Putting Trims to Good Use. World 
Development, 19, pp. 1215-1224. 
BALOUGA, J., 2012. Nigerian Local Content: Challenges and Prospects. 
International Association for Energy Economics, 3rd Quarter, pp. 23-26.  
BANERJEE, A., CHITNIS, U. B., JADHAV, S. L., BHAWALKAR, J. S., and 
CHAUDHURY, S., 2009. Hypothesis testing, type I and type II errors. 
Industrial Psychiatry Journal, 18, pp. 127-131.  
BARATA, J.F.F., QUELHAS, O.L.G., COSTA, H.G., GUTIERREZ, R.H., 
LAMEIRA, V.J., and MEIRINO, M.J., 2014. Multi-Criteria Indicator for 
Sustainability Rating in Suppliers of the Oil and Gas Industries in Brazil. 
Sustainability, 6, pp. 1107-1128.  
BARBIER, E.B., 1987. The Concept of Sustainable Economic Development. 
Environmental Conservation, 14(2), pp. 101-110.  
312 
BARRETTE, M., 2001. A Stakeholder Approach to Responsiveness 
and Accountability in Non-profit Organizations. Social Policy Journal of New 
Zealand, 17, pp. 36-51.  
BARROSO, H.R., and MACEDO, M., 2010. Local Content in Brazilian Oil 
Industry.  
BARTLETT, B.D., 2012. The effect of corporate sustainability reporting on 
firm valuation. [online] CMC Senior Theses, Paper 489. Available from: 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/489  
BASTIDA, A.E., 2014. From Extractive to Transformative Industries: Paths 
for Linkages and Diversification for Resource-driven Development. Mineral 
Economics, 27, pp. 73-87.  
BAVLY, D.A., 1999. Corporate Accountability and Governance: What Role 
for the Regulator, Director, and Auditor?, Quorum, Westport, CT.  
BEBBINGTON, J., 2001. Sustainable Development: A Review of the 
International Development, Business and Accounting Literature. Accounting 
Forum, 25(2), pp. 128-157.  
BECK, A. C., CAMPBELL, D. & SHRIVES, P. J., 2010. Content Analysis in 
Environmental Reporting Research: Enrichment and Rehearsal of the 
Method in a British-German Context. The British Accounting Reviews, 4(3), 
pp. 207-222.  
BEGG, D. and GRAY, D., 2006. Transport Policy and Vehicle Emission 
Objectives in the UK: Is the Marriage between Transport and Environment 
Policy over? Environmental Science and Policy, 7(3), 155–163. 
BELDERBOS, R.A., and SLEUWAEGEN, L., 1997. Local Content 
Requirements and Vertical Market Structure. European Journal of Political 
Economy, 13, pp. 101-119.  
BELDERBOS, R., KAPANELLI, G., and FUKAO, K., 2000. The Local Content 
of Japanese Electronics Manufacturing Operations in Asia. In: ITO, T., and 
KRUEGER, A.O., 2000. The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in East Asian 
Economic Development, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).  
BENEDICT, A.O., 2011. Tragedy of Commons: Analysis of Oil Spillage, Gas 
Flaring and Sustainable Development of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Journal 
of Sustainable Development, 4(2), pp. 200-210.  
BENTHAM, R.W., 1988. Legal Status of State Petroleum Companies in N. 
Beredjick and T. Walde (eds), Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing 
Countries. London: Graham & Trotman.  
BERG, K., and TRANOY, E., 1983. Research Ethics, New York: A.R. Liss.  
313 
BERTRAND, W.G., 2014. Extractive Industry Basics: The Petroleum Value 
Chain, University of the West Indies.  
BISMAN, J., 2010. Postpositivism and Accounting Research: A (Personal) 
Primer on Critical Realism. Australasian Accounting Business and Finance 
Journal, 4(4), 3-25.  
BLACKBURN, S., 1996. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
BLAGESCU, M., and LLOYD, R., 2006. The 2006 Global Accountability 
Report: An analytical and Practical Tool. A Briefing Paper no. 102 ed. (One 
World Trust).  
BLAGESCU, M., and LLOYD, R., 2006. Global Accountability Report Holding 
power to account. One World Trust. 
BLAIKE, N., 2000. Designing Social Research. Cambridge: Polity.  
BLAIR, J., and WHITEHEAD, C., 1998. Too Many on the Seesaw: 
Stakeholder Diagnosis and Management for Hospital. Hospital and Health 
Services Administration, 33(2), pp. 153-166.  
BLAKELEY, A., ARAUJO, J., NARDIN, F., and RICH, E., 2003. CSR in the Oil 
Sector in Angola: World Bank Technical Assistance Study. World Bank. 
BLANCO, H., LENNARD, J. and LAMONTAGNE, S., 2011. Annual Reporting 
and Accountability by Municipalities in Canada: An Empirical Investigation. 
Accounting Perspectives, 10(3), pp. 195-224.  
BOLTON, M., 2003. Public Sector Performance Measurement: Delivering 
Greater Accountability. Work Study, 52(1), pp. 20-24.  
BONI, A., PERIS, J and MCGEE, R., ACEBILLO-BAQUE, M., and HUESO, A., 
2011. Exploring Accountability Discourses and Practices in the Spanish Aid 
System. Journal of International Development, pp. 1-15.  
BORDMANN, V., 2010. Local Content Development – Facing New Challenges 
with Defining its Boundaries and its Measurement Indicators. Society of 
Petroleum Engineers (SPE 126972), SPE International. 
BOVENS, M., 2007. Analyzing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework. European Law Journal, 13(4), pp. 447-468.  
BOVENS, M. 2010. Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a 
Virtue and as a Mechanism. West European Politics, 33(5), PP. 946-967.  
BOVENS, M. SCHILLEMANS, T., and HART, P., 2008. Does Public 
Accountability Work? An Assessment Tool. Public Administration, 86(1), pp. 
225-245.  
314 
BOWEN, F.E., 2000. Environmental Visibility: A Trigger of Green 
Organizational Response? Business Strategy and the Environment, 9(2), pp. 
92-107.  
BOWIE, N. E., 2013. Business Ethics in the 21st Century. Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Springer. 
BOYKETT, T., PEIRANO, M., BORIA, S., KELLEY, H., SCHIMANA, E., 
DEKROUT, A. and OREILLY, R., 2012. Oil Contracts: How to Read and 
Understand them. Austria: Times Up Press. 
BRESSAND, A., Undated. Proving the Old Spell Wrong: New African 
Hydrocarbon Producers and the ‘resource curse’, University of Groningen, 
14012-GEM. 
BROWN, J., and FRASER, M., 2006. Approaches and Perspectives in Social 
and Environmental Accounting: An Overview of the Conceptual Landscape. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 15, pp. 103-117.  
BROWN, N. and DEEGAN, C., 1999. The Public Disclosure of Environmental 
Performance Information – A Dual Test of Media Agenda Setting Theory and 
Legitimacy Theory. Accounting and Business Research, 29(1), pp. 21-41.  
BRUME, F. 2006., Oil Pipeline Vandalization in the Niger Delta: the Way 
Out. Available at http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/oaricles/oil.htm 
[accessed June 2014] 
BRYMAN, A., 2012. Social Research Methods. 4th edition, Oxford University 
Press. 
BURCHELL, S., CLUBB, C. and HOPWOOD, A., 1985. Accounting in its 
Societal Context: Towards a History of Value-Added in the United Kingdom. 
Accounting, Organization and Society, 10(4), pp. 381-413.  
BURNARD, P., 1994. Searching for Meaning: A Method of Analyzing 
Interview Transcripts with a Personal Computer. Nurse Education Today, 
14, pp. 111-117.  
BURNARD, P., GILL, P., STEWART, K., TREASURE, E., and CHADWICK, B., 
2008. Analyzing and Presenting Qualitative Data. British Dental Journal, 
204(8), pp. 429-432. 
BURRITT, R.L. and Welch, S., 1997. Australian Commonwealth Entities: An 
Analysis of their Environmental Disclosures. Abacus, 33(1), pp. 1-19.  
BURTON, B.K. and DUNN, C.P., 1996. Feminist Ethics as Moral Grounding 
for Stakeholder Theory. Business Ethics Quarterly, 6(2), pp. 133-147. 
315 
BUSHMAN, R.M., and SMITH, A.J., 2003. Transparency, Financial 
Accounting Information, and Corporate Governance. FRBNY Economic Policy 
Review, pp. 65-87.  
BUYSSE, K., VERBEKE, A., 2003. Proactive Environmental Strategies: A 
Stakeholder Management Perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 24, 
pp. 453-470.  
BUZBY, S.L., 1975. Company Size, Listed Versus Unlisted Stocks, and the 
Extent of Financial Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 13(1), pp. 
16-37.  
CAIRNS, R.D., 2006. On Accounting for Sustainable Development and 
Accounting for the Environment. Resources Policy, 31, pp. 211-216.  
CAIRNS, R.D., 2011. Accounting for Sustainability: A Dissenting Opinion. 
Sustainability, MDPI Open Access Journal, 3(9), pp. 1341-1356. 
CARIFIO, J., PERLA, R., 2008. Resolving the 50-year Debate around Using 
and Misusing Likert-Scales. Medical Education, 42(1150), pp. 1152.  
CASH, A., 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility and Petroleum 
Development in sub-Saharan Africa: the Case of Chad. Resources Policy 37, 
pp. 144–151. 
CHALMERS, K., GODFREY, J.M. and LYNCH, B., 2012. Regulatory Theory: 
Insights into the Past, Present and Future of General Purpose Water 
Accounting Standard Setting. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
25(6), pp. 1001-1024.  
CHANTASASAWAT, B., 2008. Multinational Enterprises in China, East Asia, 
Latin America and Eastern Europe: Moving out or Moving in? Journal of 
Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies, 1(2), pp. 122-135.  
CHAO, C. C., and YU, E. S. H., 1993. Content Protection, Urban 
Unemployment and Welfare. Canadian Journal of Economics, 26, pp. 481-
492.  
CHATHAM HOUSE, 2013. Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil 
and Gas Producers. London: Chatham House.  
CHAVENT, M., DING, Y., FU, L., STOLOWY, H. and HUIWEN, W., 2006. 
Disclosure and Determinants Studies: An Extension Using the Divisive 
Clustering Method (DIV). European Accounting Review, 15(2), pp. 181 – 
218. 
CHEN, C. J. P. and JAGGI, B., 2000. Association between Independent Non-
executive Directors, Family Control and Financial Disclosures in Hong Kong. 
Journal of Accounting and public Policy, 19, pp. 285-310.  
316 
CHEN, R.S., 1975. Social and Financial Stewardship. The Accounting 
Review, 50(3), pp. 533-543.  
CHEVRON, 2014. Corporate Responsibility Report: Chevron in Nigeria. 
Policy, Government & Public Affairs (PGPA) Department, Chevron Nigeria 
Limited. 
CHISHOLM, L.B., 1995.  Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations: The 
Legal Framework. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 6(2), pp. 141-
156.  
CHITANDO, E., 2013. African Liberative Ethics. In: DE LA TORRE, M.A., 
2013. Ethics: A Liberative Approach. Fortress Press.   
CHOKOR, B.A., 2003. Environmental Issues and Challenges of the Niger 
Delta. Lilybank Property and Trust Limited.  
CHOWLA, P., 2005. Comparing Naughty BITs: Assessing the Developmental 
Impact of Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaties. Working Paper: London 
School of Economics. 
CHRIST, T.W., 2007. A Recursive Approach to Mixed Methods Research in a 
Longitudinal Study of Postsecondary Education Disability Support Services. 
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(3), pp. 226-241.  
CHUA, W.F., 1986. Radical Developments in Accounting Thought. The 
Accounting Review, 66(4), pp. 601-632.  
CIMINO, C., HUFBAUER, G.C. AND SCHOTT, J.J., 2014. A Proposed Code to 
Discipline Local Content Requirements, Policy Brief: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics.  
CLARKSON, M.B.E., 1995. A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and 
Evaluating Corporate Social Performance. Academy of Management Review, 
20, pp. 92-117.  
COHEN, L., MANION, L., and MORRISON, K., 2007. Research Methods in 
Education. 6th edition, London: Routledge.  
COLLIER, P., and HOEFFLER, A., 2000. Greed and grievance in Civil War. 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355.  
COLLINS, K., ONWUEGBUZIE, A., and SUTTON, I., 2006. A Model 
Incorporating the Rationale and Purpose for Conducting Mixed Methods 
Research in Special Education and Beyond. Learning Disabilities: A 
Contemporary Journal, 4(1), pp. 67-100.  
CONNOLLY, C., and HYNDMAN, N., 2004. Performance Reporting: A 
Comparative Study of British and Irish Charities. The British Accounting 
Review, 36, pp. 127-154.  
317 
COOKE, T.E., 1989a. Disclosure in the Corporate Annual Reports of Swedish 
Companies: Accounting and Business Research. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 19(74), pp. 113-124.  
COOKE, T.E., 1989b. Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish 
Companies. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 
1(2), pp. 171-195.  
CORBETT, J.J., KO¨HLER, H.W., 2003. Updated Emissions from Ocean 
Shipping. Journal of Geophysical Research, 108(D20), pp. ACH 9-1.  
CORNAND, C. and HEINEMANN, F., 2008. Optimal Degree of Public 
Information Dissemination, Economic Journal, 118(528), pp. 718–42. 
CORNWALL, A. and LUCAS, H., and PASTEUR, K., 2000. Introduction: 
Accountability through Participation, Developing Workable Partnership 
Models in the Health Sector. IDS Bulletin, 31(1), pp. 1-13.  
COTULA, L., 2010. Investment Contracts and Sustainable Development: 
How to Make Contracts for Fairer and More Sustainable Natural Resource 
Investments. Issue No. 20 London: The International Institute for 
Environment and Development (iied).  
COUSINEAU, D., and CHARTIER, S., 2010. Outliers Detection and 
Treatment: A Review. International Journal of Psychological Research, 3(1), 
pp. 58-67. 
COWAN, S., and GADENNE, D., 2005. Australian Corporate Environmental 
Reporting: A Comparative Analysis of Disclosure Practices across Voluntary 
and Mandatory Disclosure Systems, Journal of Accounting & Organizational 
Change, 1(2), pp. 165-179.  
COY, D., 1995. A Public Accountability Index for Annual Reporting by NZ 
Universities. Doctoral thesis, University of Waikato, Hamilton. 
CRAMER, M.E., ATWOOD, J.R., and STONER, J.A., 2006. Measuring 
Community Coalition Effectiveness Using the ICE Instrument, Public Health 
Nurs, 23, pp. 74-87.  
CRANE, A., and LIVESEY, S., 2003. Are You Talking to Me? Stakeholder 
Communication and the Risks and Rewards of Dialogue, In: Andriof, J., 
Waddock, S., Husted, B. and Rahman, S. (Eds), Unfolding Stakeholder 
Thinking. 2nd edition, Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing.  
CRESWELL, J.W., and PLANO, CLARK, V.L., 2007. Designing and Conducting 
Mixed Methods Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
CRESWELL, J.W., 2003. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and 
Mixed Method Approaches. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
318 
CROFTS, K., and BISMAN, J., 2010. Interrogating Accountability: An 
Illustration of the use of Leximancer Software for Qualitative Data Analysis. 
Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 7(2), pp. 180-207.  
CROTTY, M., 1998. The Foundations of Social Research. London: Sage.  
DAVIES, A.C.L., 2001. Accountability: A Public Law Analysis of Government 
by Contract. Oxford. 
DE HAAN, Y., and BARDOEL, J., 2012. Accountability in the Newsroom: 
Reaching out to the Public or a Form of Window Dressing? Studies in 
Communication Sciences, 12, pp. 17-21.  
DE´JEAN, F., and MARTINEZ, I., 2009. Environmental Disclosure and the 
Cost of Equity: The French Case. Account Eur., 6(1), pp. 57-80.  
DEEGAN C. and GORDON, B., 1996. A Study of the Environmental 
Disclosure Practices of Australian Corporations, Accounting and Business 
Research, 26(3), pp. 187-199.  
DEEGAN, C., 2002. The Legitimizing Effect of Social and Environmental 
Disclosures – A Theoretical Foundation, Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 15, pp. 282-311.  
DEEGAN, C. and RANKIN, M., 1996. Do Australian Companies Report 
Environmental News Objectively? An Analysis of Environmental Disclosures 
by Firms Prosecuted Successfully by the Environmental Protection 
Authority, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 9(2), pp. 50-67.  
DELIOS, A. and BJÖRKMAN, I., 2000. Expatriate Staffing in Foreign 
Subsidiaries of Japanese Multinational Corporations in the PRC and the 
United States, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 
11(2), pp. 278-293.  
DELOITTE, 2014. Inside Tax: Multiplicity of Taxes in Nigeria: Addressing the 
Impediments, Deloitte.  
DARBY, S., 2010. Natural resource governance: New Frontiers in 
Transparency and Accountability, Transparency & Accountability Initiative 
(TAI). 
DEWINTER, J. and DODOU, D., 2010. Five-Point Likert Items: t Test Versus 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon. Practical Assessment Research and Evaluation, 
15(11), pp. 1-16.  
DIESENDORF M., 2000. Sustainability and Sustainable Development. In: 
DUNPHY, D., BENVENISTE, J., GRIFFITHS, A., SUTTON, P., editors. 
Sustainability: The Corporate Challenge of the 21st Century. Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin; pp. 19–37 
319 
DOBBS, R., OPPENHEIM, J., KENDALL, A., THOMPSON, F., BRATT, M. and 
VAN DER MAREL, F., 2013. Reverse the Curse: Maximizing the Potential of 
Resource-driven Economies. McKinsey Global Institute.  
DONALDSON, T., and PRESTON, L.E., 1995. The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications. The Academy of 
Management Review, 20(1), pp. 65-91.  
DORIAN, J.P., HUMPHREYS, H.B., 1994. Economic impacts of mining: a 
changing role in the transitional economies. Natural Resource Forum, 18, 
pp. 17-29.  
DUBNICK, M., 2005. Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In 
Search of the Mechanisms. Public Performance and Management Review, 
28(3), pp. 376-417.  
DUVAL, C., LE LEUCH, H., PERTUZIO, A., and WEAVER, J.L., 2009. 
International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, 
Economic and Policy Aspects. 2nd edition, New York: Barrows Company Inc.  
DYLLICK, T. and HOCKERTS, K., 2002. Beyond the Business Case for 
Corporate Sustainability. Business Strategy and the Environment, 11(2), 
pp.130–141. 
EASO, J. and WALLACE, A., 2014. Understanding Local Content Policies in 
Africa’s Petroleum Sector. [online] The National Law Review. Available 
from: www.natlawreview.com/article/understanding-local-content-policies-africa-s-
petroleum-sector 2015].  
EBOH, M., 2013. 10,000 Jobs at Risk as Chevron, Shell Pull out from 
OKLNG. Vanguard Newspaper, 29 August.  
EBRAHIM, A., 2003. Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. World 
Development, 31(5), pp. 813-829.  
EBRAHIM, A., 2003. Making Sense of Accountability: Conceptual 
Perspective for Northern and Southern Nonprofits. Nonprofit Management & 
Leadership, 14(2), pp. 191-212.  
EDITIONS TECHNIP, 2004. Oil and Gas Exploration and Production: 
Reserves, Costs, Contracts. Centre for Economics and Management (IFP 
School), Paris. 
EDITORIAL, 2013. Public Sector Governance and Accountability. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 24, pp. 479-487.  
EDITORIAL, 2014. Academic Contributions to Enhancing Accounting for 
Sustainable Development, Accounting Organizations and Society, pp. 1-10.  
320 
EDMONDSON, A.C., and MCMANUS, S.E., 2007. Methodological Fit in 
Management Field Research, Academy of Management Review, 7, 32(4), 
pp. 1155–1179. 
EGBON, O., 2014. An Exploration of Accountability: Evidence from the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry. [online] PhD thesis, St. Andrews University, 
UK.  
EGGERT, R., 2000. Sustainable Development and the Mineral Industry. In: 
Otto, J.M., and Cordes, J. (Eds.), Sustainable Development and the Future 
of Mineral Investment. Paris: UNEP.  
EIA, 2015. Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria. US Energy Information 
Administration.  
EISINGA, R., TE GROTENHUIS, M., and PELZER, B., 2013. The Reliability of 
a Two-item Scale: Pearson, Cronbach or Spearman-Brown? International 
Journal of Public Health, 58, pp. 637-642.  
ELAW, 2013. Natural Resource Contracts: A Practical Guide, Environmental 
Law Alliance Worldwide (ELAW), U.S.A. 
ELDANFOUR, I., 2011. Accounting for Oil and Gas Upstream Activities: A 
Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of the Case of Libya. [online] PhD 
thesis, Glasgow Caledonian University, UK.  
ELLIOT, R., 2000. Rigor in Psychotherapy Research: The Search for 
Appropriate Methodologies. Unpublished Paper, Department of Psychology, 
University of Toledo. 
ELKINGTON, J., 2002. Cannibals with Forks. Oxford: Capstone Publishing 
Limited; 2002. 
ENDERWICK, P., 2011. Understanding the Rise of Global Protectionism. 
Thunderbird International Business Review, 53(3), pp. 325-336.  
ENDRESEN, Ø., SØRGÅRD, E., BEHRENS, H.L., BRETT, P.O., and ISAKSEN, 
I.S.A., 2007. A Historical Reconstruction of Ships Fuel Consumption and 
Emissions. Journal of Geophysical Research, 112  
ENDRESEN, Ø., SØRGÅRD, E., SUNDET, J.K., DALSØREN, S.B., ISAKSEN, 
I.S.A., BERGLEN, T.F. and GRAVIR, G., 2003. Emission from International 
Sea Transportation and Environmental Impact, Journal of Geophysical 
Research, 108, pp. 4560  
EPA, 2009. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA Grants California GHG 
Waiver. http://www.epa.gov/ 
321 
ERDOGAN, B., SPARROWE, R.T., LIDN, R.C., and DUNEGAN, K.J., 2004. 
Implications of Organizational Exchanges for Accountability Theory. Human 
Resource Management Review, 14(1), pp. 19-45.  
ERHUN, M.O., 2015. The Role of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Act in the 
Promotion of Sustainable Economic Development. Developing Country 
Studies, 5(16).    
ERNST & YOUNG, 2014. Creating Shared Value in Africa: Local Content in 
the Oil and Gas Industry. 
ESTEVES, A.M., 2007. An Integrated Multi-criteria Approach to Enhancing 
the Business Value of Community Investment at Mine Sites. Proceedings 
from 3rd International Conference on Sustainable Development Indicators 
in the Minerals Industry, Milos Island, Greece. 
ESTEVES, A.M., 2012. Mining Companies as Agents for Social Development: 
The Case for More Effectual Corporate-Community Investment. In: 
LANGTON, M. and LONGBOTTOM, J., 2012.  Community Future, Legal 
Architecture: Foundations for Indigenous Peoples in the Global Mining 
Boom. New York: Routledge. 
ESTEVES, A.M., and BARCLAY, M., 2011. Enhancing the Benefits of Local 
Content: Integrating Social and Economic Impact Assessment into 
Procurement Strategies. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 29(3), 
pp. 205-215.  
ESTEVES, A.M., COYNE, B., and MORENO, A., 2013. Local Content 
Initiatives: Enhancing the Subnational Benefits of the Oil, Gas and Mining 
Sectors. Briefing: Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI).  
EWEJE, G. and WU, M., 2010. Corporate Response to an Ethical Incident: 
The Case of an Energy Company in New Zealand. Business Ethics: a 
European Review, 19(4), pp. 379-392.  
EYRING, V., KOHLER, H.W., VAN AARDENNE, J., and LAUER, A., 2005. 
Emissions from International Shipping: The last 50 years. Journal of 
Geophysics Research, 110, pp. 1-12.  
FABRIKANT, R., 1975. Production-Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian 
Petroleum Industry. Harvard International Law Journal, 16, pp. 303-351.    
FASSIN, Y., 2012. Stakeholder Management, Definitions, Reciprocity and 
Stakeholder Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 109(1), pp. 83-96.  
FASSIN, Y., BUELENS, M. 2011: The hypocrisy-sincerity Continuum in 
Corporate Communication and Decision-making – A model of Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Business Ethics. Management Decision, 49(4), pp. 
586-600. 
322 
FAUZI, H., SVENSSON, G., and RAHMAN, A.Z., 2010. Triple-bottom-line as 
Sustainable Corporate Performance: A Proposition for the Future. 
Sustainability, 2, pp. 1345-1360.  
FEDERAL REPUBLIC of NIGERIA, 2013. House of Representatives: Votes 
and Proceedings. Fourth Republic, 7th National assembly. Second Session, 
No. 58.  
FENWICK, E.K., XIE, J., PESUDOVS, K., RATCLIFFE, J., CHIANG, P.P., 
FINGER, R.P., and LAMOUREUX, E.L., 2012. Assessing Disutility Association 
with Diabetic Retinopathy, Diabetic Macular Oedema and Associated Visual 
Impairment Using the Vision and Quality of Life Index. Clin. Exp. Optom, 
95, pp. 362-370  
FONSECA, A., MCALLISTER, M.L., and FITZPATRICK, P., 2012. 
Sustainability Reporting among Mining Corporations: A Constructive 
Critique of the GRI Approach. Journal of Cleaner Production, pp. 1-14.  
FORTE OIL PLC., 2010. Annual Reports, 2010. 
FOSSGARD-MOSER, T., 2003. Promoting Sustainable Development through 
the Enhancement of Local Employment and Supply Chain Opportunities 
Generated by Energy Companies: The Case of the Shell Group. Greener 
Management International, Autum, 43, pp. 79-92.  
FOWLER, M., and KUYAMA, S., 2007. Accountability and the United Nations 
System. Policy Brief, 8th edition, United Nations University. 
FREEMAN, R. E., WICKS, A.C., and PARMAR, B., 2004. Stakeholder Theory 
and the Corporate Objective Revisited. Organization Science, 15(3), pp. 
364-369.  
FREEMAN, R.E., 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. 
Marshfield, Massachusetts, USA.: Pitman Publishing Inc.  
FRIEDMAN, M., 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits. New York Times Magazine, September 13. 
FRINK, D.D, and KLIMOSKI, R.J., 2004. Advancing Accountability Theory 
and Practice: Introduction to the Human Resource Management Review 
Special Edition. Human Resource Management Review, 14, pp. 1-17.  
FRYNAS, J.G., 2005. The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies. International 
Affairs, 81(3), pp. 581-598.  
FRYNAS, J.G., and PAULO, M., 2007. A New Scramble for African Oil? 
Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives. African Affairs, 106(423), 
pp. 229-251.  
323 
GAFFIKIN, M., 2005. Regulation as Accounting Theory. Accounting & 
Finance Working Paper 05/09. School of Accounting & Finance, University of 
Wollongong.  
GAMERSCHLAG, R., MO¨LLER, K., and VERBEETEN, F., 2011. Determinants 
of Voluntary CSR Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from Germany. Review of 
Management Science, 5, pp. 233-262.  
GBOYEGA, A., SØREIDE, T., LE, T.M., and SHUKLA, G.P., 2011. Political 
Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria. Policy Research Working Paper 
5779. The World Bank Africa Region Public Sector Reform and Capacity 
Building Unit. 
GEORGE, B.C., and LACEY, K. A., 2006. Investigation of Halliburton 
Co./TSKJ's Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current 
Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement. 
The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 96(2), pp. 503-526.  
GHANA, 2013. Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) 
Regulations. LI 2204. 
GIBSON, R., 2000. Favouring the Higher Test: Contribution to Sustainability 
as the Central Criterion for Reviews and Decisions under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act. J. Environ. Law Pract., 10(1), pp. 39-54.  
GILLIES, A., 2009. Reforming Corruption out of Nigerian Oil? Part one: 
Mapping corruption risks in oil sector governance. U4 Brief, 1.  
GIORGIOV, A.D., 2012. The Effect of Accountability on Pastoral Stress and 
Burnout among Select Hungarian Baptist Pastors. Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, UMI No. 3046675. 
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (GRI), 2013. G4 Sector Disclosure: Oil and 
Gas. Global Reporting Initiative, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
GODDARD, A., 2005. Accounting and NPM in UK Local Government-
Contributions toward Governance and Accountability. Financial 
Accountability and Management, 21(2), pp. 191-214.  
GOETZ, A.M. and JENKINS, R., 2005. Reinventing Accountability: Making 
Democracy Work for Human Development. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
GRACE, D., O'CASS. A., 2002. Brand Associations: Looking through the Eye 
of the Beholder. Qualitative Market Research, 5 (2), pp. 96-112. 
GRAY, A., and JENKINS, W., 1985. Administrative Politics in British 
Government. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.  
324 
GRAY, A., and JENKINS, B., 1993. Codes of Accountability in the New Public 
Sector. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 6(3), 52-67.  
GRAY, R., 1998. Imagination, a Bowl of Petunias and Social Accounting. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 9, pp. 205-216.  
GRAY, R., 2002. The Social Accounting Projects and Accounting 
Organizations and Society Privileging Engagement, Imaginings, New 
Accounting and Pragmatism over Critique? Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 27(7), pp. 687-708.  
GRAY, R., and COLLISON, D., 2002. Can’t See the Wood for the Trees, 
Can’t See the Trees for the Numbers? Accounting Education, Sustainability 
and the Public Interest. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 13, pp. 797-
836.  
GRAY, R., KOUHY, R. and LAVERS, S., 1995. Corporate Social and 
Environmental Reporting: A Review of the Literature and a Longitudinal 
Study of UK Disclosure. Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal, 8(2), 
pp. 47-77.  
GRAY, R., KOUHY, R. and LAVERS, S., 1995. Constructing a Research 
Database of Social and Environmental Reporting by UK Companies. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 8(2), pp. 78-101.  
GRAY, R. DEY, C. OWEN, D., EVANS, R. and ZADEK, S., 1997. Struggling 
with the Praxis of Social Accounting: Stakeholder, Accountability, Audit and 
Procedures. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 10(3), pp. 
325-664.  
GRAY, R., OWEN, D. and ADAMS, C., 1996. Accounting and Accountability: 
Changes and Challenges in Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting. 
London.: Prentice Hall Europe.  
GRAY, R., 2006. Social, Environmental and Sustainability Reporting and 
Organisational Value Creation? Whose Value? Whose Creation? Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal 19, 793-819. 
GRAYSON, L.E., 1981. National Oil Companies. Chichester: John Wiley and 
Sons.  
GREILING, D., and SPRAUL, K., 2010. Accountability and the Challenges of 
Information Disclosure. Public Administration Quarterly, Fall, pp. 338-377.  
GU, W., and YABUUCHI, S., 2003. Local Content Requirements and Urban 
Unemployment. International Review of Economics and Finance, 12, pp. 
481-494.  
GUIMARAES, A., 2011. Opportunities and Challenges to Maximize Local 
Content in Brazil: A View from the Brazilian Petroleum Institute. 
325 
Presentation at IPQC Local Content Summit. The Bloomsbury Hotel, London, 
United Kingdom, September, 27-28.   
GULBRANDSEN, L.H., and MOE, A., 2005. Oil Company CSR Collaboration in 
‘New’ Petro-States. JCC, 20, Winter, pp. 53-64.  
GUNASEKARAN, A., and SPALANZANI, A., 2012. Sustainability of 
Manufacturing and Services: Investigations for Research and Applications. 
Int. J. Production Economics, 140, pp. 35-47.  
GUTHRIE J. and FARNETI, F., 2008. GRI Sustainability Reporting by 
Australian Public Sector Organizations. Public Money Management, 28(6), 
pp. 361-366.  
GUTHRIE J., PETTY R., YONGVANICH K. and RICCERI, F., 2004. Using 
Content Analysis as a Research Method to Inquire into Intellectual Capital 
Reporting. J. Intellect Cap., 5, pp. 282-293.  
GUTHRIE, J. and ABEYSEKERA, I., 2006. Content Analysis of Social, 
Environmental Reporting: What is New? Journal of Human Resource Costing 
& Accounting, 10(2), pp. 114-126.  
HANSEN, M.W., BUUR, L., KJAER, A.M. and THERKILDSEN, O., 2015. The 
Economics and Politics of Local Content in African Extractives: Lessons from 
Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique. Forum for Development Studies, pp. 1-
28.  
HAO, M., MACKENZIE, M., POMERANT, A., and STRACHAN, K., 2010. Local 
Content Requirements in British Columbia’s Wind Power Industry. Pacific 
Institute for Climate Solutions. 
HARRISON, J. A., ROUSE, P., and DE VILLIERS, C. J., 2012. Accountability 
and Performance Measurement: A Stakeholder Perspective. JCC: The 
Business and Economics Research Journal, 5(2), pp. 243-258.  
HARVEY, M. G., and RICHEY, R. G., 2001. Global Supply Chain 
Management: The Selection of Globally Competent Managers. Journal of 
International Management, 7(2), pp. 105-128.  
HAUG, M., 2011. Clean Energy and International Oil. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 27(1), pp. 92-116.  
HAVRO G, and SANTISO J., 2008. To Benefit from Plenty: Lessons from 
Chile and Norway. Policy Brief No.37. OECD Development Centre.  
HAYS, 2014. Oil & Gas Global Salary Guide Review of 2013, outlook for 
2014. 
HECKATHORN, D.D., 2011. Snowball Versus Respondent-Driven Sampling. 
Sociol. Methodol., 41(1), pp. 355-366.  
326 
HEDSTROM, G., POLTORZYCKI S., and STROB P., 1998. Sustainable 
Development: The Next Generation of Business Opportunity. Prism, 4, pp. 
5-19.  
HELLER, P.R.P., 2011. National Participation in Oil and Mining. Revenue 
Watch Institute Briefing. 
HELLER, P.R.P. and HEUTY, A., 2010 Accountability Mechanisms in Ghana’s 
2010 Proposed Oil Legislation. The Ghana Policy Journal, 4(Special Issue), 
50-67. 
HENRIQUES, I. and SADORSKY, P., 1999. The Relationship between 
Environmental Commitment and Managerial Perceptions of Stakeholder 
Importance. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1), pp. 87-99.  
HESTERMEYER, H.P., and NIELSEN, L., 2014. The Legality of Local Content 
Measures under WTO Law. Journal of World Trade, 48(3), pp. 553-592.  
HEUM, P., MWAKALI, J.A., EKERN, O.F., BYARUHANGA, J.N.M., KOOJO, 
C.A., and BIGIRWENKYA, N.K., 2011. Enhancing National Participation in 
the Oil and Gas Industry in Uganda. (SNF-project No 1286: “Local Content 
in Uganda” The National Content Study in the Oil and Gas Sector in 
Uganda). 
HEUM, P., QUALE, C., KARLSEN, J. E., KRAGHA, M. and OSAHON, G., 2003. 
Enhancement of Local Content in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry in 
Nigeria: A Comprehensive and Viable Policy Approach. (Joint study by SNF 
Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 
Norway. SNF Report No. 25/03. 
HEUM, P., KASANDE, R. and EKERN, O.F., and NYOMBI, A., 2011. Policy 
and Regulatory Framework to Enhance Local Content: Yardsticks and Best 
Practice. Working Paper no. 02/11, SNF Project no. 1286, Local Content 
Uganda. Bergen: The Institute for Research in Economics and Business 
Administration. 
HIGGINS, C., STUBBS, W., and LOVE, T., 2014. Walking 
the Talk(s): Organizational Narratives of Integrated Reporting. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 27(7), pp. 1090-1119. 
HILARY-NWOKONKO, C., 2002. Enhancing Local Content in the Upstream 
Oil and Gas Industry: An Appraisal of Current Policy. Oil, Gas and Energy 
Law Intelligence, 2(1), pp. 1-15.  
HILL, C.W.L. and JONES, T.M., 1992. Stakeholder-agency Theory. Journal 
of Management Studies, 29(2), pp. 131.  
HINES, R., 1992. Accounting: Filling the Negative Space. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 3(4), pp. 313-341.  
327 
HIRSCHMAN, E. C., 1986. Humanistic Inquiry in Marketing Research: 
Philosophy, Method and Criteria. Journal of Marketing Research, 23, pp. 
237-249 
HOLLAND, T.P., 2002. Board Accountability: Lessons from the Field. 
Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 12(4), pp. 409-428.  
HOLLANDER, A., 1987. Content Protection and Transnational Monopoly. 
Journal of International Economics, 23(3/4), 283-297. 
HOLT, D., and WATSON, A., 2008. Exploring the Dilemma of Local Sourcing 
Versus International Development – the Case of the Flower Industry. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 17(5), pp. 318-329.  
HORTSCH, D., 2010. The Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International, 
Responsible Advocacy, and NGO Accountability. Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review, 42, pp. 119-155.  
Houghton, R.A. 2008. Carbon Flux to the Atmosphere from Land-Use 
Changes 1850-2005. 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/landuse/houghton/houghton.html 
HUBBARD, G., 2009. Measuring Organizational Performance: Beyond the 
Triple-bottom-line. Business Strategy and the Environment, 19, pp. 177-
191.  
HUFBAUER, G.C., SCOTT, J.J., VIERO, M. and WADA, E., 2013. Local 
Content Requirements: A Global Problem (Policy Analyses in International 
Economics), Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington. 
HULIN C., NETEMEYER R., CUDECK R., 2001. Can a Reliability Coefficient be 
too High? J. Consumer Psychology, 10, pp. 55-58.  
HUNTER, T., 2009. It's time: Petroleum policy change for sustainable 
development in the Australian offshore upstream petroleum sector. Journal 
of applied law and policy, pp. 31-54. 
HYNDMAN, N., 1990. Charity Accounting: An Empirical Study of the 
Information Needs of Contributors to UK Fundraising Charities. Financial 
Accountability and Management, 6, pp. 295-307.  
IACOBUCCI, D., and DUHACHEK, A., 2003. Advancing Alpha: Measuring 
Reliability with Confidence. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13(4), pp. 
478-487  
IHUA, U.B., AJAYI, C. and ELOJI, K.N., 2009. Nigerian Content Policy in the 
Oil and Gas Industry: Implications for Small to Medium-Sized Oil-Service 
Companies. In: Sigue, S.P., 2009. Repositioning African Business and 
328 
Development for the 21st Century, Proceeding of the 10th International 
Academy. 
IHUA, U. B., 2010. Local Content Policy and SMEs Sector Promotion: The 
Nigerian Oil Industry Experience. Int’l Journal of Business and Management, 
5(5), pp. 3-13. 
IHUA, U.B., OLABOWALE, O.A., ELOJI, K.N., and AJAYI, C., 2011. 
Entrepreneurial Implications of Nigeria's Oil Industry Local Content Policy: 
Perceptions from the Niger-Delta Region. Journal of Enterprising 
Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy, 5(3), pp. 223-241.  
IIED, 2012. How to Scrutinize a Production Sharing Agreement: A guide for 
the Oil and Gas Sector based on Experience from the Caspian Region. 
International Institute for Environment and Development.  
IJIRI, Y., 1983. On the Accountability-based Conceptual Framework of 
Accounting. Journal of Accounting and public Policy, 2, pp. 75-81.  
IKPORUKPO, C.O., 1985. The Management of Oil Pollution of Natural 
Resources in Nigeria. Journal of Environmental Management, 20, pp. 199-
206. 
ILO, 2009. Social Dialogue and Industrial Relations Issues in the Oil 
Industry. Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Promoting Social 
Dialogue and Good Industrial Relations from Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production to Oil and Gas Distribution, Geneva.  
IMF, 2005. Draft Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
INCE, D., 1997. Determinants of Social and Environmental Disclosures of 
the UK Companies in Environmental Policy Statements. Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Accounting Conference, University of Manchester. 
UNCTAD., 2007. International Accounting and Reporting Issues, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
UNCTAD., 2008. International Accounting and Reporting Issues, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
INTSOK, 2003. Enhancement of Local Content in the Upstream Oil and Gas 
Industry in Nigeria. A study sponsored by the Norwegian and the Nigerian 
Governments.  
IPIECA, 2010. Oil and Gas Industry Guidance on Voluntary Sustainability 
Reporting. IPIECA/API/IOGP. 
329 
IPIECA, 2011. Local Content Strategy: A Guidance Document for the Oil and 
Gas Industry. The Global Oil and Gas Industry Association for 
Environmental and Social Issues. 
IPIECA, 2012. Oil and Gas Industry Guidance on Voluntary Sustainability 
Reporting. 2nd edition, London. 
ISEA, 1999. AccountAbility1000: Standard, Guidelines and Professional 
Qualification. Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability, London. 
IOPC, 2012. International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, 2012 edition. 
ITE, A.E., IBOK, U.J., ITE, M.U., and PETTERS, S.W., 2013. Petroleum 
Exploration and Production: Past and Present Environmental Issues in the 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta. American Journal of Environmental Protection, 1(4), 
pp. 78-90.  
IYATSE, G., 2014. Nigeria: Experts Advocate Collaboration among Foreign, 
Local Audit Firms. The Guardian, August, 2014. 
IYOHA, F.O., and OYERINDE, D., 2010. Accounting Infrastructure and 
Accountability in the Management of Public Expenditure in Developing 
Countries: A Focus on Nigeria. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21, pp. 
361-373.  
JAKOBSSON, U., 2004. Statistical Presentation and Analysis of Ordinal Data 
in Nursing Research. Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences, 18(4), pp. 
437-440.  
JAMIESON, S., 2004. Likert Scales: How to (Ab)use them. Medical 
Education, 38(12), pp. 1217-1218.  
JANUS, T., 2011. Natural Resource Extraction and Civil Conflict. Journal of 
Development Economics, 97, pp. 24-31.  
JENKINS, R. and GOETZ, A.M., 1999. Accounts and Accountability: 
Theoretical Implications of the Right-to-information Movement in India. 
Third World Quarterly, 20(3), pp. 603-622.  
JENNINGS, D.R., FEITEN, J.B., and BROCK, H.R., 2000. Petroleum 
Accounting Principles, Procedures & Issues. 5th edition, United States: 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers.  
JENSEN, M.C., 2001. Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function. The Monitor Group and Harvard Business 
School.  
JENSEN, M.C., 2002. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function. Business Ethics Quarterly, 12(2), pp. 235-
256.  
330 
JING, F., 2000. Participation: A Way to Better Health Outcome?. IDS 
Bulletin 31(1), 37-42. IDS Bulletin, 31(1), pp. 37-42.  
JOHNS, A., EASTERBY-SMITH, M. P. V. and BURGOYNE, J. G., 1997. Action 
Learning in Practice. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, pp. 347-354. 
JOHNSON, O., 2013a. Exploring the Effectiveness of Local Content 
Requirements in Promoting Solar PV Manufacturing in India. Discussion 
Paper, Bonn: German Development Institute.  
JOHNSON, O., 2013b. Promoting Green Industrial Development through 
Local Content Requirements: India’s National Solar Mission. Climate Policy, 
pp. 1-18.  
JOHNSON, R.B., ONWUEGBUZIE, A.J., and TURNER, L.A., 2007. Toward a 
Definition of Mixed Methods Research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 
1(2), pp. 112-133.  
JOHNSTON, J. M. and ROMZEK, B., 1999. Contracting and Accountability in 
State Medicaid Reform: Rhetoric, Theories, and Reality. Public 
Administration Review, 59(5), pp. 383-389  
JONES, R., and PENDLEBURY, M., 1996. Public Sector Accounting, 4th 
edition, London: Pitman.  
JORG, P., LODERER, C. and ROTH, L., 2004. Shareholder Value 
Maximization: What Managers Say and What They Do. DBW Die 
Betriebswirtschaft, 64(3), pp. 357-378.  
KALER, J., 2006. Evaluating Stakeholder Theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 
69(2), pp. 249-268.  
KALYUZHNOVA, Y., 2012. Developing Labour Skills through Local Content 
Policy. Human Capital and Professional Education, 3(3), pp. 37-43.  
KANKARA, A.I., 2013. Energy-Environment Interactions: Potentials and 
Problems of Renewable Energy in Nigeria. Advance in Electronic and Electric 
Engineering, 3(1), pp. 25-30.  
KARAKOSTA, C., DOUKAS, H., and PSARRAS, J., 2010. Technology Transfer 
through Climate Change: Setting a Sustainable Energy Pattern. Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 14, 1546–1557. 
KARL, T.L., 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. 
Studies in International Political Economy 6th edition, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press.  
KATES, S., 1998. A Qualitative Exploration into Voters' Ethical Perceptions 
of Political Advertising: Discourse, Disinformation, and Moral Boundaries. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 17 (16), pp. 1871-1885. 
331 
KAZZAZI, A., and NOURI, B., 2012. A Conceptual Model for Local Content 
Development in Petroleum Industry. Management Science Letters, pp. 
2165-2174.  
KELLE, U., 2005. “Emergence” vs. “forcing” of empirical data? A Crucial 
Problem of “grounded theory” Reconsidered. Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research 6(2), Art.27. 
KEUTIBEN, O., 2014. On Capturing Foreign Oil Rents. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 36, pp. 542-555. 
KIM, P.S., 2009. Enhancing Public Accountability for Developing Countries: 
Major Constraints and Strategies. The Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 68(1), pp. 89-100.  
KINGSBURY, B., KRISCH, N., and STEWART, R.B., 2005. The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law. Law and Contemporary Problems, 68(15), pp. 
15-61.  
KIRAN, S., KAKAKHEL, S.J., and SHAHEEN, F., 2015. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Firm Profitability: A Case of Oil and Gas Sector of 
Pakistan. City University Research Journal, 5(1), pp. 110-119.  
KIRK, J., and MILLER M.L., 1986. Reliability and Validity in Qualitative 
Research. Newbury Park, CA, Sage. 
KLIEMAN, K., 2012. U.S. Oil Companies, the Nigerian Civil War, and the 
Origins of Opacity in the Nigerian Oil Industry. The Journal of American 
History, pp. 155-165.  
KLUEH, U.H. and PASTOR, G., and SEGURA, A., 2009. Policies to Improve 
the Local Impact from Hydrocarbon Extraction: Observations on West Africa 
and Possible Lessons for Central Asia. Energy Policy, 37, pp. 1128-1144.  
KLUVERS, R., 2010. Mechanisms of Accountability in Local Government: An 
Exploratory Study. International Journal of Business and Management, 
5(7), pp. 46-53.  
KNIZNIKOV, A., and WILSON, E., 2010. Responsible Contracting in the 
Russian Oil and Gas Industry. International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), UK. 
KOLSTAD, I., and WIIG, A., 2009. Is Transparency the Key to Reducing 
Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries? World Development, 37(3), pp. 
521-532.  
KOOPMAN, R., WANG, Z., and WEI, S., 2012. Estimating Domestic Content 
in Exports when Processing Trade is Pervasive. Journal of Development 
Economics, 99(1), pp. 178-189. 
332 
KOPPELL, J., 2005. Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge 
of ‘Multiple Accountability Disorder’. Public Administration Review, 65(1), 
pp. 94-108.  
KOPIN´ SKI, D., POLUS, A., and TYCHOLIZ, W., 2013. Resource Curse 
or Resource Disease? Oil In Ghana, African Affairs, 112/449, 583–601. 
KPMG, 2011. A Guide to Brazilian Oil and Gas Taxation.  
KRIPPENDORFF, K., 2004. Content Analysis: An Introduction to its 
Methodology. London: Sage Publications.  
KUMAR, N., 2002. Use and Effectiveness of Performance Requirements: 
What can be Learnt from the Experiences of Developed and Developing 
Countries? In: UNCTAD, The Development Dimension of Fdi: Policy and 
Rule-Making Perspectives, 2002. Proceedings of the Expert Meeting held in 
Geneva from 6 to 8 November 2002, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4.  
KUNTZE, J., and MOERENHOUT, T., 2012. Local Content Requirements and 
the Renewable Energy Industry: A Good Match? International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and Global Green Growth 
Institute. 
KUPOLOKUN, F.M., 2006. Nigeria and the Global Gas Market. Paper 
presented at The Baker Institute Energy Forum, Houston, USA. 
KUPOLUKUN, F., 2007. The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry: Consolidating 
the gains. A paper presented at the Nigerian Oil and gas Conference, Abuja, 
Nigeria. 
KUZON, W., URBANCHEK, M., and MCCABE, S., 1996. The Seven Deadly 
Sins of Statistical Analysis. Annals of Plastic Surgery, 37(3), pp. 265-272.  
KYPREOS, S., and TURTON, H., 2011. Climate Change Scenarios and 
Technology Transfer Protocols. Energy Policy, 39(2), pp. 844-853. 
LABONNE, B., 1999. The Mining Industry and the Community: Joining 
Forces for Sustainable Social Development. Natural Resource Forum, 23, 
pp. 315-322.  
LAHN, G., MERCEL, V., MITCHELL, J., MYERS, K., and STEVENS, P., 2007. 
Report on Good Governance of the National Petroleum Sector. Petroleum 
and Mineral Law and Policy/Chatham House Centre for Energy.  
LAWAL, M.O., and ESE, T.C., 2012. Environmental Impact of Pipeline 
Vandalization on the Nigerian Landscape: The Case of the Niger Delta 
Region. J. Hum Ecol, 39, pp. 73-84.  
333 
LE BILLON, P., 2000. Political Economy of Resource Wars, in Angola’s War 
Economy – the Role of Oil and diamonds. Ed Jackie Cilliers and Christian 
Dietrick Institute for Security Studies.  
LEC, S., 2011. The Petroleum Sector Value Chain, In: Tordo, S.; Tracy, S., 
and Arfaa, N. National Oil Companies and Value Creation. World Bank 
Working Paper, vol. 1. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
LEEDY, P. and ORMROD, J., 2001. Practical Research: Planning and Design. 
7th edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall.  
LEHMAN G. 2002. Global Accountability and Sustainability: Research 
Prospects. Accounting Forum 26(3): 219-232. 
LEHMAN, G., 2010. Interpretive Accounting Research. Accounting Forum, 
34, pp. 231-235.  
LEISINGER, K. M., 2013. Globalization, Minima Moralia, and the 
Responsibilities of Multinational Companies. Available: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.5/leisinger.pdf 
(Accessed: May, 2015). 
LERNER, J.S., and TETLOCK, P.E., 1999. Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability. Psychological Bulletin, 125, pp. 255-275.  
LEWIS, J., WISER, R., 2005. A Review of International Experience with 
Policies to Promote Wind Power Industry Development. Center for Resource 
Solutions. 
LEVITT, M., and CHANDLER, A.E., 2012. Maximizing Development of Local 
Content across Industry Sectors In Emerging Markets: How Private Sector 
Self Interest can Help U.S Development Policy . (A Report of the CSIS 
Project on U.S Leadership in Development.).  
LEVY, D., and MITSCHOW, M., 2009. “I Paid for this Microphone!”: The 
Importance of Shareholder Theory in Teaching Business Ethics. Libertarian 
Papers, 1(25) 
LIKOSKY, M., 2009. Contracting and Regulatory Issues in the Oil and Gas 
and Metallic Minerals Industries. Transnational Corporations, 18(1), pp. 1-
42.  
LINDBLOM, C.K., 1993. The Implications of Organisational Legitimacy for 
Corporate Social Performance and Disclosure. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting Conference. New York.  
LINDKVIST, L., and LLEWELLYN, S., 2003. Accountability, Responsibility 
and Organization. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 19, pp. 251-273.  
334 
LINDNER, S., 2014. Tanzania: Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption. 
Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer, 4, pp. 1-14.  
LLOYD, R., 2008., 2008. Promoting Global Accountability: The Experiences 
of the  
Global Accountability Project. Global Governance. 14, pp. 273-281.  
LOUIS, M. R., 1983. Useful Knowledge and Knowledge Use. In R. Kilmann, 
K. Thomas, D. Slevin, R. Nath, & S. lerTell (Eds.), Producing Useful 
Knowledge for Organizations (pp. 25-36). New York: Praeger.  
LOZANO, R., 2008. Envisioning Sustainability Three-dimensionally. Journal 
of Cleaner Production, 16, pp. 1838-1846.  
LUNDE, L., 2013. Governance Challenges to Chinese oil Companies from 
Global Geopolitics to Local Content and Stakeholder Consultation. Beijing 
New Century Academy on Transnational Corporations Workshop. 10 
January, 2013.  
MACMILLAN, K. and DOWNING, S., 1999. Governance and Performance: 
Goodwill Hunting. Journal of General Management, 24(3), pp. 11-21.  
MACHMUD, T.N., 1993. Production-sharing Contracts in Indonesia: 25 
years’ History. Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 11, p. 179-
185. 
MAHESWARI, S.U., and KRISHNAN, J., 2014. Analysing the Role of 
Demographic Variables on Employee Retention Factors in Ceramic 
Manufacturing Industries in India. Sai Om Journal of Commerce & 
Management, 1(5), pp. 1-6. 
MAJONE, G., Regulating Europe. London: Routledge.  
MANSELL, S., 2013. Shareholder Theory and Kant’s ‘Duty of Beneficence’. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 117, pp. 583-599.  
MANWARING, P.A., 1997. Building Trust in Educational Leadership, and a 
New Instrument to Measure Subordinates’ Trust: A Study Conducted in the 
Church Educational System. Unpublished PhD thesis, Brigham Young 
University, Provo, UT, UMI No. 9717112.  
MARIANO, J., and LA ROVERE, E., 2007. Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production Activities in Brazil: The Consideration of Environmental Issues in 
the Bidding Rounds Promoted by the National Petroleum Agency. Energy 
Policy, 35, pp. 2899-2911.  
MARSH, D. and FURLONG, P., 2002. A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and 
Epistemology in Political Science, in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. Theory and 
Methods in Political Science, 2nd Edition (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan.  
335 
MARSHALL, J.M., and SERWINOWSKI, M.A., 2011. Managing use of Local 
Content in Upstream Oil and Gas. Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE).  
MARSTON, C. L., and SHRIVES, P.J., 1991. The Use of Disclosure Indices in 
Accounting Research: A Review Article. British Accounting Review, 23 (3), 
pp. 195-210. 
MARTINI, M., 2014. Local content policies and corruption in the oil and gas 
industry. Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer. 
MARTINSONS, M.G., LEUNG, A.K.Y., and LOH, L.C., 1996. Technology 
transfer for sustainable development. International Journal of Social 
Economics, 23(9), pp. 69-96.  
MATHEW, M.R., 1993. Socially Responsible Accounting. London: Chapman 
and Hall publishing.  
MATTEN, D., CRANE, A., and CHAPPLE, W., 2003. Behind the Mask: 
Revealing the True Face of Corporate Citizenship. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 45, pp. 109-120.  
MAURO, P., 1998. Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Agenda for 
further Research. Finance and Development, March 10th.  
MAXWELL, J., 1997. Designing a Qualitative Study. In: L. BICKMAN & D. J. 
ROG, ed. Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.  
MAZEEL, M.A., 2010. Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Contracts. Hamburg: 
Diplomica Verlag.  
MCCALL, S.M and KLAY, W.E., 2009. Accountability has always been the 
cornerstone of accounting. Journal of Government Financial Management, 
Fall: pp. 52–57. 
MCCLELLAN, A., 1999. Establishing and Maintaining Credibility in the 
Ministry. Unpublished Doctoral thesis, UMI. 
MELITZ, M.J., 2005. When and how should Infant Industries be Protected? 
Journal of International Economics, 66, pp. 177-196.  
MENDONÇA, R.W., and DE OLIVEIRA, L.G., 2013. Local Content Policy in 
the Brazilian Oil and Gas Sectoral System of Innovation. Latin American 
Business Review, 14, pp. 271-287.  
MENICHINI, T., and ROSATI, T., 2014. A Fuzzy Approach to Improve CSR 
Reporting: An Application to the Global Reporting Initiative Indicators. 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 109, pp. 355-359.  
MESSNER, M., 2009. The Limits of Accountability. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 34, pp. 918-938.  
336 
MICHAEL, O., 2014. Multiple Taxation as a Bane of Business Development 
in Nigeria. Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 3(1), pp. 121-128.  
MILNE, M.J., and Patten, D.M., 2002. Securing Organizational Legitimacy. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15(3), pp. 372-405.  
MINCHENER, A.J., 2000. Technology Transfer Issues and Challenges for 
Improved Efficiency and Environmental Performance in China. International 
Journal of Energy Research, pp. 24, 1011-1027.  
MITCHELL, R.K., AGLE, B.R. and WOOD, D.J., 1997. Towards a Theory of 
Stakeholder Identification and Salience. Academy of Management Review, 
22(4), pp. 853-866.  
MITCHELL, T.R., 1993. Leadership, Values, and Accountability. In M.M. 
CHEMERS, and R. AYMAN (Eds.), Leadership Theory and Research: 
Perspectives and Directions. San Diego, CA: Academic press.  
MITNICK, B.M., 2000. Commitment, Revelation and the Testament of 
Belief: the Metrics of Measurement of Corporate Social Performance. 
Business and Society, 39(4), pp. 419-456.  
MODELL, S., 2010. Bridging the Paradigm Divide in Management 
Accounting Research: the Role of Mixed-Methods Approaches. Management 
Accounting Research, 21(2), pp. 124-129.  
MOHAMMED, K.A., 2009. Nigerian Content Development: The Petroleum 
Technology Development Fund Initiatives. Petroleum Technology 
Development, An International Journal, 2, pp. 1-7.  
MOLDANOVA, J., SCHLAGER, H., and STEVENSON, D.S., 2009. Transport 
Impacts on Atmosphere and Climate: Shipping. Atmos. Environ, pp. 1-37.  
MONDAY, J.U., 2015. Local Content Policy, Human Capital Development and 
Sustainable Business Performance in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry. 
Journal of Management and Sustainability, 5(1), pp. 75-83.  
MORAN-ELLIS, J., ALEXANDER, V., CRONIN, A., DICKINSON, M., FIELDING, 
J., SLENEY, J. and THOMAS, H. 2006., Triangulation and Integration: 
Processes, Claims and Implications, Qualitative Research, 6, pp. 45–59. 
MORGAN, D.L., 2007. Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained: 
Methodological Implications of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative 
Methods. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(1), pp. 48-76.  
MORGESON, F.P., REIDER, M.H., CAMPION, M.A., and BULL, R.A., 2008. 
Review of Research on Age Discrimination in the Employment Interview. J 
Bus Psychol., 22, pp. 223–232.  
MORLEY, P.M., 1989. The Man in the Mirror. Wolgemuth & Hyatt: 
Brentwood, TN 
337 
MULGAN, R., 2000. Accountability: An Ever-expanding Concept? Public 
Administration, 7(3), pp. 555-573.  
MUNSON, C. and ROSENBLATT, MEIR J., 1997. The Impact of Local Content 
Rules On Global Sourcing Decisions. Production and Operations 
Management, 6(3), PP. 277-290, Fall. 
MURGUIA, D.I., and BÖHLING, K., 2013. Sustainability Reporting on Large-
scale Mining Conflicts: the Case of Bajo de la Alumbrera, Argentina. Journal 
of Cleaner Production, 41, pp. 202-209.  
MUTTI, D., YAKOVLEVA, N., VAZQUEZ-BRUST, D., and DIMARCO, M.H., 
2012. Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining Industry: Perspectives 
from Stakeholder Groups in Argentina. Resource Policy, 37, pp. 212-222.  
MWAKALI AND BYARUHANGA, 2011. “Local Content in the Oil and Gas 
Industry: Implications for Uganda”. 
http://news.mak.ac.ug/documents/Makfiles/aet201 1/Mwakali.pdf 
MYERS, K. and MOHAMMED, A., 2015. A Short Guide to Parliamentary 
Oversight of the Oil & Gas Sector for Parliament of Ghana, Revenue Watch 
International (RWI). 
NAEGELEN, F., and MOUGEOT, M., 1998. Discriminatory Public Procurement 
Policy and Cost Reduction Incentives. Journal of Public Economics, 67(7), 
pp. 349-367.  
NCDMB, 2012. Performance Report. Nigerian Content Development and 
Monitoring Board (NCDMB). 
NCDMB, 2013. Implementation Framework. Nigerian Content Development 
and Monitoring Board (NCDMB). 
NEFF, S., 2005. Memorandum on International Best Practice in 
Development of Local Content in the Energy Sector. Paper presented to 
Nigeria National Stakeholders Working Group, Goldwyn International 
Strategies, LLC, 4th May. 
NEITI, Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act 2007.  
NELSON, M., W. BANKS, and J. FISHER, 2003. Improved Accountability 
Disclosure by Canadian Universities. Canadian Accounting Perspectives, 
2(1), pp. 77-107.  
NEU, D., WARSAME, H. and PEDWELL, K., 1998. Managing Public 
Impressions: Environmental Disclosures in Annual Reports. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 23(3), pp. 265-282.  
338 
NEUENDORF K.A., 2002. The Content Analysis Guidebook. London: Sage 
Publications.  
NEWELL, P. and BELLOUR, S., 2002. Mapping Accountability: Origins, 
Contexts and Implications for Development. Working paper series, 168. 
Brighton: IDS. 
NGOASONG, M.Z., 2014. How International Oil and Gas Companies 
Respond to Local Content Policies in Petroleum-producing Developing 
Countries: A Narrative Enquiry. Energy Policy, 73, PP. 471–479. 
NGWAKWE, C.C., 2012. Rethinking the Accounting Stance on Sustainable 
Development. Sustainable Development, 20, pp. 28-41.  
NIGERIAN TRIBUNE, 2015. Group Urges NCDMB on Transparency in 
Disbursing Funds. April, 29.  
NIJAKI, L.K., and WORREL, G., 2012. Procurement for Sustainable Local 
Economic Development. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 
25(2), pp. 133-153.  
NISHIKIMI, K., and KUROIWA, I., 2011. Analytical Framework for East 
Asian Integration (1): Industrial Agglomeration and Concentrated 
Dispersion, In: FUJITA, M., KUROIWA, I., and KUMAGAI, S., 2011. The 
Economies of East Asian Integration: A Comprehensive Introduction to 
Regional Issues. Institute of Developing Economics (IDE), JETRO. UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing.     
NLERUM, F.E., 2010. Reflections on Participation Regimes in Nigeria’s Oil 
Sector. Nigerian Current Law Review, 2007-2010, pp. 145-162.  
NNPC, 2006. Nigerian Content. [online] Available from: www.nnpconline.org 
13/05/2012]. 
NOGICD, 2010. The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development 
Act. 
NORDAS, H. and KYVIK, E.V., and HEUM, P., 2003. Upstream Petroleum 
Industry and Local Industrial Development: A comparative Study. Bergen: 
The Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, SNF-
Report 08/03. 
NRGI, 2014. Natural Resource Charter, Second Edition. Natural Resources 
Governance Institute (NRGI). 
NRGI Reader, 2015. Natural Resource Charter: Converting Resources into 
Development, Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI). 
339 
NWAPI, C., 2015. Corruption Vulnerabilities in Local Content Policies in the 
Extractive Sector: An Examination of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry 
Content Development Act, 2010. Resources Policy, 46, 92-96.   
NWOAKORO, J.E., 2011. Signed, Sealed but will it Deliver? Nigeria's Local 
Content Bill and Cross-Sectoral Growth. World Energy Law & Business, 
4(1), pp. 40-67.  
NWOKEJI, G.U., 2007. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the 
Development of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry: History, Strategies and 
Current Direction. Rice University: James A. Baker III Institute for Public 
Policy.  
NWOSU, H.U., NWACHUKWU, I.N., OGAJI, S.O.T., and PROBERT, S.D., 
2006. Local Involvement in Harnessing Crude Oil and Natural Gas in 
Nigeria. Applied Energy, 83, pp. 1274-1287.     
O’DWYER, B., 2003. Conceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility: the 
Nature of Managerial Capture. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 16(4), pp. 523-557.  
O'DWYER, B. and GRAY, R., 1998. Corporate social reporting in the Republic 
of Ireland: a longitudinal study. Irish Accounting Review, 5(2), pp. 1-34.  
ODUMOSU-AYANU, I.T., 2012. Governments, Investors and Local 
Communities: Analysis Of A Multi-Actor Investment Contract Framework. 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, PP. 15, 1-42. 
OECD, 2008. Guideline for Multinational Enterprises. Paris, France: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
OECD, 2008. Implementation Guide to Ensure Accountability and 
Transparency in State Ownership. Paris, France: Corporate Affairs Division, 
Directorate for Finance and Enterprises Affairs, Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
OECD, 2012. Investment Policy Reviews OECD Investment Policy Reviews: 
Kazakhstan. Paris, France: OECD Publication. 
OECD/IEA, 2006. Angola Towards an Energy Strategy. OECD/IEA. 
OGBODO, J., 2008. Government Unfolds New Plans to Boost Local Content. 
[Online] Available: http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news 
OGRI, O.R., 2001. A Review of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry and the 
Associated Environmental Problems. The environmentalist, 21, pp. 11-21.  
OGUINE, I., 2011. Nigerian Content in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry: 
Legal and Policy Issues. Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 29(4), 
pp. 405-430.  
340 
OKAFOR, J., and ANICHE, E., 2014. A Critical Appraisal of Enforcement of 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development (NOGICD) Act, 2010. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 31, pp. 82-94.  
OKEKE, V.O.S. and ANICHE, E.T., 2013. A Critique of the Enforcement of 
Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NETI) Act 2007 in 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Sector. British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 
14(11), pp. 98-108.    
OKPE, F.O., 2015. Economic Development and the Utility of Local Content 
Legislation in the Oil and Gas Industry: Conflicts and Effects of Nigeria’s 
Local Content Act in the Context of International Investment Law. Pacific 
McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal, 28, pp. 255-302.   
OKOYE, E., and MBONU, C., 2005. Overview of Accounting in the Nigerian 
Petroleum (Upstream) Industry. Journal of Global Accounting, 1(2), pp. 1-
20.  
OKUSAMI, D., 2010. An Overview of the Nigerian Local Content Act”. A 
Paper Presented at the Africa Energy Week Conference in Cape Town, South 
Africa, September 29. 
OLATUNDE, S., 2013. Climate Change: The Impacts and Potential Benefits 
for the Developing Nations. International Journal of Agricultural Research 
and Review, 1, pp. 2-12.  
OLAWUYI, D.S., 2012. Legal and Sustainable Development Impacts of 
Major Oil Spills. Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development, 9(1), 
pp. 1-15.  
OLOMOLA, A. and OLUMIDE, S., 2005. The Quest for Local Content in the 
Upstream Sector of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry. Oil, Gas & Energy 
Law Intelligence (OGEL), 3(1), pp. 1-15.  
OLOWOKUDEJO, F., ADULOJU, S.A., and OKE, S.A., 2011. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Organizational Effectiveness of Insurance Companies in 
Nigeria. The Journal of Risk Finance, 12(3), pp. 156-167.  
OMENIKOLO, A.I., and AMADI, R.O., 2010. Challenges Facing Nigerian Local 
Content in Oil and Gas Industry. Continental J. Renewable Energy, 1, 15-
20. 
OMOROGBE, Y., 1987. The Legal Framework for the Production of 
Petroleum in Nigeria. Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 5(4), 
pp. 273-291.  
ONWUEGBUZIE, A. J., and LEECH, N. L., 2007. A Call for Qualitative Power 
Analyses. Quality & Quantity, 41, pp. 105-121.  
OPEC, 2011a, World Outlook. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).  
341 
OPEC, 2011b. African Oil: Local Expertise Welcome. The 20th World 
Petroleum Congress 4-8 December 2011, Doha, Qatar. 
OSAMMOR, F. U., 2008. Nigerian Local Policy Development in Oil and Gas 
Industry. Economic Confidential, June. 
OVADIA, J.S., 2013. The Political Economy of Development and 
Underdevelopment in Africa. In: Falola, T. and Achberger, J. Eds., African 
Studies. Routledge. 
OVADIA, J.S., 2014. Local Content and Natural Resource Governance: The 
Cases of Angola and Nigeria. The Extractive Industries and Society, 1(2), 
pp. 137-146. 
OVADIA, J.S., 2015. The Role of Local Content Policies in Natural Resource-
based Development. Austrian Development Policy, Commodities and 
Development [ÖSTERREICHISCHE ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK ROHSTOFFE 
UND ENTWICKLUNG], 37-46. 
OWENS, J., and SYKES, R., 2009. The International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association Social Responsibility Working 
Group and Human Rights. International Social Science Journal, 57(1), pp. 
131-141. 
OXFORD BUSINESS GROUP, 2013. The Report: Nigeria. 
Available at: www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com  
OYEDEPO, S.O., 2013. Energy and Sustainable Development in Nigeria: The 
Way Forward. Energy, Sustainability and Society, 2(15), pp. 1-17.  
OYEJIDE, T.A., and ADEWUYI, A.O., 2011. Enhancing Linkage of Oil and 
Gas Industry of the Nigerian Economy. MMCP Discussion Paper No. 8 ed. 
MMCP. 
PALLOT, J., 1992. Elements of a Theoretical Framework for Public Sector 
Accounting. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 5(1), pp. 38-
59.  
PATER, A., and VAN LIEROP, K., 2006. Sense and Sensitivity: The Roles of 
Organisation and Stakeholders in Managing Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Business Ethics: European Review, 15(4), pp. 339-351.  
PATTEN, D.M., 1992. Intra-industry Environmental Disclosures in Response 
to the Alaskan Oil Spill: A Note on Legitimacy Theory. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 17(5), pp. 471-475.  
PAUL, S., 1991. Strengthening Public Service Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework. Discussion Paper No. 136. Washington DC: World Bank. 
PAVLOVA, M., 2006. Technology Education for Sustainable Futures. Design 
and Technology Education: An International Journal, 11(2), pp. 41-53.  
342 
PEREGO, P. and KOLK, A., 2012. Multinationals’ Accountability on 
Sustainability: The Evolution of Third-party Assurance of Sustainability 
Reports. Journal of Business Ethics, 110, pp. 173-190.  
PETERSON, R., SARGENT, J., NAPIER, N. K., and SHIM, W. S., 1996. 
Corporate Expatriate HRM Policies, Internationalization, and Performance in 
the World’s Largest MNCs. Management International Review, 36(3), pp. 
215-230.  
PISANI, J.A., 2006. Sustainable Development – Historical Roots of the 
Concept. Environmental Sciences, 3(2), pp. 83-96.  
PITKIN, J., 2013. Oil, Oil, Everywhere: Environmental and Human Impacts 
of Oil Extraction in the Niger Delta. Pomona Senior Theses, Paper 88. 
POLLITT, C., 2003. The Essential Public Manager. London: Open University 
Press/McGraw-Hill. 
POST, J.E., PRESTON, L.E., and SACHS, S., 2002. Redefining the 
Corporation: Stakeholder Management and Organizational Wealth. 
California: Stanford University Press.  
PRIMO, M.A.M. and DUBOIS, F., 2012. Technological Capabilities of 
Brazilian Shipbuilding Suppliers. J. Technol. Manag. Innov., 7(2), pp. 39-51.  
PwC, 2012. Nigeria Tax Data Card 2012/2013. 
PwC, 2012. Transfer Pricing: A Critical Success Factor for Oil and Gas 
Companies. November Edition, PriceWaterHouseCoopers.  
PwC, 2013. Oil and Gas Tax Guide for Africa. PriceWaterHouseCoopers.  
PwC, 2013. Point of View: Integrated Reporting Going Beyond the Financial 
Results. PriceWaterHouseCoopers.  
RADHAKRISNA, R., 2007. Tips for Developing and Testing 
Questionnaires/Instruments. Tools of the Trade, 45(1)  
RAMDOO, I. 2015. Unpacking Local Content Requirements in the Extractive 
Sector: What Implications for the Global Trade and Investment 
Frameworks? The E15 Initiative: Strengthening the Global Trade and 
Investment System for Sustainable Development. ICTSD and World 
Economic Forum, September, 2015. 
RASCHE, A., and ESSER, D.E., 2006. From Stakeholder Management to 
Stakeholder Accountability. Journal of Business Ethics, 65, pp. 251-267.  
RAVAT, A., and KANNAN, S.P., 2013. Implementing EITI for Impact: A 
Handbook for Policy Makers and Stakeholders. Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiatives (EITI). 
343 
REICHERTZ, J., 2010. Abduction: The Logic of Discovery of Grounded 
Theory. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 11(1), Art.13. 
REINHARDT, F.L., STAVINS, R.N. and VIETOR, R.H.K., 2008. Corporate 
Social Responsibility through an Economic Lens. Rev. Environmental 
Economics and Policy, 2(2), PP. 219-239. 
RENWICK, D., 2008. No Room for Growth in Local Content. Energy 
Caribbean Yearbook. 
REXLER, J., 2010. Beyond the Oil Curse: Shell, State Power, and 
Environmental Regulation in the Niger Delta, XII (1), 26-31, Fall. Stanford 
Journal of International Relations, Fall, XII(I), pp. 26-31.  
RICHARDS, M., 2001. U.S Multinational Staffing Practices and Implications 
for Subsidiary Performance in the U.K. and Thailand. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, 2, pp. 225-242.  
RIXON, D.L., 2007. A stakeholder Reporting Model for Semi-autonomous 
Public Sector Agencies: the Case of the Workers' Compensation Agency in 
Newfoundland, Canada. Thesis submitted to the Warwick University. 
RITCHIE, J., LEWIS, J., and ELAM, G., 2003. Designing and Selecting 
Samples, In (Ed.): RITCHIE, J. and LEWIS, J.: Qualitative Research 
Practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
ROBERTS, D.H., KOEPLIN, J.P., 2007. Sustainability Reporting Practices In 
Portugal: Greenwashing Or Triple-bottom-line? International Business & 
Economics Research Journal, 6(9), pp. 29-39.  
ROBERTS, J., 1991. The Possibilities of Accountability. Accounting 
Organizations and Society, 16(4), pp. 355-368.  
ROBERTS, J., and SCAPENS, R., 1985. Accounting Systems and Systems of 
Accountability – Understanding Accounting Practices in their Organizational 
Contexts. Accounting, Organizations and Society, pp. 443-456.  
RODRIGUEZ, M.R. and SUSLICK, L.B., 2009. An Overview of Brazilian 
Petroleum Exploration Lease Auctions. TERRÆ, 6(1), pp. 6-20. 
ROSS, M., 1999. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World 
Politics, 51, pp. 297-322. 
ROTHMAN, K.J., 2010. Curbing Type I and Type II Errors. European Journal 
of Epidemiology, 25(4), pp. 223-224.  
ROY, K.C. and TISDELL, C.A., 1998. Good Governance in Sustainable 
Development: the Impact of Institutions. International Journal of Social 
Economics, 25(6/7/8), pp. 1310-1325.  
344 
RUIGROK, W., PECK, S., and TACHEVA, S., 2007. Nationality and Gender 
Diversity on Swiss Corporate Boards. Corporate Governance, 15(4), pp. 
546-557  
RYAN, B., SCAPENS, R. W., and THEOBALD, M., 2002. Research Method 
and Methodology in Finance and Accounting. 2nd ed. London: Thomson.   
SAHARA REPORTERS, 2015. NNPC: Bayelsa APC Seeks Presidential Probe 
into Local Content Funds. Sahara Reporters, August, 14th. 
SAINFORT F, B., B.C, 2000. Measuring Post-decision Satisfaction. Med Decis 
Making, 20, pp. 51-61  
SAUNDERS, M. and LEWIS, P., and THORNHILL, A, 2012. Research Methods 
for Business Students. 6th ed. England: Pearson.  
SCHALTEGGER, S., and BURITT, R.L., 2010. Sustainability Accounting for 
Companies: Catchphrase or Decision Support for Business Leaders? Journal 
of World Business, 45, pp. 375-384.  
SCHLUMBERGER OIL and GAS GLOSSARY: 
http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/Terms/l/local_content.aspx 
SCHLUMBERGER, 2014. Local Content: Four Pillars to Improving Local 
Benefits from Oil and Gas Projects. Available at: 
http://www.slb.com/news/inside_news/2014/2014_1219_local_content.aspx  
SCOT, J., DAKIN, R., HELLER, K., and EFTIMIE, A., 2013. Extracting 
Lessons on Gender in the Oil and Gas Sector: A Survey Analysis of the 
Gendered Impacts of Onshore Oil and Gas Production in three Developing 
Countries. Extractive Industries for Development, series No. 28. The World 
Bank.  
SCOTT, M.B., and LYMAN, S.M., 1968. Accounts. American Sociological 
Review, 33, pp. 46-62.  
SEARCY, C., and ROCA, L.C., 2012. An Analysis of Indicators Disclosed in 
Corporate Sustainability Reports. Journal of Cleaner Production, 20, pp. 
103-118.  
SERVAES, H. and TAMAYO, A., 2013. The Impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness. 
Management Science, 59(5), pp. 1045-1061.  
SHAFAEDDIN, M., 2000. What did Frederick List Actually Say? Some 
Clarifications on the Infant Industry Argument. UNCTAD Discussion Papers 
No. 149; UNCTAD/OSG/DP/149, UNCTAD. 
345 
SHARMA, S., and HENRIQUES, I., 2005. Stakeholder Influences on 
Sustainability Practices in the Canadian Forest Products Industry. Strategic 
Management Journal, 26, pp. 159-180.  
SHEARER, T., 2002. Ethics and Accountability: From the For-itself to the 
For-the-self. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27, pp. 541-573.  
SHORT, C., 2014. The Development of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, pp. 2-8.  
SIEGEL-JACOBS, K. and YATES, J.F., 1996. Effects of Procedural and 
Outcome Accountability on Judgment Quality. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 1, pp. 1-17.  
SIGAM, C., and GARCIA, L., 2012. Extractive Industries: Optimizing Value 
Retention in Host Countries. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development UNCTAD Publication. 
SIM, J., 1998. Collecting and Analysing Qualitative Data: Issues Raised by 
the Focus Group. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 28(2), pp. 345-352.  
SINCLAIR, A., 1995. The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and 
Discourses. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(2/3), pp. 219-237.  
SIRGY, M.J., 2002. Measuring Corporate Performance by Building on the 
Stakeholders Model of Business Ethics. J. Bus. Ethics, 35, pp. 143-162.  
SMITH, M and TAFFLER, R.J., 2000. The chairman’s statement: A content 
Analysis of Discretionary Narrative Disclosures. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 13(5), pp. 624-646. 
SMITH, E.E., DZIENKOWSKI, J.S., ANDERSON, O.L., CONINE, G.B., LOWE, 
J.S. and KRAMER, B.M., 2000. International Petroleum Transactions. 
Colorado: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation (2nd edition). 
SMYTH, S., 2013. Social Housing and Accountability: Towards a Framework 
for Analysing Critical Public Accountability. Thesis Submitted to the 
Manchester Metropolitan University. 
SOLOW, R.M., 1974. Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources. 
The Review of Economic Studies, 41, pp. 29-45.  
SPENCE, D.B., 2011. Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas 
Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 
86(1), PP. 59-85. 
SSENNAGO, F., 2006. Examining Discriminatory Procurement Practices In 
Developing Countries. Journal of Public Procurement, 6(3), pp. 218-249.  
346 
STANGA, K.G., 1976. Disclosure in Published Annual Reports. Financial 
Management, pp. 42-52.  
STANLEY, T., JENNINGS, N. and MACK, J.  2008. An Examination of the 
Content of Community Financial Reports in Queensland Local Government 
Authorities. Financial Accountability and Management, 24(4), pp. 411-437.  
STELLA, A. and GERMISO, M., and HENRIKSEN, A., 2008. Statoil in Nigeria: 
Transparency and Local Content, Report Number I, Statoil Nigeria. 
STEPHENSON, S., 2013. Addressing Local Content Requirements in a 
Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement, Global Green Growth Institute. 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). 
STEVENS, P., 2008. National Oil Companies and International Oil Companies 
in the Middle East: Under the Shadow of Government and the Resource 
Nationalism Cycle. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 1(1), PP. 5-30. 
STEWART, J.D., 1984. The Role of Information in Public Accountability. In 
Hopwood, A.G., and Tomkins, C. (Eds.) Issues in Public Sector Accounting. 
Oxford: Philip Allen. 
STURGEON, T. VAN BIESEBROECK, J., and GEREFFI, G., 2008. Value 
Chains, Networks and Clusters: Reframing the Global Automotive Industry. 
Journal of Economic Geography, 8, pp. 297-321.  
SUNDARAM, A. and INKPEN, A., 2004. The Corporate Objective Revisited. 
Organization Science, 15, pp. 350-363.  
SUTTON, T., 2004. Corporate Financial Accounting and Reporting. 3rd 
edition. Prentice Hall.  
SWAMIDASS, P., 1994. Technology on the Manufacturing Floor. The 
Manufacturing Institute, pp. 1–15. 
SWEETCRUDE, 2015. Local Content Implementation Vital to National 
Economic Security – NCDMB Boss. SweetCrude, Abuja, 03 November. 
SWIFT, T., 2001. Trust, Reputation and Corporate Accountability to 
Stakeholders. Business Ethics: a European Review, 10(1), pp. 16-26.  
SZEKELY, F., and KNIRSCH, M., 2005. Responsible Leadership and 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Metrics for Sustainable Performance. 
European Management Journal, 23(6), pp. 628-647.  
TABACHNICK, B. G., & FIDELL, L. S., 2007. Using Multivariate Statistics 
(5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
347 
TANGONYIRE, R.C., and ACHAL, L.K., 2012. Economic Behaviour as if 
Others Too Had Interests. (Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa Research & 
Publishing.  
TASHAKKORI, A., and TEDDLIE, C., 2003. Issues and Dilemmas in Teaching 
Research Methods Courses in Social and Behavioral Sciences: US 
Perspective. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 6, pp. 
61-77.  
TEDDLIE, C., and YU, F., 2007. Mixed Methods Sampling: A Typology with 
Examples. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(1): 77-100. 
TESFAY, Y.Y., 2014. Environmental Friendly Cost Efficient and Effective Sea 
Transport Outsourcing Strategy: The Case of Statoil. Transportation 
Research, 41, pp. 153-147.  
THE NATION, 2015. Nigerian Content Fund to hit $700m, July 16, 2015. 
THE TRINIDAD GUARDIAN, 2007. Local Content: The Case of Norway. 25th 
October, 2007. Available at: http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2007-10-
30/bussguardian12.html. Last visited on 13/12/2014. 
THE WILL, 2013. Local Content: House to Probe IOCs Over Violation. 
October 28th, 2013. 
THISDAY, 21st June, 2011. Local Content is the Instrument for 
Industrialization of Nigeria. ThisDay Newspaper.  
THISDAY, 2015. Low Awareness Hinders Actualization of Nigerian Local 
Content Act. Feb. 16th. 
TIENHAARA, K., 2012. Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas 
Sector: A Survey of Environmentally Relevant Clauses. Trade, Investment, 
and Sustainable Development: Spring, 11(3), pp. 14-40.  
TORDO, S., 2009. Countries Experience with the Allocation of Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Rights: Strategies and Design Issues. World 
Bank Working Paper. The World Bank Group. 
TORDO, S., JOHNSTON, D., and JOHNSTON, D., 2009. Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Rights: Allocation Strategies and Design Issues, 
Washington D.C., United States of America, World Bank, no. 179. 
TORDO, S., WARNER, M., MANZANO, O.E., and ANOUTI, Y., 2013. Local 
Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector. World Bank Study, Washington 
D.C: World Bank. 
TOULEKIMA, M., 2015. Local Content Key Enabler for Oil & Gas Projects in 
Emerging Markets: Investing, Developing, & Providing Oversight in 
Countries of Operations. Canada: 10-10-10 Publishing. 
348 
TOWER, G., 1993. A Public Accountability Model of Accounting Regulation. 
British Accounting Review, 25, pp. 61-85.  
TUODOLO, F., 2009. Corporate Social Responsibility: Between Civil Society 
and the Oil Industry in the Developing World. ACME: An International E-
Journal for Critical Geographies, 8(3), pp. 530-541.  
UGBOMEH, B.A., and ATUBI, A.O, 2010. The Role of the Oil Industry and 
the Nigerian State in Defining the Future of the Niger Delta Region of 
Nigeria. An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal, Ethiopia, 4(2), pp. 103-
112.  
UNCTAD, 2003. Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements: 
New Evidence from Selected Countries, United Nations New York and 
Geneva, 2003. 
UNCTAD, 2007. Elimination of trims: The Experience of Selected Developing 
Countries. New York and Geneva: United Nations.  
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme 
2010.http://www.unep.org/ (last visited 2013). 
USHIE, V., 2012. Political Decentralization and Natural Resource 
Governance in Nigeria, Research Report, The North-South Institute. 
USMAN, O.S., 2011. The Opacity and Conduit of Corruption in the Nigerian 
Oil Sector: Beyond the Rhetoric of the Anti-corruption Crusade. Journal of 
Sustainable Development in Africa, 13(2), pp. 294-308.  
VAALAND, T.I. and SONEYE, A.S.O., and OWUSU, R.A., 2012. Local Content 
and Struggling Suppliers: A Network Analysis of Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry. African Journal of Business Management, 6(15), pp. 5399-5413.  
VAALAND, T.I., 2015. Petro-stimulated Corporate Citizenship in Developing 
Countries. The Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 59, pp. 92-111.    
VACHA-HAASE, T. and THOMPSON, B., 2004. How to Estimate and Interpret 
Various Effect Sizes, Journal of Counseling Psychology, 51(4), PP. 473–48. 
VAN ALSTINE, J., 2014. Transparency in Resource Governance: the Pitfalls 
and Potential of “new oil” in Sub-Saharan Africa. Global Environmental 
Politics, 14(1), PP. 20-39. 
VELOSO, F.M., 2006. Understanding Local Content Decisions: Economic 
Analysis and an Application to the Automobile Industry. Journal of Regional 
Science, 46(4), pp. 747-772.  
VINTRO, C., FORTUNY, J., SANMIQUEL, L., FREIJO, M., and EDO, J., 2012. 
Is Corporate Social Responsibility Possible in the Mining Sector? Evidence 
from Catalan Companies. Resources Policy, 35, pp. 118-125.  
349 
VOSLOO, S., 2005. Towards a Sustainable Development View of Local 
Content using ICTs in South Africa A Key Priority in the National 
Information Society Strategy. International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD). 
WABOTE, S., 2011. The Nigerian Oil & Gas Industry Content Development 
Act:  The Role of Contracting & Procurement Professionals. CIPS Nigeria 
Conference & Graduation/Award Ceremony, 9th January, 2011.  
WADDOCK, S.A. and GRAVES, S.B., 1997a. The Corporate Social 
Performance – Financial Performance Link. Strategic Management Journal, 
18(4), pp. 303-319.  
WADDOCK, S.A. and GRAVES, S.B., 1997b. Quality of management and 
quality of stakeholder relations: are they synonymous? Business and 
Society, 36(3), pp. 250-279.  
WANG, P., WEE, C.H., and KOH, P.H., 1998. Control Mechanisms, Key 
Personnel Appointment, Control and Performance of Sino-Singaporean Joint 
Ventures. International Business Review, 7, pp. 351-375.  
WARNER, M., 2007. Community Content: the Interface of Community 
Investment Programmes with Local Content Practices in the Oil and Gas 
Development Sector. Briefing note 9. London: Odi.  
WARNER, M., 2011. Local Content in Procurement: Creating Local Jobs and 
Competitive Domestic Industries in Supply Chains. Greenleaf Publishing.  
WATTS, M., 2004. Antinomies of Community: Some thoughts on 
Geography, Resources and Empire. Trans. Inst. Br. Geographers, 29, PP. 
195–216. 
WBCSD, 2003. Sustainable Development Reporting: Striking the Balance. 
Geneva: World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).  
WEAVER, G.R., TREVINO, L.K., and COCHRAN, P.L., 1999. Integrated and 
Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Management Commitments, 
External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices. Academy of 
Management Journal, 42, pp. 539-552.  
WEBER, R.H., 2011. Accountability in the Internet of Things. Computer Law 
and Security Review, 27, pp. 133-138.  
WEBER, R.P., 1988. Basic Content Analysis. Sage University Paper Series 
on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Series No. 07-049. 
Beverly Hills, CA and London.  
WELLS, J., and JOHN, H., 2008. Increasing Local Content in the 
Procurement of Infrastructure Projects in Low Income Countries. Institution 
of Civil Engineers, pp. 6-7.  
350 
WENNMANN, A., 2012. Sharing Natural Resource Wealth During War-To-
Peace Transitions, In Lujala, P. and Rustad, S.A. High Value Natural 
Resources and Peacebuilding (ed.) London: Earthscan. 
WERHANE, P. and FREEMAN, R.E., 1997. The Blackwell Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary of Business Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
WETHERILL, C., 2010. Additionality of Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs) in Upstream Oil and Gas in Africa. Working Paper Series, no. 114 
(ed). African Development Finance Bank Group. 
WIIG, A., and KOLSTAD, I., 2010. Multinational Corporations and Host 
Country Institutions: A Case Study of CSR Activities in Angola. International 
Business Review, 19, pp. 178-190.  
WILLIAMS, C., 2007. Research Methods. Journal of Business and Economic 
Research, 5(2), pp. 71.  
WOOD, J.A., and WINSTON, B. E., 2007. Development of Three Scales to 
Measure Leader Accountability. Leadership & Organization Development 
Journal, 28(2), pp. 167-185.  
WORLD BANK, 2012. Increasing Local Procurement By the Mining Industry 
in West Africa. (Report No. 66585-AFR), The World Bank. 
WORLD BANK, 2012. Reporting on Local Content in the Context of EITI. The 
World Bank. 
WRIGHT, J.C and GALLUN, R.A. 2005. International Petroleum Accounting. 
USA: Pennwell Corporation. 
WTI Advisors, 2013. Local Content Requirements & the Green Economy 
(Oxford/Geneva). 
WTO/UNCTAD, 2002. Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other 
Performance Requirements: Addendum. (report, G/C/W/307/Add.1 
(February 8).  
YOKEL, E., 2001. The Social Construction of Accountability: Radiologists and 
their Record-keeping Practices. The Information Society, 17, pp. 233-245.  
ZAHRAN, M.M., 2011. Accountability Frameworks in the United Nations 
System. Geneva: Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations.  
ZEÂGHAL, D. and AHMED, S.A., 1990. Comparison of Social Responsibility 
Information Disclosure Media Used by Canadian Firms. Accounting, Auditing 
& Accountability Journal, 3(1), pp. 38-53.  
ZHANG, S., ANDREWS-SPEED, P., ZHAO,  X., and HE, Y., 2013. Interactions 
between Renewable Energy Policy and Renewable Energy Industrial Policy: 
351 
A Critical Analysis of China's Policy Approach to Renewable Energies. Energy 
Policy, 62, pp. 342-353.  
ZHANG, S., ZHAO, X., ANDREWS-SPEED, P., and HE, Y., 2013. The 
development trajectories of wind power and solar PV power in China: A 
comparison and policy recommendations. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 26, pp. 322-331.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
352 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
353 
Appendix 1a: Sample Invitation to Tenders used in the Nigerian Oil and 
Gas Industry 
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Appendix 1b: Sample Invitation to Prequalification used in the Nigerian 
Oil and Gas Industry 
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Appendix 2 
Table 3.2: Local Content Agencies and their Monitoring, Accounting and Auditing 
Functions in Selected Countries 
Country Local Content Monitoring 
Agencies 
Monitoring/Reporting, Enforcement & Auditing  
Responsibilities 
Angola Ministry of Petroleum; 
 
Sonangol 
 
 Monitoring the recruitment of foreign workers is 
done by the Ministry of Petroleum 
 Monitoring of local sourcing of materials, goods, 
equipments and services is conducted by Sonangol 
Brazil Brazilian National Agency 
for Oil, Gas and Biofuels 
(ANP) 
 Quarterly local content reporting by operators 
 Block specific reporting for the exploration phase 
and area specific reporting for the development 
phase 
 Reporting uses specific templates provided by the 
ANP which are standardized for each phase 
(exploration and development) 
 Auditing takes place at the end of each of the 
exploration and development phases 
Indonesia Interim Working Unit for 
Upstream Oil and Gas 
Business Activities 
(SKSPMIGAS) 
 Annual compliance monitoring  
 Production sharing contractors to comply with 
local content targets set by SKSPMIGAS and ticked 
against a specific template  
 Contractors to submit monthly report according to 
the format and instructions contained in 
SKSPMIGAS procurement guidelines 
 Ministry of Trade issues local content certificates 
to contractors 
Kazakhstan Ministry of Oil and Gas 
and the Ministry of New 
Technologies; 
 
Kazakhstan Contract 
Agency (KRA); 
 
Expert Council on Local 
Content; 
 
Technical Regulation and 
Metrology Committee 
 
 Subsoil users are required to file quarterly and 
annual reports in the KRA Register detailing  their: 
(1) medium- and long-term procurement plans; (2) 
local content in goods, works and services; (3) 
local employment; and (4) training performance 
 Local content in employment is monitored through 
the work permit applications and the subsoil users 
reports to the KRA 
 Educational budgets are monitored by KRA. 
Unspent amounts are carried forward and must be 
spent before the end of the relevant petroleum 
contract 
Malaysia Petronas  Reports on the level and trend of local content and 
monitoring of local content obligations under PSAs 
 PEMANDU tracks progress toward the 
achievement of the Economic Transformation 
Program’s targets 
 Indicators have been set to track progress toward: 
(1) attracting multinationals to bring their global 
oil field service and equipment operations to 
Malaysia, (2) Consolidating domestic fabrication 
sector, and (3) developing engineering, 
procurement, and installation capacity through 
strategic partnerships and JV s 
Nigeria Nigerian Content 
Development and 
New reporting guidelines mandated oil firms to submit the 
following documents to the NCDMB: 
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Monitoring Board 
(NCDMB) 
 
Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
 
National Assembly 
committee on local 
content 
 Quarterly contracting plans for all contracts which 
value exceed $1 million 
 Invitation to tender  for all contracts which value 
exceed $1 million 
 Quarterly procurement report 
 Employment, training and technology transfer plan 
 Half yearly financial, legal and insurance services 
plans 
 Annual Nigerian Content Performance Report 
showing the following: 
- Category of expenditure on a current and 
cumulative cost basis; 
- Employment achievement in hours/days 
worked by Nigerians and expatriate workers 
and their status; 
- Procurement in quantity, tonnage of foreign 
and local materials; 
 Board to issue directives to contractors/operators 
to facilitate reporting 
 
Norway Goods and Services Office 
(GSO) 
 Monitored IOCs’ contracting and procurement 
(materials, equipment and services) procedures to 
maximize local participation 
 Responsible for ensuring that qualified Norwegian 
oil companies were involved in petroleum contract 
biddings 
 Required all IOCs to publish their tender schedules 
as well as the list of all participating companies 
 Upstream oil and gas companies to submit annual 
reports disclosing information on local content 
including local materials and labour used in oil 
production 
 Encouraged joint ventures and technology transfer 
UK67 Offshore Supply Office 
(OSO) 
 set up a special auditing and reporting processes 
to track and monitor all purchases made by the oil 
and gas companies to ensure compliance with 
local content provisions 
                                                          
67 The UK OSO is no longer functioning. With entry into the EU, the UK had scrapped its local content rules. But still 
local content strategies do exist informally. For instance, it was observed that the Chambers of Commerce and local 
authorities engage in promotion of opportunities ensuring that local firms enter the supply chains (Govt. Of 
Australia, 2011).   
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Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Permanent Committee on 
Local Content; 
 
Work Permit Advisory 
Committee; 
 
Energy Research and 
Planning Division of the 
Ministry of Energy and 
Energy Industries; 
 
Energy Chamber of 
Trinidad and Tobago; 
 Production sharing contracts requires that all 
contractors to ensure that local and nonlocal 
contractors or suppliers maintain records to 
enable the government to monitor local content, 
and have to certify the cost of local materials, 
labour, and services used with supporting 
documents which will subsequently be audited 
 
 Quarterly reporting on local content activities by 
operators to the Ministry of Energy and Energy 
Industries  
 
 Training and development programs shall be 
approved by the Ministry of Energy and Energy 
Industries and progress shall be reported 
Source: Modified from The Trinidad Guardian (2007), Klueh et al. (2009), NOGICD Act 2010, and Tordo 
et al. (2013: 96-120). 
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Appendix 3 
Stages of Acquiring Participating Interests from the IOCs by the Nigerian 
Govt. 
Company Nigerian Government Interest 
(%) 
Date of Acquisition 
Elf (Formerly SAFRAP) 35 
55 
60 
01-04-1971 
01 -04-1974 
01-07-1979 
AGIP/PHILIPS 33 ½ 
55 
60 
01-04-1971 
01-04-1974 
01-07-1979 
GULP (Presently CHEVRON) 35 
55 
60 
01-04-1973 
01-04-1974 
01-07-1979 
SHELL (Formerly SHELL-BP) 35 
55 
60 
80 
01-04-1973 
01-04-1974 
01-07-1979 
01-08-1979 
MOBIL 35 
55 
60 
01-04-1973 
01-04-1974 
01-04-1979 
TEXACO/GULP (Presently 
CHEVRON) 
55 
60 
01-05-1975 
01-07-1979 
PAN OCEAN 55 
60 
01-01-1978 
01-07-1979 
Source: Crosby-Oil and Gas People (1998) 
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Appendix 4: Interview Protocol 
Designing and Contextualising the Interview Questions 
The essence of conducting interviews in this study is to obtain further information that 
cannot otherwise be obtained. This is to address the inherent limitations of the 
questionnaires. The results will converge with the results from the other procedures to give a 
more meaningful picture of the problem at hand. Generally, the research questions involved 
in this work were being informed and contextualized by the statement of the problem and 
the objectives of the study which were founded on the concepts of sustainability, 
accountability and governance. Hence, the interview questions were designed to explore the 
issue of sustainability and accountability and governance of the oil sector. There were five 
interview questions in total. Three of the questions (i.e., NCDMB’s financial accountability, 
assessment of first consideration rules, and effectiveness of local content programmes) were 
exactly covered by the questionnaire, while the other two questions (i.e., local content as 
sustainability and the accountability aspects of local content) were stand-alone and 
developed based on the researcher’s efforts to test a sustainability and a stakeholder-
accountability theories proposed. Hence, the five interview questions were partly exploratory 
and partly confirmatory as they were guided by theories. After the questions were prepared 
they passed through a pilot test as explained in the work. The administration of the 
interview ran as below.  
Conducting the Interview  
The following is a description of the process of how the interview was conducted.  
Before interview commences: 
• Informal conversation to familiarise with each other and build trust 
• Restating the purpose of the interview 
• Seeking for consent to record and use the data 
• Assurance of confidentiality 
During interview: 
• Introduction by the interviewer  
• Brief description of the area of research 
• Introduction by the interviewee 
 (questions followed) 
Questions: 
1. While some scholars view local content as a sustainability policy which contributes to the 
social, economic and environmental development, others view the policy as causing 
distortion and corruption. In your opinion can local content be classified as a sustainable 
development policy, and how?  
2. What can you say about the level of accountability expected from government and the 
stakeholders in local content implementation? 
3. NCDMB was created by the law to manage the implementation of the local content 
policy, what can you say about the NCDMB’s disclosure of financial and non-financial 
performance to stakeholders?  
4. In your opinion are the Nigerian oil and gas firms actually enjoying the ‘first 
consideration rule’ in the award of oil and gas contracts, license, employment and 
training as required by the law? If yes, how? 
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5. How can you assess the effectiveness of the NCDMB’s programmes: Offshore Rig 
Acquisition Strategy, Marine Vessel Ownership Strategy, and Equipment Component 
Manufacturing Initiative? 
*in some instances, after the completion of the interviews, the researcher asked some 
interviewees to direct him to other available participants, in another words, snowballing. 
Below is the list of the participants interviewed and their details. 
Interview Participants  
Stakeholder Groups Codes Organization Position 
Government IPG01 NCDMB Manager 
IPG02 NCDMB Manager 
IPG03 DPR Manager 
International Oil 
Companies 
IPI01 Shell General Manager 
IPI02 ExxonMobil General Manager 
Local Oil Companies IPL01 GC Energy CEO 
IPL02 PETAN Business Development 
Manager  
IPL03 PETAN Manager 
Trade Unions IPT01 PENGASSAN Director of Research  
IPT02 PENGASSAN Manager  
IPT03 PENGASSAN Manager  
Civil Society IPC01 Natural Resource 
Governance Institute 
(NRGI) 
Nigeria Officer 
IPC03 CISLAC Executive Director  
IPC02 Borderless Local 
Content Advocacy 
Founding partner 
Source: Field study 
Note: IP=Interview Participants; G=Government; I=IOC; L=Local company; T=Trade union; 
C=Civil society 
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire 
Section One  
Information on the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB)’s 
Performance Accountability (and Transparency)  
 
This section deals with the NCDMB’s performance accountability generally. Specifically, 
the section is interesting in finding out how transparent and accountable you think the 
Board has been in carrying out its legal duties in relation to the implementation of the 
sustainable development policy of local content. With this in mind, please provide a score 
(between 1 and 5) to indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements 
which deal with different aspects of the administration of the Nigerian Content 
Development Act.   
1=Strongly agree; 2=Agree; 3=Neither agree nor disagree; 4=Disagree; 5=Strongly disagree 
 Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
1.1  NCDMB has clearly communicated the objectives it wants to 
achieve for the Nigerian oil and gas industry through the 
implementation of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
     
1.2   NCDMB has clearly defined the criteria/ metrics by which local 
content can be measured 
     
1.3   NCDMB has sufficient capacity (in terms of qualified staff) to 
fully implement the provisions of the Nigerian Content 
Development Act 
     
1.4   NCDMB has sufficient funding to fully implement the 
provisions of the Nigerian Content Development Act 
     
1.5   NCDMB has sufficient power in ‘practice’ to enforce 
compliance with all the provisions of the Nigerian Content Act 
on all oil and gas companies 
      
1.6   NCDMB ensures that each stakeholder group in the oil and gas 
industry (regulators, companies, etc) effectively discharges its 
roles and responsibilities in the implementation of local content  
     
1.7   NCDMB provides timely information about new local content 
policies and regulations to the key stakeholders involved in the 
industry  
     
1.8   NCDMB provides relevant information about new areas and 
opportunities for indigenous participation in oil and gas activities 
     
1.9   Whenever NCDMB fails to disclose certain important 
information to stakeholders, it provides reasons for the non-
disclosure 
     
1.10   NCDMB engages all the key stakeholders in major decisions 
concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Nigerian 
Content Development Act  
     
1.11   NCDMB accepts advice from the key industry stakeholders if 
considered appropriate for the achievement of Nigerian content 
objectives 
     
1.12   NCDMB maintains an effective system of internal auditing 
which ensures stewardship of financial and non-financial 
resources 
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1.13   NCDMB regularly conducts facility audit to assess the capacity 
of companies to execute oil and gas contracts in the industry 
     
1.14   NCDMB conducts social audit to assess the impacts of its 
policies on the lives of the general public (in terms of job 
creation, etc) 
     
1.15   NCDMB reports its financial performance to all the key  
stakeholders in the oil and gas industry 
     
1.16   NCDMB reports its non-financial performance (process, 
achievements, etc) to all the key  stakeholders in the oil and gas 
industry 
     
1.17   NCDMB periodically (monthly, quarterly, yearly) conducts 
performance monitoring and evaluation exercises to assess the 
extent of compliance with local content requirements by the oil 
and gas companies 
     
1.18   NCDMB operates in the best interest of the government to 
achieve the required level of local participation in the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry 
     
1.19   NCDMB considers the best interests of Nigerian oil and gas 
companies in the process of implementing the provisions of the 
Nigerian Content Development Act  
     
1.20   NCDMB always responds to stakeholders’ demands to give 
account on actions undertaken to ensure effective 
implementation of the provisions of the Nigerian Content 
Development Act 
     
1.21   NCDMB complies with all existing laws and due process in   
discharging its responsibilities with regards to the 
implementation of the provisions of the Nigerian Content 
Development Act 
     
1.22   NCDMB maintains effective complaint and response 
mechanisms to address matters raised by the key stakeholders 
with respect to local  content implementation issues 
     
1.23  NCDMB maintains an effective ‘whistle-blowing’ system to 
consider complaints from the general public 
     
1.24   NCDMB provides justification for all material (major) decisions 
it   embarks on in relation to the implementation of the Nigerian 
Content Development Act 
     
1.25   NCDMB can effectively impose sanction on any company that 
violates the provisions of the Act 
     
1.26   Effectiveness of the overall governance of local content Scale 1-7 
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Section Two  
Information relating to the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board’s ability to 
report financial positions to stakeholders 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree that the NCDMB has been successful in 
managing and reporting of its financial positions in relation to the Nigerian Content 
Development Fund (NCDF) 
1= Strongly agree; 2= Agree; 3= Neither agree nor disagree; 4= Disagree; 5= Strongly 
disagree  
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
2.1 NCDMB ensures that all oil and gas operators/contractors 
remit the mandatory 1% of the contract sum to the Nigerian 
Content Development Fund (NCDF) 
     
2.2  NCDMB reports the financial position (income and 
expenditure) of the Nigerian Content Development Fund to 
all the key stakeholders in the oil and gas industry  
     
2.3 NCDMB consults with key stakeholders before spending any 
money from the Nigerian Content Development Fund 
(NCDF) 
      
2.4 The Nigerian Content Development Fund (NCDF) is achieving 
its purpose of providing easy access to finance for 
indigenous oil companies to execute oil and gas projects  
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Section Three 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the Nigerian Content Development and 
Monitoring Board’s (NCDMB)’s efforts in implementing and enforcing compliance with the 
provision for the first consideration for Nigerian companies in the award of oil contracts, 
employment, procurement and technology transfer 
  
1= Strongly agree; 2= Agree; 3= Neither agree nor disagree; 4= Disagree; 5= Strongly 
disagree  
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 NCDMB ensures that Nigerian indigenous oil and gas 
companies are always given priority in the awarding of 
contracts that are within their capacity 
     
3.2 NCDMB ensures that Nigerian indigenous oil and gas 
companies are not excluded from the award of oil and gas 
contracts only on the ‘lowest bidder’ basis as stated by the law   
     
3.3 NCDMB ensures that the minimum Nigerian content set by the 
law is always achieved before oil and gas contracts are 
awarded to any company 
     
3.4 NCDMB ensures that the indigenous oil and gas companies win 
more contracts after the enactment of the Nigerian Content 
legislation  
     
3.5 NCDMB ensures that all materials used in oil and gas 
operations  which are available in Nigeria are sourced locally 
and not imported 
     
3.6 NCDMB ensures that  International Oil and Gas Companies give 
priority consideration for the Nigerian banks for services that 
are within their capacity 
     
3.7 NCDMB ensures that  International Oil and Gas Companies give 
priority consideration for the Nigerian insurance companies for 
services that are within their capacity 
     
3.8 NCDMB ensures that  International Oil and Gas Companies give 
priority consideration for the Nigerian legal firms for services 
that are within their capacity 
     
3.9 NCDMB ensures that  International Oil and Gas Companies give 
employment priority to Nigerian labour for services that are 
within their expertise 
     
3.10  NCDMB is making all necessary efforts to ensure that 
International Oil and Gas companies set up offices and facilities 
in the communities they operate as required by the law 
     
3.11 NCDMB ensures that all information on employment  and 
training programmes are made public 
     
3.12  NCDMB ensures that only Nigerians are employed by the 
International Oil Companies in junior and intermediate cadre 
as required by the law 
     
3.13 NCDMB effectively involve the oil industry Trade Unions 
(NUPENG and PENGASSEN) in important training and 
employment decisions 
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3.14 NCDMB effectively collaborates with International Oil and 
Gas Companies to facilitate technology transfer 
programmes to Nigerian workforce 
     
 
 
Section Four 
Information in relation to the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board’s 
(NCDMB’s) and the International Oil and Gas Companies’ (IOCs) ability to enforce and 
comply with the mandatory local content Reporting and Disclosure Provisions  
 
As a precondition for the award of contracts, oil service companies are required to 
submit certain documents disclosing some vital information to NCDMB in 
compliance with the new reporting requirements. The information to be disclosed 
includes the following: 
 
 
Documents 
a.    Quarterly contracting plan for contracts which value exceeds $1m as set 
by the law 
b.     Invitations to tender for all contracts which value exceeds $1m as set by      
the law 
c.      Quarterly Procurement Report  
d.      Employment and Training Plan 
e.      Technology Transfer Plan 
f.      Annual Nigerian Content Performance Report 
g.     Half yearly Financial Services Plans  
h.     Half yearly Legal Services Plans 
i.      Insurance Programmes 
 
4.1  Do you agree that all oil and gas service companies submit the above listed 
documents to  NCDMB before they are awarded any  oil and gas contracts? 
1=Strongly agree; 2=Agree; 3= Neither agree nor Disagree; 4=Disagree; 5=Strongly 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Section five  
Information in relation to the awareness and effectiveness of the Nigerian Content 
Development & Monitoring Board’s (NCDMB’s) programmes initiated to ensure effective 
implementation of local content in the oil and gas sector 
  
Statements indicating stakeholders’ awareness of NCDMB local content programmes 
Yes = I am aware of the programme;  No = I am not aware of the programme 
NCDMB’s Nigerian Content Programmes Yes No 
5.1    Marine Vessel Ownership Strategy (MAVOS)   
5.2    Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy (ORAS)   
5.3    Equipment Components Manufacturing Initiative (ECMI)   
 
Statements that indicate the level of effectiveness of NCDMB’s programmes 
1 = Very effective; 2 = Effective; 3 = Neither effective nor ineffective; 4 =Ineffective; 5 = 
Very Ineffective 
NCDMB’s Nigerian Content Programmes 1 2 3 4 5 
5.6 Marine Vessel Ownership Strategy (MAVOS)      
5.7   Offshore Rig Acquisition Strategy (ORAS)      
5.8 Equipment Components Manufacturing Initiative   
(ECMI) 
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Section Six  
Personal Information 
1. Please indicate your qualification (s). You can select more than one qualification 
 
(a) Below first degree (    )     (b) First degree (    )               (c) Masters (    ) 
(d)   PhD (    )                              (e) Other, specify................................... 
2. Please indicate your years of service 
(a) 1-5 years (    )      (b) 6-10 years (    )      (c) 11-15 years (    )      (d) 16-
above years (    )  
 
3. Please indicate your gender    
(a) Male (    )  (b) Female (    ) 
 
4. Please indicate your age 
(a) 20-29 (      )  (b) 30-39 (      )       (c) 40-49 (      )        (d) 50 – above (      )  
 
 
5. Please indicate your organization 
 Organization Tick 
a Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB)  
b National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS)  
c Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI)  
d Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)  
e Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)  
f Indigenous oil and gas companies  
h International Oil Companies (IOCs)    
i International oilfield services company  
j Oil and gas Trade Unions  
k Civil Society groups  
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING 
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Appendix 6a: Introductory Letter 
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Appendix 6b: Study Population 
 
Regulatory Agencies 
S/n Organizations Population 
1 Nigerian Content Development & Monitoring Board 
(NCDMB) 
63 
2 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 24 
3 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 31 
4 National Petroleum Investment Management Services 
(NAPIMS) 
18 
5 Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI) 
17 
 Total 153 
 
Civil Society Groups 
S/n Organizations Population 
1 Natural Resources Governance Institute (NRGI)  13 
2 Borderless Local Content Advocacy Group 11 
3 Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) 14 
 Total 38 
 
Trade Unions 
S/n Organizations Population 
1 PENGASSAN 43 
2 NUPENG 29 
 Total 72 
 
International Oil Companies 
S/n Organizations Population 
1 Shell 15 
2 Chevron 14 
3 ExxonMobil 18 
4 Total 16 
5 Eni-Agip 13 
 Total 76 
 
 
 
 
 
370 
Local Oil Companies: List of PETAN members68 
SN Name of Companies SN Name of Companies 
1 Aftrac Group 29 Laser Engineering & Resources 
Consultants Limited 
2 Ana Industries Limited 30 Lonestar Drilling Nigeria Limited 
3 Ansett Integrated Services 
Limited 
31 Mansfield Energy 
4 Ariboil Company Limited 32 Matrix Petro-Chem Limited 
5 Atlantic Fluids & Integrated 
Services Limited 
33 Nestoil Group 
6 Baywood Continental Limited 34 Northern Oilfield Supplies and 
Services Limited 
7 B.G.Technical Limited 35 Oco Industrial Services Limited 
8 Dover Engineering Ltd 36 Oildata Wireline Services Limited 
9 Chesroc Nigeria Limited 37 Oilserv Limited 
10 Ciscon Nigeria Limited 38 Oiltest Group 
11 Dormanlong Engineering Limited 39 Orbital & Oranges Nigeria Limited 
12 Drillog Petro-Dynamics Limited 40 Petrolog Limited 
13 Elshcon Nigeria Limited 41 Point Engineering Limitefd 
14 Emval Group 42 Poseidon Energy Services Nigeria 
Limited 
15 Epic Atlantic 43 Popham Walter Odusote 
16 Future Concerns Nigeria Ltd 44 Radial Circle Group 
17 Gilbles Nigeria Limited 45 Richardson Oil and Gas 
18 Gil Automations 46 Segofs Energy Services Limited 
19 G.G.I International Ltd 47 Sego Wireline Services 
20 Geoplex Drillteq Limited 48 Sowsco Well Services Nigeria 
Limited 
21 Gramen Petroserve 49 Speciality Drilling Fluids Limited 
22 Halden Nigeria Limited 50 Tecon Oil Services Limited 
23 Harrybeat International Services 
Limited 
51 Tilone Subsea Limited 
24 Hobark International Limited 52 Weafri Well Services Company 
Limited 
25 Hyprops Nigeria Limited 53  
26 International Energy Services 
Limited 
54 Topline Limited 
27 Wog Allied Services Nigeria 
Limited 
55 Tolmann Allied Services Company 
28 Zitadel Limited 56 Vandrezzer Energy Services 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 The average number of possible respondents in the local content units of the local oil companies ranges between 
8-10.  
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Sample for the Study  
Respondent Groups Study sample (participants) 
Government 110 
Local Oil Companies 100 
Int’l Oil Companies 55 
Trade Unions 60 
Civil Society 35 
Total 360 
 
**For the local companies only those clustered around Lagos were selected for 
easy access.  
 
Interview Participants 
Stakeholder Groups Codes Organization Position 
Government IPG01 NCDMB Manager 
IPG02 NCDMB Manager 
IPG03 DPR Manager 
International Oil 
Companies 
IPI01 Shell General Manager  
IPI02 ExxonMobil General Manager  
Local Oil Companies IPL01 GC Energy CEO 
IPL02 PETAN Business Development 
Manager  
IPL03 PETAN Manager 
Trade Unions IPT01 PENGASSAN Director of Research  
IPT02 PENGASSAN Manager  
IPT03 PENGASSAN Manager  
Civil Society IPC01 Natural Resource 
Governance Institute 
(NRGI) 
Nigeria Officer 
IPC03 CISLAC Executive Director  
IPC02 Borderless Local 
Content Advocacy 
Founding partner 
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Appendix 7: Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney and Cross-tabulation tests for 
NCDMB’s accountability performance 
 
Table 1a: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB has clearly communicated the objectives/targets 
it wants to achieve 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU CS 
GV Chi-
Sq=13.68 
Sig. = .008 
- - - - .000 
LOC - - - - .004 
IOCs - - - - .004 
TU - - - - .001 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 1b: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB has clearly communicated the 
objectives/targets it wants to achieve  
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count( %) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 32 (33) 29 (29.9) 16 (16.5) 17 (17.5) 3 (3.1) 97 (100) 
A 36 (34) 29 (27.4) 14 (13.2) 18 (17) 9 (8.5) 106 (100) 
N 9 (19.2) 11 (23.4) 10 (21.3) 11 (23.4) 6 (12.8) 47 (100) 
D 5 (45.5) 2 (18.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (36.4) 11 (100) 
SD 3 (17.6) 8 (47.1) 2 (11.8) 0 (0.0) 4 (23. 17 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 2a: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB has clearly defined the criteria/metrics by which 
local content can be measured 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H Test 
Mann-Whitney Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-sq=13.69 
Sig. = .008 
 - - - .043 
LOC   - - - 
IOCs    .010 - 
TU     .000 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
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Table 2b: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB has clearly defined the criteria/metrics by 
which local content can be measured 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 23 (38.3) 15 (25) 10 (16.7) 9 (15) 3 (5) 60 (100) 
A 31 (23.1) 40 (29.9) 15 (11.2) 37 (27.6) 11 (8.2) 134 (100) 
N 23 (44.2) 13 (25) 12 (23.1) 0 (0.0) 4 (7.7) 52 (100) 
D 8 (38.1) 7 (33.3) 2 (9.5) 0 (0.0) 4 (19) 21 (100) 
SD 0 (0.0) 4 (36.4) 3 (27.3) 0 (0.0) 4 (36.4) 11 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
 Table 3a: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB has sufficient power in ‘practice’ to enforce 
compliance 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV p-value = 
.026 
 - - - .006 
LOC   - - .002 
IOCs    - .029 
TU     .023 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 3b: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB has sufficient power in ‘practice’ to enforce 
compliance 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 28 (36.8) 23 (30.3) 13 (17.1) 8 (10.5) 4 (5.3) 76 (100) 
A 31 (29.0) 36 (33.6) 11 (10.3) 23 (21.5) 6 (5.6) 107 (100) 
N 11 (20.8) 12 (22.6) 13 (24.5) 10 (18.9) 7 (13.2) 53 (100) 
D 15 (39.5) 7 (18.4) 5 (13.2) 5 (13.2) 6 (15.8) 38 (100) 
SD 0 (0.0) 1 (25) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (75) 4 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
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Table 4a KW-MW Tests: NCDMB ensures that each stakeholder group in the oil and 
gas industry (regulators, companies, etc) effectively discharges its roles & 
responsibilities 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-sq=9.59 
Sig. = .048 
- - - .018 - 
LOC - - - - - 
IOCs - - - .003 - 
TU - - - - .021 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table: 4b: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB ensures that each stakeholder group in the oil 
and gas industry (regulators, companies, etc) effectively discharges its roles & 
responsibilities 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 8 (44.4) 5 (27.8) 3 (16.7) 2 (11.1) 0 (0.0) 18 (100) 
A 18 (26.1) 22 (31.9) 7 (10.1) 16 (23.2) 6 (8.7) 69 (100) 
N 35 (26.7) 35 (26.7) 18 (13.7) 28 (21.4) 15 (11.5) 131 (100) 
D 23 (39.7) 16 (27.6) 14 (24.1) 0 (0.0) 5 (98.6) 58 (100) 
SD 1 (50) 1 (50) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.40 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 5a: KW-MW Tests: Whenever NCDMB fails to disclose certain important 
information to stakeholders, it provides reasons for the non-disclosure 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq.=16.15 
Sig. = .003 
 - - - .005 
LOC   - .006 - 
IOCs    - .009 
TU     .002 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
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Table: 5b: Cross-tabulation: Whenever NCDMB fails to disclose certain important 
information to stakeholders, it provides reasons for the non-disclosure 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 10 (50) 2 (10) 4 (20) 2 (10) 2 (10) 20 (100) 
A 22 (26.5) 21 (25.3) 11 (13.3) 25 (30.1) 4 (4.8) 83 (100) 
N 40 (33.6) 37 (31.1) 23 (19.3) 11 (9.2) 8 (6.7) 119 (100) 
D 13 (28.9) 15 (33.3) 3 (6.7) 8 (17.8) 6 (13.3) 45 (100) 
SD 0 (0.0) 4 (36.4) 1 (9.1) 0 (0.0) 6 (54.5) 11 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 6a: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB always responds to stakeholders’ demands to give 
account on actions undertaken 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU CS 
GV Chi-
sq=18.21 
Sig.=.001 
 - - .022 .016 
LOC   - .000 - 
IOCs    - - 
TU     .000 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table: 6b:   Cross-tabulation: NCDMB always responds to stakeholders’ demands to 
give account on actions undertaken 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 14 (37.8) 7 (18.9) 8 (21.6) 7 (18.9) 1 (2.7) 37 (100) 
A 28 (25.7) 28 (25.7) 15 (13.8) 28 (25.7) 10 (9.2) 69 (100) 
N 35 (40.7) 26 (30.2) 11 (12.8) 10 (11.6) 4 (4.7) 131 (100) 
D 7 (22.6) 14 (45.2) 4 (12.9) 1 (3.2) 5 (16.1) 58 (100) 
SD 1 (6.7) 4 (26.7) 4 (26.7) 0 (0.0) 6 (40) 2 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
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Table 7a: KW-MW tests: NCDMB can effectively impose sanction on any company 
that violates the provisions of the Act 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=21.48 
 
.000 
 - - .000 .002 
LOC   - .008 .028 
IOCs    .044 - 
TU - - - - - 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 7b: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB can effectively impose sanction on any 
company that violates the provisions of the Act 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 21 (61.8) 6 (17.6) 2 (5.9) 4 (11.8) 1 (2.9) 18 (100) 
A 21 (25.9) 29 (35.8) 14 (17.3) 11 (13.6) 6 (7.4) 70 (100) 
N 32 (32.3) 31 (31.3) 19 (19.2) 8 (8.1) 9 (9.1) 126 (100) 
D 10 (27) 7 (18.9) 4 (10.8) 11 (29.7) 5 (13.5) 37 (100) 
SD 1 (3.7) 6 (22.2) 3 (11.1) 12 (44.4) 5 (18.5) 27 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
377 
Appendix 8: Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney Tests and Cross-tabulation of 
the NCDMB’s Financial Accountability 
 
Table 8a: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB ensures that all oil and gas 
operators/contractors remit the mandatory 1% of the contract sum to the Nigerian 
Content Development Fund (NCDF) 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=14.79 
Sig.=.005 
 .046 .030 .006 .001* 
LOC   - - - 
IOCs    - - 
TU     - 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 8b: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB ensures that all oil and gas 
operators/contractors remit the mandatory 1% of the contract sum to the Nigerian 
Content Development Fund (NCDF) 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 36 (46.2) 23 (29.5) 10 (12.8) 5 (6.4) 4 (5.1) 78 (100) 
A 31 (26.7) 31 (26.7) 17 (14.7) 28 (24.1) 9 (7.8) 116 (100) 
N 13 (21) 16 (25.8) 12 (19.4) 13 (21) 8 (12.9) 62 (100) 
D 4 (23.5) 7 (41.2) 3 (17.6) 0 (0.0) 3 (17.6) 17 (100) 
SD 1 (20) 2 (40) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (40) 5 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 9a: KW-MW Tests: the Nigerian Content Development Fund is achieving its 
purpose of providing easy access to finance for indigenous oil companies to 
execute oil and gas projects 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=12.025 
Sig.=.017 
 - .039 .001 - 
LOC   - - - 
IOCs    - - 
TU     - 
Source: Author from Field Survey 
Note: GV=government; LOC=local oil companies; IOC=international oil companies; 
TU=trade unions; CS=civil society 
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Table 9b: Cross-tabulation: the Nigerian Content Development Fund is achieving its 
purpose of providing easy access to finance for indigenous oil companies to 
execute oil and gas projects 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 12 (38.7) 9 (29) 5 (16.1) 0 (0.0) 5 (16.1) 31 (100) 
A 31 (43.1) 18 (25) 6 (8.3) 11 (15.3) 6 (8.3) 72 (100) 
N 26 (25.7) 32 (31.7) 20 (19.8) 20 (19.8) 3 (3) 101 (100) 
D 16 (27.1) 16 (27.1) 10 (16.9) 10 (16.9) 7 (11.9) 59 (100) 
SD 0 (0.0) 4 (26.7) 1 (6.7) 5 (33.3) 5 (33.3) 15 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
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Appendix 9: Kruskal-Wallis/Mann-Whitney Tests and Cross-tabulation of 
First Consideration for the Nigerian Firms 
Table 10a: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB ensures that Nigerian indigenous oil and 
gas companies are always given priority in the awarding of contracts that 
are within their capacity 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=12.79 
Sig.=.012 
 .036 - - .008 
LOC   - .032 - 
IOCs    - - 
TU     .007 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
  
In the above instance no cross-tabulation was computed because all the 
differences were above the alpha value of 0.005.  
Table 10b: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB ensures that Nigerian indigenous oil and 
gas companies are not excluded from the award of oil and gas contracts 
only on the ‘lowest bidder’ basis as stated by the law 
Stakeholders Kruskal--
+Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005)  
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=19.48 
.001 
 .002 .021 .000 .008 
LOC   - - - 
IOCs    - - 
TU     - 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 11a: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB ensures that Nigerian indigenous oil 
and gas companies are not excluded from the award of oil and gas 
contracts only on the ‘lowest bidder’ basis as stated by the law 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 25 (64.1) 10 (25.6) 2 (5.1) 1 (2.6) 1 (2.6) 39 (100) 
A 30 (29.1) 23 (22.3) 21 (20.4) 17 (16.5) 12 (11.7) 103 (100) 
N 21 (24.1) 33 (37.9) 12 (13.8) 16 (18.4) 5 (5.7) 87 (100) 
D 9 (19.1) 12 (25.5) 7 (14.9) 12 (25.5) 7 (14.9) 47 (100) 
SD 0 (0.0) 1 (50) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (50) 2 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
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GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 11b: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB ensures that all materials used in oil and 
gas operations  which are available in Nigeria are sourced locally and not 
imported 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=16.090 
Sig.=.003 
 - - - .001 
LOC   - - .000 
IOCs    - .006 
TU     .004 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 12a: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB ensures that all materials used in oil 
and gas operations  which are available in Nigeria are sourced locally and 
not imported 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 26 (36.1) 24 (33.3) 12 (16.7) 7 (9.7) 3 (4.2) 72 (100) 
A 34 (29.6) 35 (30.4) 14 (12.2) 26 (22.6) 6 (5.2) 115 (100) 
N 14 (26.4) 13 (24.5) 11 (20.8) 8 (15.1) 7 (13.2) 53 (100) 
D 10 (32.3) 6 (19.4) 5 (16.1) 4 (12.9) 6 (19.4) 31 (100) 
SD 1 (14.3) 1 (14.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (14.3) 4 (57.1) 7 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Soc 
 
Table 12b: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB ensures that International Oil and Gas 
Companies give priority consideration for the Nigerian banks for services 
that are within their capacity 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=11.83 
Sig.=.019 
 - - .001 .021 
LOC   - - - 
IOCs  .  - - 
TU     - 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade  
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
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Table 13a: Cross-tabulation: NCDMB ensures that International Oil and Gas 
Companies give priority consideration for the Nigerian banks for services 
that are within their capacity 
 
Responses 
Organizations  
Total 
Count (%) 
GV 
Count (%) 
LOC 
Count (%) 
IOC 
Count (%) 
TU 
Count (%) 
CS 
Count (%) 
SA 22(40) 16 (29.1) 12 (21.8) 2 (3.6) 3 (5.5) 55 (100) 
A 44 (34.4) 37 (28.9) 12 (9.4) 23 (18) 12 (9.4) 128 (100) 
N 16 (21.1) 18 (23.7) 15 (19.7) 20 (26.3) 7 (9.2) 76 (100) 
D 1 (6.7) 7 (46.7) 3 (20) 1 (6.7) 3 (20) 15 (100) 
SD 2 (50) 1 (25) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (25) 4 (100) 
Total 85 (30.6) 79 (28.4) 42 (15.1) 46 (16.5) 26 (9.4) 278 (100) 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
 
Table 13b: KW-MW Tests: NCDMB ensures that International Oil and Gas 
Companies give employment priority to Nigerian labour for services that 
are within their expertise 
Stakeholders Kruskal-
Wallis H 
Test 
Mann-Whitney U Test (Bonferroni corrected alpha = .005) 
GV LOCs IOCs TU Cs 
GV Chi-
sq=9.91 
Sig.=.042 
 .015 - .022 .031 
LOC   - - - 
IOCs    - - 
TU     - 
Source: Author from field survey 
GV=Government; LOC=Local Oil Companies; IOCs=International Oil Companies; TU=Trade 
Unions; CS=Civil Society 
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Appendix 10: Sample Local Content Reporting Template 
Source: International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) (2011) 
 
 
 
 
% of Total Committed value 
Contract 
no. 
Single 
source/ 
bidding 
Contract 
description 
Contractor/ 
supplier 
name 
Start 
date 
Finish 
date 
Historical 
value of 
contract 
($’000) 
Approved 
amendments 
if any ($’000) 
Total 
committed 
value: 
contract 
value + 
amendments 
($’000) 
Expenditure 
to date: 
Value of 
work done 
($’000) 
Int’l 
% 
National/local  
% 
Total 
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Appendix 11a: Normality Distribution Curve, Q-Q Plot and Box Plot for 
loglocsus_before Data 
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Appendix 11b: Normality Distribution Curve, Q-Q Plot and Box Plot for 
loglocsus_after Data 
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Appendix 12: Categorization Matrix for the Marine Vessel Vendors 
 
